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CVE-2026-131809: Grizzl-E Smart 40A OCPP Backend Authentication Bypass — Unpatched Pwn2Own Vulnerability Defense Guide

SA
Security Arsenal Team
November 19, 2026
12 min read

The Zero Day Initiative has published advisory ZDI-26-1037 disclosing an authentication bypass vulnerability in the OCPP backend configuration of United Chargers Grizzl-E Smart 40A EV charging stations. The flaw — demonstrated at Pwn2Own — carries a CVSS rating of 7.6 and, critically, remains unpatched as of disclosure. Because EV chargers sit on operational networks, often with weak segmentation and long patch cycles, this is a live, exposed-attack-surface problem for every organization running these units: fleets, hospitality, multi-tenant residential, parking infrastructure, and corporate campuses.

This is exactly the class of vulnerability that defenders should treat as an unpatched exposure window requiring immediate compensating controls. There is no firmware to deploy yet — only network-level risk reduction, monitoring, and hardening of the OCPP trust boundary.

What Happened

ZDI tracked this issue as ZDI-26-1037 and assigned CVE-2026-131809. The vulnerability allows network-adjacent attackers to bypass authentication on affected Grizzl-E Smart 40A installations. No authentication is required to trigger the flaw. The vulnerable component is the OCPP (Open Charge Point Protocol) backend configuration — the management plane that governs how the charger communicates with its central charging management system (CSMS), including settings such as the backend URL, authorization keys, security profiles, and firmware update sources.

A CVSS 7.6 rating on an unauthenticated, network-adjacent flaw in infrastructure hardware is serious. The "adjacent" requirement limits remote mass exploitation from the internet, but real-world charger deployments routinely expose these interfaces on flat networks, shared Wi-Fi, poorly segmented VLANs, or vendor-managed backhaul — precisely the adjacency an attacker needs.

Why Defenders Should Care

Compromise of the OCPP configuration plane is not a nuisance bug. An attacker who can manipulate the backend configuration of a Grizzl-E Smart 40A can plausibly:

  • Redirect the charger to a rogue OCPP backend by rewriting the Central System URL, enabling full man-in-the-middle of charging sessions, transaction data, and authorization tokens.
  • Harvest RFID tags and user identifiers collected during charging sessions — relevant to privacy and to cloneable access credentials.
  • Manipulate charging behavior — disabling chargers (availability impact for fleets), forcing free vend, or tampering with load management settings that interact with building electrical infrastructure.
  • Pivot into the management network if the charger shares a segment with CSMS infrastructure or building management systems.
  • Push or accept malicious firmware update URLs via configuration change, converting an auth bypass into persistent compromise.

For organizations operating EV fleets or charger networks for customers, this is also a compliance and liability issue: charging infrastructure increasingly falls under NIST CSF asset inventories, and EVSE is explicitly in scope for emerging regulatory scrutiny.

Technical Analysis

Affected Products

AttributeDetail
ProductUnited Chargers Grizzl-E Smart 40A (smart/OCPP-enabled model)
ComponentOCPP backend configuration interface
AdvisoryZDI-26-1037
CVECVE-2026-131809
CVSS7.6 (High)
Vector (assessed)Network-adjacent, unauthenticated, low complexity
Patch statusUnpatched — 0-day status at time of disclosure (Pwn2Own)

Defenders should verify their exact hardware/firmware revision against United Chargers' support channels. The classic (non-smart) Grizzl-E lacks the OCPP stack and is not implicated; only the Smart 40A model with OCPP connectivity carries the vulnerable code path.

How the Vulnerability Works (Defender's View)

While ZDI withholds full exploit details in line with coordinated disclosure, the advisory language — "OCPP Backend Configuration Authentication Bypass" — tells us the failure class: the charger exposes a configuration interface (commonly a local web/HTTP management endpoint or a configuration service on the charger's network interface) whose access controls can be circumvented. Typical failure patterns in this class include:

  • Endpoints reachable without session validation when requested directly (broken access control / forced browsing).
  • Default, hardcoded, or weakly enforced credentials on the configuration service.
  • Configuration-write functionality (e.g., setting the OCPP Central System URL, authorization key, or security profile) that does not properly gate state-changing requests.

