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CVE-2026-112136 & CVE-2026-112137: Siemens Mendix Studio Pro MCP Server Vulnerabilities — Detection and Remediation Guide

SA
Security Arsenal Team
November 17, 2026
15 min read

CISA published ICS Advisory ICSA-26-321-05 on November 18, 2025, disclosing two high-severity vulnerabilities in Siemens Mendix Studio Pro that carry a combined CVSS v3 score of 8.8. The flaws affect the Model Context Protocol (MCP) Server component — a local server introduced to support AI-assisted development workflows — and expose organizations to unauthorized data access, remote tool execution, and full workstation compromise.

Mendix Studio Pro is one of the most widely deployed low-code application development platforms in enterprise and industrial environments. Development workstations running this software frequently hold elevated privileges: source code access, API credentials, database connection strings, cloud service principal secrets, and direct paths into CI/CD pipelines. A compromised developer workstation is a compromised software supply chain. If your organization builds applications on Mendix — particularly in operational technology, critical infrastructure, or regulated industries — this advisory demands immediate action.

The vulnerabilities affect Mendix Studio Pro 11 versions 11.15.0 through (but not including) 11.16.0, and versions 11.12.6 through (but not including) 11.12.7. Siemens has released patched versions and recommends immediate updates.


Technical Analysis

Affected Products and Versions

ProductAffected VersionsCVEsFixed Version
Mendix Studio Pro 11>= 11.15.0, < 11.16.0CVE-2026-112136, CVE-2026-11213711.16.0
Mendix Studio Pro 11.12>= 11.12.6, < 11.12.7CVE-2026-112136, CVE-2026-11213711.12.7

Mendix Studio Pro is a Windows-based desktop IDE. The MCP Server component runs locally on the developer workstation, listening for connections from AI tools and plugins that integrate with the Mendix development environment.

Vulnerability Breakdown

CVE-2026-112136 — Binding to an Unrestricted IP Address (CWE-1327)

The MCP Server embedded in Mendix Studio Pro binds to all network interfaces (0.0.0.0) instead of restricting itself to the loopback interface (127.0.0.1). This is a classic exposed-service vulnerability. A local development server designed exclusively for localhost communication becomes reachable by any system on the network segment — or, if the workstation has a public-facing interface, potentially from the internet.

From an attacker's perspective, this means the MCP Server's API surface — which includes capabilities to query project data, execute development tools, and interact with the Mendix environment — is accessible without any local access to the target machine. On a flat corporate network, any compromised host or rogue device can directly interact with the MCP Server on a developer's workstation.

CVE-2026-112137 — Cross-Site Request Forgery via MCP Server

The second vulnerability enables an attacker to trick an authenticated user's browser into sending unauthorized requests to the local MCP Server. Because the MCP Server does not adequately validate the origin of incoming requests, a malicious webpage — delivered via phishing, watering hole, or compromised internal site — can instruct the victim's browser to issue requests to the MCP Server on the victim's own machine.

This attack vector is particularly dangerous because it bypasses network perimeter controls entirely. The malicious request originates from the victim's browser, targeting localhost or the local interface — traffic that never crosses a firewall boundary and that most network detection tools never see.

Attack Chain

A realistic exploitation scenario combines both vulnerabilities:

  1. Reconnaissance: Attacker identifies Mendix Studio Pro users via LinkedIn, job postings, or internal network scanning for the MCP Server's listening port.
  2. Initial Access: Via CVE-2026-112136, the attacker connects directly to the exposed MCP Server from another host on the network. Alternatively, via CVE-2026-112137, the attacker lures a Mendix developer to a malicious webpage that issues CSRF requests to the local MCP Server.
  3. Data Access: The attacker queries the MCP Server for project metadata, configuration files, connection strings, and environment variables — harvesting credentials and architectural intelligence.
  4. Tool Execution: The attacker invokes MCP Server tools to execute actions within the Mendix development environment, potentially modifying application logic, injecting malicious microflows, or altering access control rules in the application under development.
  5. Persistence and Escalation: With access to the developer's credentials and pipeline access tokens, the attacker pivots into the CI/CD pipeline, injecting backdoors into applications that get deployed to production — including OT/ICS environments.

Exploitation Status

As of this writing, there is no confirmed public proof-of-concept exploit and no confirmed active exploitation in the wild. These CVEs are not currently listed in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog. However, the CVSS 8.8 score, the network-accessible attack surface, and the fact that exploitation requires no authentication on the target MCP Server make this a high-priority patch. Low-code development platforms in industrial environments are increasingly targeted as supply-chain entry points — the window between disclosure and active exploitation for accessible, unauthenticated services continues to shrink.


