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Storm-3075 AI Impersonation & UAT-8616 SD-WAN Exploitation: SilabRAT, Vidar, and Cisco Breaches

SA
Security Arsenal Team
June 14, 2026
5 min read

Excerpt

Active exploitation of Cisco SD-WAN (CVE-2026-20128) and AI-themed campaigns delivering Vidar/SilabRAT. Urgent detection required.

Threat Summary

Recent OTX pulses reveal a disturbing convergence of nation-state-level infrastructure exploitation and financially motivated dark web malware services. The threat landscape is dominated by three distinct but equally critical vectors:

  1. Infrastructure Takedown (UAT-8616): Active exploitation of critical Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN vulnerabilities (CVE-2026-20128, CVE-2026-20133) to deploy webshells (XenShell, Godzilla) and C2 frameworks (Sliver).
  2. Social Engineering at Scale (Storm-3075): Abuse of "AI Hype" via malvertising and SEO poisoning to distribute info-stealers (Vidar, Lumma) using the Hijack Loader.
  3. Malware-as-a-Service Evolution (SilabRAT): The emergence of SilabRAT by actor o1oo1, a $5,000/month service offering HVNC and browser profile cloning, utilizing Hijack Loader and AsmCrypt to evade detection.

Collectively, these campaigns aim to establish persistent remote access (RATs/Webshells) and facilitate immediate financial theft (cryptocurrency wallets, credentials).

Threat Actor / Malware Profile

Storm-3075

  • Objective: Credential theft and financial fraud.
  • Distribution: Malvertising campaigns impersonating AI brands (ChatGPT, DeepSeek, Claude). SEO manipulation to push malicious domains.
  • Payload Chain: Uses Hijack Loader to decrypt and inject payloads.
  • Malware: Vidar (info-stealer) and Lumma Stealer.
  • Behavior: Harvests browser data, cryptocurrency wallets, and 2FA sessions. Exfiltrates via C2.

UAT-8616

  • Objective: Infrastructure compromise and persistence.
  • Distribution: Direct exploitation of internet-facing Cisco SD-WAN controllers.
  • Tools: XenShell and Godzilla (webshells), Sliver (C2), XMRig (crypto-mining).
  • Behavior: Bypasses authentication via CVE-2026-20128 to drop webshells, enabling full administrative control and lateral movement.

SilabRAT (Actor: o1oo1)

  • Objective: Long-term access to financial assets via "invisible" control.
  • Distribution: Sold on Dark Web forums; delivered via initial access brokers or bundled software.
  • Key Features: Hidden VNC (HVNC) for evading user detection, Browser Profile Cloning to bypass MFA/cookies.
  • Protection: Encrypted with AsmCrypt and loaded via Hijack Loader.

IOC Analysis

  • File Hashes (SHA256/MD5): Multiple samples for Vidar, Lumma, SilabRAT, and webshells. Operationalization: EDR solutions should be configured to block/ quarantine immediately. Focus on the 0a26238f... (Vidar) and 3a6adbe... (SilabRAT) hashes.
  • Domains & Hostnames: brokeapt.com, pan.rongtv.xyz, pan.ssffaa19.xyz. Operationalization: Sinkhole these domains via DNS Firewall (RPZ). These are likely C2 or payload delivery servers.
  • IPv4: 91.199.163.124. Operationalization: Block inbound/outbound traffic to this IP at the perimeter firewall; correlate with netflow data for beaconing activity.
  • CVEs: CVE-2026-20128, CVE-2026-20133. Operationalization: Use vulnerability scanners to identify unpatched Cisco SD-WAN endpoints immediately.

