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CVE-2026-113627: ONLYOFFICE Docs Vulnerability Chain Leads to Container Root — Detection and Remediation Guide

SA
Security Arsenal Team
November 16, 2026
11 min read

Organizations that run self-hosted ONLYOFFICE Docs as part of a Zimbra Collaboration Suite deployment (or as a standalone DocumentServer) face a critical exposure. Rapid7 disclosed a chain of five vulnerabilities that allows an attacker with nothing more than view-only access to a document to read arbitrary files, forge session tokens, inject parameters into document conversions, traverse the filesystem, and ultimately execute arbitrary operating system commands as root inside the official DocumentServer container.

The findings are particularly dangerous because they bypass the "download disabled" control that many administrators rely on to protect sensitive documents. Data that the viewer never renders is directly exposed. If you run ONLYOFFICE DocumentServer anywhere in your environment, treat this as a priority-one patch cycle.

Technical Analysis

Affected Products

  • ONLYOFFICE Docs (DocumentServer) — the official container image and on-premises packages
  • Commonly deployed alongside Zimbra Collaboration Suite, Nextcloud, ownCloud, and other document-management platforms that embed ONLYOFFICE for in-browser editing

Rapid7 discovered these vulnerabilities during research into Zimbra, but the flaws live entirely within ONLYOFFICE Docs itself and are exploitable regardless of which front-end suite integrates the editor.

CVE Identifiers and Severity

CVEFindingCVSS
CVE-2026-113627DocBuilder native file read and Session JWT forgery7.1 High
CVE-2026-110385DocBuilder SaveFile conversion parameter injection and code execution8.7 High
CVE-2026-97727Complete-save format path traversal and arbitrary file write6.5 Medium
CVE-2026-113630Root-helper command injection7.8 High
CVE-2026-1136Additional finding (details pending full disclosure)—

Attack Chain Overview (Defender's Perspective)

The attack requires only a legitimate, low-privilege session — a user who has been granted view-only access to any document hosted by the ONLYOFFICE editor. From that starting position, the chain progresses through five distinct weaknesses:

  1. CVE-2026-113627 — DocBuilder native file read and Session JWT forgery. The DocBuilder scripting engine exposes a native file-read capability that can be invoked from a crafted document or API call. An attacker reads the JWT secret (or other configuration secrets) directly from the container filesystem. With that secret, session JWTs can be forged, granting the attacker elevated privileges within the DocumentServer API — effectively converting view-only access into a fully authenticated editing or administrative session.

  2. CVE-2026-110385 — DocBuilder SaveFile conversion parameter injection. The DocBuilder SaveFile method passes user-controlled parameters into a document-conversion pipeline. Because the input is not sanitized, the attacker can inject additional arguments or paths into the underlying conversion call. This parameter injection is the code-execution pivot: it allows the attacker to influence how the conversion utility runs and what it operates on, turning a document-save request into arbitrary command execution inside the container.

  3. CVE-2026-97727 — Complete-save format path traversal. During the "complete save" workflow (the final write-back of a document after editing), the format/conversion path parameter is not properly confined to the intended output directory. An attacker can supply ../ sequences to write files to arbitrary locations on the container filesystem. Combined with the parameter injection above, this enables dropping payloads, overwriting configuration, or placing files in directories served by the web process.

  4. CVE-2026-113630 — Root-helper command injection. ONLYOFFICE DocumentServer uses a privileged helper process (running as root inside the container) for certain system-level operations such as font generation and directory management. Arguments passed to this helper are insufficiently sanitized, allowing shell metacharacter injection. Because the helper executes as root, this is the final escalation step — the attacker's injected command runs with full root privileges inside the DocumentServer container.

  5. Impact of the full chain: The attacker transitions from a view-only document session to root inside the container, with the ability to read every document stored on the server (even when the UI shows "download disabled"), access the host filesystem through mounted volumes, pivot to adjacent containers or the Docker host (if the container is not properly isolated), and persist via cron jobs, systemd units, or modified startup scripts.

