Operation Endgame Aftermath & Cisco Root Exploits: Week 26 Threat Analysis

---
title: Potential Amadey Loader Persistence via Scheduled Task
id: 8a4c2d10-1f9e-4b3c-9a5d-6e7f8a9b0c1d
status: experimental
description: Detects the creation of scheduled tasks often used by Amadey loader for persistence, typically invoking PowerShell or cmd to download payloads.
references:
 - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005/
author: Security Arsenal
date: 2026/06/26
tags:
 - attack.persistence
 - attack.scheduled_task
 - attack.t1053.005
logsource:
 category: process_creation
 product: windows
detection:
 selection:
   Image|endswith:
     - '\schtasks.exe'
   CommandLine|contains:
     - '/create'
     - '/sc'
   CommandLine|contains|any:
     - 'http://'
     - 'https://'
 condition: selection
falsepositives:
 - Legitimate software installers updating via web tasks
level: high
---
title: StealC Info-Stealer Process Injection
id: 9b5d3e21-2a0f-5c4d-0b6e-7f8g9h0i1j2k
status: experimental
description: Detects potential StealC activity characterized by suspicious access to browser credential files or injection into common browser processes.
references:
 - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/001/
author: Security Arsenal
date: 2026/06/26
tags:
 - attack.credential_access
 - attack.t1055.001
logsource:
 category: process_access
 product: windows
detection:
 selection:
   SourceImage|contains:
     - '\AppData\'
     - '\Temp\'
   TargetImage|contains:
     - '\chrome.exe'
     - '\edge.exe'
     - '\firefox.exe'
   GrantedAccess|contains:
     - '0x1010'
     - '0x1410'
 condition: selection
falsepositives:
 - Legitimate browser extensions or security tools accessing process memory
level: high
---
title: Cisco Device Root Access Attempt via Web Interface
id: 0c1d2e3f-4b5c-6d7e-8f9a-0b1c2d3e4f5a
status: experimental
description: Detects potential exploitation attempts against Cisco web interfaces that may lead to root access, identified by anomalous URI patterns or administrative access anomalies.
references:
 - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190/
author: Security Arsenal
date: 2026/06/26
tags:
 - attack.initial_access
 - attack.exploitation
 - attack.t1190
logsource:
 category: webserver
 product: apache # Assuming generic syslog/web log ingestion for Cisco devices
detection:
 selection:
   c-uri|contains:
     - '/webui'
     - '/admin/'
   c-uri|contains|any:
     - '%2F' # URL encoding often used in exploits
     - 'logout'
     - 'exec'
   sc-status:
     - 200
     - 403 # Failed exploit attempts often return 403 before success
 condition: selection
falsepositives:
 - Legitimate administrative management
level: medium

// Hunt for Amadey/StealC C2 communication orSuspicious Scheduled Tasks
let SuspiciousProcesses = DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where ProcessCommandLine has "schtasks" and (ProcessCommandLine has "http" or ProcessCommandLine has "ftp");
// Check for network connections to known C2 ports or non-standard ports by common browsers (StealC behavior)
let SuspiciousNetwork = DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in ("chrome.exe", "msedge.exe", "firefox.exe")
| where RemotePort !in (80, 443, 8080);
// Hunt Cisco Exploitation via Syslog (CEF format assumed)
let CiscoLogs = Syslog
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where Facility contains "Cisco" 
| where SyslogMessage has "root" or SyslogMessage has "privilege" 
| extend ParsedMessage = parse_syslog(SyslogMessage)
| where ParsedMessage has "%"; // Often indicates input validation errors in exploits
;
union SuspiciousProcesses, SuspiciousNetwork, CiscoLogs

// Hunt for Amadey persistence (Scheduled Tasks) and StealC binaries
SELECT 
  OSPath,
  Mtime,
  Atime,
  Size,
  Mode.String
FROM glob(globs="C:/Windows/System32/Tasks/**/*.job")
WHERE Mtime > now() - 7d

-- Hunt for StealC common file paths or temp executables
SELECT 
  Pid,
  Name,
  Exe,
  CommandLine,
  Username
FROM pslist()
WHERE Exe =~ "[A-Za-z]{8}\.exe"  // Amadey/StealC often use random 8-char names in Temp
   AND Exe =~ "Temp"

# Remediation Script: Amadey & StealC Artifact Check and Removal
# Requires Administrative Privileges

Write-Host "Starting Security Arsenal Remediation Script..." -ForegroundColor Cyan

# 1. Identify Suspicious Scheduled Tasks (Amadey Persistence)
Write-Host "Checking for Suspicious Scheduled Tasks..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
$suspiciousTasks = Get-ScheduledTask | Where-Object { 
    $_.Actions.Execute -like "*powershell*" -or 
    $_.Actions.Execute -like "*cmd*" 
} | Where-Object { 
    $_.Actions.Arguments -match "http[s]?://" -or
    $_.Actions.Arguments -match "-enc"
}

if ($suspiciousTasks) {
    foreach ($task in $suspiciousTasks) {
        Write-Host "[!] Found suspicious task: $($task.TaskName)" -ForegroundColor Red
        # Unregister-ScheduledTask -TaskName $task.TaskName -Confirm:$false -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
    }
} else {
    Write-Host "[+] No suspicious scheduled tasks found." -ForegroundColor Green
}

# 2. Scan User Profiles for StealC/Amadey Artifacts in Temp Folders
Write-Host "Scanning for loader artifacts in User Temp directories..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
Get-ChildItem -Path "C:\Users\*\AppData\Local\Temp" -Filter "*.exe" -Recurse -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | 
Where-Object { 
    ($_.Length -lt 500kb -and $_.Length -gt 100kb) -and 
    ($_.Name -match "^[a-zA-Z]{8}\.exe$") 
} | ForEach-Object {
    Write-Host "[!] Potential malicious binary found: $($_.FullName)" -ForegroundColor Red
    # Remove-Item -Path $_.FullName -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
}

Write-Host "Remediation scan complete. Please review findings before executing removal." -ForegroundColor Cyan