Back to Intelligence

ARMORY CASTLE vSphere Zero-Day Chain, N0N Extortion Crew, and UAT-12643 Blockchain C2: OTX Multi-Campaign Intelligence Brief — Enterprise Detection Pack

SA
Security Arsenal Team
November 20, 2026
10 min read

Three concurrent OTX pulses published 2026-11-20 paint a picture of a crowded, high-sophistication threat landscape spanning nation-state espionage, financially motivated extortion, and cryptocurrency-focused theft.

ARMORY CASTLE (UTA0178) — a suspected PRC-nexus actor — executed a chained zero-day intrusion beginning with CVE-2026-102764 in BeyondTrust Remote Support for initial access, then pivoting to CVE-2026-123890, a zero-day in VMware vCenter Server. Post-exploitation deployed an arsenal of six malware families: BONESAW (Golang exploitation utility), SAWSNAKE, SLIMSAVAGE, CAGEMATCH, BEARBONES, and LAZYBONES, with webshells dropped on ESXi hosts and Golden SAML techniques for identity-layer persistence. This is a hypervisor-level campaign targeting the virtualization control plane itself — the crown jewels of enterprise infrastructure.

N0N — a financially motivated extortion group active since September 2026 — abandons encryption entirely in favor of pure data-theft extortion. Their attack chain begins with credentials harvested by third-party infostealer campaigns, followed by network infiltration, Active Directory mapping, exfiltration of legal documents and sensitive data, and leak-site pressure via a Tor onion service. Targeting spans Healthcare, Retail, Finance, Technology, Education, and Telecommunications across the US, Canada, France, Italy, Netherlands, and Botswana.

UAT-12643 — a suspected North Korea-aligned actor — blends financially motivated theft with novel resilience engineering. The group deploys the Overlord RAT, the Python-based Good Game infostealer, and a multi-cryptocurrency clipboard hijacker against crypto holders, gaming platform users, and VoIP operators. Most notably, Overlord uses the Solana blockchain as a C2 dead-drop/resolution layer, making takedown-resistant infrastructure a core design feature.

Collective assessment: Enterprises face simultaneous pressure at three layers — the hypervisor (ARMORY CASTLE), the identity/credential layer (N0N), and the endpoint/crypto wallet layer (UAT-12643). Detection engineering must cover all three.


Threat Actor / Malware Profile

ARMORY CASTLE (UTA0178) — PRC-Nexus Espionage

  • Distribution / Initial Access: Exploitation of CVE-2026-102764 (BeyondTrust Remote Support) followed by CVE-2026-123890 (VMware vCenter Server). Supply-chain-style entry via trusted remote access tooling.
  • Payload Behavior: BONESAW serves as the Golang exploitation utility; SAWSNAKE and SLIMSAVAGE handle post-exploitation; CAGEMATCH, BEARBONES, and LAZYBONES provide modular capability delivery. Webshells are deployed directly onto ESXi hosts, operating beneath guest-OS visibility.
  • Persistence: Webshells on ESXi + Golden SAML forgery, enabling long-term federated-identity access independent of endpoint controls.
  • Anti-Analysis: Operates at the hypervisor layer where traditional EDR has no sensor coverage; Golang payloads complicate static signature detection.

N0N — Data Extortion (No Encryption)

  • Distribution: Valid credential access sourced from infostealer logs purchased/harvested from third-party stealer campaigns (credential compromise is the entry vector, not phishing).
  • Payload Behavior: Living-off-the-land with administrative tools; Active Directory enumeration and mapping; bulk exfiltration of legal and sensitive documents.
  • C2 / Leak Infrastructure: Tor-based leak site (nongzecboljwv3yfndkggsybsglfrkffw7bvk2zemuteoxe6etpusnad.onion) with infrastructure spread across Sweden (AS42675), Lithuania (AS16125), Canada, and the US.
  • Objective: Pure extortion — data theft and public leak threat without the operational risk of ransomware encryption.

