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CVE-2026-90436: Apache Axis Unsafe Reflection Actively Exploited Against Atlassian Confluence Data Center and N-able N-central — Detection and Remediation Guide

SA
Security Arsenal Team
November 16, 2026
16 min read

On November 6, 2026, the Apache Software Foundation disclosed CVE-2026-90436 — a critical unsafe reflection vulnerability (CWE-470) in Apache Axis 1.x carrying a CVSS score of 9.8 (Critical). The flaw enables unauthenticated remote code execution via attacker-controlled class loading through Java reflection mechanisms.

The situation escalated rapidly. Since the initial disclosure, security researchers at Rapid7 have confirmed that Atlassian Confluence Data Center and N-able N-central ship with the vulnerable Axis library in certain configurations — and both products are now being actively exploited in the wild.

If your organization runs either product, treat this as an emergency patch event. This post provides the technical breakdown, detection content, and remediation steps your team needs.


Technical Analysis

Affected Products and Platforms

ProductVendorVulnerable ComponentNotes
Atlassian Confluence Data CenterAtlassianApache Axis 1.x (bundled)Requires non-default configuration
N-able N-centralN-able (SolarWinds)Apache Axis 1.x (bundled)Requires non-default configuration
Apache Axis 1.x (standalone)Apache Software FoundationAxis SOAP engineAll 1.x versions affected

Important: Both Atlassian and N-able have indicated that the vulnerable Axis library is only reachable in a non-default configuration. This means not every deployment is exploitable — but it also means many organizations may not realize they have the vulnerable code path enabled. Do not assume you are safe because you are running default settings; verify explicitly.

Vulnerability Mechanics (CWE-470: Unsafe Reflection)

Apache Axis 1.x is a legacy Java SOAP framework that processes XML-based web service requests. CVE-2026-90436 exploits the way Axis handles SOAP service deployment and method invocation.

The vulnerability is rooted in Axis's use of Java reflection to dynamically load and invoke classes specified in incoming SOAP requests. Specifically:

  1. Attack chain entry point: An attacker sends a crafted SOAP request to an exposed Axis endpoint (typically on the application's HTTP/HTTPS port).
  2. Unsafe class resolution: The Axis engine uses Class.forName() or equivalent reflection calls to resolve class names from attacker-controlled input in the SOAP envelope — without adequate validation or allowlisting.
  3. Arbitrary class instantiation: The attacker specifies a class present on the application's classpath (or loads a malicious class via a URLClassLoader gadget chain), leading to instantiation of arbitrary Java objects.
  4. Code execution: By chaining reflection calls — invoking setter methods, factory methods, or known gadget classes — the attacker achieves arbitrary code execution in the context of the application server process (typically running with elevated or service-level privileges).

This is a pre-authentication vulnerability. No credentials, session tokens, or prior access are required. The attacker only needs network reachability to the Axis SOAP endpoint.

Why the Non-Default Configuration Matters

In Confluence Data Center, the Axis SOAP API is not enabled by default in recent versions. However, organizations that have enabled remote API access (SOAP/XML-RPC) for integrations, automation, or legacy tooling may have inadvertently exposed the vulnerable Axis servlet.

In N-able N-central, the Axis library is used for certain web service integrations. Again, the vulnerable code path requires a specific configuration to be reachable — but given that N-central is an RMM platform often deployed in MSP environments with broad network access, the blast radius of a compromise is severe.

Exploitation Status

CONFIRMED ACTIVE EXPLOITATION. Rapid7 has detected real-world exploitation of CVE-2026-90436 against both Atlassian Confluence Data Center and N-able N-central instances. This is not a theoretical or proof-of-concept scenario — threat actors are actively scanning for and exploiting vulnerable deployments.

Given the 9.8 CVSS score, the unauthenticated nature of the flaw, and the confirmed exploitation, defenders should treat this with the same urgency as a zero-day event.

