Three concurrent OTX pulses published 2026-11-20 paint a picture of a crowded, high-sophistication threat landscape spanning nation-state espionage, financially motivated extortion, and cryptocurrency-focused theft.
ARMORY CASTLE (UTA0178) — a suspected PRC-nexus actor — executed a chained zero-day intrusion beginning with CVE-2026-102764 in BeyondTrust Remote Support for initial access, then pivoting to CVE-2026-123890, a zero-day in VMware vCenter Server. Post-exploitation deployed an arsenal of six malware families: BONESAW (Golang exploitation utility), SAWSNAKE, SLIMSAVAGE, CAGEMATCH, BEARBONES, and LAZYBONES, with webshells dropped on ESXi hosts and Golden SAML techniques for identity-layer persistence. This is a hypervisor-level campaign targeting the virtualization control plane itself — the crown jewels of enterprise infrastructure.
N0N — a financially motivated extortion group active since September 2026 — abandons encryption entirely in favor of pure data-theft extortion. Their attack chain begins with credentials harvested by third-party infostealer campaigns, followed by network infiltration, Active Directory mapping, exfiltration of legal documents and sensitive data, and leak-site pressure via a Tor onion service. Targeting spans Healthcare, Retail, Finance, Technology, Education, and Telecommunications across the US, Canada, France, Italy, Netherlands, and Botswana.
UAT-12643 — a suspected North Korea-aligned actor — blends financially motivated theft with novel resilience engineering. The group deploys the Overlord RAT, the Python-based Good Game infostealer, and a multi-cryptocurrency clipboard hijacker against crypto holders, gaming platform users, and VoIP operators. Most notably, Overlord uses the Solana blockchain as a C2 dead-drop/resolution layer, making takedown-resistant infrastructure a core design feature.
Collective assessment: Enterprises face simultaneous pressure at three layers — the hypervisor (ARMORY CASTLE), the identity/credential layer (N0N), and the endpoint/crypto wallet layer (UAT-12643). Detection engineering must cover all three.
Threat Actor / Malware Profile
ARMORY CASTLE (UTA0178) — PRC-Nexus Espionage
- Distribution / Initial Access: Exploitation of CVE-2026-102764 (BeyondTrust Remote Support) followed by CVE-2026-123890 (VMware vCenter Server). Supply-chain-style entry via trusted remote access tooling.
- Payload Behavior: BONESAW serves as the Golang exploitation utility; SAWSNAKE and SLIMSAVAGE handle post-exploitation; CAGEMATCH, BEARBONES, and LAZYBONES provide modular capability delivery. Webshells are deployed directly onto ESXi hosts, operating beneath guest-OS visibility.
- Persistence: Webshells on ESXi + Golden SAML forgery, enabling long-term federated-identity access independent of endpoint controls.
- Anti-Analysis: Operates at the hypervisor layer where traditional EDR has no sensor coverage; Golang payloads complicate static signature detection.
N0N — Data Extortion (No Encryption)
- Distribution: Valid credential access sourced from infostealer logs purchased/harvested from third-party stealer campaigns (credential compromise is the entry vector, not phishing).
- Payload Behavior: Living-off-the-land with administrative tools; Active Directory enumeration and mapping; bulk exfiltration of legal and sensitive documents.
- C2 / Leak Infrastructure: Tor-based leak site (
nongzecboljwv3yfndkggsybsglfrkffw7bvk2zemuteoxe6etpusnad.onion) with infrastructure spread across Sweden (AS42675), Lithuania (AS16125), Canada, and the US. - Objective: Pure extortion — data theft and public leak threat without the operational risk of ransomware encryption.
UAT-12643 — DPRK-Aligned Financial Theft
- Distribution: Targeted delivery against cryptocurrency holders, gaming platform users, and VoIP software operators.
- Payloads: Overlord RAT (remote access), Good Game infostealer (Python-based credential/data theft), clipboard hijacker substituting multi-cryptocurrency wallet addresses in real time.
- C2 Communication: Innovative use of the Solana blockchain — C2 instructions or C2 addressing are embedded in blockchain transactions, providing censorship-resistant, immutable command channels that survive traditional infrastructure takedowns.
- Anti-Analysis: Blockchain dead-dropping defeats DNS sinkholing and IP blocking; defenders must detect the client-side resolution behavior rather than the infrastructure itself.
