The Zero Day Initiative has published ZDI-26-1038, a vulnerability in the United Chargers Grizzl-E Smart 40A electric vehicle charger that allows unauthenticated, network-adjacent attackers to execute arbitrary code on the device. The flaw — tracked as CVE-2026-131813 and rated CVSS 7.5 — lives in the charger's handling of the OCPP (Open Charge Point Protocol) UpdateFirmware message and is an out-of-bounds write condition. It was demonstrated at a Pwn2Own event, which means exploitability has been proven in front of judges, not theorized in a lab.
The critical operational fact for defenders: there is no patch. ZDI's advisory is a zero-day disclosure. Every Grizzl-E Smart 40A unit reachable on a network segment an attacker can touch is a fully unauthenticated code execution primitive sitting on your wire. EV chargers are frequently deployed on flat networks, shared VLANs, or — worse — consumer-grade home networks with weak segmentation, and they're almost never covered by EDR, patch management, or even asset inventory. If your organization operates fleet charging infrastructure, parking facilities, or workplace charging stations, this is your problem today.
Technical Analysis
Affected Products
- Product: United Chargers Grizzl-E Smart 40A (the OCPP-enabled "Smart" variant — the non-connected base Grizzl-E units without network connectivity are not in scope)
- Affected component: OCPP message handler, specifically the
UpdateFirmwareoperation - CVE: CVE-2026-131813
- Advisory: ZDI-26-1038
- CVSS: 7.5 (High)
- Vendor status: Unpatched at time of disclosure
How the Vulnerability Works
OCPP is the industry-standard protocol EV chargers use to communicate with a Central System Management Server (CSMS / Charge Point Operator backend). It typically runs over WebSocket (ports 80/443, commonly 8080 for local management) and defines operations including BootNotification, Authorize, StartTransaction, and — relevant here — UpdateFirmware, which instructs the charger to download and install new firmware from a specified URL.
Per ZDI's advisory, the Grizzl-E Smart 40A's parsing of the UpdateFirmware message contains an out-of-bounds write: fields within the message are processed without adequate bounds validation, allowing an attacker to write attacker-controlled data beyond the intended buffer. On an embedded device without modern mitigations (no meaningful ASLR, no stack canaries, no DEP on many of these MCU/RTOS builds), an OOB write of this class is a direct path to control of execution flow — which is exactly what the Pwn2Own researcher demonstrated.
The exploitation requirements are what make this dangerous:
- No authentication. OCPP implementations on chargers frequently trust any endpoint that can reach the service, and the vulnerable handler processes the message pre-authentication.
- Network-adjacent access only. The attacker needs Layer 2/Layer 3 reachability to the charger — same VLAN, compromised host on the same segment, compromised Wi-Fi, or a CSMS path the charger trusts. This tempers internet-wide wormability but is cold comfort given how flat most charger deployments are.
- Arbitrary code execution as the result. Full device compromise. From there: persistence on the charger, lateral movement pivot point into the network segment, manipulation of charging behavior and billing data, or recruitment of the device into a botnet.
Exploitation Status
- Proven exploitable — demonstrated at Pwn2Own. The winning researcher's exploit chain is real and functional.
- No public PoC released as of this writing (ZDI's standard practice is to withhold details pending vendor remediation), but Pwn2Own-grade vulnerabilities in embedded targets historically get reverse-engineered from conference talk materials and firmware diffs within months.
- Not currently listed in CISA KEV — there are no confirmed reports of in-the-wild exploitation yet.
- Unpatched — defenders must treat mitigation as a compensating-controls exercise, not a patch cycle.
The window between "no public PoC" and "mass exploitation" for IoT devices is historically measured in weeks-to-months once technical details leak. Treat every reachable Grizzl-E Smart 40A as pre-compromised-pending-access until United Chargers ships a fix.