Threat Context: Why Confluence and N-central Are High-Value Targets

Confluence Data Center instances typically house an organization's internal documentation, architecture diagrams, credentials in plaintext pages, API keys, and operational runbooks. A compromised Confluence server is an intelligence goldmine for lateral movement and privilege escalation.

N-able N-central is a Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) platform used by MSPs and IT teams to manage endpoints at scale. Compromising N-central provides an attacker with a built-in lateral movement and persistence mechanism — the RMM agent itself. This mirrors the attack patterns we have seen in previous supply-chain and RMM-targeting campaigns where a single compromised management plane cascades into hundreds or thousands of downstream endpoints.


Detection & Response

SIGMA Rules

The following Sigma rules target observable behaviors associated with CVE-2026-90436 exploitation. These are designed to fire on the post-exploitation phase — process execution from the web server or RMM service — as well as the SOAP request pattern that triggers the vulnerability.

YAML
---
title: Confluence or Java Process Spawning Suspicious Child Processes
id: 3f8a1b42-7c2e-4d91-ae56-9b0c3d4e5f78
status: experimental
description: Detects Confluence Data Center or Java application server processes spawning command shells, script interpreters, or download utilities — consistent with post-exploitation activity following CVE-2026-90436 remote code execution via Apache Axis unsafe reflection.
references:
  - https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/etr-rapid7-detected-exploitation-of-cve-2026-90436-against-atlassian-confluence-data-center-n-able-n-central-also-exploited
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
author: Security Arsenal
date: 2026/11/06
tags:
  - attack.execution
  - attack.t1059
  - attack.t1190
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_parent:
    ParentImage|endswith:
      - '\java.exe'
      - '\javaw.exe'
      - '\tomcat.exe'
  selection_child:
    Image|endswith:
      - '\cmd.exe'
      - '\powershell.exe'
      - '\pwsh.exe'
      - '\wscript.exe'
      - '\cscript.exe'
      - '\mshta.exe'
      - '\certutil.exe'
      - '\curl.exe'
      - '\bitsadmin.exe'
      - '\rundll32.exe'
      - '\regsvr32.exe'
  condition: selection_parent and selection_child
falsepositives:
  - Confluence plugins or scheduled tasks that legitimately invoke scripts
  - Tomcat-based applications that use Runtime.exec() for legitimate operations
level: high
---
title: N-central Agent or Server Process Spawning Shell or Script Interpreter
id: 8d4e2f16-3a9b-4c57-bd28-1e7f9a0b5c34
status: experimental
description: Detects N-able N-central server or agent processes spawning command shells or script interpreters, which may indicate post-exploitation activity following CVE-2026-90436 exploitation via the bundled Apache Axis library.
references:
  - https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/etr-rapid7-detected-exploitation-of-cve-2026-90436-against-atlassian-confluence-data-center-n-able-n-central-also-exploited
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
author: Security Arsenal
date: 2026/11/06
tags:
  - attack.execution
  - attack.t1059
  - attack.t1190
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_parent:
    ParentImage|contains:
      - 'N-central'
      - 'NCentral'
      - 'nagent'
      - 'NableAgent'
  selection_child:
    Image|endswith:
      - '\cmd.exe'
      - '\powershell.exe'
      - '\pwsh.exe'
      - '\wscript.exe'
      - '\cscript.exe'
      - '\mshta.exe'
      - '\certutil.exe'
      - '\rundll32.exe'
  condition: selection_parent and selection_child
falsepositives:
  - N-central automated tasks and scripts pushed via the RMM platform itself
  - MSP-deployed monitoring scripts
level: high
---
title: Linux Java Process Spawning Shell — Possible Axis Exploitation
id: 5c1d9e37-6f4a-4b82-9c13-7d2e8f0a3b56
status: experimental
description: Detects Java processes on Linux spawning shells or common post-exploitation tools, consistent with remote code execution via CVE-2026-90436 against Confluence Data Center running on Linux.
references:
  - https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/etr-rapid7-detected-exploitation-of-cve-2026-90436-against-atlassian-confluence-data-center-n-able-n-central-also-exploited
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
author: Security Arsenal
date: 2026/11/06
tags:
  - attack.execution
  - attack.t1059
  - attack.t1190
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: linux
detection:
  selection_parent:
    ParentImage|endswith:
      - '/java'
      - '/jsvc'
  selection_child:
    Image|endswith:
      - '/sh'
      - '/bash'
      - '/dash'
      - '/zsh'
      - '/curl'
      - '/wget'
      - '/nc'
      - '/ncat'
      - '/python'
      - '/python3'
      - '/perl'
  condition: selection_parent and selection_child
falsepositives:
  - Confluence backup or indexing scripts invoked by the application
  - Custom Confluence plugins that execute system commands
level: high

