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CVE-2026-78568: Critical SQL Injection in WordPress Total Donations Plugin — Detection, Hunting, and Remediation Guide

SA
Security Arsenal Team
August 25, 2026
9 min read

The NVD has published CVE-2026-78568, a CVSS 9.8 (Critical), network-exploitable SQL injection vulnerability affecting the Total Donations plugin for WordPress in all versions up to and including 2.0.5. The flaw is exploitable by unauthenticated, remote attackers — no account, no session, no user interaction. If your organization runs WordPress with this plugin installed, your database contents — donor PII, administrative credentials, payment metadata — are one crafted HTTP request away from disclosure. This is a patch-or-remove-now event.

SQL injection in a WordPress plugin is not a theoretical nuisance. WordPress sites sit at the edge of the network, are scanned continuously by automated exploit infrastructure, and are among the most frequently compromised platforms on the internet. A 9.8 unauthenticated SQLi in a plugin that handles donation workflows means attackers are directly incentivized: donor databases contain names, emails, addresses, and transaction histories, and the same wp_users table that stores your admin password hashes is reachable through the same database connection.

Technical Analysis

Affected Products and Versions

AttributeDetail
CVECVE-2026-78568
CVSS v3.x9.8 (Critical) — Network / Unauthenticated
ComponentTotal Donations plugin for WordPress
Affected versionsAll versions ≤ 2.0.5
Root causeInsufficient escaping of user-supplied input + lack of prepared statements
ImpactArbitrary SQL appended to existing queries; sensitive data extraction

How the Vulnerability Works (Defender's View)

The plugin fails on two classic defensive controls simultaneously:

  1. Insufficient escaping of a user-supplied parameter — input arriving over HTTP is concatenated into a SQL string without being passed through WordPress's escaping functions (e.g., esc_sql(), sanitize_text_field()).
  2. Lack of query preparation — the vulnerable code path does not use $wpdb->prepare(), meaning attacker-controlled tokens are interpreted as SQL syntax rather than string literals.

The practical result: an unauthenticated attacker can send a crafted request to a plugin-exposed endpoint (typically via /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php with a plugin-registered action, or a direct plugin file under /wp-content/plugins/) and append arbitrary SQL to an existing query. From there, the standard SQLi playbook applies:

  • Union-based extraction of wp_users (user_login, user_pass hashes, user_email)
  • Time-based blind extraction (SLEEP(), BENCHMARK()) where output is not reflected
  • Error-based extraction via extractvalue() / updatexml() on MySQL
  • Reading wp_options for API keys, SMTP credentials, and serialized plugin secrets

Exploitation requires nothing more than network reachability to the WordPress instance. Because the attack executes within the PHP/MySQL context of the web application, traditional host-based controls see nothing — the malicious input arrives as a legitimate-looking HTTP request.

Exploitation Status

At the time of writing, CVE-2026-78568 has been published by NVD with a Critical rating. Historically, unauthenticated SQLi vulnerabilities in WordPress plugins attract automated scanning and mass exploitation within days to weeks of public disclosure — exploit writers monitor NVD and Wordfence-style feeds specifically for this vulnerability class. Defenders should operate under the assumption that public PoC and active scanning are imminent or already underway. Check the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog and the NVD entry for updated KEV status.

Detection & Response

Detection for this threat lives primarily in three places: web access logs (the crafted request), WAF/proxy telemetry (SQLi pattern matching), and database-layer anomalies (unusual query volume or error rates from the WordPress DB account). Host-based EDR is secondary but useful for post-exploitation (e.g., php/apache/nginx spawning shells after credential theft).

Sigma Rules

These rules assume you are ingesting web server (IIS/Apache/Nginx) or reverse-proxy logs into a Sigma-compatible pipeline. They are deliberately scoped to the plugin path/ajax context plus SQLi tokens to minimize noise — a generic SQLi rule without the plugin context would drown your queue.