Detection and Response

Sigma Rules

The following Sigma rules target observable behaviors associated with exploitation of these vulnerabilities. The MCP Server in Mendix Studio Pro runs as a child process of studiopro.exe (or Mendix Studio Pro.exe). Network connections to this process from non-localhost addresses, and the MCP Server spawning unexpected child processes, are the highest-fidelity detection opportunities.

YAML
---
title: Mendix Studio Pro MCP Server Network Connection from Remote Host
id: a1b2c3d4-e5f6-7890-abcd-ef1234567890
status: experimental
description: Detects inbound network connections to Mendix Studio Pro MCP Server process from non-loopback addresses, indicating potential exploitation of CVE-2026-112136 (unrestricted IP binding).
references:
  - https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-26-321-05
author: Security Arsenal
date: 2026/01/15
tags:
  - attack.initial_access
  - attack.t1190
logsource:
  category: network_connection
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_process:
    Image|contains:
      - 'studiopro'
      - 'Mendix'
      - 'mcp'
  filter_loopback:
    DestinationIp|startswith:
      - '127.'
      - '::1'
      - '[::1]'
  condition: selection_process and not filter_loopback
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate MCP client connections from AI development tools on other local interfaces
  - Docker or WSL2 networking that routes through non-loopback addresses
level: high
---
title: Mendix Studio Pro Process Spawning Command Shell or Script Interpreter
id: b2c3d4e5-f6a7-8901-bcde-f12345678901
status: experimental
description: Detects Mendix Studio Pro or its MCP Server component spawning command shells, PowerShell, or script interpreters — consistent with tool execution via CVE-2026-112136 or CVE-2026-112137.
references:
  - https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-26-321-05
author: Security Arsenal
date: 2026/01/15
tags:
  - attack.execution
  - attack.t1059
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_parent:
    ParentImage|contains:
      - 'studiopro'
      - 'Mendix'
      - 'mcp_server'
      - 'mcp-server'
  selection_child:
    Image|endswith:
      - '\cmd.exe'
      - '\powershell.exe'
      - '\pwsh.exe'
      - '\wscript.exe'
      - '\cscript.exe'
      - '\mshta.exe'
      - '\rundll32.exe'
      - '\regsvr32.exe'
      - '\certutil.exe'
      - '\bitsadmin.exe'
  condition: selection_parent and selection_child
falsepositives:
  - Mendix build processes invoking compilers or packaging tools
  - Legitimate plugin execution during development workflows
level: high
---
title: Browser Process Connecting to Mendix MCP Server Port
id: c3d4e5f6-a7b8-9012-cdef-123456789012
status: experimental
description: Detects web browser processes establishing connections to localhost on common MCP Server ports, potentially indicating CSRF-based exploitation via CVE-2026-112137.
references:
  - https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-26-321-05
author: Security Arsenal
date: 2026/01/15
tags:
  - attack.initial_access
  - attack.t1189
logsource:
  category: network_connection
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_browser:
    Image|endswith:
      - '\chrome.exe'
      - '\firefox.exe'
      - '\msedge.exe'
      - '\brave.exe'
      - '\opera.exe'
  selection_destination:
    DestinationIp|startswith:
      - '127.'
      - '::1'
      - '[::1]'
    DestinationPort:
      - 3000
      - 3001
      - 8080
      - 8081
      - 8090
      - 8443
      - 9080
      - 5000
      - 5001
  filter_common_dev:
    DestinationPort:
      - 4200
      - 4300
      - 5173
      - 9229
  condition: selection_browser and selection_destination and not filter_common_dev
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate browser-based development tools connecting to local dev servers
  - Browser extensions communicating with local services
  - Web IDEs and browser-based development environments
level: medium

KQL Hunt Query (Microsoft Sentinel / Defender)

The following KQL queries hunt for indicators of MCP Server exploitation across your environment. These queries assume you are ingesting Sysmon, Defender for Endpoint, or equivalent EDR telemetry into Sentinel.