KQL — Microsoft Sentinel / Defender

The following KQL queries hunt for CVE-2026-90436 exploitation indicators across endpoint and network telemetry ingested into Microsoft Sentinel or available via Microsoft Defender for Endpoint.

Query 1 — Java/Confluence Process Spawning Suspicious Children (Defender for Endpoint):

KQL — Microsoft Sentinel / Defender
// Hunt for Java/Tomcat processes spawning shells or LOLBins
// Targets post-exploitation from CVE-2026-90436 against Confluence Data Center
DeviceProcessEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("java.exe", "javaw.exe", "tomcat.exe", "java", "jsvc")
| where FileName in~ (
    "cmd.exe", "powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "wscript.exe", "cscript.exe",
    "mshta.exe", "certutil.exe", "curl.exe", "bitsadmin.exe", "rundll32.exe", "regsvr32.exe",
    "sh", "bash", "dash", "curl", "wget", "nc", "ncat", "python", "python3", "perl"
)
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine,
          FileName, ProcessCommandLine, AccountName, RemoteIP, ReportId
| sort by TimeGenerated desc

Query 2 — N-central Process Spawning Suspicious Children:

KQL — Microsoft Sentinel / Defender
// Hunt for N-able N-central server/agent processes spawning suspicious children
// Targets post-exploitation from CVE-2026-90436 against N-central
DeviceProcessEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName has_any ("N-central", "NCentral", "nagent", "NableAgent", "java.exe")
| where InitiatingProcessFolderPath has_any ("N-central", "NCentral", "Nable", "n-central")
    or InitiatingProcessFileName has_any ("N-central", "NCentral", "nagent")
| where FileName in~ (
    "cmd.exe", "powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "wscript.exe", "cscript.exe",
    "mshta.exe", "certutil.exe", "rundll32.exe", "regsvr32.exe"
)
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessFolderPath,
          InitiatingProcessCommandLine, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, AccountName, ReportId
| sort by TimeGenerated desc

Query 3 — Network Connections to Confluence or N-central SOAP Endpoints from Unusual Sources:

KQL — Microsoft Sentinel / Defender
// Hunt for inbound SOAP/XML-RPC requests to Confluence or N-central from external or unusual IPs
// Axis endpoints typically respond to POST requests with SOAP content
// Ingest via CommonSecurityLog (firewall/proxy) or Syslog from reverse proxies
CommonSecurityLog
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where RequestMethod == "POST"
| where RequestURL has_any (
    "/rpc/soap-axis",
    "/rpc/soap",
    "/axis/services",
    "/axis/",
    "/soap",
    "/services/"
)
| where SourceIP !startswith "10."
    and SourceIP !startswith "172.16."
    and SourceIP !startswith "192.168."
| project TimeGenerated, SourceIP, DestinationIP, DestinationPort, RequestURL,
          RequestMethod, RequestPayload, DeviceAction
| sort by TimeGenerated desc

Velociraptor VQL

The following VQL artifact hunts for evidence of post-exploitation activity on Confluence Data Center or N-central servers, focusing on suspicious child processes and recently modified web application files (potential webshells).

