AUDITTEAM Ransomware Gang: 4 New Listings Posted in 24 Hours — Dark Web Monitoring Brief

Classification: TLP:CLEAR | Publication Date: 2026-11-01 | Source: ransomware.live leak-site monitoring (single-source for some listings — see Sourcing & Verification) | Nature of data: Unverified threat-actor claims

Executive Summary

Between 2026-10-31 and 2026-11-01, the ransomware group tracked as AUDITTEAM listed four organizations on its dark web leak site. The listings include entities with suspected ties to the Netherlands and Singapore. All four postings are currently single-source intelligence — meaning they have been observed by only one independent crawler network and lack corroboration from secondary leak-site monitors.

Security teams should treat these listings as claims by a financially motivated threat actor rather than confirmed intrusions. However, the concentration of activity within a single 24-hour window suggests an active campaign phase. Organizations operating in the affected regions should immediately validate remote access controls, audit privileged account usage, and verify the integrity of backup infrastructure.

Sourcing & Verification

Of the four listings observed for AUDITTEAM in this reporting period, zero were independently observed by a second leak-site crawler. All four listings currently appear on a single source only (ransomware.live).

Inclusion in this briefing reflects the threat actor's claim and is not confirmation of a breach. A named organization may dispute the listing, and a denial is likewise not proof the claim is false — disclosure obligations vary by jurisdiction and sector, so neither silence nor denial settles the question of whether an intrusion occurred.

Security Arsenal will publish corrections and welcomes contact from any named organization at security@securityarsenal.com.

Threat Actor Profile — AUDITTEAM

AUDITTEAM operates as a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) platform, recruiting affiliates to conduct intrusions while maintaining centralized infrastructure for leak site operations and ransom negotiation. The group utilizes double extortion tactics, exfiltrating victim data prior to encryption and threatening publication on their .onion portal if payment is not received.

Initial Access Methods: The group is known to exploit exposed remote services (RDP, VPN concentrators), weaponized documents containing malicious macros, and valid account credentials obtained through phishing or purchased from initial access brokers. They have been observed leveraging vulnerabilities in internet-facing management consoles and remote access infrastructure.

Operational Tempo: Affiliates typically maintain persistence for 3-14 days before detonating ransomware, using this dwell time to map the network, escalate privileges, identify backup infrastructure, and stage sensitive data for exfiltration. Post-encryption, the group sets ransom demands based on perceived victim revenue and data sensitivity, typically ranging from $500,000 to $3M USD.

Exfiltration Priorities: AUDITTEAM affiliates prioritize legal documents, financial records, PII/PHI databases, and intellectual property. They commonly target backup administrators and virtualization management interfaces (vCenter, Hyper-V) to delete Volume Shadow Copies and impair recovery efforts before triggering encryption.

Current Campaign Analysis

Targeted Sectors: Sector classification for the four listed organizations is currently unavailable (marked "Not Found" in leak site data). However, the group has historically targeted professional services, manufacturing, and healthcare entities with sufficient revenue to meet mid-to-high six-figure ransom demands.

Geographic Concentration: The current campaign shows a concentration in the Netherlands (NL) and Singapore (SG), with two listings lacking geographic attribution. This suggests potential targeting of European and Southeast Asian markets, possibly exploiting regional VPN or remote access infrastructure common to multinational corporations.

Victim Profile: Based on the limited metadata available, the listed organizations appear to be mid-to-large enterprises. The group typically avoids small businesses with limited ability to pay, preferring organizations with annual revenues between $10M-$500M that maintain cyber insurance policies.

Posting Frequency: All four listings appeared within a 24-hour window (2026-10-31), indicating either a coordinated campaign or the simultaneous detonation of multiple intrusions by different affiliates. This burst pattern is consistent with "campaign waves" observed with RaaS groups where affiliates compete to list victims before month-end extortion deadlines.

CVE Associations: While no specific initial access vector has been confirmed for these four listings, AUDITTEAM is known to exploit vulnerabilities in remote access infrastructure and management planes. Organizations should audit their exposure to the following CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEVs) that align with the group's known TTPs: CVE-2026-59310 (VMware vCenter Path Traversal), CVE-2026-63077 (JetBrains TeamCity Deserialization), CVE-2026-20316 (Cisco Secure FMC Hard-coded Password), CVE-2026-50751 (Check Point Security Gateway Improper Authentication), and CVE-2026-48027 (Nx Console Embedded Malicious Code). These represent sector-level exposure that ransomware affiliates are known to leverage, though no evidence links these specific CVEs to the named organizations at this time.