Detection Engineering

Sigma Rules

YAML
---
title: Potential Vidar/Lumma Stealer Execution via Hijack Loader
id: c4c3c4c4-0000-0000-0000-000000000001
description: Detects execution patterns associated with Hijack Loader dropping Vidar or Lumma stealers, characterized by suspicious PowerShell arguments and specific child processes.
status: experimental
date: 2026/06/15
author: Security Arsenal
references:
    - https://otx.alienvault.com/pulse/618a1f2c00000000
tags:
    - attack.credential_access
    - attack.execution
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_parent:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\\explorer.exe'
            - '\\chrome.exe'
            - '\firefox.exe'
            - '\\msedge.exe'
            - '\\cmd.exe'
    selection_loader:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\
undll32.exe'
            - '\
egsvr32.exe'
            - '\\powershell.exe'
    selection_suspicious_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '-encodedcommand'
            - '-enc'
            - 'brokeapt.com'
            - 'pan.rongtv.xyz'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administrative scripts
level: high
---
title: Cisco SD-WAN Webshell Creation Detection
id: c4c3c4c4-0000-0000-0000-000000000002
description: Detects potential webshell file creation (Godzilla/XenShell) on systems vulnerable to Cisco SD-WAN exploits CVE-2026-20128.
status: experimental
date: 2026/06/15
author: Security Arsenal
references:
    - https://otx.alienvault.com/pulse/618a1f2c00000001
tags:
    - attack.initial_access
    - attack.persistence
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: linux
detection:
    selection_paths:
        TargetFilename|contains:
            - '/var/www/html/'
            - '/usr/local/tmp/'
            - '/opt/'
    selection_extensions:
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '.jsp'
            - '.php'
            - '.aspx'
    selection_keywords:
        TargetFilename|contains:
            - 'shell'
            - 'xen'
            - 'godzilla'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administrative uploads
level: critical
---
title: SilabRAT C2 Network Connection
id: c4c3c4c4-0000-0000-0000-000000000003
description: Detects outbound connection to known SilabRAT infrastructure IP 91.199.163.124 or non-standard ports associated with HVNC.
status: experimental
date: 2026/06/15
author: Security Arsenal
references:
    - https://otx.alienvault.com/pulse/618a1f2c00000002
tags:
    - attack.c2
    - attack.command_and_control
logsource:
    category: network_connection
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_ip:
        DestinationIp:
            - '91.199.163.124'
    selection_port:
        DestinationPort:
            - 4444
            - 5555
            - 8080
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Rare legitimate traffic to this IP
level: high

KQL (Microsoft Sentinel)

KQL — Microsoft Sentinel / Defender
// Hunt for Vidar/Lumma Hashes and C2 Domains
let IOCHashes = pack_array(
  \"0a26238f6c516de5885457c93042531aa59bc206a9537cebf5267cedc6c68531\",
  \"25270cc429ada8028b5b33220ed412c47907ecceea7377d608fac5af01bed56a\",
  \"3a6adbe0081b2488e0f137496e92591e0c29148154b2d99faadab9cc435b879b\"
);
let IOCUrls = pack_array(\"brokeapt.com\", \"pan.rongtv.xyz\", \"pan.ssffaa19.xyz\");
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where RemoteUrl has_any (IOCUrls) or RemoteIP == \"91.199.163.124\"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, RemoteUrl, RemoteIP
| union DeviceProcessEvents
| where SHA256 in (IOCHashes)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FolderPath, SHA256, AccountName

PowerShell Hunt Script

PowerShell
# SilabRAT and Vidar IOC Hunter
# Checks for file presence and registry persistence

$MaliciousHashes = @(
    \"0a26238f6c516de5885457c93042531aa59bc206a9537cebf5267cedc6c68531\",
    \"25270cc429ada8028b5b33220ed412c47907ecceea7377d608fac5af01bed56a\",
    \"3a6adbe0081b2488e0f137496e92591e0c29148154b2d99faadab9cc435b879b\"
)

$SuspiciousIPs = @(\"91.199.163.124\")

Write-Host \"[+] Checking for established connections to C2 IPs...\"
$netstat = netstat -ano | Select-String \"$($SuspiciousIPs -join '|')\"
if ($netstat) { $netstat }

Write-Host \"[+] Scanning common malware directories...\"
$paths = @(\"$env:TEMP\", \"$env:APPDATA\", \"$env:LOCALAPPDATA\")
foreach ($p in $paths) {
    Get-ChildItem -Path $p -Recurse -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Where-Object { 
        $_.Length -gt 0 -and $_.Extension -match '\\.(exe|dll|ps1)' 
    } | ForEach-Object {
        $hash = (Get-FileHash -Path $_.FullName -Algorithm SHA256 -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue).Hash
        if ($hash -in $MaliciousHashes) {
            Write-Host \"[!] MALWARE DETECTED: $($_.FullName) | Hash: $hash\" -ForegroundColor Red
        }
    }
}

Write-Host \"[+] Checking for Run Keys persistence...\"
Get-Item -Path \"HKCU:\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | 
    Get-ItemProperty | Select-Object * -ExcludeProperty PSPath,PSChildName | 
    Where-Object { $_.PSObject.Properties.Value -match \"brokeapt\" -or $_.PSObject.Properties.Value -match \"pan.rongtv\
darkwebotx-pulsedarkweb-aptvidar-stealersilabratcisco-sd-wanstorm-3075hijack-loader

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