VQL — Velociraptor
-- Hunt for suspicious child processes spawned by Java/Tomcat/N-central
-- and recently modified JSP/webshell files in Confluence web directories
-- Relevant to CVE-2026-90436 post-exploitation investigation

-- Part 1: Suspicious process tree
SELECT Pid, Ppid, Name, Exe, CommandLine, Username, CreateTime
FROM pslist()
WHERE (
    -- Java or Tomcat spawning suspicious children
    (Name =~ '(?i)java|javaw|tomcat|jsvc'
     AND CommandLine =~ '(?i)cmd|powershell|pwsh|bash|/sh|curl|wget|certutil|mshta|rundll32')
    OR
    -- N-central processes spawning shells
    (Exe =~ '(?i)N-central|NCentral|NableAgent|nagent'
     AND CommandLine =~ '(?i)cmd|powershell|pwsh|wscript|cscript|mshta')
)
VQL — Velociraptor
-- Part 2: Hunt for recently modified JSP files in Confluence directories (webshell artifacts)
-- Adjust the path glob based on your Confluence installation directory
SELECT FullPath, Size, Mtime, Ctime
FROM glob(globs=[
    'C:/Program Files/Atlassian/Confluence/**/*.jsp',
    'C:/Atlassian/Confluence/**/*.jsp',
    '/opt/atlassian/confluence/**/*.jsp',
    '/var/atlassian/application-data/confluence/**/*.jsp',
    'C:/Program Files (x86)/N-able/**/*.jsp',
    '/opt/n-central/**/*.jsp'
])
WHERE Mtime > now() - 604800  -- Files modified in the last 7 days
ORDER BY Mtime DESC

Remediation Script

The following Bash script checks for the presence of the vulnerable Apache Axis library and SOAP endpoint exposure on Linux-based Confluence Data Center and N-central servers.

Bash / Shell
#!/bin/bash
# CVE-2026-90436 — Apache Axis Unsafe Reflection Detection Script
# Run on Confluence Data Center or N-central Linux servers
# Security Arsenal — Incident Response

echo "==================================================="
echo " CVE-2026-90436 Apache Axis Vulnerability Checker"
echo " $(date)"
echo "==================================================="
echo ""

# --- Check 1: Search for Axis JAR files ---
echo "[CHECK 1] Searching for Apache Axis 1.x JAR files..."
AXIS_JARS=$(find /opt/atlassian /var/atlassian /opt/n-central /usr/share -name "axis*.jar" -o -name "axis-*.jar" 2>/dev/null)
if [ -n "$AXIS_JARS" ]; then
    echo "  [!] FOUND Axis JAR files:"
    echo "$AXIS_JARS" | while read -r jar; do
        VERSION=$(echo "$jar" | grep -oP 'axis-[0-9]+\.[0-9]+[0-9.]*' | head -1)
        echo "      $jar  (Version: ${VERSION:-unknown})"
    done
    echo "  [!] ACTION REQUIRED: Check if these are vulnerable 1.x versions."
else
    echo "  [OK] No Axis JAR files found in standard paths."
fi
echo ""

# --- Check 2: Check if SOAP/Axis endpoint is enabled in Confluence ---
echo "[CHECK 2] Checking Confluence for SOAP/Axis endpoint exposure..."
# Look for Axis servlet mappings in web.xml
WEB_XML_PATHS=$(find /opt/atlassian/confluence -name "web.xml" -path "*/confluence/*" 2>/dev/null)
if [ -n "$WEB_XML_PATHS" ]; then
    echo "$WEB_XML_PATHS" | while read -r webxml; do
        if grep -qi "axis" "$webxml" 2>/dev/null; then
            echo "  [!] AXIS REFERENCE FOUND in: $webxml"
            grep -i "axis" "$webxml" | head -5
        fi
    done
fi

# Check Confluence configuration for remote API settings
CONF_CONFIG=$(find /var/atlassian -name "confluence.cfg.xml" 2>/dev/null)
if [ -n "$CONF_CONFIG" ]; then
    echo "  Checking Confluence configuration..."
    grep -i "remote.api\|soap\|xmlrpc\|axis" $CONF_CONFIG 2>/dev/null
fi

echo ""

