VECT 2.0 Ransomware: Critical Wiper Variant Detection and Incident Response Guide

---
title: VECT 2.0 - Large File Deletion Pattern
id: 8a4f2e1d-9c3b-4a7f-b5d6-1e8f3a2b4c5d
status: experimental
description: Detects rapid modification or deletion of files larger than 100KB, characteristic of VECT 2.0 wiper behavior across platforms
references:
  - https://thehackernews.com/2026/04/vect-20-ransomware-irreversibly.html
author: Security Arsenal
date: 2026/04/06
tags:
  - attack.impact
  - attack.t1485
logsource:
  category: file_change
  product: windows
detection:
  selection:
    TargetFilename|contains:
      - '\\Users\\'
      - '\\ProgramData\\'
      - '\\Documents\\'
  filter_size:
    FileSize|gt: 100000
  filter_rate:
    StartTime|delta: 1m
  condition: selection and filter_size and filter_rate
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate backup operations
  - Database maintenance
  - System updates
level: high
---
title: VECT 2.0 - ESXi Suspicious Process Execution
id: 3c9f5b2a-7e4d-8a1f-c2e6-4b5d6a7f8e9g
status: experimental
description: Detects suspicious process execution patterns on ESXi hosts indicative of VECT 2.0 ransomware targeting virtual infrastructure
references:
  - https://thehackernews.com/2026/04/vect-20-ransomware-irreversibly.html
author: Security Arsenal
date: 2026/04/06
tags:
  - attack.execution
  - attack.t1059.004
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: linux
detection:
  selection:
    Image|endswith:
      - '/bin/vmtx'
      - '/bin/chmod'
      - '/bin/vmkfstools'
    CommandLine|contains:
      - '-d eagerZeroedThick'
      - '-i '
      - '.vmdk'
  filter_legit:
    ParentImage|contains:
      - '/usr/lib/vmware/vpxa/vpxa'
      - '/usr/lib/vmware/hostd/hostd'
  condition: selection and not filter_legit
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate VM administration tasks
  - Storage vMotion operations
level: critical
---
title: VECT 2.0 - Cross-Platform Ransomware Execution
id: 7d2e4f1b-6a8c-5d9e-3f2a-8b4c6d7e9f0a
status: experimental
description: Detects execution of binaries with ransomware-like characteristics across Windows, Linux, and ESXi platforms
references:
  - https://thehackernews.com/2026/04/vect-20-ransomware-irreversibly.html
author: Security Arsenal
date: 2026/04/06
tags:
  - attack.execution
  - attack.t1059
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: linux
detection:
  selection_elf:
    Image|endswith:
      - '/tmp/.'
      - '/var/tmp/.
      - '/dev/shm/.'
    CommandLine|contains:
      - '--encrypt'
      - '--crypt'
      - '--lock'
  selection_esxi:
    Image|contains:
      - '/store/packages/'
      - '/tmp/'
    Image|endswith:
      - '.bin'
      - '.sh'
  condition: selection_elf or selection_esxi
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate backup utilities
  - System administration scripts
level: high

// VECT 2.0 Detection - Large File Modification Pattern
let Timeframe = 1h;
let FileSizeThreshold = 100000;
// Windows Endpoint Events
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(Timeframe)
| where FileSize > FileSizeThreshold
| where ActionType in ("FileCreated", "FileModified", "FileDeleted")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, 
          FileName, FolderPath, FileSize, ActionType, SHA256
| summarize FileCount = count(), TotalSizeMB = sum(FileSize/1048576) by DeviceName, 
          InitiatingProcessAccountName, bin(Timestamp, 5m)
| where FileCount > 10 and TotalSizeMB > 50
| extend Alert = "VECT 2.0 Potential Wiper Activity - High Volume Large File Modification";
// Linux/ESXi via Syslog
Syslog
| where TimeGenerated > ago(Timeframe)
| where ProcessName in ("chmod", "chown", "rm", "sh", "bash")
| extend CommandLine = coalesce(SyslogMessage, "")
| where CommandLine has_any(".vmdk", ".vmx", "--encrypt", "--crypt")
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, ProcessName, CommandLine, SourceIP
| summarize Count = count() by Computer, ProcessName, bin(TimeGenerated, 10m)
| where Count > 5
| extend Alert = "VECT 2.0 Suspicious Activity on Linux/ESXi Host";