Detection & Response
Because these chargers are embedded Linux/RTOS devices, you cannot deploy EDR to them. Detection must live at the network layer (firewall/Zeek/Suricata telemetry into your SIEM) and on the adjacent endpoints an attacker would stage from. The detection strategy has two prongs: (1) flag any OCPP traffic to chargers originating from anything other than your authorized CSMS, and (2) flag any charger initiating outbound connections to destinations it shouldn't — post-exploitation C2.
Sigma Rules
---
title: OCPP Traffic to EV Charger from Non-CSMS Source
id: 3f9c1a84-7b2e-4d51-9c83-6e1a2b4f8d07
status: experimental
description: Detects network connections to EV charger OCPP service ports originating from hosts other than the authorized Charge Point Management Server. CVE-2026-131813 (ZDI-26-1038) exploitation requires network-adjacent delivery of a crafted OCPP UpdateFirmware message to the charger; any non-CSMS host talking to the charger on OCPP ports is anomalous and potentially pre-exploitation staging.
references:
- http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-26-1038/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1210/
author: Security Arsenal
date: 2026/01/15
tags:
- attack.exploitation
- attack.t1210
logsource:
category: firewall
product: zeek
detection:
selection:
dst_port:
- 80
- 443
- 8080
- 9000
dst_ip|cidr: '%EV_CHARGER_VLAN_CIDR%'
filter_csms:
src_ip: '%AUTHORIZED_CSMS_IP%'
condition: selection and not filter_csms
falsepositives:
- Legitimate charger management/scanning by network operations — whitelist scanner and NMS hosts explicitly
- Charger vendor cloud telemetry if not routed via CSMS
level: high
---
title: EV Charger Initiating Outbound Connection to Unexpected Destination
id: 8c2d5e91-4a6b-4f73-b1c9-2d8e7a5f3c16
status: experimental
description: Detects EV charger IP addresses initiating outbound connections to destinations outside the approved CSMS/firmware vendor allowlist. Post-exploitation of CVE-2026-131813, compromised Grizzl-E chargers will beacon to attacker C2 or be used as lateral movement pivots. Charger egress should be nearly static — any novel destination is a strong compromise indicator.
references:
- http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-26-1038/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/
author: Security Arsenal
date: 2026/01/15
tags:
- attack.command_and_control
- attack.t1071
logsource:
category: firewall
product: zeek
detection:
selection:
src_ip|cidr: '%EV_CHARGER_VLAN_CIDR%'
filter_allowlist:
dst_ip:
- '%AUTHORIZED_CSMS_IP%'
- '%FIRMWARE_UPDATE_HOST%'
filter_dns_ntp:
dst_port:
- 53
- 123
condition: selection and not filter_allowlist and not filter_dns_ntp
falsepositives:
- Vendor cloud backend changes not yet added to allowlist
- Time sync and DNS to non-standard resolvers if charger is misconfigured
level: critical
KQL — Microsoft Sentinel Hunt
This query assumes firewall/NGFW logs are ingested into CommonSecurityLog (CEF) — Palo Alto, Fortinet, Check Point, or Zeek via syslog all land here. It hunts for any non-CSMS host initiating connections to your charger subnet on OCPP service ports, and separately surfaces charger egress anomalies. Replace the placeholder CIDRs and IPs with your environment's values.