Exploitation Status

As of the Rapid7 disclosure (2026), a proof-of-concept has been described in the published research. There is no confirmed report of active in-the-wild exploitation at the time of writing, but the attack requires only view-only access — a role routinely granted to external collaborators, contractors, and low-trust users. Given the low barrier to entry and the severity of the impact, assume that weaponization is imminent. This is not a vulnerability to queue for the next maintenance window.

Detection & Response

This is a technical threat — a multi-CVE exploit chain against a server-side document platform. The following detection content targets the observable behaviors at each stage of the chain.

Sigma Rules

YAML
---
title: ONLYOFFICE DocBuilder Native File Read via Crafted API Request
id: 3f8a1b2c-9d4e-4c5a-b6f7-8e9d0a1b2c3d
status: experimental
description: Detects HTTP requests to ONLYOFFICE DocumentServer DocBuilder endpoints that reference sensitive filesystem paths, consistent with CVE-2026-113627 native file read and JWT secret exfiltration.
references:
  - https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/ve-from-view-only-access-to-container-root-five-vulnerabilities-in-onlyoffice-docs-fixed
author: Security Arsenal
date: 2026/04/06
tags:
  - attack.initial_access
  - attack.t1190
logsource:
  category: webserver
detection:
  selection_uri:
    cs-uri-stem|contains:
      - '/docbuilder'
      - '/coauthoring'
      - '/converter'
  selection_payload:
    cs-uri-query|contains:
      - 'appsettings.json'
      - 'local.json'
      - '/etc/onlyoffice'
      - 'default.json'
      - '.env'
      - '/proc/self/environ'
      - 'secret'
  condition: selection_uri and selection_payload
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate DocBuilder API usage with benign file paths
level: high
---
title: ONLYOFFICE DocumentServer Conversion Process Spawning Shell
id: 7c2e5f8a-1b3d-4e6f-a0b9-2c4d6e8f0a1b
status: experimental
description: Detects shell or scripting interpreter processes spawned as children of ONLYOFFICE DocumentServer conversion or DocBuilder processes, consistent with CVE-2026-110385 parameter injection leading to code execution.
references:
  - https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/ve-from-view-only-access-to-container-root-five-vulnerabilities-in-onlyoffice-docs-fixed
author: Security Arsenal
date: 2026/04/06
tags:
  - attack.execution
  - attack.t1059
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: linux
detection:
  selection_parent:
    ParentImage|contains:
      - 'x2t'
      - 'docbuilder'
      - 'onlyoffice'
      - 'DocumentServer'
      - 'converter'
  selection_child:
    Image|endswith:
      - '/sh'
      - '/bash'
      - '/dash'
      - '/python'
      - '/python3'
      - '/perl'
      - '/wget'
      - '/curl'
      - '/nc'
      - '/ncat'
  condition: selection_parent and selection_child
falsepositives:
  - Rare; legitimate conversion pipelines do not typically spawn shells
level: critical
---
title: Path Traversal in ONLYOFFICE Complete-Save File Write
id: 9d1a3e5b-7c2f-4a8d-b0e1-3f5a7c9d1e2f
status: experimental
description: Detects file-write operations by ONLYOFFICE DocumentServer processes that traverse outside the expected document storage directories, consistent with CVE-2026-97727 arbitrary file write.
references:
  - https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/ve-from-view-only-access-to-container-root-five-vulnerabilities-in-onlyoffice-docs-fixed
author: Security Arsenal
date: 2026/04/06
tags:
  - attack.defense_evasion
  - attack.t1036
logsource:
  category: file_event
  product: linux
detection:
  selection_process:
    Image|contains:
      - 'x2t'
      - 'docbuilder'
      - 'onlyoffice'
      - 'converter'
  selection_traversal:
    TargetFilename|contains:
      - '../'
      - '/etc/cron'
      - '/etc/systemd'
      - '/root/.ssh'
      - '/usr/local/bin'
      - '/opt/onlyoffice'
  condition: selection_process and selection_traversal
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate font-cache writes by the root helper process (should be reviewed)
level: high

KQL (Microsoft Sentinel)

The following queries assume ONLYOFFICE DocumentServer logs reach Sentinel via Syslog/CEF ingestion from the container host or a reverse proxy.

