Back to Intelligence

Dysphoria IoT Botnet: Defending Against Blockchain C2 and Relay Networks

SA
Security Arsenal Team
July 27, 2026
7 min read

In the cat-and-mouse game of threat actor disruption, the adversaries have evolved again. Following the March 2026 law enforcement operation against the "JackSkid" infrastructure, the tracked IoT botnet "Dysphoria"—monitored closely by CNCERT and XLab—has successfully re-architected its command and control (C2) infrastructure. Instead of relying on traditional, sinkhole-able domains, Dysphoria has adopted blockchain-based name services and implemented a victim relay mechanism.

For defenders, this represents a significant shift in the Threat Landscape. We are no longer just fighting malware; we are fighting resilient, decentralized infrastructure designed to withstand traditional takedown methods. If your environment manages IoT devices—routers, cameras, or edge computing nodes—you are the target. This post details the technical shift of Dysphoria and provides the necessary detection and remediation steps to protect your network.

Technical Analysis

The Evolution of Dysphoria

The Dysphoria botnet, consisting of compromised IoT devices, has moved away from static IP addresses or hardcoded domain names for C2 communication. In the wake of the JackSkid disruption, the operators implemented two critical defensive measures for their malicious network:

  1. Blockchain-Based Name Services: The botnet now queries blockchain name services (likely akin to ENS or decentralized DNS systems) to resolve C2 addresses. This renders standard domain blacklisting and DNS sinkholing ineffective. The "address" becomes a smart contract or a registry entry that can be updated instantly by the attacker without changing the bot code.

  2. Victim Relays: To obscure the true source of commands and traffic, Dysphoria utilizes infected devices as relay nodes. Traffic is routed through multiple compromised victims before reaching the actual C2 server or the target. This adds a layer of anonymity for the attacker and creates a mesh-like network that is difficult to dismantle.

Affected Platforms & Exploitation

While the specific CVE used for the initial infection is not detailed in this report (often relying on default credentials or older, unpatched IoT firmware), the operational shift impacts all Linux-based IoT infrastructure.

  • Affected Platforms: Linux-based embedded systems, routers, IP cameras, DVRs.
  • Attack Vector: The devices are compromised, join the P2P/relay network, and begin scanning for other vulnerable targets or relaying traffic.
  • Exploitation Status: Active. CNCERT and XLab have confirmed this activity is a direct response to recent takedowns, indicating active development and deployment.

Detection & Response

Detecting blockchain-based C2 and peer-to-peer (P2P) relay activity on IoT devices requires a shift from signature-based detection to behavioral network analysis. We are looking for IoT devices initiating connections to non-web ports and exhibiting behavior inconsistent with their function.

SIGMA Rules

YAML
---
title: Suspicious Outbound Connection to Common Blockchain P2P Ports
id: 8a4f2c1b-9e3d-4a5f-8b2c-1d3e4f5a6b7c
status: experimental
description: Detects IoT devices or Linux endpoints establishing outbound connections to ports commonly used for blockchain P2P communication (e.g., Ethereum, IPFS, libp2p).
references:
 - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/
author: Security Arsenal
date: 2026/07/15
tags:
 - attack.command_and_control
 - attack.t1071.001
logsource:
 category: network_connection
 product: linux
detection:
 selection:
   DestinationPort|in:
     - 30303 # Ethereum P2P
     - 8545  # Ethereum RPC
     - 4001  # IPFS Swarm
     - 1478  # libp2p
   Initiated: true
 filter:
   Image|endswith:
     - '/geth'
     - '/ipfs'
     - '/node'
falsepositives:
 - Legitimate blockchain nodes running on authorized servers
level: high
---
title: Linux IoT Device Establishing High Volume of Outbound Connections
id: b1c5d9e2-f3a4-4b8c-9e1a-2f3b4c5d6e7f
status: experimental
description: Detects potential botnet relay activity where a Linux IoT device initiates connections to numerous distinct external IPs, indicative of scanning or relay behavior.
references:
 - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/
author: Security Arsenal
date: 2026/07/15
tags:
 - attack.command_and_control
 - attack.t1090.003
logsource:
 category: network_connection
 product: linux
detection:
 selection:
   Initiated: true
 condition: selection | count DestinationIp > 50
 timeframe: 5m
falsepositives:
 - Network scanners or specific load balancers
level: medium

KQL (Microsoft Sentinel / Defender)

This query hunts for Linux/IoT devices in your environment connecting to high-risk ports or exhibiting C2 beaconing behavior via Syslog or CommonSecurityLog data.

