Pwn2Own Berlin 2026: 47 Zero-Days Disclosed — Immediate Defense and Vulnerability Management Strategy

---
title: Suspicious Process Spawn by System Service
id: 9a8b7c6d-5e4f-3a2b-1c0d-9e8f7a6b5c4d
status: experimental
description: Detects when a critical system service spawns a shell or script interpreter, a common post-exploitation behavior following RCE.
references:
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
author: Security Arsenal
date: 2026/04/06
tags:
  - attack.execution
  - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection:
    ParentImage|contains:
      - '\svchost.exe'
      - '\services.exe'
      - '\java.exe'
      - '\tomcat'
    Image|endswith:
      - '\cmd.exe'
      - '\powershell.exe'
      - '\wscript.exe'
  filter_legit:
    User|contains:
      - 'SYSTEM'
      - 'NETWORK SERVICE'
  condition: selection and not filter_legit
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate administrative maintenance
level: high
---
title: Potential ICS/SCADA Service Anomaly
id: 1a2b3c4d-5e6f-7a8b-9c0d-1e2f3a4b5c6d
status: experimental
description: Detects unexpected network connections initiated by common ICS software, potentially indicating C2 or data exfiltration.
references:
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/
author: Security Arsenal
date: 2026/04/06
tags:
  - attack.command_and_control
  - attack.t1071
logsource:
  category: network_connection
  product: windows
detection:
  selection:
    Image|contains:
      - 'console.exe'
      - 'runtime.exe'
      - 'station.exe'
    DestinationPort|notin:
      - 102
      - 502
      - 2404
      - 443
      - 80
    Initiated: true
falsepositives:
  - Valid management traffic to non-standard ports
level: medium

DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
// Identify common parent services often targeted at Pwn2Own
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("java.exe", "httpd.exe", "nginx.exe", "tomcat.exe", "svchost.exe")
// Look for suspicious child processes
| where FileName in~ ("cmd.exe", "powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "bash.exe", "python.exe", "regsvr32.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc

-- Hunt for suspicious process characteristics indicative of exploitation
SELECT Pid, Name, CommandLine, Exe, Username, Token.IsElevated
FROM pslist()
WHERE Name =~ "svchost" OR Name =~ "services"
  AND Exe NOT IN生化 "C:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe", "C:\\Windows\\System32\\services.exe"
  OR (CommandLine =~ "-sc" AND CommandLine =~ "start")
-- Additionally hunt for unsigned DLLs loaded by critical processes
LET suspicious_dlls = SELECT *
FROM glob(globs="C:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\*.dll")
WHERE NOT Mtime < now() - 24h
SELECT Name, Pid, CommandLine, Exe
FROM process_ldr()
WHERE Dll.Name IN suspicious_dlls.Path

# Pwn2Own Berlin 2026 Post-Event Hardening Audit
Write-Host "[+] Starting Pwn2Own Berlin 2026 Hardening Audit..." -ForegroundColor Cyan

# 1. Check for common vulnerabilities in .NET/Java versions often targeted
Write-Host "[*] Checking .NET Framework Versions..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
Get-ChildItem 'HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\NET Framework Setup\NDP\v4\Full\' | Get-ItemPropertyValue -Name Release | ForEach-Object {
    $release = $_
    if ($release -lt 528040) {
        Write-Host "[!] WARNING: Outdated .NET Framework detected (Release: $release)." -ForegroundColor Red
    } else {
        Write-Host "[+] .NET Framework appears up to date." -ForegroundColor Green
    }
}

# 2. Identify services running as SYSTEM with non-standard binaries (Risk target)
Write-Host "[*] Auditing High-Risk Services..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
Get-WmiObject Win32_Service | Where-Object { 
    $_.StartMode -eq "Auto" -and 
    $_.State -eq "Running" -and 
    $_.StartName -like "*LocalSystem*" -and
    $_.PathName -notlike "C:\\Windows\\*" -and
    $_.PathName -notlike "%ProgramFiles%*"
} | Select-Object Name, DisplayName, StartName, PathName | Format-Table

# 3. Ensure Structured Exception Handling Overwrite Protection (SEHOP) is enabled
$sehProp = Get-ItemProperty "HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\kernel" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
if ($sehProp.DisableExceptionChainValidation -eq 1) {
    Write-Host "[!] CRITICAL: SEHOP is disabled. Enable it to mitigate memory corruption exploits." -ForegroundColor Red
} else {
    Write-Host "[+] SEHOP is enabled." -ForegroundColor Green
}

Write-Host "[+] Audit Complete. Review outputs for vulnerabilities." -ForegroundColor Cyan