CVE-2026-108065: Unauthenticated SQL Injection in Channel Software WebAlliance eCommerce — Detection and Remediation Guide

---
title: SQL Server Process Spawning Command Shell or Reconnaissance Tool
id: 3f8a1c92-6d4e-4b7a-9e21-8c5d2f7a0143
status: experimental
description: Detects cmd.exe, PowerShell, or common admin/recon binaries spawned by sqlservr.exe, consistent with xp_cmdshell abuse following SQL injection exploitation such as CVE-2026-108065. Database engines should almost never spawn child processes in normal operation.
references:
  - https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/ve-unauthenticated-sql-injection-in-channel-software-weballiance-ecommerce
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190/
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
author: Security Arsenal
date: 2026/04/06
tags:
  - attack.initial_access
  - attack.t1190
  - attack.execution
  - attack.t1059
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_parent:
    ParentImage|endswith: '\sqlservr.exe'
  selection_child:
    Image|endswith:
      - '\cmd.exe'
      - '\powershell.exe'
      - '\pwsh.exe'
      - '\net.exe'
      - '\net1.exe'
      - '\whoami.exe'
      - '\ipconfig.exe'
      - '\wmic.exe'
      - '\rundll32.exe'
      - '\regsvr32.exe'
      - '\certutil.exe'
      - '\bitsadmin.exe'
      - '\curl.exe'
  condition: selection_parent and selection_child
falsepositives:
  - Database maintenance jobs or ETL tools that legitimately shell out from SQL Server (rare; inventory and allowlist explicitly)
  - Monitoring agents invoked via SQL Agent job steps
level: critical
---
title: IIS Worker Process Spawning Command Shell
id: 91e7b244-3a5c-4f68-bd12-6a9e0c835217
status: experimental
description: Detects command shells or scripting engines spawned by the IIS worker process (w3wp.exe), which may indicate post-exploitation activity against a vulnerable web application such as WebAlliance eCommerce (CVE-2026-108065), including injected command execution or webshell deployment.
references:
  - https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/ve-unauthenticated-sql-injection-in-channel-software-weballiance-ecommerce
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190/
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505.003/
author: Security Arsenal
date: 2026/04/06
tags:
  - attack.initial_access
  - attack.t1190
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.t1505.003
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_parent:
    ParentImage|endswith: '\w3wp.exe'
  selection_child:
    Image|endswith:
      - '\cmd.exe'
      - '\powershell.exe'
      - '\pwsh.exe'
      - '\cscript.exe'
      - '\wscript.exe'
      - '\mshta.exe'
      - '\rundll32.exe'
      - '\certutil.exe'
      - '\bitsadmin.exe'
  condition: selection_parent and selection_child
falsepositives:
  - Legacy applications that shell out for report generation or print rendering — validate against the specific AppPool identity and application name, then allowlist narrowly
level: high
---
title: SQL Injection Patterns in Web Request Query Strings
id: c52d8f10-77b1-4e39-a904-2d6b1e48f9ac
status: experimental
description: Detects common SQL injection keywords and metacharacter sequences in web server request URIs, consistent with exploitation attempts against unauthenticated endpoints such as those affected by CVE-2026-108065 in WebAlliance eCommerce. Tune against application-specific legitimate query parameters before production deployment.
references:
  - https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/ve-unauthenticated-sql-injection-in-channel-software-weballiance-ecommerce
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190/
author: Security Arsenal
date: 2026/04/06
tags:
  - attack.initial_access
  - attack.t1190
logsource:
  category: webserver
detection:
  selection_keywords:
    cs-uri-query|contains:
      - 'union select'
      - 'union all select'
      - 'information_schema'
      - 'xp_cmdshell'
      - 'waitfor delay'
      - 'pg_sleep'
      - 'benchmark('
      - 'char('%27')'
      - '%27%20or%20'
      - '%27%20and%20'
      - 'convert(int'
      - 'db_name('
      - 'user_name('
      - '@@version'
  condition: selection_keywords
falsepositives:
  - Vulnerability scanners and authorized penetration tests — correlate with known scanner source IPs
  - Security research or QA tooling
level: high

// Hunt for SQL injection attempts against WebAlliance / IIS-hosted e-commerce endpoints
// Source: IIS logs ingested into Sentinel (W3CIISLog) or WAF/NGFW logs via CommonSecurityLog
let sqli_patterns = dynamic(["union select", "union all select", "information_schema", "xp_cmdshell", "waitfor delay", "@@version", "convert(int", "db_name(", "user_name(", "%27%20or%20", "%27%20and%20"]);
union isfuzzy=true
    (W3CIISLog
    | where TimeGenerated > ago(14d)
    | extend QueryLower = tolower(tostring(csUriQuery))
    | where QueryLower has_any (sqli_patterns)
    | extend DecodedQuery = url_decode(csUriQuery)
    | summarize Attempts = count(), DistinctURIs = dcount(csUriStem), TargetURIs = make_set(csUriStem, 10) by cIP, Computer, bin(TimeGenerated, 1h)
    | where Attempts >= 3
    | sort by Attempts desc),
    (CommonSecurityLog
    | where TimeGenerated > ago(14d)
    | where DeviceVendor =~ "Microsoft" or DeviceProduct has_any ("WAF", "Firewall", "IIS")
    | extend ReqLower = tolower(tostring(RequestURL))
    | where ReqLower has_any (sqli_patterns)
    | summarize Attempts = count() by SourceIP, DestinationHostName, DeviceAction, bin(TimeGenerated, 1h)
    | sort by Attempts desc)