UAT-12643 — DPRK-Aligned Financial Theft

  • Distribution: Targeted delivery against cryptocurrency holders, gaming platform users, and VoIP software operators.
  • Payloads: Overlord RAT (remote access), Good Game infostealer (Python-based credential/data theft), clipboard hijacker substituting multi-cryptocurrency wallet addresses in real time.
  • C2 Communication: Innovative use of the Solana blockchain — C2 instructions or C2 addressing are embedded in blockchain transactions, providing censorship-resistant, immutable command channels that survive traditional infrastructure takedowns.
  • Anti-Analysis: Blockchain dead-dropping defeats DNS sinkholing and IP blocking; defenders must detect the client-side resolution behavior rather than the infrastructure itself.

IOC Analysis

Indicator types present across pulses:

  • IPv4 (C2 / infrastructure): ARMORY CASTLE infrastructure at 103.147.251.5, 103.190.38.3, 118.174.128.34, 118.174.128.36; N0N-linked infrastructure including 185.157.161.148, 185.157.161.93 (AS42675, SE), 188.214.135.130 (AS16125, LT), 198.13.158.143, 81.161.239.10, 217.18.55.185; UAT-12643 C2 at 41.216.188.11.
  • Domains: N0N's Tor onion leak site and uberip.com (dynamic DNS — a classic fast-flux/C2 enabler).
  • FileHash-SHA256: Seven Overlord RAT / Good Game stealer payloads from UAT-12643 (e.g., b7dfd524b305f476eebf5fc05c4689ed105df44e66353b0d21212a2192c9c26c).
  • CVEs: CVE-2026-102764, CVE-2026-123890, CVE-2026-59309, CVE-2025-22457 — vulnerability intelligence indicating the ARMORY CASTLE exploit chain.

Operationalization guidance for SOC teams:

  1. Block all listed IPv4s at egress firewall/proxy immediately; add the onion domain to DNS/web-filter watchlists (Tor traffic to it from corporate assets is a red flag).
  2. Hash-sweep the seven SHA256 values across EDR/MDE (DeviceFileEvents) and email gateway detonation history.
  3. CVE triage: Verify patch posture for BeyondTrust Remote Support (CVE-2026-102764) and vCenter Server (CVE-2026-123890). Internet-facing instances are P0.
  4. Enrich via OTX, AbuseIPDB, and Shodan to identify scan/exploit attempts against your perimeter from these netblocks. Feed indicators into your TIP with 90-day decay and high confidence scoring given AlienVault authorship.