The practical attack chain a defender should model:

  1. Reconnaissance: Attacker gains network adjacency — compromised device on the charger VLAN, rogue Wi-Fi client on a shared SSID, or upstream CSMS compromise.
  2. Discovery: Scan for Grizzl-E units (HTTP services on common management ports, OCPP WebSocket traffic, mDNS/DHCP fingerprints).
  3. Bypass: Access the configuration interface without valid credentials and read or write backend settings.
  4. Impact: Re-point CentralSystemURI/backend URL to attacker infrastructure, capture OCPP traffic (BootNotification, Authorize, StartTransaction), and optionally drive firmware-update or configuration-change operations.

Exploitation Status

  • Demonstrated: Successfully exploited at Pwn2Own (researcher-controlled).
  • In-the-wild exploitation: Not publicly confirmed at time of writing.
  • CISA KEV: Not listed at time of writing — monitor the KEV catalog; ICS/IoT vulnerabilities with public disclosure frequently see opportunistic scanning within days.
  • Patch availability: None. This is a zero-day exposure window; compensating controls are mandatory.

Given that Pwn2Own entries are disclosed with working exploit code known to the researcher and the vendor's disclosure clock has elapsed, assume motivated actors can reproduce this.

Detection & Response

Because the vulnerable device is an embedded Linux network appliance, detection lives at the network and management-plane layers: NetFlow/firewall logs, OCPP backend (CSMS) logs, and syslog forwarded from any charger that supports it. The detections below assume your chargers are on a dedicated VLAN with a known management subnet and that your CSMS logs OCPP message traffic — both prerequisites for the remediation guidance as well.

Sigma Rules

These rules target the highest-fidelity observable behaviors: unexpected management-plane access to charger interfaces from non-management sources, and OCPP configuration-change messages that did not originate from your legitimate CSMS.

YAML
---
title: Grizzl-E Charger Management Interface Access from Unauthorized Source
id: 8f2c4a91-6d3b-4e78-b1a5-9c7d2e4f6a01
status: experimental
description: Detects network connections to Grizzl-E Smart charger management/HTTP interfaces originating from outside the approved management subnet, consistent with exploitation of CVE-2026-131809 OCPP backend configuration authentication bypass.
references:
  - https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-26-1037/
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190/
author: Security Arsenal
date: 2026/01/15
tags:
  - attack.initial_access
  - attack.t1190
logsource:
  category: firewall
  product: network
detection:
  selection_dst:
    DestinationIp|cidr:
      - '10.60.0.0/24'  # Replace with your charger VLAN
  selection_ports:
    DestinationPort:
      - 80
      - 443
      - 8080
      - 8443
  filter_mgmt:
    SourceIp|cidr:
      - '10.60.10.0/28'  # Replace with your CSMS/management subnet
  condition: selection_dst and selection_ports and not filter_mgmt
falsepositives:
  - Network scanners and vulnerability management platforms (scope exclusions)
  - DHCP/NTP infrastructure if misrouted
level: high
---
title: OCPP Configuration Change from Unrecognized Backend
id: 3b7e1d52-8a4c-4f69-9d2e-5f8a1c3b7e09
status: experimental
description: Detects OCPP ChangeConfiguration or SetConfiguration operations, particularly those modifying the Central System URL or security profile keys, which may indicate an attacker re-pointing a Grizzl-E charger via CVE-2026-131809.
references:
  - https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-26-1037/
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557/
author: Security Arsenal
date: 2026/01/15
tags:
  - attack.collection
  - attack.t1557
  - attack.persistence
logsource:
  product: ocpp  # CSMS application logs ingested into SIEM
  service: central-system
detection:
  selection:
    ocpp_action:
      - 'ChangeConfiguration'
      - 'SetConfiguration'
      - 'DataTransfer'
  selection_keys:
    ocpp_key|contains:
      - 'CentralSystemURI'
      - 'BackendURL'
      - 'SecurityProfile'
      - 'AuthorizationKey'
      - 'BasicAuthPassword'
      - 'FirmwareURL'
  filter_approved_csms:
    csms_host:
      - 'csms-prod-01.corp.example.com'  # Replace with approved CSMS hostnames
  condition: selection and selection_keys and not filter_approved_csms
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate vendor maintenance windows (suppress by change ticket)
level: critical

A note on tuning: the second rule is only as good as your CSMS logging. If your charging management platform does not log OCPP message payloads, enable verbose message logging now — it is your single best detection source for this threat class.

KQL Hunt — Microsoft Sentinel

This query hunts across firewall/CommonSecurityLog data for any non-management host initiating sessions to charger management ports, and joins against a baseline to surface first-time-seen source IPs — the pattern you'd expect from an attacker who just landed on the charger segment.

