Pwn2Own Berlin 2026: 47 Zero-Days Disclosed — Defense Strategy and Zero-Day Readiness Guide

---
title: Suspicious Process Injection via VirtualAlloc Remote
id: 8a2b3c4d-5e6f-7g8h-9i0j-1k2l3m4n5o6p
status: experimental
description: Detects potential exploit kit behavior using VirtualAlloc with remote process injection, common in browser-based zero-day exploitation chains
references:
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/
author: Security Arsenal
date: 2026/04/06
tags:
  - attack.defense_evasion
  - attack.t1055.002
  - attack.privilege_escalation
  - attack.t1068
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection:
    Image|endswith:
      - '\powershell.exe'
      - '\cmd.exe'
      - '\wscript.exe'
      - '\cscript.exe'
    ParentImage|endswith:
      - '\chrome.exe'
      - '\firefox.exe'
      - '\msedge.exe'
      - '\opera.exe'
      - '\brave.exe'
  injection:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - 'VirtualAlloc'
      - 'WriteProcessMemory'
      - 'CreateRemoteThread'
      - 'OpenProcess'
  condition: selection and injection
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate browser automation or testing frameworks
level: high
---
title: Browser Process Abnormal Child Process Spawn
id: 1b2c3d4e-5f6a-7b8c-9d0e-1f2a3b4c5d6e
status: experimental
description: Detects browser processes spawning unexpected child processes, a common indicator of successful sandbox escape or browser exploit
references:
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/
author: Security Arsenal
date: 2026/04/06
tags:
  - attack.initial_access
  - attack.t1204
  - attack.execution
  - attack.t1204.002
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection:
    ParentImage|endswith:
      - '\chrome.exe'
      - '\firefox.exe'
      - '\msedge.exe'
      - '\opera.exe'
      - '\brave.exe'
  filter_legit:
    Image|endswith:
      - '\chrome.exe'
      - '\firefox.exe'
      - '\msedge.exe'
      - '\opera.exe'
      - '\brave.exe'
      - '\utility_process.exe'
      - '\renderer_process.exe'
      - '\gpu_process.exe'
      - '\browser_broker.exe'
  filter_system:
    Image|contains:
      - '\System32\'
      - '\SysWOW64\'
  condition: selection and not filter_legit and not filter_system
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate browser extensions spawning helper processes
  - User-initiated downloads executing installers
level: medium
---
title: Suspicious Kernel Mode Driver Load from Untrusted Path
id: 2c3d4e5f-6a7b-8c9d-0e1f-2a3b4c5d6e7f
status: experimental
description: Detects loading of unsigned kernel drivers from unusual paths, potential indicator of privilege escalation exploit post-sandbox escape
references:
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/
author: Security Arsenal
date: 2026/04/06
tags:
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.t1547.006
  - attack.privilege_escalation
  - attack.t1068
logsource:
  category: driver_load
  product: windows
detection:
  selection:
    SignatureStatus: 'Unsigned'
  filter_paths:
    ImageLoaded|contains:
      - '\System32\drivers\'
      - '\SysWOW64\drivers\'
      - '\Program Files\'
      - '\Program Files (x86)\'
  condition: selection and not filter_paths
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate beta/test drivers from trusted vendors
  - Virtualization platform guest drivers
level: critical

// Hunt for suspicious browser process spawning patterns indicative of zero-day exploitation
let BrowserProcesses = dynamic(["chrome.exe", "firefox.exe", "msedge.exe", "opera.exe", "brave.exe", "safari.exe"]);
let SuspiciousChildren = dynamic(["powershell.exe", "cmd.exe", "wscript.exe", "cscript.exe", "mshta.exe", "regsvr32.exe", "rundll32.exe"]);
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ BrowserProcesses
| where FileName in~ SuspiciousChildren
| extend FullCommandLine = iff(isempty(CommandLine), ProcessCommandLine, CommandLine)
| where FullCommandLine !contains "--utility-parent" 
      and FullCommandLine !contains "--type=" 
      and FullCommandLine !contains "--log-file"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessId, 
          FileName, ProcessId, FullCommandLine, SHA256, FolderPath
| order by Timestamp desc


// Detect potential memory corruption indicators from unexpected process access patterns
let HighRiskAccess = dynamic(["PROCESS_VM_WRITE", "PROCESS_VM_OPERATION", "PROCESS_CREATE_THREAD"]);
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(3d)
| where ActionType has "Process Access"
| where RequestedAccess in~ HighRiskAccess
| where InitiatingProcessFileName !in~ ("svchost.exe", "csrss.exe", "lsass.exe", "services.exe", "wininit.exe")
| where TargetProcessFileName in~ ("chrome.exe", "firefox.exe", "msedge.exe", "explorer.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessAccountName,
          TargetProcessFileName, TargetProcessAccountName, RequestedAccess
| order by Timestamp desc

-- Hunt for suspicious memory injection indicators across endpoint processes
SELECT Pid, Name, CommandLine, Exe, Username, CreateTime, 
       parse_string(data=CommandLine, regex='.*--type=(?P<Type>\w+).*').Type as ProcessType
FROM pslist()
WHERE Name =~ "chrome|firefox|msedge|opera|brave"
  AND NOT ProcessType =~ "renderer|gpu|utility|broker"
  AND CommandLine !~ "--log-file|--extension-process"

-- Investigate suspicious module loads in browser processes
SELECT Name, Pid, Username, ModPath, ModSize, ModTime
FROM process_modules(module_glob="*.dll")
WHERE Name =~ "chrome|firefox|msedge|opera|brave"
  AND (ModPath NOT =~ "Program Files|System32|Windows"
       OR ModPath =~ "\\AppData\\Local\\Temp|\\Downloads")