Detection Engineering

YAML
---
title: ARMORY CASTLE ESXi Webshell Deployment via vCenter Exploitation
id: 7a3f1c2e-9b4d-4e1a-8c5f-2d6b9a1e3f47
status: experimental
description: Detects suspicious shell or webshell process execution on VMware ESXi/vCenter appliances consistent with ARMORY CASTLE (UTA0178) post-exploitation of CVE-2026-123890, including BONESAW/SAWSNAKE tooling.
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intel
references:
  - https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/armory-castle-exploits-vsphere
date: 2026/11/20
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: linux
  host_filter: esxi|vcenter|vcsa
detection:
  selection_parent:
    ParentImage|endswith:
      - '/bin/java'
      - '/usr/lib/vmware-vmon/vmon_svc'
      - 'vpxd'
  selection_shell:
    Image|endswith:
      - '/bin/sh'
      - '/bin/bash'
      - '/usr/bin/python'
      - '/usr/bin/python3'
      - '/usr/bin/curl'
      - '/usr/bin/wget'
  selection_suspicious_cmd:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - 'chmod +x'
      - 'base64 -d'
      - '/tmp/'
      - 'busybox wget'
      - 'esxcli'
      - 'vim-cmd'
  condition: selection_parent and selection_shell and selection_suspicious_cmd
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate VMware administrative scripts
  - Backup/monitoring agents
level: high
tags:
  - attack.initial_access
  - attack.t1190
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.t1505.003
---
title: N0N Extortion Group AD Enumeration and Bulk Data Staging
id: 2b8e4d1a-5c6f-4a2b-9d3e-7f1a8b2c4d59
status: experimental
description: Detects Active Directory mapping and data staging behaviors associated with the N0N extortion group using compromised credentials and administrative tools for pre-exfiltration reconnaissance.
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intel
references:
  - https://ransomware.socradar.io/groups/n0n
date: 2026/11/20
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_ad_enum:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - 'net group "Domain Admins"'
      - 'nltest /dclist'
      - 'dsquery'
      - 'Get-ADComputer'
      - 'Get-ADUser'
      - 'adfind'
      - 'SharpHound'
      - 'BloodHound'
  selection_staging:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - 'rar.exe a '
      - '7z.exe a '
      - 'Compress-Archive'
      - 'makecab'
  timeframe: 30m
  condition: selection_ad_enum or selection_staging
falsepositives:
  - IT administrators performing legitimate AD audits
  - Enterprise backup solutions
level: medium
tags:
  - attack.discovery
  - attack.t1087
  - attack.collection
  - attack.t1560.001
---
title: UAT-12643 Overlord RAT Solana Blockchain C2 Resolution Behavior
id: 9c1d5e7f-3a8b-4c6d-8e2f-1b4a6c8d0e31
status: experimental
description: Detects outbound connections to Solana blockchain RPC endpoints from non-browser processes, consistent with UAT-12643 Overlord RAT using blockchain transactions as a C2 dead-drop mechanism. Also covers Python-based Good Game stealer execution.
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intel
references:
  - https://blog.talosintelligence.com/uat-12643-suspected-north-korea-aligned-actor-blends-blockchain-resilience-with-targeted-infostealing/
date: 2026/11/20
logsource:
  category: network_connection
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_solana_rpc:
    DestinationHostname|contains:
      - 'api.mainnet-beta.solana.com'
      - 'solana-api.projectserum.com'
      - '.rpcpool.com'
      - 'rpc.ankr.com/solana'
  selection_non_browser:
    Image|endswith:
      - '\python.exe'
      - '\pythonw.exe'
      - '\powershell.exe'
      - '\rundll32.exe'
      - '\mshta.exe'
      - '\wscript.exe'
  condition: selection_solana_rpc and selection_non_browser
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate crypto portfolio/dApp tooling (rare in enterprise)
level: high
tags:
  - attack.command_and_control
  - attack.t1102
  - attack.t1071.001
KQL — Microsoft Sentinel / Defender
// Security Arsenal Hunt: Multi-Campaign IOC & Behavior Sweep (ARMORY CASTLE / N0N / UAT-12643)
let SuspiciousIPs = dynamic(["103.147.251.5","103.190.38.3","118.174.128.34","118.174.128.36","185.157.161.148","185.157.161.93","188.214.135.130","198.13.158.143","81.161.239.10","217.18.55.185","41.216.188.11"]);
let SuspiciousHashes = dynamic(["b7dfd524b305f476eebf5fc05c4689ed105df44e66353b0d21212a2192c9c26c","16622bb8df60403217ccf8e326e2e9e718e01c85d7b52fe5c5e1cf44d62d25c8","b0b636f5c7e40af94aacf9ebd9a696dac57debcd628127414248908562380d33","5a52d6773840fd5ab45d781d572d9fbd6a8dacb08dcda65036ce8b28548a5224","f1e5174084bfded283b9dcf081615478e6941d12b652793197556beb72cc7588","f7951b11be06d59a3e8fdd9bde4f19869978de8385c9107129c635b2cdba5082","19ca4e0e8e7dd62d130afbfed49646f1566dce2633cf937b848d990da3e3e9a2"]);
union isfuzzy=true
(DeviceNetworkEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(14d)
| where RemoteIP in (SuspiciousIPs) or RemoteUrl has_any ("uberip.com","api.mainnet-beta.solana.com","solana-api.projectserum.com","rpcpool.com")
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, RemoteIP, RemoteUrl, RemotePort
),
(DeviceFileEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(14d)
| where SHA256 in (SuspiciousHashes)
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, FileName, FolderPath, SHA256, InitiatingProcessFileName
),
(DeviceProcessEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(14d)
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("nltest /dclist","dsquery","SharpHound","BloodHound","Get-ADComputer","net group \"Domain Admins\"")
   or (FileName in~ ("rar.exe","7z.exe") and ProcessCommandLine has " a ")
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessAccountName
)
| sort by TimeGenerated desc
PowerShell
# Security Arsenal IOC Hunt Script - ARMORY CASTLE / N0N / UAT-12643
# Run as Administrator on endpoints and (via SSH adaptation) ESXi-adjacent management hosts
$ErrorActionPreference = 'SilentlyContinue'
$report = @()