let ChargerSubnet = "10.50.20.0/24"; // EV charger VLAN
let CSMS = dynamic(["203.0.113.10"]); // Authorized Charge Point Management Server(s)
let OCPPPorts = dynamic([80, 443, 8080, 9000]);
let Window = 7d;
// Prong 1: Non-CSMS sources initiating connections to chargers on OCPP ports
let InboundAbuse = CommonSecurityLog
| where TimeGenerated > ago(Window)
| where ipv4_is_in_range(DestinationIP, ChargerSubnet)
| where DestinationPort in (OCPPPorts)
| where not(SourceIP in (CSMS))
| summarize ConnectionCount = count(), FirstSeen = min(TimeGenerated), LastSeen = max(TimeGenerated)
by SourceIP, DestinationIP, DestinationPort, DeviceAction
| extend Hunt = "Non-CSMS source -> charger OCPP port";
// Prong 2: Chargers initiating egress to novel destinations (potential C2 post-exploitation)
let KnownEgress = CommonSecurityLog
| where TimeGenerated between (ago(30d) .. ago(Window))
| where ipv4_is_in_range(SourceIP, ChargerSubnet)
| summarize by DestinationIP;
let EgressAnomaly = CommonSecurityLog
| where TimeGenerated > ago(Window)
| where ipv4_is_in_range(SourceIP, ChargerSubnet)
| where not(DestinationIP in (KnownEgress))
| where not(DestinationIP in (CSMS))
| summarize ConnectionCount = count(), FirstSeen = min(TimeGenerated), LastSeen = max(TimeGenerated)
by SourceIP, DestinationIP, DestinationPort, DeviceAction
| extend Hunt = "Charger egress to novel destination";
union InboundAbuse, EgressAnomaly
| sort by Hunt, ConnectionCount desc
Also hunt for lateral staging from endpoints — a compromised workstation on the charger segment reaching for the charger is your pre-exploitation warning:
let ChargerSubnet = "10.50.20.0/24";
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where ipv4_is_in_range(RemoteIP, ChargerSubnet)
| where RemotePort in (80, 443, 8080, 9000, 22, 23)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName !in~ ("msedge.exe", "chrome.exe") // tune: remove benign management tooling
| summarize Connections = count(), Ports = make_set(RemotePort)
by DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, RemoteIP
| sort by Connections desc
Velociraptor VQL
If you have Velociraptor deployed on infrastructure hosts (facility management workstations, CSMS servers, jump boxes) that share segments with chargers, hunt for unexpected processes holding connections to the charger VLAN — the attacker's staging host is the most forensically rich target you actually control.
-- Hunt for unexpected processes with connections to the EV charger VLAN
-- (potential attacker staging host for CVE-2026-131813 exploitation)
LET ChargerNet = "10.50.20."
SELECT Pid, Name, CommandLine, Exe, Username
FROM pslist()
WHERE Pid IN (
SELECT Pid FROM netstat()
WHERE RemoteAddress =~ ChargerNet
OR LocalAddress =~ ChargerNet
)
AND NOT Exe =~ '(?i)(chrome|msedge|firefox|iexplore)\\.exe$'
Pair with an artifact capturing charger-facing connection detail for triage:
-- Detail all live connections to/from the EV charger segment
SELECT Pid, Name, Status, LocalAddress, LocalPort, RemoteAddress, RemotePort
FROM netstat()
WHERE RemoteAddress =~ '10.50.20.'
OR LocalAddress =~ '10.50.20.'
ORDER BY RemoteAddress
Remediation & Hardening Script
Until United Chargers ships firmware, your compensating controls are segmentation and reachability restriction. This Bash script (run from a management host) discovers Grizzl-E devices on a target segment, identifies the OCPP service, and generates a lockdown report. Follow it with the firewall policy work described in the Remediation section.
