Adobe has shipped an out-of-band security update addressing multiple critical vulnerabilities across ColdFusion, Commerce, and Campaign Classic — three of which carry the maximum possible CVSS score of 10.0. The standout flaw, CVE-2026-48362, is an operating system command injection vulnerability in ColdFusion that can result in arbitrary code execution. Companion flaws in Commerce and Campaign Classic (also CVSS 10.0) can result in code execution and unauthorized privilege gain.
If you've been in this industry long enough, you know what a CVSS 10.0 on ColdFusion means operationally. ColdFusion sits on the perimeter of a surprising number of enterprises — government portals, financial services back ends, healthcare scheduling systems — and it has been a ransomware and espionage magnet for over a decade. Threat actors monitor Adobe patch Tuesdays specifically for ColdFusion deltas, and historically, weaponization of critical ColdFusion flaws has moved from disclosure to mass scanning in days, not weeks.
If you run ColdFusion, Adobe Commerce, or Campaign Classic anywhere reachable — treat this as an emergency patch event, not a routine Tuesday.
Technical Analysis
Affected Products
| Product | Vulnerability Type | Max CVSS | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Adobe ColdFusion | OS command injection (CVE-2026-48362) | 10.0 | Arbitrary code execution |
| Adobe Commerce | Critical vulnerability (unspecified) | 10.0 | Arbitrary code execution |
| Adobe Campaign Classic | Critical vulnerability (unspecified) | 10.0 | Code execution / privilege escalation |
How CVE-2026-48362 Works — Defender's View
OS command injection in a ColdFusion context typically means an attacker-controlled input — a CFML template parameter, an HTTP header, a file upload path, or an internal API argument — is passed unsanitized into a shell invocation (e.g., cfexecute, runtime exec calls, or an underlying OS call made by the ColdFusion service). The practical exploitation chain looks like this:
- Attacker sends a crafted HTTP request to an exposed ColdFusion endpoint (often under
/CFIDE/, a custom CFM application, or an admin/rest component). - The ColdFusion service process executes attacker-supplied OS commands. On Windows this is typically
cmd.exe /c ...orpowershell.exe; on Linux,/bin/sh -c ...or/bin/bash -c .... - Commands run with the privileges of the ColdFusion service account — frequently
SYSTEM,root, or a highly privileged service account, which is why the score is a clean 10.0. - Post-exploitation follows a predictable pattern: webshell deployment into the webroot, credential dumping, reverse shells, and — in many historical ColdFusion incidents — ransomware staging.
The companion Campaign Classic flaw allowing unauthorized privilege gain is equally concerning in environments where Campaign Classic handles marketing databases containing PII — a low-privileged foothold can be escalated to full control of the campaign server and its data stores.
Exploitation Status
At time of publication, Adobe has not reported confirmed in-the-wild exploitation, and the flaws have not yet appeared in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog. Do not let that lull you. Critical ColdFusion RCEs have a documented history of rapid weaponization — patch diffs are reverse-engineered within days, and honeypots consistently see scanning against newly disclosed ColdFusion paths within the first week. Assume exploitation is imminent and patch on an emergency timeline.
Detection & Response
Patching is the fix; hunting tells you whether you're already too late. The highest-fidelity detection for an OS command injection in ColdFusion is simple and extremely low-noise: the ColdFusion server process spawning a shell. Legitimate ColdFusion deployments almost never have cfusion.exe/jrunsvc.exe (Windows) or cfusion/java under the ColdFusion home (Linux) spawning cmd.exe, powershell.exe, /bin/sh, or /bin/bash. When they do, it's either exploitation or a misbehaving legacy cfexecute integration — both worth investigating.
Sigma Rules
---
title: ColdFusion Service Spawning OS Shell (Possible CVE-2026-48362 Exploitation)
id: 3f8c2a71-6b4d-4e91-a2c7-9d1e5f0a8b33
status: experimental
description: Detects the ColdFusion server process spawning cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or other shells — a high-fidelity indicator of OS command injection exploitation such as CVE-2026-48362.
references:
- https://thehackernews.com/2026/08/adobe-patches-three-cvss-100-coldfusion.html
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
author: Security Arsenal
date: 2026/08/12
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059
- attack.t1190
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_parent:
ParentImage|endswith:
- '\cfusion.exe'
- '\jrunsvc.exe'
- '\jrun.exe'
- '\coldfusion.exe'
selection_child:
Image|endswith:
- '\cmd.exe'
- '\powershell.exe'
- '\pwsh.exe'
- '\wscript.exe'
- '\cscript.exe'
- '\mshta.exe'
- '\rundll32.exe'
- '\certutil.exe'
- '\bitsadmin.exe'
- '\whoami.exe'
- '\net.exe'
- '\nltest.exe'
condition: selection_parent and selection_child
falsepositives:
- Legacy CFML applications using cfexecute for legitimate OS commands
level: high
---
title: Webshell Dropped into ColdFusion Webroot
id: 9a1d4e62-7c3f-4b58-b6d2-4e8f1a0c5d77
status: experimental
description: Detects creation of script files (CFM, JSP, ASPX) in ColdFusion webroot or CFIDE directories — consistent with post-exploitation webshell deployment following ColdFusion RCE.