# 1. UAT-12643 payload hash sweep (Overlord RAT / Good Game stealer)
$malHashes = @(
    'b7dfd524b305f476eebf5fc05c4689ed105df44e66353b0d21212a2192c9c26c',
    '16622bb8df60403217ccf8e326e2e9e718e01c85d7b52fe5c5e1cf44d62d25c8',
    'b0b636f5c7e40af94aacf9ebd9a696dac57debcd628127414248908562380d33',
    '5a52d6773840fd5ab45d781d572d9fbd6a8dacb08dcda65036ce8b28548a5224',
    'f1e5174084bfded283b9dcf081615478e6941d12b652793197556beb72cc7588',
    'f7951b11be06d59a3e8fdd9bde4f19869978de8385c9107129c635b2cdba5082',
    '19ca4e0e8e7dd62d130afbfed49646f1566dce2633cf937b848d990da3e3e9a2'
)
$searchPaths = @("$env:TEMP","$env:APPDATA","$env:LOCALAPPDATA","$env:ProgramData","$env:USERPROFILE\Downloads")
foreach ($path in $searchPaths) {
    Get-ChildItem -Path $path -Recurse -File -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | ForEach-Object {
        $h = (Get-FileHash -Algorithm SHA256 $_.FullName).Hash.ToLower()
        if ($malHashes -contains $h) {
            $report += [pscustomobject]@{Type='MALWARE_HASH'; Path=$_.FullName; SHA256=$h; Host=$env:COMPUTERNAME}
        }
    }
}

# 2. Active network connections to campaign C2 infrastructure
$badIPs = @('103.147.251.5','103.190.38.3','118.174.128.34','118.174.128.36','185.157.161.148','185.157.161.93','188.214.135.130','198.13.158.143','81.161.239.10','217.18.55.185','41.216.188.11')
Get-NetTCPConnection -State Established | Where-Object { $badIPs -contains $_.RemoteAddress } | ForEach-Object {
    $proc = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess
    $report += [pscustomobject]@{Type='C2_CONNECTION'; Path=$proc.Path; RemoteIP=$_.RemoteAddress; RemotePort=$_.RemotePort; Host=$env:COMPUTERNAME}
}

# 3. Solana RPC connections from script interpreters (Overlord blockchain C2)
Get-NetTCPConnection -State Established | Where-Object { $_.RemotePort -eq 443 } | ForEach-Object {
    $proc = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess
    if ($proc.ProcessName -match 'python|powershell|mshta|wscript|rundll32') {
        $dns = (Resolve-DnsName $_.RemoteAddress -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue).NameHost
        if ($dns -match 'solana|rpcpool') {
            $report += [pscustomobject]@{Type='BLOCKCHAIN_C2'; Process=$proc.ProcessName; RemoteIP=$_.RemoteAddress; Resolved=$dns; Host=$env:COMPUTERNAME}
        }
    }
}

# 4. Persistence artifacts: suspicious scheduled tasks and Run keys (N0N / infostealer foothold)
Get-ScheduledTask | Where-Object { $_.Actions.Execute -match 'powershell|wscript|mshta|python|rundll32' -and $_.TaskPath -notmatch 'Microsoft' } | ForEach-Object {
    $report += [pscustomobject]@{Type='SUSPICIOUS_TASK'; Path=$_.TaskName; Action=$_.Actions.Execute; Host=$env:COMPUTERNAME}
}
$runKeys = @('HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run','HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run')
foreach ($key in $runKeys) {
    Get-ItemProperty $key | Select-Object * | ForEach-Object {
        $_.PSObject.Properties | Where-Object { $_.Value -match 'AppData|Temp|python|powershell -e|base64' } | ForEach-Object {
            $report += [pscustomobject]@{Type='RUNKEY_PERSISTENCE'; Path=$key; Name=$_.Name; Value=$_.Value; Host=$env:COMPUTERNAME}
        }
    }
}