IOC Analysis
Indicator types present across pulses:
- IPv4 (C2 / infrastructure): ARMORY CASTLE infrastructure at
103.147.251.5,103.190.38.3,118.174.128.34,118.174.128.36; N0N-linked infrastructure including185.157.161.148,185.157.161.93(AS42675, SE),188.214.135.130(AS16125, LT),198.13.158.143,81.161.239.10,217.18.55.185; UAT-12643 C2 at41.216.188.11. - Domains: N0N's Tor onion leak site and
uberip.com(dynamic DNS — a classic fast-flux/C2 enabler). - FileHash-SHA256: Seven Overlord RAT / Good Game stealer payloads from UAT-12643 (e.g.,
b7dfd524b305f476eebf5fc05c4689ed105df44e66353b0d21212a2192c9c26c). - CVEs: CVE-2026-102764, CVE-2026-123890, CVE-2026-59309, CVE-2025-22457 — vulnerability intelligence indicating the ARMORY CASTLE exploit chain.
Operationalization guidance for SOC teams:
- Block all listed IPv4s at egress firewall/proxy immediately; add the onion domain to DNS/web-filter watchlists (Tor traffic to it from corporate assets is a red flag).
- Hash-sweep the seven SHA256 values across EDR/MDE (DeviceFileEvents) and email gateway detonation history.
- CVE triage: Verify patch posture for BeyondTrust Remote Support (CVE-2026-102764) and vCenter Server (CVE-2026-123890). Internet-facing instances are P0.
- Enrich via OTX, AbuseIPDB, and Shodan to identify scan/exploit attempts against your perimeter from these netblocks. Feed indicators into your TIP with 90-day decay and high confidence scoring given AlienVault authorship.
Detection Engineering
---
title: ARMORY CASTLE ESXi Webshell Deployment via vCenter Exploitation
id: 7a3f1c2e-9b4d-4e1a-8c5f-2d6b9a1e3f47
status: experimental
description: Detects suspicious shell or webshell process execution on VMware ESXi/vCenter appliances consistent with ARMORY CASTLE (UTA0178) post-exploitation of CVE-2026-123890, including BONESAW/SAWSNAKE tooling.
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intel
references:
- https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/armory-castle-exploits-vsphere
date: 2026/11/20
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: linux
host_filter: esxi|vcenter|vcsa
detection:
selection_parent:
ParentImage|endswith:
- '/bin/java'
- '/usr/lib/vmware-vmon/vmon_svc'
- 'vpxd'
selection_shell:
Image|endswith:
- '/bin/sh'
- '/bin/bash'
- '/usr/bin/python'
- '/usr/bin/python3'
- '/usr/bin/curl'
- '/usr/bin/wget'
selection_suspicious_cmd:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'chmod +x'
- 'base64 -d'
- '/tmp/'
- 'busybox wget'
- 'esxcli'
- 'vim-cmd'
condition: selection_parent and selection_shell and selection_suspicious_cmd
falsepositives:
- Legitimate VMware administrative scripts
- Backup/monitoring agents
level: high
tags:
- attack.initial_access
- attack.t1190
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1505.003
---
title: N0N Extortion Group AD Enumeration and Bulk Data Staging
id: 2b8e4d1a-5c6f-4a2b-9d3e-7f1a8b2c4d59
status: experimental
description: Detects Active Directory mapping and data staging behaviors associated with the N0N extortion group using compromised credentials and administrative tools for pre-exfiltration reconnaissance.
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intel
references:
- https://ransomware.socradar.io/groups/n0n
date: 2026/11/20
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_ad_enum:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'net group "Domain Admins"'
- 'nltest /dclist'
- 'dsquery'
- 'Get-ADComputer'
- 'Get-ADUser'
- 'adfind'
- 'SharpHound'
- 'BloodHound'
selection_staging:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'rar.exe a '
- '7z.exe a '
- 'Compress-Archive'
- 'makecab'
timeframe: 30m
condition: selection_ad_enum or selection_staging
falsepositives:
- IT administrators performing legitimate AD audits
- Enterprise backup solutions
level: medium
tags:
- attack.discovery
- attack.t1087
- attack.collection
- attack.t1560.001
---
title: UAT-12643 Overlord RAT Solana Blockchain C2 Resolution Behavior
id: 9c1d5e7f-3a8b-4c6d-8e2f-1b4a6c8d0e31
status: experimental
description: Detects outbound connections to Solana blockchain RPC endpoints from non-browser processes, consistent with UAT-12643 Overlord RAT using blockchain transactions as a C2 dead-drop mechanism. Also covers Python-based Good Game stealer execution.