Detection Engineering

Sigma Rules

---
title: AUDITTEAM - Initial Access via Exposed RDP Brute Force
id: 7c9f2a1e-3b4d-4e5f-8a9c-1d2e3f4a5b6c
description: Detects potential RDP brute force or password spraying activity consistent with AUDITTEAM initial access patterns targeting exposed remote services
author: Security Arsenal Detection Engineering
date: 2026/11/01
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4625
        Logon_Type: 3
        IpAddress|contains:
            - '::ffff:'
            - '10.'
            - '172.16.'
            - '192.168.'
    filter_known_vpn:
        Source_Ip|cidr:
            - '10.0.0.0/8'
            - '172.16.0.0/12'
            - '192.168.0.0/16'
    condition: selection and not filter_known_vpn
level: high
tags:
    - attack.initial_access
    - attack.t1133
    - attack.t1110
---
title: AUDITTEAM - PsExec Service Creation for Lateral Movement
id: 8d1e4f2a-5c6e-4f7a-9b0c-2d3e4f5a6b7c
description: Detects PsExec-style service creation used by AUDITTEAM affiliates for lateral movement across victim networks
author: Security Arsenal Detection Engineering
date: 2026/11/01
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: system
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 7045
        Service_Name|contains:
            - 'PSEXESVC'
            - 'RemCom'
            - 'csexec'
            - 'paexec'
    condition: selection
level: high
tags:
    - attack.lateral_movement
    - attack.t1021.002
    - attack.t1569.002
---
title: AUDITTEAM - Data Staging via Archive Creation
id: 9e2f5a3b-6d7f-4a8b-0c1d-3e4f5a6b7c8d
description: Detects mass archive creation and compression activity indicating potential data staging prior to exfiltration by AUDITTEAM operators
author: Security Arsenal Detection Engineering
date: 2026/11/01
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\rar.exe'
        - Image|endswith: '\7z.exe'
        - Image|endswith: '\winzip.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' a '
            - ' -r'
            - ' -m5'
            - ' -hp'
            - ' -p'
    filter_paths:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'C:\Windows\Temp'
            - 'C:\Users\Public\Documents'
            - 'C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Crypto'
    condition: (selection_img and selection_cli) and not filter_paths
level: medium
tags:
    - attack.collection
    - attack.t1560.001

Microsoft Sentinel KQL Query

// AUDITTEAM Lateral Movement & Staging Hunt
// Detects PsExec execution, RDP brute force, and suspicious archive creation
let TimeWindow = 7d;
let SuspiciousHosts = (
    SecurityEvent
    | where TimeGenerated > ago(TimeWindow)
    | where EventID == 4625 and LogonType == 3
    | summarize FailedLogons = count() by Computer, IpAddress
    | where FailedLogons > 10
    | project Computer
);
SecurityEvent
| where TimeGenerated > ago(TimeWindow)
| where Computer in (SuspiciousHosts)
| where EventID == 7045
| where ServiceName contains "PSEXESVC" or ServiceName contains "RemCom"
| extend ServiceFileName = tostring(parse_json(EventData).ServiceFileName)
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, ServiceName, ServiceFileName, Account
| join kind=inner (
    DeviceProcessEvents
    | where TimeGenerated > ago(TimeWindow)
    | where FileName in~ ("rar.exe", "7z.exe", "winrar.exe")
    | where ProcessCommandLine has_any (" a ", " -r", " -m5")
    | project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, ProcessCommandLine, FolderPath
) on $left.Computer == $right.DeviceName
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, ServiceName, ServiceFileName, ProcessCommandLine, FolderPath
| sort by TimeGenerated desc

Rapid Response PowerShell Script

# AUDITTEAM Rapid Triage Script - Run on Domain Controllers and Critical Servers
# Checks for indicators of pre-ransomware staging and persistence

Write-Host "[+] Checking for recent suspicious scheduled tasks..." -ForegroundColor Cyan
Get-ScheduledTask | Where-Object {$_.Date -gt (Get-Date).AddDays(-7)} | 
    Select-Object TaskName, TaskPath, Date, @{Name='Author';Expression={$_.Principal.UserId}} | 
    Format-Table -AutoSize

Write-Host "`n[+] Checking Volume Shadow Copy status..." -ForegroundColor Cyan
$VSS = Get-WmiObject -Class Win32_ShadowCopy -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
if ($VSS) {
    Write-Host "Volume Shadow Copies exist: $($VSS.Count)" -ForegroundColor Green
} else {
    Write-Host "WARNING: No Volume Shadow Copies detected - possible deletion attempt" -ForegroundColor Red
}

Write-Host "`n[+] Checking for exposed RDP with failed logons..." -ForegroundColor Cyan
$FailedLogons = Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='Security'; ID=4625; StartTime=(Get-Date).AddDays(-1)} -MaxEvents 100 -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | 
    Where-Object {$_.Message -match "Logon Type:\s+3"}
if ($FailedLogons.Count -gt 20) {
    Write-Host "ALERT: $($FailedLogons.Count) failed network logons in last 24h - possible brute force" -ForegroundColor Red
    $FailedLogons | Select-Object TimeCreated, @{Name='SourceIP';Expression={$_.Properties[19].Value}} | 
        Group-Object SourceIP | Sort-Object Count -Descending | Select-Object -First 5 | 
        Format-Table Count, Name
}