# 5. Clipboard hijacker behavior artifact: recently spawned clip monitors by non-standard processes
Get-Process | Where-Object { $_.ProcessName -match 'python|powershell' -and $_.MainWindowTitle -eq '' -and $_.StartTime -gt (Get-Date).AddDays(-7) } | ForEach-Object {
    $report += [pscustomobject]@{Type='SUSPICIOUS_INTERPRETER'; Process=$_.ProcessName; PID=$_.Id; StartTime=$_.StartTime; Host=$env:COMPUTERNAME}
}

$report | Format-Table -AutoSize
$report | Export-Csv -Path "$env:TEMP\otx_hunt_$(Get-Date -Format 'yyyyMMdd_HHmmss').csv" -NoTypeInformation
Write-Host "[+] Hunt complete. Findings: $($report.Count)" -ForegroundColor Cyan

Response Priorities

Immediate (0–4 hours)

  • Block all 11 IPv4 indicators and uberip.com at egress firewall, DNS resolver, and web proxy. Alert (don't just block) on any Tor traffic to the N0N onion domain from corporate assets.
  • Hash-sweep the seven UAT-12643 SHA256 values across EDR and email detonation history.
  • Emergency patch validation: Confirm whether BeyondTrust Remote Support (CVE-2026-102764) or vCenter Server (CVE-2026-123890) instances exist in your environment and whether they are internet-exposed. Isolate unpatched vCenter/ESXi management interfaces immediately.
  • Run the KQL hunt and PowerShell sweep on all domain controllers, jump boxes, and virtualization management hosts.

24 Hours

  • Identity verification (credential-theft exposure): N0N's entry vector is infostealer-harvested credentials. Force password resets for any account with logons from anomalous geographies/ASNs; audit for impossible travel and legacy-protocol (IMAP/SMTP basic auth) sign-ins.
  • Golden SAML / federated identity audit: ARMORY CASTLE uses Golden SAML persistence. Review ADFS/Entra ID signing certificate integrity, audit SAML token issuance logs, and rotate token-signing certificates if any vCenter compromise is confirmed.
  • Hypervisor forensics: Check ESXi hosts for unexpected VIBs, cron entries, and webshell artifacts in /usr/lib/vmware/ paths; review vCenter vpxd.log for anomalous session creation.
  • Revoke and re-issue sessions for privileged accounts; verify MFA enforcement on all remote access tooling.

1 Week

  • Architecture hardening: Segment vCenter/ESXi management networks behind dedicated jump hosts with JIT access; disable direct internet exposure of remote support appliances.
  • Deploy EDR coverage or syslog-based monitoring for ESXi (traditional agents cannot see hypervisor-layer webshells — forward ESXi shell logs to your SIEM).
  • Implement egress filtering blocking Solana RPC endpoints from non-approved processes; alert on script interpreters making direct HTTPS to blockchain RPC services.
  • Deploy the Sigma rules above to production; tune AD-enumeration detections against legitimate admin tooling baselines.
  • Subscribe to the referenced OTX pulses for indicator updates and feed them into your TIP with automated blocklist distribution.

Related Resources

Security Arsenal Incident Response Managed SOC & MDR Services AlertMonitor Threat Detection From The Dark Side Intel Hub

Is your security operations ready?

Get a free SOC assessment or see how AlertMonitor cuts through alert noise with automated triage.

ARMORY CASTLE vSphere Zero-Day Chain, N0N Extortion Crew, and UAT-12643 Blockchain C2: OTX Multi-Campaign Intelligence Brief — Enterprise Detection Pack | Security Arsenal | Security Arsenal