references:
- https://thehackernews.com/2026/08/adobe-patches-three-cvss-100-coldfusion.html
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/003/
author: Security Arsenal
date: 2026/08/12
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1505.003
logsource:
category: file_event
product: windows
detection:
selection_path:
TargetFilename|contains:
- '\cfusion\wwwroot\'
- '\ColdFusion\'
- '\CFIDE\'
selection_ext:
TargetFilename|endswith:
- '.cfm'
- '.cfc'
- '.jsp'
- '.aspx'
- '.php'
condition: selection_path and selection_ext
falsepositives:
- Legitimate developer deployments of CFML templates (correlate with change windows)
level: medium
---
title: Linux ColdFusion Process Spawning Shell (Command Injection Indicator)
id: 5e7b9f03-2d8a-4c61-9a3b-8f2c6d4e1a90
status: experimental
description: Detects ColdFusion-related Java processes on Linux spawning interactive or scripting shells — a strong indicator of OS command injection exploitation (e.g., CVE-2026-48362).
references:
- https://thehackernews.com/2026/08/adobe-patches-three-cvss-100-coldfusion.html
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004/
author: Security Arsenal
date: 2026/08/12
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.004
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: linux
detection:
selection_parent:
ParentCommandLine|contains:
- 'cfusion'
- 'coldfusion'
- 'jrun'
selection_child:
Image|endswith:
- '/sh'
- '/bash'
- '/dash'
- '/zsh'
- '/python'
- '/python3'
- '/perl'
- '/curl'
- '/wget'
- '/nc'
- '/ncat'
condition: selection_parent and selection_child
falsepositives:
- Administrative maintenance scripts invoked through ColdFusion scheduled tasks
level: high
KQL — Microsoft Sentinel / Defender
This hunts both the command-injection execution pattern (ColdFusion spawning shells) and likely post-exploitation tooling, across Windows (DeviceProcessEvents) and Linux via Syslog ingestion:
// Hunt: ColdFusion service spawning shells or recon tooling — possible CVE-2026-48362 exploitation
let cfParents = dynamic(["cfusion.exe", "jrunsvc.exe", "jrun.exe", "coldfusion.exe"]);
let suspiciousChildren = dynamic(["cmd.exe", "powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "whoami.exe", "net.exe", "nltest.exe", "certutil.exe", "bitsadmin.exe", "curl.exe", "wscript.exe", "cscript.exe", "mshta.exe", "rundll32.exe"]);
let windowsEvents = DeviceProcessEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ (cfParents)
| where FileName in~ (suspiciousChildren)
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, ReportId
| extend Source = "Defender";
let linuxEvents = Syslog
| where SyslogMessage has_any ("cfusion", "coldfusion", "jrun")
| where SyslogMessage has_any ("/bin/sh", "/bin/bash", "curl ", "wget ", "python", "nc ", "base64")
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, HostIP, ProcessName, SyslogMessage
| extend Source = "Syslog";
union isfuzzy=true windowsEvents, linuxEvents
| order by TimeGenerated desc
Also hunt web access logs in Sentinel (via W3CIISLog or CommonSecurityLog) for anomalous requests to ColdFusion endpoints immediately preceding any shell execution — repeated requests to a single CFM template with encoded characters (%2e, %00, cmd=, |, ;, backticks) are classic command-injection probes.
Velociraptor VQL
For DFIR triage of a ColdFusion host you suspect may already be compromised, this artifact pulls suspicious child processes of the ColdFusion service and recently modified scripts in the webroot:
-- Artifact: ColdFusion Command Injection Triage (CVE-2026-48362)
-- 1. Suspicious child processes of ColdFusion service
SELECT Pid, Ppid, Name, Exe, CommandLine, Username, CreateTime
FROM pslist()
WHERE CommandLine =~ '(?i)(cmd\.exe|powershell|pwsh|whoami|certutil|bitsadmin|/bin/(ba)?sh|curl|wget|nc )'
AND (
Exe =~ '(?i)(cmd|powershell|pwsh|sh|bash|curl|wget|nc)'
)
-- 2. Recently created/modified script files in ColdFusion webroots (last 14 days)
SELECT FullPath, Size, Mtime, Ctime
FROM glob(globs=[
'C:/ColdFusion*/cfusion/wwwroot/**/*.cfm',
'C:/ColdFusion*/cfusion/wwwroot/**/*.cfc',
'C:/ColdFusion*/cfusion/wwwroot/**/*.jsp',
'C:/ColdFusion*/cfusion/wwwroot/CFIDE/**/*',
'/opt/coldfusion*/cfusion/wwwroot/**/*.cfm',
'/opt/coldfusion*/cfusion/wwwroot/**/*.jsp'
])
WHERE Mtime > (now() - 1209600)
ORDER BY Mtime DESC
Any CFM/JSP file in the webroot modified around the time of suspicious inbound HTTP requests — especially one containing cfexecute, createObject("java","java.lang.Runtime"), or base64 blobs — should be pulled for analysis immediately.