YAML
---
title: CVE-2026-78568 Total Donations Plugin SQL Injection Attempt
id: 9c1f4e7a-2b3d-4f58-9a6c-7e2d1b8f0a45
status: experimental
description: Detects SQL injection payloads in HTTP requests targeting WordPress Total Donations plugin paths or admin-ajax.php with SQL metacharacters indicative of CVE-2026-78568 exploitation.
references:
  - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-78568
author: Security Arsenal
date: 2026/04/06
tags:
  - attack.initial_access
  - attack.t1190
logsource:
  category: webserver
  product: apache
  service: access
detection:
  selection_plugin_path:
    cs-uri|contains:
      - '/wp-content/plugins/total-donations'
      - 'admin-ajax.php'
  selection_sqli_tokens:
    cs-uri-query|contains:
      - '%27'
      - 'union%20select'
      - 'union+select'
      - 'sleep('
      - 'benchmark('
      - 'extractvalue('
      - 'updatexml('
      - 'information_schema'
  condition: selection_plugin_path and selection_sqli_tokens
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate security scanning from authorized internal scanners (allowlist scanner IPs)
level: critical
---
title: WordPress Database Credential Extraction via SQLi Keywords
id: 3d8b2a1c-5f47-4e91-b6d2-0c9a3f7e5b18
status: experimental
description: Detects HTTP requests containing SQLi tokens combined with WordPress table names (wp_users, wp_options), indicating active database extraction attempts consistent with post-exploitation of plugin SQL injection vulnerabilities.
references:
  - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-78568
author: Security Arsenal
date: 2026/04/06
tags:
  - attack.credential_access
  - attack.t1190
logsource:
  category: webserver
detection:
  selection_tables:
    cs-uri-query|contains:
      - 'wp_users'
      - 'wp_options'
      - 'user_pass'
      - 'user_login'
  selection_sqli:
    cs-uri-query|contains:
      - 'select'
      - 'union'
      - 'concat'
  condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
  - Authorized vulnerability assessments and penetration tests
level: high
---
title: Web Server Process Spawning Shell After SQLi Exploitation
id: 71a5c9e2-4d8b-4a3f-9c1e-2f6b8d0a5e37
status: experimental
description: Detects web server or PHP processes spawning command interpreters, a common post-exploitation behavior following SQL injection leading to credential theft or webshell deployment on WordPress hosts.
references:
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190/
author: Security Arsenal
date: 2026/04/06
tags:
  - attack.execution
  - attack.t1059
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: linux
detection:
  selection_parent:
    ParentImage|endswith:
      - '/apache2'
      - '/httpd'
      - '/php-fpm'
      - '/nginx'
  selection_child:
    Image|endswith:
      - '/bash'
      - '/sh'
      - '/dash'
      - '/curl'
      - '/wget'
  condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate plugin or backup scripts invoked by PHP (rare; investigate before allowlisting)
level: high

KQL — Microsoft Sentinel / Defender

This query assumes web access logs reach Sentinel via CEF/Syslog ingestion (CommonSecurityLog) or a custom IIS/Apache table. It hunts for SQLi tokens in requests targeting WordPress ajax endpoints and the plugin path, aggregated by source IP for triage.

KQL — Microsoft Sentinel / Defender
// Hunt for CVE-2026-78568 SQLi exploitation attempts against Total Donations plugin
let sqliTokens = dynamic(["%27", "union select", "union+select", "sleep(", "benchmark(", "extractvalue(", "updatexml(", "information_schema", "wp_users", "user_pass"]);
CommonSecurityLog
| where TimeGenerated > ago(14d)
| where RequestURL has_any ("admin-ajax.php", "total-donations", "wp-content/plugins")
| extend DecodedURL = url_decode(RequestURL)
| extend MatchedTokens = extract_all(@"(%27|'|union select|sleep\(|benchmark\(|extractvalue\(|updatexml\(|information_schema|wp_users|user_pass)", DecodedURL)
| where array_length(MatchedTokens) > 0
| summarize RequestCount = count(), SampleURLs = make_set(strcat(RequestMethod, " ", DecodedURL), 5) by SourceIP, DestinationHostName, bin(TimeGenerated, 1h)
| where RequestCount >= 2
| order by RequestCount desc;
// Correlate: suspicious DB-layer errors or high-volume queries from WordPress app servers via Syslog
Syslog
| where TimeGenerated > ago(14d)
| where ProcessName has_any ("mysqld", "mariadbd")
| where SyslogMessage has_any ("SQL syntax", "wp_users", "unauthenticated")
| summarize ErrorCount = count() by Computer, bin(TimeGenerated, 30m)
| where ErrorCount > 20;

Velociraptor VQL

Use this artifact to sweep WordPress hosts for evidence of compromise: recently modified PHP files in the plugin directory (dropped webshells) and access-log hits matching the exploitation pattern.

