DeepLoad Malware: Detecting ClickFix Attacks and WMI Persistence

Date: March 2026
Author: Senior Security Consultant, Security Arsenal

Introduction

A sophisticated new malware loader, dubbed DeepLoad, has been identified in the wild, demonstrating a dangerous convergence of social engineering and advanced evasion techniques. According to ReliaQuest researchers, DeepLoad utilizes the "ClickFix" tactic—fake browser update prompts—to initiate the infection chain. What sets DeepLoad apart is its reported use of AI-assisted obfuscation to bypass static analysis and its ability to commence credential theft immediately upon execution, often before security controls can block the primary loader.

For defenders, this represents a critical shift: the threat is not just persistence, but immediate data exfiltration. The use of WMI (Windows Management Instrumentation) for persistence further complicates detection, as it allows the malware to blend seamlessly into legitimate system administration activity. Immediate action is required to identify indicators of compromise (IOCs) and shore up browser-based attack vectors.

Technical Analysis

Threat Vector: ClickFix (Social Engineering)
Malware Family: DeepLoad (Loader)
Persistence Mechanism: WMI Event Subscription
Evasion: AI-assisted obfuscation, Process Injection
Objective: Stealing browser credentials (passwords, session cookies)

The Attack Chain

1. Initial Access (ClickFix): The campaign begins with the ClickFix technique. Victims are presented with fabricated, browser-injected dialogs claiming a critical software update is required (e.g., "Update Chrome"). Clicking this button triggers a malicious script.

2. Execution and Evasion: Upon interaction, DeepLoad executes. Researchers indicate it likely leverages AI-generated obfuscation, making traditional signature-based detection difficult. The malware employs process injection to hollow out legitimate processes, hiding its malicious payload within memory.

3. Immediate Credential Theft: Unlike standard loaders that focus first on establishing a C2 channel, DeepLoad prioritizes data theft. It targets browser credential stores immediately, capturing passwords and active sessions. This means users may be compromised even if the loader itself is subsequently detected and blocked.

4. Persistence (WMI): To survive reboots, DeepLoad installs a persistence mechanism via WMI. By creating event consumers (likely ActiveScriptEventConsumer or CommandLineEventConsumer), the malware ensures execution without creating easily detectable files or registry run keys.

Affected Platforms

• Operating Systems: Windows (versions utilizing WMI)
• Browsers: All major browsers targeted via ClickFix overlays (Chrome, Edge, Firefox)

Detection & Response

Classification: TYPE A (Technical Threat)

Given the specific TTPs described—WMI persistence and ClickFix—we can deploy high-fidelity detection rules. However, due to the "AI-assisted obfuscation," defenders must rely heavily on behavioral analysis rather than static file hashes.

SIGMA Rules

The following rule targets the specific persistence mechanism (WMI Event Consumer creation) associated with this threat. While WMI is used by admins, the creation of Event Consumers is rare in standard user environments and highly indicative of malware persistence.

---
title: DeepLoad Malware - WMI Event Consumer Persistence
id: 9a8b7c6d-5e4f-3a2b-1c0d-9e8f7a6b5c4d
status: experimental
description: Detects the creation of WMI Event Consumers (ActiveScript or CommandLine), a persistence method utilized by DeepLoad malware and other loaders to maintain access without using registry autoruns.
references:
  - https://thehackernews.com/2026/03/deepload-malware-uses-clickfix-and-wmi.html
author: Security Arsenal
date: 2026/03/01
tags:
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.t1546.003
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_wmi:
    Image|endswith:
      - '\wmic.exe'
      - '\powershell.exe'
    CommandLine|contains:
      - 'ActiveScriptEventConsumer'
      - 'CommandLineEventConsumer'
  selection_creation:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - 'Create'
      - 'New-Object'
  condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate system administration scripts (rare)
level: high

Threat Hunting Guidance

Since ClickFix involves browser manipulation and AI obfuscation may hide the initial payload file, hunting for the execution chain is more effective than hunting for the file itself.

1. Hunt for ClickFix Execution Patterns:
   • Data Source: EDR Process Logs.
   • Hypothesis: A browser process (chrome.exe, msedge.exe) spawns a shell or script interpreter (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, mshta.exe) directly.
   • KQL (Defender for Endpoint): kql DeviceProcessEvents

| where InitiatingProcessFileName in (~"chrome.exe", ~"msedge.exe", ~"firefox.exe")
| where FileName in (~"cmd.exe", ~"powershell.exe", ~"mshta.exe", ~"cscript.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, FileName, CommandLine

2. Hunt for WMI Anomalies:
   • Data Source: Windows Event Logs (Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity/Operational) or Sysmon EID 19 (WmiEventConsumerFilter).
   • Pattern: Look for Event ID 19 and 20/21 combinations occurring suspiciously close to user logon or browser execution.

Remediation

To effectively remediate and protect against DeepLoad:

1. Isolate and Investigate: If the SIGMA rule fires or the hunting queries return positive results, isolate the endpoint immediately. Credential theft occurs "immediately," so assume user sessions for the infected machine are compromised.

2. Remove WMI Persistence:

   • Use PowerShell to identify and remove malicious WMI subscriptions.
   • Command to list consumers:

Get-WmiObject -Namespace root\subscription -Class __EventConsumer

*   Command to list filters:

Get-WmiObject -Namespace root\subscription -Class __EventFilter

*   Analyze the `CommandLine` within the consumers. Remove any suspicious objects using `Remove-WmiObject`.

3. Force Password Resets: As DeepLoad targets browser credentials, require a password reset and MFA re-authentication for all accounts accessed from the infected machine.

4. User Awareness Training: Reiterate to end-users that legitimate browsers never update via a popup on a webpage requiring a click. Updates should only occur via the browser's internal "About" menu or managed software distribution tools (SCCM/Intune).

5. Restrict WMI: For high-security workstations, consider restricting WMI access or using Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) rules to block abuse of WMI for persistence.

Related Resources

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