Remediation / Verification Script
Use this PowerShell script on Windows ColdFusion hosts to enumerate installed ColdFusion version info, check for unexpected child processes of the ColdFusion service (a live-compromise indicator), and flag recently modified webroot scripts:
# ColdFusion CVE-2026-48362 triage & verification script
# Run elevated on each ColdFusion host. Review output before patching.
# 1. Identify running ColdFusion services and their versions
Write-Host "=== ColdFusion Services ===" -ForegroundColor Cyan
Get-CimInstance Win32_Service | Where-Object {
$_.Name -match 'ColdFusion|cfusion|jrun' -or $_.PathName -match 'ColdFusion'
} | Select-Object Name, State, StartName, PathName | Format-List
# 2. Check for suspicious child processes of the ColdFusion service (live exploitation indicator)
Write-Host "=== Suspicious Child Processes of ColdFusion ===" -ForegroundColor Cyan
$cfProcs = Get-CimInstance Win32_Process | Where-Object { $_.Name -match 'cfusion|jrun' }
foreach ($p in $cfProcs) {
Get-CimInstance Win32_Process | Where-Object { $_.ParentProcessId -eq $p.ProcessId } |
Where-Object { $_.Name -match 'cmd|powershell|pwsh|certutil|bitsadmin|whoami|net\.exe|wscript|cscript|mshta' } |
Select-Object ProcessId, Name, CommandLine, CreationDate | Format-List
}
# 3. Flag recently modified scripts in the webroot (last 14 days) - possible webshells
Write-Host "=== Recently Modified Webroot Scripts ===" -ForegroundColor Cyan
Get-ChildItem -Path 'C:\ColdFusion*\cfusion\wwwroot' -Recurse -Include *.cfm,*.cfc,*.jsp,*.aspx,*.php -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
Where-Object { $_.LastWriteTime -gt (Get-Date).AddDays(-14) } |
Sort-Object LastWriteTime -Descending |
Select-Object FullName, LastWriteTime | Format-Table -AutoSize
# 4. Confirm current hotfix level - compare against Adobe advisory APSB26-xx patched builds
Write-Host "=== ColdFusion Version ===" -ForegroundColor Cyan
Get-ChildItem 'C:\ColdFusion*\cfusion\lib\cfusion.jar' -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
Select-Object FullName, @{N='Version';E={$_.VersionInfo.ProductVersion}}, LastWriteTime | Format-List
Write-Host "ACTION: Verify version against https://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/coldfusion.html and apply the latest hotfix via the ColdFusion Administrator or command-line installer." -ForegroundColor Yellow
For Linux hosts, the equivalent rapid triage:
#!/bin/bash
# ColdFusion Linux triage - run as root on each ColdFusion host
echo "=== ColdFusion processes and version ==="
ps aux | grep -iE 'cfusion|coldfusion|jrun' | grep -v grep
cat /opt/coldfusion*/cfusion/lib/updates/chf*.txt 2>/dev/null | head -20
echo "=== Suspicious child processes of ColdFusion ==="
CF_PID=$(pgrep -f cfusion | head -1)
[ -n "$CF_PID" ] && ps --ppid "$CF_PID" -o pid,comm,args
echo "=== Webroot scripts modified in last 14 days ==="
find /opt/coldfusion*/cfusion/wwwroot -type f \( -name '*.cfm' -o -name '*.cfc' -o -name '*.jsp' \) -mtime -14 -ls 2>/dev/null
echo "=== Outbound connections from ColdFusion process (C2 check) ==="
[ -n "$CF_PID" ] && ss -tnp | grep "$CF_PID"
Remediation
-
Patch immediately — this is an emergency change. Download the latest ColdFusion hotfix from Adobe's official security bulletin page: https://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/coldfusion.html. Apply the corresponding updates for Adobe Commerce (https://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/magento.html) and Campaign Classic (https://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/campaign.html). Verify the post-patch build number against the advisory — don't trust a "success" message alone.
-
If you cannot patch within 24–72 hours, reduce exposure now:
- Block external access to
/CFIDE/,/CFIDE/administrator/, and any unused CFM endpoints at the WAF/reverse proxy. - Place ColdFusion behind a WAF rule set with command-injection signatures (ModSecurity CRS includes relevant rules — verify they're in blocking, not detection-only, mode).
- Restrict outbound egress from ColdFusion servers — RCE with no egress is far less useful to an attacker.
- Block external access to
-
Run the service with least privilege. The reason these bugs score 10.0 is that ColdFusion too often runs as SYSTEM or root. Move the service to a dedicated low-privilege account with no interactive logon and tightly scoped filesystem rights.
-
Hunt before and after patching. Patching closes the hole; it does not evict an attacker who got in last week. Run the detections above across a lookback window of at least 30 days, and check for webshells in the webroot, new local accounts, and anomalous scheduled tasks/services.
-
Watch CISA KEV. Given the score and product, these CVEs are strong KEV candidates. If added, federal agencies get a mandated remediation deadline — and you should treat that deadline as your own.
-
Validate with your scanning stack. Confirm your vulnerability scanner has updated detection signatures for these Adobe flaws, and re-scan after patching to close the loop for your change-management record.
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