-- Check for unexpected child processes spawned by browsers
SELECT Parent.Name as ParentProcess, Parent.Pid as ParentPid,
       Child.Name as ChildProcess, Child.Pid as ChildPid,
       Child.CommandLine, Child.Username
FROM chain(parent_pslist=pslist(), child_pslist=pslist())
WHERE Parent.Name =~ "chrome|firefox|msedge|opera|brave"
  AND Child.Name !~ Parent.Name
  AND Child.Name !~ "conhost"

# Zero-Day Readiness Assessment and Hardening Script
# Version 1.0 - Pwn2Own Berlin 2026 Response

Write-Host "[+] Starting Zero-Day Readiness Assessment..." -ForegroundColor Cyan

# 1. Check Windows Exploit Protection status
Write-Host "\n[*] Checking Windows Exploit Protection Configuration..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
try {
    $ExploitProtection = Get-ProcessMitigation -System
    $CriticalMitigations = @("ASLR", "DEP", "CFG", "SEHOP")
    foreach ($mitigation in $CriticalMitigations) {
        $status = ($ExploitProtection | Where-Object {$_.Name -eq $mitigation}).Value
        Write-Host "  [-] $mitigation : $status" -ForegroundColor $(if($status -eq "ON"){"Green"}else{"Red"})
    }
} catch {
    Write-Host "  [!] Unable to retrieve exploit protection status" -ForegroundColor Red
}

# 2. Verify browser security configurations
Write-Host "\n[*] Checking Browser Security Hardening..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
$Browsers = @{
    "Chrome" = "HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Policies\Google\Chrome"
    "Firefox" = "HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Policies\Mozilla\Firefox"
    "Edge" = "HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Edge"
}

foreach ($browser in $Browsers.GetEnumerator()) {
    if (Test-Path $browser.Value) {
        Write-Host "  [+] $($browser.Key) policies found" -ForegroundColor Green
        $policies = Get-ItemProperty $browser.Value
        if ($policies) {
            $policies.PSObject.Properties | Where-Object {$_.Name -match "Block|Extension|Plugin"} | 
            ForEach-Object { Write-Host "    - $($_.Name): $($_.Value)" }
        }
    } else {
        Write-Host "  [!] $($browser.Key) policy path not found - recommend hardening policies" -ForegroundColor Red
    }
}

# 3. Check for outdated or vulnerable browser versions
Write-Host "\n[*] Checking for outdated browser versions..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
$BrowserPaths = @(
    ${env:ProgramFiles}\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe,
    ${env:ProgramFiles(x86)}\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe,
    ${env:ProgramFiles}\Microsoft\Edge\Application\msedge.exe,
    ${env:ProgramFiles}\Mozilla Firefox\firefox.exe
)

foreach ($path in $BrowserPaths) {
    if (Test-Path $path) {
        $version = (Get-Item $path).VersionInfo.FileVersion
        $name = (Get-Item $path).BaseName
        $fileTime = (Get-Item $path).LastWriteTime
        $daysOld = (New-TimeSpan -Start $fileTime -End (Get-Date)).Days
        Write-Host "  [-] $name : $version (Updated $daysOld days ago)" -ForegroundColor $(if($daysOld -lt 14){"Green"}else{"Yellow"})
    }
}

# 4. Verify critical security services status
Write-Host "\n[*] Verifying Critical Security Services Status..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
$CriticalServices = @("WinDefend", "wuauserv", "EventLog", "Schedule")
foreach ($service in $CriticalServices) {
    $svc = Get-Service -Name $service -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
    if ($svc) {
        Write-Host "  [-] $($svc.Name): $($svc.Status) (StartType: $($svc.StartType))" -ForegroundColor 
            $(if($svc.Status -eq "Running" -and $svc.StartType -ne "Disabled"){"Green"}else{"Red"})
    }
}

# 5. Output remediation recommendations
Write-Host "\n[+] Zero-Day Readiness Recommendations:" -ForegroundColor Cyan
Write-Host "  1. Enable all exploit protection mitigations (ASLR, DEP, CFG)" -ForegroundColor White
Write-Host "  2. Deploy browser hardening policies via GPO/Intune" -ForegroundColor White
Write-Host "  3. Force browser updates to auto-install within 24 hours" -ForegroundColor White
Write-Host "  4. Implement application allowlisting for browser child processes" -ForegroundColor White
Write-Host "  5. Enable Microsoft Defender Exploit Guard Attack Surface Reduction" -ForegroundColor White
Write-Host "  6. Subscribe to ZDI advisories for patch notifications" -ForegroundColor White

Write-Host "\n[+] Assessment complete. Review critical findings." -ForegroundColor Cyan

     Set-ItemProperty -Path "HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\DeviceGuard\Scenarios\HypervisorEnforcedCodeIntegrity" -Name "Enabled" -Value 1

# Enable all critical exploit protections
Set-ProcessMitigation -System -Enable ASLR, DEP, CFG, SEHOP
Set-ProcessMitigation -System -Enable BottomUp, HighEntropy


**For Linux Endpoints:**

# Enable kernel hardening (requires reboot)
sysctl -w kernel.randomize_va_space=2
sysctl -w kernel.kptr_restrict=2
sysctl -w kernel.dmesg_restrict=1

# Enable AppArmor/SELinux enforcing mode
aa-enforce /etc/apparmor.d/*
# OR
setenforce 1