# --- Check 3: Check if SOAP endpoint is responding ---
echo "[CHECK 3] Testing local SOAP endpoint availability..."
for PORT in 8090 8091 8443 443 80; do
    RESPONSE=$(curl -sk -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" --connect-timeout 3 "http://localhost:$PORT/rpc/soap-axis/confluenceservice-v2?wsdl" 2>/dev/null)
    if [ "$RESPONSE" = "200" ]; then
        echo "  [CRITICAL] Axis SOAP endpoint responding on port $PORT (HTTP $RESPONSE)"
        echo "  [CRITICAL] This instance may be VULNERABLE to CVE-2026-90436"
    fi
done
for PORT in 443 8443 10000; do
    RESPONSE=$(curl -sk -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" --connect-timeout 3 "https://localhost:$PORT/axis/services" 2>/dev/null)
    if [ "$RESPONSE" = "200" ]; then
        echo "  [CRITICAL] Axis services endpoint responding on HTTPS port $PORT (HTTP $RESPONSE)"
    fi
done
echo "  [OK] Endpoint check complete."
echo ""

# --- Check 4: Check for suspicious child processes of Java ---
echo "[CHECK 4] Checking for suspicious child processes of Java..."
JAVA_PIDS=$(pgrep -f "java" 2>/dev/null)
if [ -n "$JAVA_PIDS" ]; then
    for PID in $JAVA_PIDS; do
        CHILDREN=$(ps --ppid "$PID" -o pid,comm,args --no-headers 2>/dev/null)
        if echo "$CHILDREN" | grep -qE 'bash|sh|curl|wget|nc|python|perl'; then
            echo "  [ALERT] Java PID $PID has suspicious children:"
            echo "$CHILDREN"
        fi
    done
    echo "  [OK] Process check complete."
else
    echo "  [OK] No Java processes currently running."
fi
echo ""

# --- Check 5: Check for recently modified JSP files (webshell indicators) ---
echo "[CHECK 5] Checking for recently modified JSP files (last 7 days)..."
RECENT_JSP=$(find /opt/atlassian /var/atlassian /opt/n-central -name "*.jsp" -mtime -7 2>/dev/null)
if [ -n "$RECENT_JSP" ]; then
    echo "  [ALERT] Recently modified JSP files found:"
    echo "$RECENT_JSP" | while read -r f; do
        echo "      $f  ($(stat -c '%y' "$f" 2>/dev/null))"
    done
else
    echo "  [OK] No recently modified JSP files found."
fi
echo ""

# --- Summary ---
echo "==================================================="
echo " SUMMARY"
echo "==================================================="
echo "Review the findings above. If any [CRITICAL] or [ALERT]"
echo "items were found, isolate the server and begin incident"
echo "response procedures immediately."
echo ""
echo "Reference: CVE-2026-90436 (Apache Axis 1.x CWE-470)"
echo "Rapid7: https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/etr-rapid7-detected-exploitation-of-cve-2026-90436-against-atlassian-confluence-data-center-n-able-n-central-also-exploited"
echo "==================================================="

Remediation

Immediate Actions (Within 24 Hours)

1. Determine Exposure

Verify whether your Confluence Data Center or N-central deployment has the vulnerable Axis SOAP endpoint enabled:

  • Confluence Data Center: Check whether the remote API (SOAP/XML-RPC) is enabled. Navigate to Administration > General Configuration > Remote API (XML-RPC & SOAP). If this is enabled and you are running a version with the bundled vulnerable Axis library, you are exposed.
  • N-able N-central: Review your N-central server configuration for any enabled SOAP-based web service integrations that rely on the Axis framework.