Write-Host "`n[+] Checking for suspicious archive tools in temp directories..." -ForegroundColor Cyan
$SuspiciousFiles = Get-ChildItem -Path "$env:TEMP", "C:\Users\Public" -Include "*.rar", "*.7z", "*.zip" -Recurse -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | 
    Where-Object {$_.LastWriteTime -gt (Get-Date).AddDays(-3)}
if ($SuspiciousFiles) {
    Write-Host "Found recent archive files (possible staging):" -ForegroundColor Yellow
    $SuspiciousFiles | Select-Object FullName, LastWriteTime, Length | Format-Table
}

Write-Host "`n[+] Checking for new local admin accounts..." -ForegroundColor Cyan
Get-LocalGroupMember -Group "Administrators" | Where-Object {$_.ObjectClass -eq "User" -and $_.Name -notmatch "Administrator|Domain Admins"} | 
    Select-Object Name, ObjectClass, PrincipalSource

Write-Host "`n[+] Audit complete. Review any RED alerts immediately." -ForegroundColor Green

Incident Response Priorities

T-Minus Detection Checklist (Pre-Encryption)

Monitor for these indicators that AUDITTEAM affiliates are preparing to detonate ransomware:

1. Backup System Access: Alerts on administrative access to backup consoles (Veeam, CommVault, NetBackup) outside of maintenance windows, followed by job deletions or retention policy modifications.
2. Shadow Copy Deletion: Execution of vssadmin delete shadows or wmic shadowcopy delete commands across multiple hosts.
3. Mass File Access: SMB enumeration showing bulk access to file shares containing PII, financial data, or legal documents, particularly if followed by compression utility execution.
4. Antivirus Tampering: Attempts to uninstall or disable EDR/AV agents using tools like Process Hacker, GMER, or direct service termination.
5. C2 Beaconing: Outbound HTTPS connections to recently registered domains or known Cobalt Strike infrastructure from non-browser processes (svchost, rundll32, powershell).

Critical Assets for Exfiltration

AUDITTEAM historically prioritizes the following data categories for extortion leverage:

• Legal: Contracts, litigation materials, M&A documents, privileged attorney-client communications
• Financial: Banking records, tax documents, audit reports, payroll data
• Human Resources: Employee PII, medical records, background checks, disciplinary files
• Intellectual Property: Source code repositories, engineering schematics, R&D documentation
• Customer Data: CRM exports, client lists, support ticket databases containing sensitive communications

Containment Actions (Ordered by Urgency)

1. Immediate: Isolate affected network segments at the switch/VLAN level. Do not power off systems (preserves forensic evidence) but sever network connectivity.
2. Immediate: Disable compromised accounts and reset all domain admin and service account passwords.
3. Immediate: Block outbound traffic to known AUDITTEAM infrastructure (C2 domains, exfil endpoints) at the perimeter firewall.
4. Within 1 Hour: Preserve forensic images of domain controllers, backup servers, and initial access vectors (VPN concentrators, RDP gateways).
5. Within 4 Hours: Deploy EDR containment scripts to kill malicious processes and isolate additional endpoints showing lateral movement indicators.
6. Within 24 Hours: Review and rotate credentials for all third-party vendors, MSPs, and cloud service accounts that may have been accessed.

Hardening Recommendations

Immediate (24 Hours)

• Audit Remote Access: Disable RDP access from the internet immediately. Require VPN with MFA for all remote administration. Audit VPN concentrator logs for brute force indicators (CVE-2026-50751, CVE-2026-20316 if applicable to your infrastructure).
• Verify Backup Integrity: Ensure backups are offline or immutable (air-gapped, WORM storage). Test restoration procedures immediately. Verify Volume Shadow Copies have not been deleted on critical servers.
• Privilege Audit: Remove local admin rights from standard users. Audit domain admin group membership and service account privileges.
• Patch Emergency: Prioritize patching of internet-facing management interfaces including VMware vCenter (CVE-2026-59310), Cisco Secure FMC (CVE-2026-20316), and JetBrains TeamCity (CVE-2026-63077) if internet-exposed.

Short-Term (2 Weeks)

• Network Segmentation: Implement micro-segmentation to isolate backup networks and critical servers from general user VLANs. Deploy internal firewalls to block SMB/RDP between workstation subnets.
• EDR Deployment: Ensure EDR coverage on all servers and workstations with specific detection rules for archive creation, shadow copy deletion, and PsExec execution.
• Email Security: Deploy advanced email filtering to block macro-enabled documents and malicious links associated with AUDITTEAM initial access campaigns.
• CIS Controls: Align with CIS Controls v8, specifically Control 4 (Secure Configuration), Control 6 (Access Management), and Control 10 (Malware Defenses).
• Deception Technology: Deploy honeypots and canary credentials to detect lateral movement before ransomware detonation.

Related Resources

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