KQL — Microsoft Sentinel / Defender
// Hunt 1: Detect DocBuilder/converter requests referencing sensitive paths (JWT secret theft — CVE-2026-113627)
CommonSecurityLog
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where RequestURL has_any ("docbuilder", "coauthoring", "converter")
| where RequestURL has_any ("appsettings.json", "local.json", "/etc/onlyoffice", ".env", "secret", "environ")
| project TimeGenerated, SourceIP, RequestURL, RequestMethod, DeviceVendor, DeviceProduct
| order by TimeGenerated desc;

// Hunt 2: Detect shell processes spawned under ONLYOFFICE conversion user (code execution — CVE-2026-110385)
Syslog
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where SyslogMessage has_any ("x2t", "docbuilder", "onlyoffice")
| where SyslogMessage has_any ("/bin/sh", "/bin/bash", "curl", "wget", "python", "nc ", "ncat")
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, SyslogMessage
| order by TimeGenerated desc;

// Hunt 3: Detect JWT forgery indicators — session tokens used from unexpected source IPs
CommonSecurityLog
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where RequestURL has "onlyoffice" or RequestURL has "docbuilder"
| summarize DistinctIPs = dcount(SourceIP), IPs = make_set(SourceIP) by RequestClientApplication, bin(TimeGenerated, 1h)
| where DistinctIPs > 3
| project TimeGenerated, RequestClientApplication, DistinctIPs, IPs
| order by TimeGenerated desc;

Velociraptor VQL

VQL — Velociraptor
-- Hunt for suspicious child processes of ONLYOFFICE DocumentServer components
-- and for files written outside expected document storage paths
SELECT Pid, Ppid, Name, Exe, CommandLine, Username, CreateTime
FROM pslist()
WHERE (
  -- Parent is an ONLYOFFICE component and child is a shell/interpreter
  (Name =~ 'sh|bash|dash|python|perl|wget|curl|nc$|ncat'
   AND CommandLine =~ 'onlyoffice|docbuilder|x2t|converter')
  OR
  -- Any ONLYOFFICE process running as root with unusual command lines
  (Name =~ 'onlyoffice|docbuilder|x2t'
   AND Username =~ 'root'
   AND CommandLine =~ 'sh -c|bash -c|/etc/|\.\./')
)
ORDER BY CreateTime DESC

Remediation Script (Bash)

Bash / Shell
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# ONLYOFFICE DocumentServer — post-patch verification and hardening script
# Run on the Docker host or bare-metal server running DocumentServer
# Addresses: CVE-2026-113627, CVE-2026-110385, CVE-2026-97727, CVE-2026-113630

set -euo pipefail

echo "=== ONLYOFFICE DocumentServer Security Verification ==="
echo ""

# 1. Identify running ONLYOFFICE containers and their image versions
echo "[1] Identifying ONLYOFFICE containers..."
docker ps --filter "name=onlyoffice" --format "table {{.Names}}\t{{.Image}}\t{{.Status}}\t{{.CreatedAt}}" 2>/dev/null || \
  echo "  No ONLYOFFICE containers found via docker ps. Check podman or bare-metal install."

echo ""

# 2. Check image tag against patched version (consult vendor advisory for exact fixed tag)
echo "[2] Current image tags (verify against https://github.com/ONLYOFFICE/DocumentServer/releases for the fixed version):"
docker images --filter "reference=onlyoffice/documentserver*" --format "  {{.Repository}}:{{.Tag}}  ({{.CreatedSince}})" 2>/dev/null || true

echo ""