KQL — Microsoft Sentinel / Defender
// Hunt for IoT connections to non-standard high ports often used in P2P/C2
let BlockchainPorts = dynamic([30303, 8545, 4001, 1478, 9944, 5001]);
let TimeWindow = 1h;
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(TimeWindow)
| where ActionType in ("ConnectionAllowed", "ConnectionSuccess")
| where RemotePort in (BlockchainPorts) or RemotePort >= 10000
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in ("busybox", "dropbear", "telnetd", "httpd", "mips", "arm") 
    or OSPlatform =~ "Linux"
| summarize Count=count(), DistinctIPs=dcount(RemoteIP) by DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, RemotePort
| where Count > 10 or DistinctIPs > 5
| project DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, RemotePort, Count, DistinctIPs
| order by Count desc

Velociraptor VQL

Use this artifact on suspected Linux endpoints to identify processes listening on non-standard ports or maintaining established connections to external IPs.

VQL — Velociraptor
-- Hunt for processes with established connections to non-standard ports
SELECT Pid, Name, Exe, Cmdline, Family, State, RemoteAddress, RemotePort
FROM foreach(row={
    SELECT Pid
    FROM pslist()
    WHERE Name =~ 'busybox' OR Name =~ 'dropbear' OR Name =~ 'httpd'
}, query={
    SELECT *
    FROM netstat(pid=Pid)
    WHERE State =~ 'ESTABLISHED' AND RemotePort > 1024 AND RemoteAddress NOT IN ('127.0.0.1', '::1', '0.0.0.0')
})

Remediation Script (Bash)

Run this script on Linux-based IoT devices to identify and mitigate potential relay activity by killing suspicious processes and blocking listening ports.

Bash / Shell
#!/bin/bash
# Dysphoria IoT Botnet - Relay Identification and Mitigation
# Usage: sudo ./check_dysphoria_relay.sh

echo "[*] Checking for listening processes on non-standard ports..."

# Identify processes listening on high ports (>1024) excluding standard SSH (22) and Web (80/443/8080)
suspicious_listeners=$(ss -tulnp | awk '{print $5}' | grep -o '[0-9]*$' | awk -F: '{if ($2 > 1024 && $2 != 22 && $2 != 80 && $2 != 443 && $2 != 8080) print $2}')

if [ -z "$suspicious_listeners" ]; then
    echo "[+] No suspicious listeners found on high ports."
else
    echo "[!] ALERT: Found listeners on the following high ports:"
    echo "$suspicious_listeners"
    
    echo "[*] Fetching process details..."
    for port in $suspicious_listeners; do
        pid=$(ss -tulnp | grep ":$port " | awk -F, '{print $2}' | awk '{print $1}' | cut -d'=' -f2)
        if [ ! -z "$pid" ]; then
            echo "[!] Port $port is used by PID $pid:"
            ps -p $pid -o pid,ppid,cmd
            
            # WARNING: Verify process legitimacy before killing
            # read -p "Kill process $pid? (y/n): " confirm
            # if [[ "$confirm" == "y" ]]; then
            #     kill -9 $pid
            #     echo "[+] Process $pid killed."
            # fi
        fi
    done
fi

echo "[*] Checking for established outbound connections to blockchain P2P ports (30303, 4001, 8545)..."
netstat -anp 2>/dev/null | grep -E 'ESTABLISHED' | grep -E ':30303|:4001|:8545|:1478'

echo "[+] Scan complete."

Remediation

Remediating a threat like Dysphoria requires a "Zero Trust" approach to IoT security. Traditional perimeter defenses are insufficient against blockchain C2s.

  1. Network Segmentation (Critical): Immediately isolate IoT devices into a dedicated VLAN. They should not be able to initiate outbound connections to the internet unless strictly necessary (e.g., for firmware updates). If they must communicate, use a strict proxy.

  2. Egress Filtering: Block outbound traffic from IoT segments to non-essential ports. Specifically, block access to known blockchain P2P ports (TCP/UDP 30303, 4001, 8545) unless a business need exists. Block access to public DNS resolvers; force IoT devices to use internal resolvers where you can inspect traffic.

  3. Factory Reset and Firmware Updates: For any device suspected of compromise:

    • Disconnect from the network.
    • Perform a factory reset to clear the malware.
    • Immediately update to the latest firmware version to patch the vulnerability used for initial access.
    • Change default credentials to strong, unique passwords.

  4. Disable Unused Services: On IoT gateways and routers, disable UPnP, Telnet, and SSH if not required. Ensure remote management interfaces are disabled or exposed only via VPN.

Related Resources

Security Arsenal Alert Triage Automation AlertMonitor Platform Book a SOC Assessment platform Intel Hub

alert-triagealert-fatiguesoc-automationfalse-positive-reductionalertmonitoriot-securitydysphoria-botnetthreat-huntingblockchain-c2

Is your security operations ready?

Get a free SOC assessment or see how AlertMonitor cuts through alert noise with automated triage.

Book a SOC AssessmentSee AlertMonitor in Action