KQL — Microsoft Sentinel / Defender
// Hunt: First-time or unauthorized access to Grizzl-E charger management interfaces
// Tune ChargerSubnet and MgmtSources to your environment
let ChargerSubnet = "10.60.0.0/24";
let MgmtPorts = dynamic([80, 443, 8080, 8443]);
let ApprovedSources = dynamic(["10.60.10.4", "10.60.10.5"]); // CSMS + vuln scanner
let Lookback = 14d;
let Baseline =
    CommonSecurityLog
    | where TimeGenerated between (ago(30d) .. ago(Lookback))
    | where ipv4_is_in_range(DestinationIP, ChargerSubnet)
    | where DestinationPort in (MgmtPorts)
    | summarize by SourceIP;
CommonSecurityLog
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(Lookback)
| where ipv4_is_in_range(DestinationIP, ChargerSubnet)
| where DestinationPort in (MgmtPorts)
| where SourceIP !in (ApprovedSources)
| where SourceIP !in (Baseline)
| summarize FirstSeen=min(TimeGenerated), LastSeen=max(TimeGenerated),
            ConnectionCount=count(), Ports=make_set(DestinationPort),
            Devices=make_set(DeviceName)
  by SourceIP, DestinationIP
| order by FirstSeen desc;
// Secondary hunt: OCPP WebSocket sessions to non-standard backends (Syslog from CSMS)
Syslog
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(Lookback)
| where SyslogMessage has_any ("BootNotification", "ChangeConfiguration", "SetConfiguration")
| extend ConfigKey = extract(@"\"key\"\s*:\s*\"([^\"]+)\"", 1, SyslogMessage)
| where ConfigKey has_any ("CentralSystemURI", "SecurityProfile", "BasicAuthPassword", "Firmware")
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, ProcessName, ConfigKey, SyslogMessage
| order by TimeGenerated desc;

Velociraptor VQL — Management Host Forensics

If you operate a jump host or CSMS server that administers the chargers, hunt that endpoint for unexpected outbound connections to the charger segment or tooling consistent with post-exploitation discovery (an attacker who compromised the management path will show up here).

VQL — Velociraptor
-- Hunt for unexpected network connections to the EV charger VLAN
-- from management/CSMS hosts. Adjust the CIDR regex to your charger subnet.
LET charger_net = '10\\.60\\.0\\.'

SELECT Pid,
       Name,
       CommandLine,
       Exe,
       Username,
       netstat().LocalAddr.IP AS LocalIP,
       netstat().LocalAddr.Port AS LocalPort,
       netstat().RemoteAddr.IP AS RemoteIP,
       netstat().RemoteAddr.Port AS RemotePort,
       netstat().Status AS ConnState
FROM pslist()
WHERE netstat().RemoteAddr.IP =~ charger_net
  AND Name !~ '(?i)(csms|ocpp-server|python.*ocpp)'  -- approved charger comms processes
ORDER BY RemoteIP

Hardening & Verification Script

No patch exists, so the remediation script focuses on the controls you can deploy today: network ACL enforcement, management-plane isolation, and verification that only your CSMS can reach the chargers. Run from a Linux management host.

Bash / Shell
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Grizzl-E CVE-2026-131809 compensating controls — verification & hardening
# Run on the CSMS / management host. Adjust variables for your environment.

CHARGER_VLAN="10.60.0.0/24"
MGMT_HOSTS=("10.60.10.4" "10.60.10.5")   # Approved CSMS / scanner IPs
MGMT_PORTS="80,443,8080,8443"
OCPP_PORT="9000"                            # Charger -> CSMS WebSocket port (adjust)
LOG="/var/log/grizzle_hardening_$(date +%Y%m%d).log"

echo "[*] $(date) - Grizzl-E CVE-2026-131809 hardening check" | tee -a "$LOG"

# 1) Inventory: enumerate live charger management interfaces on the segment
echo "[*] Enumerating charger management interfaces..." | tee -a "$LOG"
nmap -sS -p "$MGMT_PORTS" --open "$CHARGER_VLAN" -oG - \
  | awk '/Ports/{print $2, $4}' | tee -a "$LOG"