KQL — Microsoft Sentinel / Defender
// Hunt 1: Detect remote network connections to Mendix Studio Pro processes
// Targets CVE-2026-112136 — MCP Server accessible from non-localhost addresses
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName has_any ("studiopro", "Mendix", "mcp_server", "mcp-server")
   or InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any ("mendix", "studiopro", "mcp")
| where not(RemoteIP startswith "127." or RemoteIP == "::1" or RemoteIP == "0.0.0.0")
| where ActionType == "InboundConnectionAllowed" or ActionType == "ConnectionSuccess"
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine,
          LocalIP, LocalPort, RemoteIP, RemotePort, ActionType
| order by TimeGenerated desc

// Hunt 2: Detect Mendix Studio Pro spawning suspicious child processes
// Targets tool execution via CVE-2026-112136 or CVE-2026-112137
DeviceProcessEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName has_any ("studiopro", "Mendix", "mcp_server", "mcp-server")
   or InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any ("mendix", "studiopro")
| where FileName in~ ("cmd.exe", "powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "wscript.exe",
                       "cscript.exe", "mshta.exe", "rundll32.exe", "regsvr32.exe",
                       "certutil.exe", "bitsadmin.exe", "curl.exe", "wget.exe")
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine,
          FileName, ProcessCommandLine, AccountName
| order by TimeGenerated desc

// Hunt 3: Detect browsers connecting to local MCP Server ports (CSRF indicator)
// Targets CVE-2026-112137 — browser-based CSRF attacks against local MCP Server
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("chrome.exe", "firefox.exe", "msedge.exe", "brave.exe", "opera.exe")
| where RemoteIP startswith "127." or RemoteIP == "::1"
| where RemotePort in (3000, 3001, 5000, 5001, 8000, 8080, 8081, 8443, 9080)
| where ActionType == "ConnectionSuccess"
| summarize ConnectionCount = count(), 
            FirstSeen = min(TimeGenerated), 
            LastSeen = max(TimeGenerated)
  by DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, RemotePort
| where ConnectionCount > 50
| order by ConnectionCount desc

Velociraptor VQL Hunt

The following VQL artifact hunts for Mendix Studio Pro installations with vulnerable MCP Server configurations and identifies active network listeners associated with the MCP Server process.

VQL — Velociraptor
-- Hunt for Mendix Studio Pro MCP Server network exposure
-- Identifies Mendix processes with non-loopback network listeners (CVE-2026-112136)

-- Step 1: Find all Mendix Studio Pro related processes and their network connections
SELECT Pid, Name, CommandLine, Exe, Username, CreateTime
FROM pslist()
WHERE Name =~ '(?i)(studiopro|mendix|mcp)'
   OR CommandLine =~ '(?i)(mendix|studiopro|mcp[_-]server)'

-- Step 2: Enumerate network connections for those processes
LET mendix_pids = SELECT Pid FROM pslist()
WHERE Name =~ '(?i)(studiopro|mendix|mcp)'
   OR CommandLine =~ '(?i)(mendix|studiopro|mcp[_-]server)'

SELECT Pid, Name, Status, 
       LocalAddress.IP as LocalIP, 
       LocalAddress.Port as LocalPort,
       RemoteAddress.IP as RemoteIP, 
       RemoteAddress.Port as RemotePort
FROM netstat()
WHERE Pid in (SELECT Pid FROM mendix_pids)
  AND Status =~ 'LISTEN'
  AND NOT LocalAddress.IP =~ '^(127\\.|::1|\\[::1\\])'

-- Step 3: Check installed Mendix Studio Pro version against vulnerable range
SELECT FullPath, 
       timestamp(epoch=Mtime) as ModifiedTime,
       Size
FROM glob(globs='C:/Program Files/Mendix/*/modeler/studiopro.exe')
UNION
SELECT FullPath,
       timestamp(epoch=Mtime) as ModifiedTime,
       Size
FROM glob(globs='C:/Program Files (x86)/Mendix/*/modeler/studiopro.exe')

Remediation Script

The following PowerShell script inventories Mendix Studio Pro installations, identifies vulnerable versions, and provides guidance for remediation. Run this across your environment via your preferred RMM, SCCM, or Intune.

PowerShell
# Mendix Studio Pro Vulnerability Assessment and Remediation Script
# CVE-2026-112136 / CVE-2026-112137 — ICSA-26-321-05
# Run as Administrator on developer workstations or deploy via RMM/Intune

$ErrorActionPreference = 'SilentlyContinue'
$report = @()

Write-Host "[+] Scanning for Mendix Studio Pro installations..." -ForegroundColor Cyan

# Common installation paths for Mendix Studio Pro
$searchPaths = @(
    "C:\Program Files\Mendix",
    "C:\Program Files (x86)\Mendix",
    "$env:LOCALAPPDATA\Mendix",
    "$env:APPDATA\Mendix"
)

$foundInstallations = @()

foreach ($basePath in $searchPaths) {
    if (Test-Path $basePath) {
        $exeFiles = Get-ChildItem -Path $basePath -Recurse -Filter "studiopro.exe" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
        foreach ($exe in $exeFiles) {
            $versionInfo = $exe.VersionInfo
            $foundInstallations += [PSCustomObject]@{
                Path        = $exe.FullName
                Version     = $versionInfo.ProductVersion
                FileVersion = $versionInfo.FileVersion
            }
        }
    }
}