-- VECT 2.0 Artifact Collection - Large File Modification and Suspicious Processes
-- Collect process execution evidence
SELECT Pid, Ppid, Name, Exe, CommandLine, Username, StartTime, Token.User
FROM pslist()
WHERE Exe NOT IN regex_split("/usr/sbin/|/usr/bin/|/System/|/Windows/|/Program Files/")
   OR CommandLine =~ "--encrypt|--crypt|\.vmdk|\.vmx|-d eagerZeroedThick"
   OR Exe =~ "(/tmp/|/var/tmp/|/dev/shm/)"

-- File system changes for large files
SELECT FullPath, Size, Mtime, Mode, Type
FROM glob(globs="/**/*", accessor="auto")
WHERE Size > 100000
   AND Mtime > now() - 3600

-- ESXi specific VMFS storage artifacts
SELECT FullPath, Size, Mode.Type, Mtime
FROM glob(globs="/vmfs/volumes/**/*.vmdk")
WHERE Mtime > now() - 7200

-- Network connections for C2 detection
SELECT Pid, RemoteAddr, RemotePort, State, Family
FROM netstat()
WHERE State =~ "ESTABLISHED"
   AND RemotePort NOT IN (22, 80, 443, 902, 903)

# VECT 2.0 Response - Windows Isolation and Preservation Script
# Run with administrative privileges

# 1. Isolate affected system immediately
Write-Host "[+] Isolating system from network..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
$nic = Get-NetAdapter | Where-Object { $_.Status -eq "Up" }
foreach ($adapter in $nic) {
    Disable-NetAdapter -Name $adapter.Name -Confirm:$false
    Write-Host "[+] Disabled adapter: $($adapter.Name)" -ForegroundColor Green
}

# 2. Identify processes with ransomware-like behavior
Write-Host "[+] Scanning for suspicious processes..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
$suspiciousProcesses = Get-WmiObject Win32_Process | Where-Object { 
    $_.CommandLine -match "--encrypt|--crypt|/tmp/|C:\\Users\\.*\\AppData\\Local\\Temp" -and
    $_.ExecutablePath -notmatch "C:\\Windows\\System32\\|C:\\Program Files\\"
}

if ($suspiciousProcesses) {
    Write-Host "[!] Found $($suspiciousProcesses.Count) suspicious processes" -ForegroundColor Red
    foreach ($proc in $suspiciousProcesses) {
        Write-Host "[+] Killing process PID $($proc.Handle): $($proc.Name)" -ForegroundColor Green
        Stop-Process -Id $proc.Handle -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
    }
}

# 3. Preserve volatile memory and process artifacts
Write-Host "[+] Collecting forensic artifacts..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
$artifactPath = "C:\VECT_Incident_$(Get-Date -Format 'yyyyMMdd_HHmmss')"
New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path $artifactPath -Force | Out-Null

# Collect process list
Get-Process | Select-Object Id, Name, Path, StartTime, @{Name="CommandLine";Expression={(Get-CimInstance Win32_Process -Filter "ProcessId = $($_.Id)").CommandLine}} | 
    Export-Csv -Path "$artifactPath\process_list.csv" -NoTypeInformation

# Collect network connections
Get-NetTCPConnection | Select-Object State, OwningProcess, LocalAddress, LocalPort, RemoteAddress, RemotePort | 
    Export-Csv -Path "$artifactPath\network_connections.csv" -NoTypeInformation

