The extradition of a Kazakh national from Italy to face federal charges in the United States marks a significant law enforcement victory — and a stark reminder of the persistent threat facing critical infrastructure. According to the Justice Department, this individual operated as an affiliate of the INC ransomware group, conducting encryption-based attacks against US schools, hospitals, and healthcare entities. If convicted, he faces up to 27 years in prison.
For defenders in healthcare and education, this case is not merely a news headline. It confirms that ransomware affiliates — often operating with impunity from overseas — view your organizations as high-value, soft targets. The INC ransomware operation has been particularly aggressive, employing double extortion tactics that combine file encryption with data theft and public leak threats. These attacks exploit common entry vectors that remain unpatched or misconfigured across thousands of environments.
This post breaks down the INC ransomware attack chain, provides actionable detection content for SOC teams, and outlines hardening steps to reduce your attack surface before affiliates like this one set their sights on your network.
Technical Analysis
The Threat: INC Ransomware and the Affiliate Model
INC ransomware first emerged in mid-2023 and quickly established itself as a formidable operation targeting healthcare, education, and government sectors. The group operates under a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) model, where affiliates gain access to the ransomware payload and infrastructure in exchange for a percentage of ransom payments.
The extradited suspect allegedly leveraged this model to conduct attacks against organizations that could least afford operational disruption — hospitals managing patient care and schools serving vulnerable populations.
Attack Chain and Initial Access Vectors
Based on incident response engagements and public threat intelligence, INC ransomware affiliates typically follow this attack chain:
-
Initial Access: Phishing emails with malicious attachments, exploitation of exposed RDP services, or compromised VPN credentials. The group has also been observed purchasing access from initial access brokers (IABs).
-
Persistence and Privilege Escalation: Deployment of legitimate remote access tools (AnyDesk, TeamViewer) to blend with administrative activity. Credential theft using tools like Mimikatz or exploitation of unpatched privilege escalation vulnerabilities.
-
Lateral Movement: Use of PsExec, WMI, or RDP to move laterally across the network. Affiliates often target backup servers and domain controllers to maximize impact.
-
Data Exfiltration: Before encryption, sensitive data is exfiltrated using Rclone, MegaSync, or custom scripts. This enables the double extortion model — pay the ransom or your data gets published.
-
Encryption: The ransomware payload is deployed across the network, often via Group Policy Objects (GPO) or PsExec. Files are encrypted with a combination of AES and RSA algorithms, and shadow copies are deleted to prevent recovery.
-
Extortion: Victims receive a ransom note directing them to a Tor negotiation portal. Non-payment results in data publication on the INC leak site.
Why Healthcare and Education?
These sectors are targeted for specific reasons:
- Legacy Systems: Hospitals and schools often run outdated Windows versions, unpatched medical devices, and end-of-life software that cannot be easily updated.
- Operational Urgency: A hospital with encrypted patient records faces life-or-death pressure to restore operations quickly, making ransom payment more likely.
- Sensitive Data: Healthcare records command premium prices on criminal marketplaces and provide leverage for extortion.
- Limited Security Budgets: Compared to financial services or tech companies, these organizations often lack mature SOC capabilities, making detection and response slower.
Detection & Response
SIGMA Rules
The following Sigma rules target observable behaviors associated with INC ransomware attacks. These rules focus on technique-based detection rather than specific IOCs, which change frequently across affiliate operations.
---
title: Shadow Copy Deletion via vssadmin or wmic
id: 8f2c4b1e-9a3d-4e5f-b6c7-2d3e4f5a6b7c
status: experimental
description: Detects deletion of volume shadow copies commonly performed by ransomware before encryption to prevent recovery.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490/
author: Security Arsenal
date: 2026/01/15
tags:
- attack.impact
- attack.t1490
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'vssadmin delete shadows'
- 'vssadmin.exe delete shadows'
- 'wmic shadowcopy delete'
- 'bcdedit /set {default} recoveryenabled no'
- 'bcdedit /set {default} bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures'
falsepositives:
- Legitimate backup maintenance scripts (rare)
level: high
---
title: Rclone Data Exfiltration to Cloud Storage
id: 3a7f9c2d-8b4e-4f1a-9c5d-1e2f3a4b5c6d
status: experimental
description: Detects execution of Rclone with cloud storage remotes, commonly used by ransomware groups for data exfiltration in double extortion attacks.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567.002/
author: Security Arsenal
date: 2026/01/15
tags:
- attack.exfiltration
- attack.t1567.002
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith: '\rclone.exe'
CommandLine|contains:
- 'copy'
- 'sync'
- 'move'
filter_legitimate:
CommandLine|contains:
- '--config "C:\\Program Files\\rclone'
condition: selection and not filter_legitimate
falsepositives:
- Legitimate backup operations using Rclone (uncommon in most environments)
level: high
---
title: Suspicious Remote Access Tool Execution
id: 5c9e1a3f-7b2d-4e8f-a6c9-3d4e5f6a7b8c
status: experimental
description: Detects execution of remote access tools commonly abused by ransomware affiliates for persistence and lateral movement.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219/
author: Security Arsenal
date: 2026/01/15
tags:
- attack.command_and_control
- attack.t1219
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith:
- '\AnyDesk.exe'
- '\TeamViewer.exe'
- '\ScreenConnect.exe'
- '\splashtop.exe'
filter_programfiles:
Image|startswith:
- 'C:\\Program Files\\AnyDesk\\'
- 'C:\\Program Files\\TeamViewer\\'
- 'C:\\Program Files (x86)\\AnyDesk\\'
condition: selection and not filter_programfiles
falsepositives:
- Legitimate IT remote support tools installed in non-standard paths
level: medium
KQL for Microsoft Sentinel
This hunt query identifies potential INC ransomware precursor activity by correlating shadow copy deletion with subsequent suspicious process execution patterns.