# Also check registry for installed versions
$regPaths = @(
    "HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall\*",
    "HKLM:\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall\*",
    "HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall\*"
)

foreach ($regPath in $regPaths) {
    $apps = Get-ItemProperty $regPath -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | 
            Where-Object { $_.DisplayName -like "*Mendix*" }
    foreach ($app in $apps) {
        $foundInstallations += [PSCustomObject]@{
            Path        = $app.InstallLocation
            Version     = $app.DisplayVersion
            FileVersion = "Registry"
        }
    }
}

if ($foundInstallations.Count -eq 0) {
    Write-Host "[-] No Mendix Studio Pro installations found on this system." -ForegroundColor Green
    exit 0
}

Write-Host "[!] Found $($foundInstallations.Count) Mendix Studio Pro installation(s):" -ForegroundColor Yellow

$vulnerableFound = $false

foreach ($install in $foundInstallations) {
    Write-Host "    Path: $($install.Path)" -ForegroundColor White
    Write-Host "    Version: $($install.Version)" -ForegroundColor White

    # Parse version and check if vulnerable
    $version = $null
    if ($install.Version -match '^(\d+)\.(\d+)\.(\d+)') {
        $major = [int]$Matches[1]
        $minor = [int]$Matches[2]
        $patch = [int]$Matches[3]

        $isVulnerable = $false
        $fixedVersion = ""

        # Check 11.15.x branch: vulnerable if >= 11.15.0 and < 11.16.0
        if ($major -eq 11 -and $minor -eq 15) {
            $isVulnerable = $true
            $fixedVersion = "11.16.0"
        }
        # Check 11.12.x branch: vulnerable if >= 11.12.6 and < 11.12.7
        elseif ($major -eq 11 -and $minor -eq 12 -and $patch -eq 6) {
            $isVulnerable = $true
            $fixedVersion = "11.12.7"
        }

        if ($isVulnerable) {
            $vulnerableFound = $true
            Write-Host "    STATUS: *** VULNERABLE *** - Update to version $fixedVersion or later" -ForegroundColor Red
            Write-Host "    CVEs: CVE-2026-112136, CVE-2026-112137" -ForegroundColor Red
        } else {
            Write-Host "    STATUS: Not in known vulnerable range" -ForegroundColor Green
        }
    } else {
        Write-Host "    STATUS: Could not parse version - manual verification required" -ForegroundColor Yellow
    }
    Write-Host ""
}

# Check for MCP Server network listeners (potential exposure)
Write-Host "[+] Checking for MCP Server network listeners..." -ForegroundColor Cyan

$mendixProcesses = Get-Process | Where-Object { 
    $_.ProcessName -match '(?i)(studiopro|mendix|mcp)' 
}

if ($mendixProcesses) {
    foreach ($proc in $mendixProcesses) {
        Write-Host "    Running process: $($proc.ProcessName) (PID: $($proc.Id))" -ForegroundColor White

        $connections = Get-NetTCPConnection -OwningProcess $proc.Id -State Listen -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
        foreach ($conn in $connections) {
            $exposure = if ($conn.LocalAddress -eq "0.0.0.0" -or $conn.LocalAddress -eq "::") {
                "EXPOSED - Listening on ALL interfaces"
            } elseif ($conn.LocalAddress -match '^127\.' -or $conn.LocalAddress -eq '::1') {
                "Localhost only"
            } else {
                "Listening on $($conn.LocalAddress)"
            }

            $color = if ($exposure -match "EXPOSED") { "Red" } else { "Green" }
            Write-Host "      Listener: $($conn.LocalAddress):$($conn.LocalPort) - $exposure" -ForegroundColor $color
        }
    }
} else {
    Write-Host "    No Mendix Studio Pro processes currently running." -ForegroundColor Gray
}

Write-Host ""
Write-Host "======================================================" -ForegroundColor Cyan
Write-Host "REMEDIATION ACTIONS REQUIRED:" -ForegroundColor Cyan
Write-Host "1. Update Mendix Studio Pro 11.15.x to version 11.16.0 or later" -ForegroundColor White
Write-Host "2. Update Mendix Studio Pro 11.12.6 to version 11.12.7 or later" -ForegroundColor White
Write-Host "3. Download updates from: https://marketplace.mendix.com/link/studiopro" -ForegroundColor White
Write-Host "4. If immediate patching is not possible, apply Windows Firewall rules" -ForegroundColor White
Write-Host "   to block inbound connections to Mendix Studio Pro from non-localhost" -ForegroundColor White
Write-Host "======================================================" -ForegroundColor Cyan

