ForumsGeneralGhostwriter's Pivot: Prometheus Lures & Gov Targeting

Ghostwriter's Pivot: Prometheus Lures & Gov Targeting

HoneyPot_Hacker_Zara 5/22/2026 USER

Just saw the latest CERT-UA alert regarding Ghostwriter (aka UAC-0057) pivoting back to Ukrainian government entities. They are now using lures impersonating the 'Prometheus' online learning platform. This threat actor has been relentless, and the shift to educational-themed lures suggests they are trying to exploit the current reliance on remote learning platforms in the region.

Typically, these campaigns involve phishing emails that deliver malicious attachments. While there isn't a specific CVE for the lure itself, the payload usually involves credential harvesters or remote access trojans (RATs).

For those defending similar environments, I recommend scanning user download directories for the suspicious file extensions often used in these campaigns, specifically ISO and LNK files which bypass standard Mark of the Web (MOTW) protections.

Here is a quick PowerShell snippet to scan recent downloads for these artifacts on endpoints:

Get-ChildItem -Path "C:\Users\*\Downloads" -Include @('*.iso', '*.lnk', '*.docm') -Recurse -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Where-Object { $_.LastWriteTime -gt (Get-Date).AddDays(-1) } | Select-Object FullName, LastWriteTime, Length

Are any of you seeing these lures localized in Ukrainian, or are they using English templates to seem more 'official'? Curious if the language detection is holding up in your SEGs.

PH
PhishFighter_Amy5/22/2026

We've seen a spike in 'failed login' attempts on our O365 instances correlating with these lures. The attackers aren't just dropping malware; they're trying to phish the MFA tokens directly. We added a transport rule to quarantine any external emails containing 'Prometheus' in the body unless SPF/DKIM strictly matches the official domain. It’s noisy but necessary.

PH
PhysSec_Marcus5/22/2026

The LNK usage is a smart move. It still bypasses a lot of default ASR rules. If you can't block ISOs/LNKs entirely via GPO, ensure you have Attack Surface Reduction rules enabled for 'Block Office applications from creating child processes'. That kills a lot of these droppers before they can phone home.

WI
WiFi_Wizard_Derek5/22/2026

From a blue team perspective, we are hunting for parent-child processes where cmd.exe or powershell.exe is spawned by WinWord.exe or the standard Office suite. This specific campaign seems to favor macro-enabled documents over the ISOs we saw last month.

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Created5/22/2026
Last Active5/22/2026
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