# Identify recently modified large files (>100KB in last 2 hours)
Write-Host "[+] Identifying recently modified large files..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
$largeFiles = Get-ChildItem -Path C:\ -Recurse -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | 
    Where-Object { $_.Length -gt 100000 -and $_.LastWriteTime -gt (Get-Date).AddHours(-2) }
$largeFiles | Select-Object FullName, Length, LastWriteTime | 
    Export-Csv -Path "$artifactPath\recent_large_files.csv" -NoTypeInformation

Write-Host "[+] Incident artifacts preserved to: $artifactPath" -ForegroundColor Green
Write-Host "[+] CRITICAL: This system is a wiper victim - FILE RECOVERY IS IMPOSSIBLE. Focus on restoring from offline backups." -ForegroundColor Red


**Linux/ESXi Bash:**

#!/bin/bash
# VECT 2.0 Response - Linux/ESXi Isolation and Preservation Script
# Execute with root or root-equivalent privileges

echo "[+] VECT 2.0 Incident Response - Starting isolation procedures..."

# 1. Isolate from network immediately
if command -v esxcli &> /dev/null; then
    echo "[+] ESXi detected - isolating management network..."
    esxcli network ip connection list | grep ESTABLISHED | awk '{print $4}' | cut -d: -f1 | sort -u | while read ip; do
        esxcli network firewall ruleset set -e true -r "outgoing"
    done
else
    echo "[+] Linux detected - isolating network interfaces..."
    for iface in $(ip link show | grep -E '^[0-9]+:' | awk '{print $2}' | tr -d ':'); do
        ip link set $iface down
        echo "[+] Disabled interface: $iface"
    done
fi

# 2. Kill suspicious processes
echo "[+] Terminating suspicious processes..."

# Common ransomware process patterns
SUSPICIOUS_PATTERNS="--encrypt|--crypt|\.vmdk|-d eagerZeroedThick"

for pid in $(ps aux | grep -E "$SUSPICIOUS_PATTERNS" | grep -v grep | awk '{print $2}'); do
    echo "[+] Killing PID: $pid"
    kill -9 $pid 2>/dev/null
done

# 3. Preserve forensic artifacts
ARTIFACT_DIR="/var/VECT_incident_$(date +%Y%m%d_%H%M%S)"
mkdir -p "$ARTIFACT_DIR"
echo "[+] Creating artifact directory: $ARTIFACT_DIR"

# Process snapshot
echo "[+] Capturing process list..."
ps auxww > "$ARTIFACT_DIR/process_list.txt"

# Network connections
echo "[+] Capturing network connections..."
netstat -tulpn > "$ARTIFACT_DIR/network_connections.txt"
ss -tulpn >> "$ARTIFACT_DIR/network_connections.txt"

# Open files and handles
echo "[+] Capturing open files..."
lsof > "$ARTIFACT_DIR/open_files.txt" 2>/dev/null

# ESXi specific artifacts
if command -v esxcli &> /dev/null; then
    echo "[+] Capturing ESXi specific artifacts..."
    esxcli storage filesystem list > "$ARTIFACT_DIR/esxi_filesystems.txt"
    esxcli vm process list > "$ARTIFACT_DIR/esxi_vm_processes.txt"
    
    # Identify recently modified VMDK files
    echo "[+] Scanning for recently modified VMDK files..."
    find /vmfs/volumes -name "*.vmdk" -mmin -120 -exec ls -lh {} \; > "$ARTIFACT_DIR/recent_vmdk_files.txt"
else
    # Linux large file scan
    echo "[+] Scanning for recently modified large files (>100KB)..."
    find / -type f -size +100k -mmin -120 -exec ls -lh {} \; 2>/dev/null > "$ARTIFACT_DIR/recent_large_files.txt"
fi

echo "[+] Incident artifacts preserved to: $ARTIFACT_DIR"
echo "[!] CRITICAL WARNING: VECT 2.0 is a WIPER - Data recovery is impossible. Restore from offline, isolated backups only."