2. Disable the Vulnerable Endpoint (Immediate Mitigation)

If patching cannot be completed immediately:

  • Confluence Data Center: Disable the remote API (SOAP/XML-RPC) if it is not business-critical. This can be done via the admin console or by removing/commenting out Axis servlet mappings in the Confluence web.xml file, followed by an application restart.
  • N-able N-central: Disable or restrict access to the Axis-based web service endpoints. Contact N-able support for guidance on disabling specific SOAP integrations without breaking core RMM functionality.
  • Network-level control: Block inbound access to SOAP endpoint paths (/rpc/soap-axis/*, /axis/*, /services/*) at your reverse proxy, WAF, or load balancer. This is a stopgap, not a substitute for patching.

3. Apply Vendor Patches

Monitor the following vendor advisories for patch releases:

  • Atlassian: Check the Atlassian Security Advisories page for Confluence Data Center patches addressing CVE-2026-90436. Apply the patched version immediately when available.
  • N-able: Check the N-able Security Advisories page for N-central patches. MSPs should prioritize patching N-central servers given the downstream impact on managed endpoints.
  • Apache Axis: Refer to the Apache Software Foundation advisory for the upstream fix. Note that Axis 1.x is a legacy project — if your application depends on it directly, plan a migration to a supported SOAP framework.

4. Network Segmentation and Access Controls

  • Ensure Confluence Data Center is not directly exposed to the internet without a reverse proxy or WAF in front. If it must be externally accessible, restrict access by IP allowlist to known user segments.
  • N-central servers should have strict network ACLs limiting management plane access to authorized administrator networks only.
  • Review firewall rules for any rules that allow unrestricted inbound access to Confluence or N-central service ports (typically 8090, 8091, 8443, 443 for Confluence; 443, 8443, 10000 for N-central).

Investigation (If Exposure Is Confirmed)

If you determine that your instance had the vulnerable SOAP endpoint exposed, assume compromise and initiate incident response:

  1. Preserve evidence: Capture memory dumps, disk images, and application logs before patching or restarting.
  2. Review web server access logs for POST requests to Axis SOAP endpoints (/rpc/soap-axis/*, /axis/*, /services/*). Look for requests from unusual source IPs, requests with abnormally large payloads, or requests containing Java class names in SOAP body elements.
  3. Check for webshells: Search for recently created or modified JSP, WAR, or class files in the Confluence or N-central web application directories. The VQL artifact above can assist with this.
  4. Review process execution history: Use your EDR platform to search for the process execution patterns described in the Sigma rules — Java or N-central processes spawning shells, script interpreters, or download utilities.
  5. Credential exposure assessment: If Confluence was compromised, assume that any credentials, API keys, or sensitive information stored in Confluence pages may have been exfiltrated. Rotate all credentials stored in or accessible through the platform.
  6. Lateral movement check: For N-central compromises, audit all endpoint management actions performed through the platform — script deployments, software installations, remote sessions — for any unauthorized activity.

Longer-Term Hardening

  • Eliminate Axis 1.x from your environment. Apache Axis 1.x is a legacy framework that has not received active development for years. Any application that depends on it carries inherent risk. Work with vendors and internal development teams to migrate to modern, actively maintained alternatives.
  • Implement egress filtering on application servers. Confluence and N-central servers should have restricted outbound internet access — only the destinations required for licensing, updates, and integrations.
  • Deploy a WAF with rules to block known Axis exploitation patterns, including SOAP requests containing Java reflection class names or unusually structured XML payloads.
  • Enable enhanced logging on Confluence and N-central servers. Ensure that web server access logs, application logs, and OS audit logs are forwarded to your SIEM with adequate retention.
  • Subscribe to vendor security notifications from Atlassian, N-able, and Apache so that future advisories are received and acted on promptly.

Key Takeaways

CVE-2026-90436 is a textbook example of why legacy library dependencies continue to be one of the most dangerous attack surfaces in enterprise environments. Apache Axis 1.x has been superseded for years, yet it remains embedded in widely deployed products — creating exploitable attack surface that many organizations do not know they have.

The active exploitation of both Confluence Data Center and N-central elevates this from a patching exercise to an incident response event. If your organization runs either product, act now: verify exposure, patch or mitigate, and hunt for compromise.

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