We haven't seen direct Kimwolf activity yet, but we've been ramping up our IoT monitoring. We deployed Zeek (Bro) with custom scripts to detect lateral scanning from our IoT VLAN. One thing that caught my attention - many IoT devices still use Telnet and HTTP instead of SSH/HTTPS. We're pushing to block these protocols entirely at the firewall level for IoT segments. Also, monitoring for unexpected NTP or DNS traffic patterns has been surprisingly effective at spotting compromised devices early.

This botnet reinforces why we moved all IoT devices to their own isolated VLAN with strictly controlled egress traffic. Only required ports are allowed (usually just NTP and specific cloud service endpoints). We also implemented automated firmware updates where possible and disabled unused services. For devices we can't manage directly, we're using MAC address filtering at the switch level. It's been a pain to set up, but worth it given the alternative. Anyone else using ZTNA for IoT access?

During a recent engagement, I found that ~70% of IoT devices in the client's environment still had default credentials - exactly what Kimwolf targets. Many organizations forget these even exist once deployed. The botnet's scanning capability is particularly dangerous because IoT devices often have full visibility of the internal network. I've been recommending NAC solutions that force IoT devices through registration and compliance checks before granting network access. Also, regular network discovery scans specifically targeting common IoT ports (23, 80, 443, 8080, 554) can help catch compromises early.

Solid advice on segmentation. Since traditional EDR is often too heavy for sensors, we prioritize protecting the gateways and controllers that support agents. We’ve deployed custom YARA rules on these endpoints to catch the droppers associated with Kimwolf.

Additionally, monitor for unexpected netcat or telnet processes on Linux workstations—a common lateral move for these botnets. This syscall audit rule helps detect the abuse:

auditctl -a exit,always -F arch=b64 -S execve -F path=/usr/bin/nc

This provides a last line of defense if the IoT VLAN is compromised.

Building on the monitoring angle, we've had success deploying IoT-specific honeypots to catch lateral movement early. Low-interaction honeypots like Cowrie are lightweight enough for the hardware mentioned. They alert us the second the botnet tries to brute-force them.

Here is a quick KQL query we use to correlate these signals with our telemetry:

DeviceEvents | where ActionType contains "Cowrie" | summarize count() by SourceIP


It provides a safe sandbox to analyze the TTPs without risking production assets.

Solid advice on isolation. However, segmentation often masks the root issue: unpatched firmware. We implemented a process to checksum IoT firmware against NVD databases, discovering many devices ran kernels years out of date. If you can't automate that, at least audit your web management interfaces regularly. You can use Nmap to identify exposed IoT panels:

nmap -p 80,443,8080 --script http-headers --open 10.0.0.0/24

This helps you prioritize patching or replacing the riskiest assets.