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intel
references:
- https://blog.talosintelligence.com/uat-12643-suspected-north-korea-aligned-actor-blends-blockchain-resilience-with-targeted-infostealing/
date: 2026/11/20
logsource:
category: network_connection
product: windows
detection:
selection_solana_rpc:
DestinationHostname|contains:
- 'api.mainnet-beta.solana.com'
- 'solana-api.projectserum.com'
- '.rpcpool.com'
- 'rpc.ankr.com/solana'
selection_non_browser:
Image|endswith:
- '\python.exe'
- '\pythonw.exe'
- '\powershell.exe'
- '\rundll32.exe'
- '\mshta.exe'
- '\wscript.exe'
condition: selection_solana_rpc and selection_non_browser
falsepositives:
- Legitimate crypto portfolio/dApp tooling (rare in enterprise)
level: high
tags:
- attack.command_and_control
- attack.t1102
- attack.t1071.001
// Security Arsenal Hunt: Multi-Campaign IOC & Behavior Sweep (ARMORY CASTLE / N0N / UAT-12643)
let SuspiciousIPs = dynamic(["103.147.251.5","103.190.38.3","118.174.128.34","118.174.128.36","185.157.161.148","185.157.161.93","188.214.135.130","198.13.158.143","81.161.239.10","217.18.55.185","41.216.188.11"]);
let SuspiciousHashes = dynamic(["b7dfd524b305f476eebf5fc05c4689ed105df44e66353b0d21212a2192c9c26c","16622bb8df60403217ccf8e326e2e9e718e01c85d7b52fe5c5e1cf44d62d25c8","b0b636f5c7e40af94aacf9ebd9a696dac57debcd628127414248908562380d33","5a52d6773840fd5ab45d781d572d9fbd6a8dacb08dcda65036ce8b28548a5224","f1e5174084bfded283b9dcf081615478e6941d12b652793197556beb72cc7588","f7951b11be06d59a3e8fdd9bde4f19869978de8385c9107129c635b2cdba5082","19ca4e0e8e7dd62d130afbfed49646f1566dce2633cf937b848d990da3e3e9a2"]);
union isfuzzy=true
(DeviceNetworkEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(14d)
| where RemoteIP in (SuspiciousIPs) or RemoteUrl has_any ("uberip.com","api.mainnet-beta.solana.com","solana-api.projectserum.com","rpcpool.com")
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, RemoteIP, RemoteUrl, RemotePort
),
(DeviceFileEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(14d)
| where SHA256 in (SuspiciousHashes)
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, FileName, FolderPath, SHA256, InitiatingProcessFileName
),
(DeviceProcessEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(14d)
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("nltest /dclist","dsquery","SharpHound","BloodHound","Get-ADComputer","net group \"Domain Admins\"")
or (FileName in~ ("rar.exe","7z.exe") and ProcessCommandLine has " a ")
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessAccountName
)
| sort by TimeGenerated desc
# Security Arsenal IOC Hunt Script - ARMORY CASTLE / N0N / UAT-12643
# Run as Administrator on endpoints and (via SSH adaptation) ESXi-adjacent management hosts
$ErrorActionPreference = 'SilentlyContinue'
$report = @()
# 1. UAT-12643 payload hash sweep (Overlord RAT / Good Game stealer)
$malHashes = @(
'b7dfd524b305f476eebf5fc05c4689ed105df44e66353b0d21212a2192c9c26c',
'16622bb8df60403217ccf8e326e2e9e718e01c85d7b52fe5c5e1cf44d62d25c8',
'b0b636f5c7e40af94aacf9ebd9a696dac57debcd628127414248908562380d33',
'5a52d6773840fd5ab45d781d572d9fbd6a8dacb08dcda65036ce8b28548a5224',
'f1e5174084bfded283b9dcf081615478e6941d12b652793197556beb72cc7588',
'f7951b11be06d59a3e8fdd9bde4f19869978de8385c9107129c635b2cdba5082',
'19ca4e0e8e7dd62d130afbfed49646f1566dce2633cf937b848d990da3e3e9a2'
)
$searchPaths = @("$env:TEMP","$env:APPDATA","$env:LOCALAPPDATA","$env:ProgramData","$env:USERPROFILE\Downloads")
foreach ($path in $searchPaths) {
Get-ChildItem -Path $path -Recurse -File -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | ForEach-Object {
$h = (Get-FileHash -Algorithm SHA256 $_.FullName).Hash.ToLower()
if ($malHashes -contains $h) {
$report += [pscustomobject]@{Type='MALWARE_HASH'; Path=$_.FullName; SHA256=$h; Host=$env:COMPUTERNAME}
}
}
}
# 2. Active network connections to campaign C2 infrastructure
$badIPs = @('103.147.251.5','103.190.38.3','118.174.128.34','118.174.128.36','185.157.161.148','185.157.161.93','188.214.135.130','198.13.158.143','81.161.239.10','217.18.55.185','41.216.188.11')
Get-NetTCPConnection -State Established | Where-Object { $badIPs -contains $_.RemoteAddress } | ForEach-Object {
$proc = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess
$report += [pscustomobject]@{Type='C2_CONNECTION'; Path=$proc.Path; RemoteIP=$_.RemoteAddress; RemotePort=$_.RemotePort; Host=$env:COMPUTERNAME}
}