#!/bin/bash
# Grizzl-E Smart 40A exposure audit — CVE-2026-131813 compensating control validation
# Run from a management host with nmap installed. Adjust SEGMENT and CSMS_IP.
SEGMENT="10.50.20.0/24" # Charger VLAN/subnet
CSMS_IP="203.0.113.10" # Authorized OCPP Central System
OUT="grizzle_audit_$(date +%Y%m%d_%H%M).txt"
echo "=== Grizzl-E Smart 40A Exposure Audit — CVE-2026-131813 ===" | tee "$OUT"
echo "[*] Scanning $SEGMENT for live hosts with OCPP service ports open..." | tee -a "$OUT"
# Discover hosts exposing OCPP/WebSocket management ports
nmap -Pn -sS -p 80,443,8080,9000 --open "$SEGMENT" -oG - | \
awk '/Ports:/{print $2, $4, $5, $6, $7}' | tee -a "$OUT"
echo "" | tee -a "$OUT"
echo "[*] Grabbing HTTP banners for charger identification..." | tee -a "$OUT"
for host in $(nmap -Pn -p 80,8080 --open "$SEGMENT" -oG - | awk '/Up$/{print $2}'); do
BANNER=$(curl -sk --max-time 5 "http://$host/" | grep -iE 'grizzl|united chargers|chargepoint' | head -3)
if [ -n "$BANNER" ]; then
echo "[+] POSSIBLE GRIZZL-E at $host: $BANNER" | tee -a "$OUT"
fi
done
echo "" | tee -a "$OUT"
echo "[*] Validating segmentation: only $CSMS_IP should reach chargers on OCPP ports." | tee -a "$OUT"
echo " ACTION: Verify firewall ACL restricts charger VLAN ingress to $CSMS_IP only." | tee -a "$OUT"
echo " ACTION: Verify charger VLAN egress restricted to CSMS + firmware host only." | tee -a "$OUT"
echo " ACTION: Confirm no user/corporate VLAN routes to $SEGMENT." | tee -a "$OUT"
echo "" | tee -a "$OUT"
echo "[*] Audit complete. Review $OUT and reconcile against asset inventory." | tee -a "$OUT"
echo " Any Grizzl-E Smart 40A found on a non-segmented network = immediate isolation priority."
Remediation
There is no vendor patch for CVE-2026-131813 as of this publication. This is a compensating-controls engagement. Prioritize in this order:
- Isolate the chargers. Place all Grizzl-E Smart 40A units on a dedicated VLAN/SSID with no route to corporate user segments, servers, or other IoT. "Network-adjacent" is the exploitation prerequisite — remove adjacency and you remove the attack. This is the single highest-value action.
- Enforce strict ingress ACLs. Only your authorized CSMS IP should be permitted to initiate connections to the chargers on OCPP ports (80/443/8080/9000). Everything else: deny and log. Logged denies feed directly into the Sigma rule above.
- Enforce strict egress ACLs. Chargers should talk to exactly two things: the CSMS and the vendor firmware host. Deny-and-alert on all other egress. Post-exploitation C2 has nowhere to go.
- Disable OCPP remote firmware update functionality where configurable, or gate it behind a maintenance window change-control process. If the vulnerable
UpdateFirmwarehandler can't be reached with a live backend path, exploitation value drops sharply. - Inventory and track. Add every Grizzl-E unit to your asset inventory with a CVE-2026-131813 flag so the patch gets applied the day United Chargers releases it. Subscribe to United Chargers support channels and monitor the ZDI-26-1038 advisory for patch status updates — ZDI advisories are updated when fixes ship.
- Home users and small deployments: If the charger is on your home network, put it on your router's guest/IoT network immediately, disable remote access features you don't use, and check for firmware updates via the vendor's app/support portal weekly.
- Plan for physical verification. When a patch does ship, firmware update integrity matters — an already-compromised charger could report a false version. For high-sensitivity deployments, validate post-patch behavior with network monitoring, not just the device's self-reported version string.
Why This Class of Bug Keeps Winning
EV charging infrastructure sits at the exact intersection security teams handle worst: it's OT-adjacent, network-connected, cloud-managed, physically accessible, and excluded from every endpoint security control the organization owns. OCPP's UpdateFirmware handler is an especially juicy target class — it takes remote-controlled strings (URLs, retrieve dates, signatures) and feeds them into download-and-execute logic on a device with root-equivalent authority over a high-amperage electrical load. Expect more Pwn2Own Automotive findings against this protocol surface across multiple vendors, and build your charger segmentation standard now rather than per-CVE.
Related Resources
Security Arsenal Penetration Testing Services AlertMonitor Platform Book a SOC Assessment vulnerability-management Intel Hub
Is your security operations ready?
Get a free SOC assessment or see how AlertMonitor cuts through alert noise with automated triage.