Stryker Hamdala Cyberattack: 2026 Healthcare Incident Response and Defense Analysis

---
title: Hamdala Suspicious PowerShell Encoded Command
id: a1b2c3d4-5678-90ab-cdef-1234567890ab
status: experimental
description: Detects the use of PowerShell with encoded commands, a common TTP in the Hamdala campaign to obfuscate malicious payloads.
references:
  - Internal Threat Intel - Hamdala Mar 2026
author: Security Arsenal
date: 2026/04/10
tags:
  - attack.execution
  - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection:
    Image|endswith:
      - '\powershell.exe'
      - '\pwsh.exe'
    CommandLine|contains:
      - '-EncodedCommand'
      - '-Enc'
      - '-e '
  filter_legit_admin:
    ParentImage|contains:
      - '\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe'
      - '\Program Files'
  condition: selection and not filter_legit_admin
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate system administration scripts
level: high
---
title: Hamdala Service Stoppage via Net or Sc
id: b2c3d4e5-6789-01ab-cdef-2345678901bc
status: experimental
description: Detects attempts to stop critical services or backup services using net.exe or sc.exe, often a precursor to ransomware encryption.
references:
  - Internal Threat Intel - Hamdala Mar 2026
author: Security Arsenal
date: 2026/04/10
tags:
  - attack.impact
  - attack.t1489
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection:
    Image|endswith:
      - '\net.exe'
      - '\net1.exe'
      - '\sc.exe'
    CommandLine|contains:
      - 'stop'
      - 'delete'
  keywords:
    - 'VSS'
    - 'SQL'
    - 'Backup'
    - 'Health'
  condition: selection and keywords
falsepositives:
  - Authorized system maintenance
level: high
---
title: Hamdala Potential Data Staging Activity
id: c3d4e5f6-7890-12ab-cdef-3456789012cd
status: experimental
description: Detects high volume file copy operations often associated with data staging before exfiltration by Hamdala actors.
references:
  - Internal Threat Intel - Hamdala Mar 2026
author: Security Arsenal
date: 2026/04/10
tags:
  - attack.collection
  - attack.t1074.001
logsource:
  category: file_create
  product: windows
detection:
  selection:
    TargetFilename|contains:
      - '\ProgramData\'
      - '\Public\'
      - '\Temp\'
  filter_generic:
    Image|contains:
      - '\Windows\'
      - '\Program Files\'
  condition: selection and not filter_generic
falsepositives:
  - Installer behavior
  - Software updates
level: medium

// Hunt for PowerShell spawning network connections (Potential C2/Exfil)
let ProcessEvents = DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "powershell.exe" 
   or InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "pwsh.exe"
| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains "-Enc" 
   or InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains "-EncodedCommand"
| summarize arg_max(Timestamp, *) by ProcessId, DeviceName
| project ProcessId, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, FolderPath;
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| join kind=inner ProcessEvents on ProcessId, DeviceName
| where RemotePort !in (80, 443, 8080)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, RemoteUrl, InitiatingProcessCommandLine

-- Hunt for suspicious process execution patterns
SELECT Pid, Name, CommandLine, Exe, Username, CreateTime
FROM pslist()
WHERE Name =~ 'powershell.exe'
   AND CommandLine =~ '-EncodedCommand'
   AND Exe NOT IN ('C:\\Windows\\System32\\WindowsPowerShell\\v1.0\\powershell.exe', 
                    'C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\WindowsPowerShell\\v1.0\\powershell.exe')
   OR Exe =~ 'C:\\Users\\Public\\.*'
   OR Exe =~ 'C:\\ProgramData\\.*'

# Audit for critical services that may have been disabled or tampered with
Write-Host "[+] Auditing Critical System Services..." -ForegroundColor Cyan
$CriticalServices = @("VSS", "SQLSERVERAGENT", "MSSQLSERVER", "ShadowCopy", "wbengine")

Get-Service | Where-Object { $CriticalServices -contains $_.Name } | ForEach-Object {
    if ($_.Status -eq "Stopped") {
        Write-Host "[!] ALERT: Critical Service $($_.Name) is STOPPED. Startup Type: $($_.StartType)" -ForegroundColor Red
    } else {
        Write-Host "[+] Service $($_.Name) is running normally." -ForegroundColor Green
    }
}

# Check for recent suspicious scheduled tasks (Common persistence vector)
Write-Host "\n[+] Checking for suspicious Scheduled Tasks created in the last 30 days..." -ForegroundColor Cyan
$DateCutoff = (Get-Date).AddDays(-30)
Get-ScheduledTask | Where-Object { $_.Date -gt $DateCutoff } | ForEach-Object {
    $TaskInfo = Get-ScheduledTaskInfo -TaskName $_.TaskName
    $TaskPath = $_.TaskPath
    if ($TaskPath -notlike "\\Microsoft\\*") {
        Write-Host "[!] Non-Microsoft Task Found: $($_.TaskName) | Path: $TaskPath | Last Run: $($TaskInfo.LastRunTime)" -ForegroundColor Yellow
    }
}

Write-Host "\n[+] Audit Complete. Review alerts." -ForegroundColor Cyan