-- Hunt for command shells or tooling spawned by database or web server processes
-- Relevant to post-exploitation of CVE-2026-108065 (xp_cmdshell or web-tier command execution)
LET parents = SELECT Pid, Name AS ParentName
FROM pslist()
WHERE Name =~ '(?i)sqlservr|w3wp'

SELECT Pid,
       Ppid,
       Name,
       CommandLine,
       Exe,
       Username,
       CreateTime,
       dict(Ppid=Ppid).ParentName AS SpawningProcess
FROM pslist()
WHERE Ppid IN (SELECT Pid FROM parents)
  AND Name =~ '(?i)cmd|powershell|pwsh|net\.exe|whoami|ipconfig|wmic|certutil|bitsadmin|mshta|rundll32'

#requires -RunAsAdministrator
# CVE-2026-108065 - WebAlliance eCommerce SQL Injection: Hardening & Verification Script
# Run on the SQL Server host backing WebAlliance. Review output before making changes in production.

$ReportPath = "$env:SystemDrive\CVE-2026-108065-Hardening-$(Get-Date -Format 'yyyyMMdd-HHmmss').log"
function Write-Finding { param([string]$Msg) $Msg | Tee-Object -FilePath $ReportPath -Append }

Write-Finding "=== CVE-2026-108065 SQL Server Hardening Check - $(Get-Date) ==="

# 1. Check xp_cmdshell status and disable it if enabled
# Adjust server/instance and credentials for your environment
$Instance = "localhost"
try {
    $xpStatus = Invoke-Sqlcmd -ServerInstance $Instance -Database master -TrustServerCertificate `
        -Query "SELECT name, value_in_use FROM sys.configurations WHERE name IN ('xp_cmdshell','Ole Automation Procedures','clr enabled')" -ErrorAction Stop
    Write-Finding "[INFO] Dangerous SQL Server feature status:"
    $xpStatus | ForEach-Object { Write-Finding "       $($_.name) = $($_.value_in_use)" }

    foreach ($feature in $xpStatus) {
        if ($feature.value_in_use -eq 1) {
            Write-Finding "[ACTION] Disabling $($feature.name)..."
            Invoke-Sqlcmd -ServerInstance $Instance -Database master -TrustServerCertificate `
                -Query "EXEC sp_configure '$($feature.name)', 0; RECONFIGURE;" -ErrorAction Stop
            Write-Finding "[OK] $($feature.name) disabled."
        }
    }
} catch {
    Write-Finding "[WARN] Could not query SQL Server: $($_.Exception.Message) - verify manually with sp_configure."
}

# 2. Identify the WebAlliance application's database login and flag excessive privileges
try {
    $sysadmins = Invoke-Sqlcmd -ServerInstance $Instance -Database master -TrustServerCertificate `
        -Query "SELECT p.name FROM sys.server_role_members rm JOIN sys.server_principals p ON rm.member_principal_id = p.principal_id JOIN sys.server_principals r ON rm.role_principal_id = r.principal_id WHERE r.name = 'sysadmin'" -ErrorAction Stop
    Write-Finding "[REVIEW] Logins holding sysadmin (application login must NOT appear here):"
    $sysadmins | ForEach-Object { Write-Finding "       $($_.name)" }
} catch {
    Write-Finding "[WARN] Could not enumerate sysadmin role members."
}

# 3. Check for suspicious child processes of sqlservr.exe and w3wp.exe (live triage)
$suspiciousParents = Get-CimInstance Win32_Process | Where-Object { $_.Name -in @('sqlservr.exe','w3wp.exe') }
foreach ($proc in $suspiciousParents) {
    $children = Get-CimInstance Win32_Process | Where-Object { $_.ParentProcessId -eq $proc.ProcessId -and $_.Name -match 'cmd|powershell|pwsh|net\.exe|whoami|certutil|bitsadmin' }
    foreach ($child in $children) {
        Write-Finding "[ALERT] Suspicious child process: $($proc.Name) (PID $($proc.ProcessId)) spawned $($child.Name) (PID $($child.ProcessId)) :: $($child.CommandLine)"
    }
}

# 4. Sweep IIS logs from the last 14 days for SQLi indicators
$IISLogRoot = "$env:SystemDrive\inetpub\logs\LogFiles"
$Patterns = 'union select','union all select','information_schema','xp_cmdshell','waitfor delay','%27%20or%20','@@version'
if (Test-Path $IISLogRoot) {
    $hits = Get-ChildItem $IISLogRoot -Recurse -Filter *.log | Where-Object { $_.LastWriteTime -gt (Get-Date).AddDays(-14) } |
        Select-String -Pattern ($Patterns -join '|') -SimpleMatch:$false
    if ($hits) {
        Write-Finding "[ALERT] $($hits.Count) potential SQLi request(s) found in IIS logs:"
        $hits | Select-Object -First 50 | ForEach-Object { Write-Finding "       $($_.Path):$($_.LineNumber) :: $($_.Line.Trim())" }
    } else {
        Write-Finding "[OK] No obvious SQLi patterns found in the last 14 days of IIS logs."
    }
}

# 5. Verify outbound firewall stance for the database host (egress should be deny-by-default)
Write-Finding "[REVIEW] Confirm the database server has no direct internet egress. Outbound rules:"
Get-NetFirewallRule -Direction Outbound -Action Allow -Enabled True |
    Where-Object { $_.Profile -match 'Any|Domain' } |
    Select-Object -First 20 DisplayName, Profile |
    ForEach-Object { Write-Finding "       $($_.DisplayName) [$($_.Profile)]" }

Write-Finding "=== Complete. Apply the Channel Software patch for CVE-2026-108065 before relying on compensating controls. Report: $ReportPath ==="