# 2) Verify egress: chargers should ONLY initiate to the approved CSMS endpoint
echo "[*] Checking for chargers initiating OCPP to unexpected backends..." | tee -a "$LOG"
for ip in $(nmap -sn "$CHARGER_VLAN" -oG - | awk '/Up$/{print $2}'); do
  timeout 5 tcpdump -c 20 -nn -i any host "$ip" and tcp port "$OCPP_PORT" 2>/dev/null \
    | grep -v "${MGMT_HOSTS[0]}" && \
    echo "[ALERT] $ip speaking OCPP to non-CSMS host" | tee -a "$LOG"
done

# 3) Enforce host-based ACL on CSMS: accept OCPP only from charger VLAN
echo "[*] Enforcing iptables ACL: OCPP port $OCPP_PORT restricted to $CHARGER_VLAN" | tee -a "$LOG"
iptables -C INPUT -p tcp -s "$CHARGER_VLAN" --dport "$OCPP_PORT" -j ACCEPT 2>/dev/null \
  || iptables -A INPUT -p tcp -s "$CHARGER_VLAN" --dport "$OCPP_PORT" -j ACCEPT
for src in "${MGMT_HOSTS[@]}"; do
  iptables -C INPUT -p tcp -s "$src" --dport "$OCPP_PORT" -j ACCEPT 2>/dev/null \
    || iptables -A INPUT -p tcp -s "$src" --dport "$OCPP_PORT" -j ACCEPT
done
iptables -C INPUT -p tcp --dport "$OCPP_PORT" -j DROP 2>/dev/null \
  || iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport "$OCPP_PORT" -j DROP
iptables-save > /etc/iptables/rules.v4 2>/dev/null || true

# 4) Detect rogue-backend indicators: flag any charger whose backend URL
#    is not your approved CSMS (requires your CSMS API/DB — example stub)
echo "[*] ACTION REQUIRED: Audit each charger's OCPP CentralSystemURI via your CSMS console." | tee -a "$LOG"
echo "    Any value other than your approved CSMS URL = investigate immediately." | tee -a "$LOG"

echo "[+] Hardening verification complete. Review $LOG" | tee -a "$LOG"

Adapt the NMAP/tc​pdump portions to run from a sensor with visibility into the charger segment; on managed switches, mirror the charger VLAN uplink to your NDR instead.

Remediation

There is no vendor patch available at the time of publication. United Chargers has been notified through ZDI's coordinated disclosure process. Until firmware is released, execute the following in priority order:

  1. Isolate the charger segment immediately. Place Grizzl-E Smart 40A units on a dedicated VLAN with a default-deny ACL. Permit only: (a) outbound WebSocket/TLS from chargers to the approved CSMS IP/port, and (b) inbound management from a hardened jump host. Block all peer-to-peer and general user-network access to the charger VLAN. This directly defeats the "network-adjacent" requirement.
  2. Disable or restrict the local configuration interface if your deployment does not require it. If the units support disabling the local web management UI or setting strong unique credentials, do so per unit — and change any default credentials today.
  3. Audit current configuration state. Through your CSMS, pull every charger's backend URL, security profile, and authorization settings. Any CentralSystemURI not pointing at your approved backend is an incident, not a configuration drift — treat it as potential compromise and collect forensic data (charger logs, network captures) before remediation.
  4. Enforce OCPP security best practices: use OCPP 1.6/2.0.1 security profiles with TLS (Security Profile 2+), mutual authentication where supported, and unique per-charger credentials. This raises the cost of rogue-backend redirection substantially.
  5. Enable and centralize logging. Forward CSMS OCPP message logs (especially ChangeConfiguration, SetConfiguration, UpdateFirmware, GetDiagnostics) to your SIEM. Deploy the detections above.
  6. Monitor vendor channels. Track United Chargers' support portal and the ZDI advisory page for firmware release. Apply the patch within 72 hours of release — Pwn2Own bugs get weaponized fast once public.
  7. Watch CISA KEV. If CVE-2026-131809 is added, federal remediation deadlines apply and exploitation is confirmed — escalate to emergency change.
  8. Longer term: include EVSE in your asset inventory, vulnerability management scope, and IR playbooks. Chargers are network infrastructure; treat them accordingly in procurement (require SBOMs, patch SLAs, and OCPP security profile support).

The Bottom Line

CVE-2026-131809 is a textbook unpatched-exposure scenario: a demonstrated Pwn2Own bypass on the management plane of infrastructure hardware with no fix available. The vulnerability is only exploitable by network-adjacent attackers — which means segmentation is not a nice-to-have compensating control, it is the entire control until a patch ships. Lock down the segment, audit the backend configuration on every unit, monitor for configuration-change OCPP messages, and be ready to patch on release.

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