# 3. Check for signs of exploitation — suspicious files in common write locations
echo "[3] Checking for suspicious files in DocumentServer container..."
CONTAINER_ID=$(docker ps --filter "name=onlyoffice" --format "{{.ID}}" | head -1)
if [ -n "$CONTAINER_ID" ]; then
  echo "  Scanning container $CONTAINER_ID for anomalies..."
  # Check for unexpected files in web-accessible and system directories
  docker exec "$CONTAINER_ID" find /var/www/onlyoffice/documentserver/server/files -name "*.sh" -o -name "*.py" -o -name "*.php" 2>/dev/null | head -20 || true
  docker exec "$CONTAINER_ID" ls -la /etc/cron.d/ 2>/dev/null || true
  docker exec "$CONTAINER_ID" ls -la /root/.ssh/ 2>/dev/null || true
else
  echo "  No running container found — perform manual filesystem review if bare-metal."
fi

echo ""

# 4. Check for unexpected network connections from the container
echo "[4] Checking for unexpected outbound connections..."
if [ -n "$CONTAINER_ID" ]; then
  docker exec "$CONTAINER_ID" ss -tlnp 2>/dev/null | head -20 || true
  echo ""
  echo "  Active outbound connections:"
  docker exec "$CONTAINER_ID" ss -tnp state established 2>/dev/null | head -20 || true
fi

echo ""

# 5. Verify JWT secret has been rotated (post-patch requirement)
echo "[5] JWT Secret Rotation Reminder:"
echo "  After patching, you MUST rotate the JWT secret used by DocumentServer."
echo "  The old secret may have been exfiltrated via CVE-2026-113627."
echo "  Location: /etc/onlyoffice/documentserver/local.json (key: services.CoAuthoring.secret)"
echo "  Docker env: JWT_SECRET environment variable"
echo ""

# 6. Network-level hardening recommendations
echo "[6] Network Hardening Checklist:"
echo "  [ ] Restrict inbound access to DocumentServer to trusted IP ranges / reverse proxy only"
echo "  [ ] Ensure DocumentServer is NOT directly exposed to the internet"
echo "  [ ] Verify egress filtering — DocumentServer should not initiate arbitrary outbound connections"
echo "  [ ] If using Docker, ensure the container runs with --read-only where possible"
echo "  [ ] Confirm mounted volumes use least-privilege (no host /etc or /root mounts)"
echo ""

echo "=== Verification complete. Review all findings above. ==="

Remediation

  1. Patch immediately. Consult the official ONLYOFFICE DocumentServer release notes at https://github.com/ONLYOFFICE/DocumentServer/releases for the fixed version. Rapid7 coordinated disclosure with ONLYOFFICE — the patched release addresses all five CVEs. Do not delay this update.

  2. Rotate all JWT secrets. Because CVE-2026-113627 enables reading the JWT secret from the filesystem, assume the secret is compromised on any unpatched instance. After patching, generate a new JWT secret and update it in local.json (or the JWT_SECRET environment variable for container deployments). Restart DocumentServer and all integrated applications (Zimbra, Nextcloud, etc.) so they pick up the new secret.

  3. Audit for signs of compromise. Run the verification script above. Specifically look for: unexpected files in cron directories, new SSH authorized_keys entries, modified startup scripts, unfamiliar processes running as root inside the container, and outbound network connections from the DocumentServer container to unknown destinations.

  4. Restrict network access. DocumentServer should never be directly exposed to the internet. Place it behind a reverse proxy or load balancer that enforces IP allowlisting. If document collaboration with external users is required, use authenticated proxying — do not expose the raw DocumentServer API endpoints.

  5. Enforce container isolation. If running DocumentServer in Docker or Kubernetes: use --read-only root filesystems where possible, apply seccomp and AppArmor profiles, drop all capabilities except those explicitly required, and ensure no host directories are mounted into the container with write access.

  6. Review view-only access grants. This exploit chain requires only view-only access — the lowest privilege tier. Audit who has been granted view access to documents on your ONLYOFFICE instance. Revoke any grants that are no longer needed, especially for external collaborators and service accounts.

  7. Monitor for JWT forgery post-patch. Even after patching and rotating secrets, monitor for anomalous session token usage — the same JWT used from multiple source IPs, sessions that persist beyond expected durations, or API calls to DocBuilder endpoints from clients that do not normally use the builder API.

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