// Hunt for ransomware precursor activity: shadow copy deletion followed by encryption behavior
let TimeWindow = 1h;
let ShadowCopyDeletion = SecurityEvent
| where EventID == 4688
| where CommandLine has_any ("vssadmin delete shadows", "wmic shadowcopy delete", "bcdedit")
| project DeleteTime=TimeGenerated, Computer, Account, DeleteCommand=CommandLine, DeleteProcess=Process;
let SuspiciousActivity = SecurityEvent
| where EventID == 4688
| where CommandLine has_any ("rclone", "psexec", "wmic process call create")
| project ActivityTime=TimeGenerated, Computer, Account, ActivityCommand=CommandLine;
ShadowCopyDeletion
| join kind=inner SuspiciousActivity on Computer
| where ActivityTime between (DeleteTime .. DeleteTime + TimeWindow)
| project DeleteTime, ActivityTime, Computer, Account, DeleteCommand, ActivityCommand
| order by DeleteTime desc
For environments using Microsoft Defender for Endpoint, this query hunts for ransomware-associated file operations and process behaviors:
// Defender for Endpoint: Hunt for mass file encryption behavior
DeviceFileEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where ActionType == "FileRenamed"
| summarize FileCount = count(), Extensions = make_set(FileExtension) by DeviceId, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName
| where FileCount > 100
| join kind=inner (DeviceProcessEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("vssadmin", "bcdedit", "wbadmin")
| project DeviceId, ProcessCommandLine, ProcessTime=TimeGenerated) on DeviceId
| project DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileCount, Extensions, ProcessCommandLine, ProcessTime
| order by FileCount desc
Velociraptor VQL
This VQL artifact hunts for evidence of ransomware precursor activity across endpoints, including shadow copy deletion commands and suspicious remote access tool execution.
-- Hunt for ransomware precursor activity: shadow deletion and remote access tools
SELECT Pid, Name, CommandLine, Exe, Username, CreateTime
FROM pslist()
WHERE CommandLine =~ '(vssadmin.*delete.*shadows|wmic.*shadowcopy.*delete|bcdedit.*recoveryenabled)'
OR Exe =~ '(?i)(anydesk|teamviewer|screenconnect|splashtop)\.exe$'
OR CommandLine =~ '(?i)rclone.*(copy|sync|move)'
ORDER BY CreateTime DESC
Remediation
Immediate Actions for Healthcare and Education Organizations
1. Audit and Harden Remote Access
- Disable RDP on internet-facing systems. If RDP is required, place it behind a VPN with MFA.
- Audit for unauthorized remote access tools (AnyDesk, TeamViewer, ScreenConnect) and remove any that are not explicitly approved.
- Implement application allowlisting to prevent unauthorized remote access tool execution.
2. Protect Backup Infrastructure
- Implement the 3-2-1 backup rule: 3 copies of data, on 2 different media types, with 1 copy offline or immutable.
- Ensure backup systems are not accessible from production networks using standard domain credentials.
- Test restoration procedures regularly. A backup that cannot be restored is worthless.
- Monitor for shadow copy deletion attempts using the Sigma rules provided above.
3. Enforce Phishing-Resistant MFA
- Deploy MFA on all remote access, email, and administrative accounts.
- Prefer hardware keys (FIDO2) or certificate-based authentication over SMS or push notifications, which can be bypassed via MFA fatigue attacks.
- Implement conditional access policies that block authentication from unusual locations or devices.
4. Patch and Vulnerability Management
- Prioritize patching of internet-facing systems, VPN concentrators, and remote access infrastructure.
- Subscribe to CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog and remediate listed vulnerabilities within mandated timeframes.
- Conduct regular vulnerability scans of external attack surface to identify exposed services.
5. Network Segmentation
- Segment networks to limit lateral movement. Critical systems (EHR, patient monitoring, financial systems) should be isolated from general user networks.
- Implement firewall rules that restrict SMB, RDP, and administrative protocols between network segments.
- Deploy honeypots or canary credentials to detect lateral movement attempts.
6. Incident Response Preparedness
- Develop and test a ransomware-specific incident response plan that includes decision frameworks for ransom payment, communication templates, and legal/regulatory notification requirements.
- Establish relationships with external IR firms, legal counsel, and cyber insurance providers before an incident occurs.
- Conduct tabletop exercises that simulate ransomware scenarios, including decision points around operational continuity and patient/student safety.
For Organizations Currently Under Attack
If you suspect an active INC ransomware intrusion:
- Isolate affected systems immediately. Disconnect from the network but do NOT power off — forensic artifacts in memory may be critical.
- Engage professional incident response. Contact a DFIR firm with ransomware experience. Security Arsenal provides 24/7 emergency response for healthcare and education organizations.
- Preserve evidence. Capture memory dumps and forensic images before remediation.
- Report to law enforcement. Contact the FBI (ic3.gov) and CISA. Federal agencies can provide decryption assistance and threat intelligence.
- Review insurance obligations. Cyber insurance policies often have strict notification requirements and may require use of approved IR firms.
Conclusion
The extradition of this INC ransomware affiliate demonstrates that law enforcement is increasingly capable of reaching across borders to hold cybercriminals accountable. However, for every affiliate arrested, dozens more continue operations. The RaaS model ensures that ransomware remains accessible to threat actors with varying skill levels.
Healthcare and education organizations cannot rely on law enforcement as their primary defense. The detection rules and hardening guidance in this post provide a foundation, but implementation requires sustained commitment and resources. If your organization lacks the internal capability to deploy and monitor these controls, partnering with a managed security services provider with healthcare expertise is not optional — it is essential.
The next attack is already being planned. The question is whether your defenses will detect it in time.
Related Resources
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