# 3. Solana RPC connections from script interpreters (Overlord blockchain C2)
Get-NetTCPConnection -State Established | Where-Object { $_.RemotePort -eq 443 } | ForEach-Object {
$proc = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess
if ($proc.ProcessName -match 'python|powershell|mshta|wscript|rundll32') {
$dns = (Resolve-DnsName $_.RemoteAddress -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue).NameHost
if ($dns -match 'solana|rpcpool') {
$report += [pscustomobject]@{Type='BLOCKCHAIN_C2'; Process=$proc.ProcessName; RemoteIP=$_.RemoteAddress; Resolved=$dns; Host=$env:COMPUTERNAME}
}
}
}
# 4. Persistence artifacts: suspicious scheduled tasks and Run keys (N0N / infostealer foothold)
Get-ScheduledTask | Where-Object { $_.Actions.Execute -match 'powershell|wscript|mshta|python|rundll32' -and $_.TaskPath -notmatch 'Microsoft' } | ForEach-Object {
$report += [pscustomobject]@{Type='SUSPICIOUS_TASK'; Path=$_.TaskName; Action=$_.Actions.Execute; Host=$env:COMPUTERNAME}
}
$runKeys = @('HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run','HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run')
foreach ($key in $runKeys) {
Get-ItemProperty $key | Select-Object * | ForEach-Object {
$_.PSObject.Properties | Where-Object { $_.Value -match 'AppData|Temp|python|powershell -e|base64' } | ForEach-Object {
$report += [pscustomobject]@{Type='RUNKEY_PERSISTENCE'; Path=$key; Name=$_.Name; Value=$_.Value; Host=$env:COMPUTERNAME}
}
}
}
# 5. Clipboard hijacker behavior artifact: recently spawned clip monitors by non-standard processes
Get-Process | Where-Object { $_.ProcessName -match 'python|powershell' -and $_.MainWindowTitle -eq '' -and $_.StartTime -gt (Get-Date).AddDays(-7) } | ForEach-Object {
$report += [pscustomobject]@{Type='SUSPICIOUS_INTERPRETER'; Process=$_.ProcessName; PID=$_.Id; StartTime=$_.StartTime; Host=$env:COMPUTERNAME}
}
$report | Format-Table -AutoSize
$report | Export-Csv -Path "$env:TEMP\otx_hunt_$(Get-Date -Format 'yyyyMMdd_HHmmss').csv" -NoTypeInformation
Write-Host "[+] Hunt complete. Findings: $($report.Count)" -ForegroundColor Cyan
Response Priorities
Immediate (0–4 hours)
- Block all 11 IPv4 indicators and
uberip.comat egress firewall, DNS resolver, and web proxy. Alert (don't just block) on any Tor traffic to the N0N onion domain from corporate assets. - Hash-sweep the seven UAT-12643 SHA256 values across EDR and email detonation history.
- Emergency patch validation: Confirm whether BeyondTrust Remote Support (CVE-2026-102764) or vCenter Server (CVE-2026-123890) instances exist in your environment and whether they are internet-exposed. Isolate unpatched vCenter/ESXi management interfaces immediately.
- Run the KQL hunt and PowerShell sweep on all domain controllers, jump boxes, and virtualization management hosts.
24 Hours
- Identity verification (credential-theft exposure): N0N's entry vector is infostealer-harvested credentials. Force password resets for any account with logons from anomalous geographies/ASNs; audit for impossible travel and legacy-protocol (IMAP/SMTP basic auth) sign-ins.
- Golden SAML / federated identity audit: ARMORY CASTLE uses Golden SAML persistence. Review ADFS/Entra ID signing certificate integrity, audit SAML token issuance logs, and rotate token-signing certificates if any vCenter compromise is confirmed.
- Hypervisor forensics: Check ESXi hosts for unexpected VIBs, cron entries, and webshell artifacts in
/usr/lib/vmware/paths; review vCentervpxd.logfor anomalous session creation. - Revoke and re-issue sessions for privileged accounts; verify MFA enforcement on all remote access tooling.
1 Week
- Architecture hardening: Segment vCenter/ESXi management networks behind dedicated jump hosts with JIT access; disable direct internet exposure of remote support appliances.
- Deploy EDR coverage or syslog-based monitoring for ESXi (traditional agents cannot see hypervisor-layer webshells — forward ESXi shell logs to your SIEM).
- Implement egress filtering blocking Solana RPC endpoints from non-approved processes; alert on script interpreters making direct HTTPS to blockchain RPC services.
- Deploy the Sigma rules above to production; tune AD-enumeration detections against legitimate admin tooling baselines.
- Subscribe to the referenced OTX pulses for indicator updates and feed them into your TIP with automated blocklist distribution.
Related Resources
Security Arsenal Incident Response Managed SOC & MDR Services AlertMonitor Threat Detection From The Dark Side Intel Hub
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