VQL — Velociraptor
-- Hunt for webshells and SQLi access-log evidence on WordPress hosts
-- 1) Recently modified PHP files under the Total Donations plugin directory (potential dropped webshells)
SELECT FullPath, Size, Mtime, Ctime
FROM glob(globs='/var/www/**/wp-content/plugins/total-donations/**/*.php')
WHERE Mtime > now() - 1209600  -- modified within last 14 days
ORDER BY Mtime DESC;

-- 2) Access log entries with SQLi tokens targeting plugin/ajax endpoints
SELECT FullPath AS LogFile, Line
FROM foreach(row=glob(globs='/var/log/{apache2,nginx,httpd}/*access*.log'),
query={
  SELECT FullPath, Line
  FROM parse_lines(filename=FullPath, accessor='file')
  WHERE Line =~ 'admin-ajax\\.php|total-donations'
    AND Line =~ '(%27|union.{0,3}select|sleep\\(|benchmark\\(|information_schema|wp_users)'
});

Remediation & Verification Script

Run this Bash script on WordPress hosts (or against your fleet via your orchestration tool) to identify the plugin, check its version, and neutralize the vulnerable component until a patched release is deployed.

Bash / Shell
#!/bin/bash
# CVE-2026-78568 — Total Donations plugin SQLi mitigation/verification
# Run as root or a user with read access to the WordPress installation.

WP_ROOT="${1:-/var/www/html}"
PLUGIN_DIR="$WP_ROOT/wp-content/plugins/total-donations"

echo "[*] Checking for Total Donations plugin under $WP_ROOT ..."

if [ ! -d "$PLUGIN_DIR" ]; then
  echo "[+] Plugin directory not found. Verify WP root path; host may not be affected."
  exit 0
fi

# Extract plugin version from the main plugin file header
VERSION=$(grep -ri "Version:" "$PLUGIN_DIR" --include="*.php" | head -1 | awk '{print $NF}' | tr -d '[:space:]')
echo "[!] Total Donations plugin detected. Installed version: ${VERSION:-unknown}"

# Versions <= 2.0.5 are vulnerable per CVE-2026-78568
if [ -n "$VERSION" ] && [ "$(printf '%s\n2.0.5\n' "$VERSION" | sort -V | head -1)" = "$VERSION" ]; then
  echo "[CRITICAL] Vulnerable version (<= 2.0.5) detected. Deactivating plugin..."
  if command -v wp >/dev/null 2>&1; then
    wp plugin deactivate total-donations --path="$WP_ROOT" --allow-root && echo "[+] Plugin deactivated via WP-CLI."
  else
    mv "$PLUGIN_DIR" "${PLUGIN_DIR}.disabled-$(date +%Y%m%d%H%M%S)" && echo "[+] WP-CLI unavailable; plugin directory renamed to disable it."
  fi
else
  echo "[+] Installed version appears newer than 2.0.5. Confirm against vendor advisory."
fi

# Review recent access logs for exploitation attempts
echo "[*] Scanning access logs (last 100k lines) for SQLi indicators..."
grep -hEi "total-donations|admin-ajax" /var/log/apache2/*access*.log /var/log/nginx/*access*.log 2>/dev/null \
  | tail -100000 \
  | grep -Ei "(%27|union.{0,3}select|sleep\(|benchmark\(|information_schema|wp_users|extractvalue\()" \
  | awk '{print $1}' | sort | uniq -c | sort -rn | head -20

echo "[*] Done. Any source IPs above should be treated as hostile: block, then pivot to IR scoping."

Remediation

  1. Patch immediately. Update the Total Donations plugin to a fixed release the moment one is published. Monitor the plugin's page on wordpress.org/plugins and the NVD entry for the fixed version number. If no patch is available, remove or deactivate the plugin — a donation workflow outage is cheaper than a full database compromise.
  2. If you cannot patch today, apply a virtual patch. Add WAF rules (ModSecurity/OWASP CRS with the SQLi ruleset enabled, or your cloud WAF equivalent) blocking requests containing SQL metacharacters to admin-ajax.php actions registered by the plugin and to any direct plugin file access under /wp-content/plugins/total-donations/.
  3. Block direct plugin file access. Ensure your web server configuration denies direct HTTP access to PHP files under plugin directories that don't need it (all requests should route through WordPress).
  4. Harden the database layer. Enforce least privilege on the WordPress MySQL account — it should never have FILE, SUPER, or cross-database access. This limits blast radius even if injection succeeds.
  5. Hunt retrospectively. Run the queries above across at least the last 30 days of web logs. Any hit means treat the database as compromised: rotate all WordPress admin credentials, invalidate sessions and salts (wp-config.php keys), rotate API keys stored in wp_options, and force password resets for donor/user accounts.
  6. Reduce attack surface permanently. Audit your WordPress plugin inventory. Unmaintained or low-install-count plugins are your highest-risk components; remove anything not business-critical, and subscribe to a vulnerability feed covering WordPress ecosystem CVEs.

Unauthenticated SQLi in a widely deployed WordPress plugin is the exact vulnerability class that fuels mass-compromise campaigns. Treat this as an emergency change, not a routine patch cycle.

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