ForumsExploitsCritical Update: Active Exploitation of Defender Zero-Days (BlueHammer, RedSun, UnDefend)

Critical Update: Active Exploitation of Defender Zero-Days (BlueHammer, RedSun, UnDefend)

SCADA_Guru_Ivan 4/17/2026 USER

Just caught the latest report from Huntress regarding three zero-day vulnerabilities in Microsoft Defender that are currently under active exploitation. The flaws—codenamed BlueHammer, RedSun, and UnDefend—were disclosed by researcher Chaotic Eclipse. While details are still emerging, the consensus is that these allow threat actors to elevate privileges on already compromised systems.

The primary vector involves leveraging how Defender handles specific scanning operations or file parsing, effectively turning the AV against itself to gain SYSTEM-level access. The kicker is that two of these (RedSun and UnDefend) are currently unpatched, leaving a gap for attackers until Microsoft releases a fix.

Since we can't rely on a patch for all three immediately, we need to focus on containment and detection of the initial access vector, as the privilege escalation might be silent if the AV is bypassed.

I recommend auditing your endpoints for unusual child processes spawned by the Defender engine. While MsMpEng.exe spawning cmd.exe isn't always malicious, in this context, it’s a massive red flag.

Here is a basic KQL query for Sentinel/MDE users to hunt for suspicious process lineage:

DeviceProcessEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFileName == "MsMpEng.exe"
| where FileName in ("cmd.exe", "powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, ProcessCommandLine

Additionally, ensure you are monitoring for modifications to Defender's exclusion lists, as actors often add exclusions to pave the way for these exploits.

How is everyone handling the gap for the two unpatched flaws? Are you considering disabling specific Defender features temporarily, or just relying on strict privilege management (LAPS, removing local admins) to stop the initial foothold?

LO
LogAnalyst_Pete4/17/2026

We're seeing similar activity in our SOC environment. The key here is that the attacker needs to be on the box before they can exploit the Defender flaw to escalate. We've pushed a script to our fleet to audit local admin group memberships and remove any unnecessary accounts. It's a blunt instrument, but without a patch for RedSun/UnDefend, limiting the 'initial compromise' is our best bet.

ZE
ZeroDayHunter4/17/2026

Solid query. I'd add that you should also check for signed binaries leveraging the Defender directories for DLL side-loading, which is how I suspect some of these privilege escalation mechanisms are triggered.

Get-ChildItem -Path "C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Platform\" -Recurse -Filter *.dll | Select-Object FullName, LastWriteTime


If you see DLLs with recent timestamps that don't match the Defender version update schedule, investigate immediately.
SY
SysAdmin_Dave4/18/2026

Great insights. To add a practical verification step, we're forcing a signature update check on all endpoints immediately to ensure the latest definitions are applied, as this often patches heuristic detection gaps before the full platform update rolls out. You can trigger updates remotely with this snippet:

Invoke-Command -ComputerName (Get-Content servers.txt) -ScriptBlock { Update-MpSignature }

Has anyone seen success with disabling the MpEngine temporarily as a stopgap until the patch is fully deployed?

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Created4/17/2026
Last Active4/18/2026
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