# Optional: Apply temporary firewall mitigation if vulnerable
if ($vulnerableFound) {
    Write-Host ""
    $applyFirewall = Read-Host "Apply temporary firewall mitigation? Blocks inbound to MCP Server from non-localhost (Y/N)"
    if ($applyFirewall -eq 'Y' -or $applyFirewall -eq 'y') {
        Write-Host "[+] Applying temporary Windows Firewall mitigation..." -ForegroundColor Yellow

        # Block inbound connections to Mendix Studio Pro from non-localhost
        New-NetFirewallRule -DisplayName "Mendix MCP Server - Block Remote Inbound (CVE-2026-112136 Mitigation)" `
            -Direction Inbound `
            -Program "C:\Program Files\Mendix\*\modeler\studiopro.exe" `
            -RemoteAddress Any `
            -LocalAddress Any `
            -Action Block `
            -Profile Any `
            -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue

        # Allow localhost explicitly
        New-NetFirewallRule -DisplayName "Mendix MCP Server - Allow Localhost (CVE-2026-112136 Mitigation)" `
            -Direction Inbound `
            -Program "C:\Program Files\Mendix\*\modeler\studiopro.exe" `
            -RemoteAddress @("127.0.0.1", "::1") `
            -Action Allow `
            -Profile Any `
            -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue

        Write-Host "[+] Firewall rules applied. NOTE: Wildcard paths may require adjustment" -ForegroundColor Green
        Write-Host "    based on actual installation directory. Verify with: Get-NetFirewallRule -DisplayName '*Mendix*'" -ForegroundColor Yellow
        Write-Host "    REMOVE these rules after patching to avoid breaking legitimate MCP functionality." -ForegroundColor Yellow
    }
}

Write-Host ""
Write-Host "[+] Scan complete." -ForegroundColor Cyan

Remediation

Immediate Actions (Within 24 Hours)

  1. Patch Mendix Studio Pro to the fixed versions:

    • 11.15.x branch: Update to Mendix Studio Pro 11.16.0 or later
    • 11.12.x branch: Update to Mendix Studio Pro 11.12.7 or later
    • Download the latest versions from the Mendix Marketplace
  2. Inventory your Mendix Studio Pro deployments. Use the PowerShell script above or your software asset management tooling to identify every workstation running affected versions. In enterprise environments, developers may have installed Mendix Studio Pro outside of standard software deployment processes — check non-standard installation paths.

  3. Apply network-level mitigations if patching is delayed:

    • Use Windows Firewall or host-based firewall rules to restrict inbound connections to the Mendix Studio Pro process to localhost only
    • On network segments with developer workstations, apply micro-segmentation or VLAN ACLs to prevent direct workstation-to-workstation communication on MCP Server ports
    • If the MCP Server feature is not actively used, investigate whether it can be disabled in Mendix Studio Pro configuration settings

Short-Term Actions (Within 7 Days)

  1. Deploy the Sigma detection rules provided above to your SIEM or EDR platform. Tune the browser-to-localhost rule (Rule 3) against your baseline development tool traffic to reduce false positives.

  2. Run the KQL hunt queries against the last 30 days of telemetry to identify any historical exploitation attempts before patching.

  3. Review developer workstation network exposure. Confirm that developer workstations are not directly reachable from untrusted network segments. Enforce host-based firewall policies that deny inbound connections by default.

  4. Audit MCP Server usage. Determine which development teams are actively using AI-assisted development features that rely on the MCP Server. If the feature is unused, disabling it eliminates the attack surface entirely.

Long-Term Actions (Within 30 Days)

  1. Establish a low-code platform security policy. Low-code development platforms like Mendix are increasingly targeted as supply-chain entry points. Include these platforms in your vulnerability management program with defined SLA timelines for patching.

  2. Segment developer workstations. Development environments should be on isolated network segments with strict ingress/egress filtering. Developer machines should never be directly reachable from user VLANs, guest networks, or the internet.

  3. Monitor for anomalous MCP Server behavior going forward. Even after patching, the MCP Server represents a privileged API surface on developer workstations. Maintain the behavioral detections (Rule 2 — process spawning) as ongoing monitoring for any future abuse of the MCP Server's tool execution capabilities.

  4. Review your OT/ICS development pipeline security. If Mendix applications are deployed in operational technology environments, ensure that the development-to-deployment pipeline includes code review gates, signed artifacts, and integrity verification. A compromised development environment that pushes directly to OT is an unacceptable risk.

Vendor Resources


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