BRAINCIPHER Ransomware: 4 New Victims Posted — Cross-Sector Surge & Detection Engineering

---
title: Potential ScreenConnect Authentication Bypass
description: Detects potential exploitation of CVE-2024-1708 involving path traversal in ConnectWise ScreenConnect web handlers.
status: experimental
date: 2026/07/04
author: Security Arsenal Research
references:
    - https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog
logsource:
    category: web
definition: 'Required fields: uri_query, http_method'
detection:
    selection:
        uri_query|contains:
            - '../'
            - '%2e%2e'
            - 'WebControl/Handler.ashx'
    filter:
        http_method: 'POST'
    condition: selection and filter
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: critical
---
title: Suspicious Web Server Process Spawn
id: 6d5d8e8d-8e8d-4d5d-8d5d-8d5d8d5d8d5d
description: Detects suspicious child processes spawned by web server services, indicative of webshell activity or deserialization exploits (e.g., Cisco FMC, Check Point).
status: experimental
date: 2026/07/04
author: Security Arsenal Research
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_parent:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\apache.exe'
            - '\httpd.exe'
            - '\tomcat.exe'
            - '\java.exe'
    selection_child:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\regsvr32.exe'
    condition: selection_parent and selection_child
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administrative tasks
level: high
---
title: Volume Shadow Copy Deletion via VssAdmin
description: Detects attempts to delete volume shadow copies, a common precursor to ransomware encryption to prevent recovery.
status: experimental
date: 2026/07/04
author: Security Arsenal Research
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\vssadmin.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: 'delete shadows'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - System administration (rare)
level: critical

// Hunt for lateral movement and staging associated with BRAINCIPHER campaigns
// Looks for PsExec/WMI execution and massive file modifications
let TimeWindow = 1h;
let ProcessList = dynamic(["psexec.exe", "psexec64.exe", "wmic.exe", "powershell.exe"]);
let SuspiciousScripts = dynamic(["Invoke-Mimikatz", "Invoke-SMBExec", "Invoke-ReflectivePEInjection"]);
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(TimeWindow)
| where FileName in~ ProcessList
| extend EncodedCommand = parse_command_line(ProcessCommandLine, "windows")
| where ProcessCommandLine has "-enc" or ProcessCommandLine has "-encodedcommand"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName
| join kind=inner (
    DeviceFileEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(TimeWindow)
    | where ActionType == "FileCreated" 
    | where FolderPath contains "\\ProgramData\\" or FolderPath contains "\\Temp\\"
    | summarize count() by DeviceName, bin(Timestamp, 5m)
    | where count_ > 50 // High frequency of file creation in temp dirs
) on DeviceName

<#
.SYNOPSIS
    BRAINCIPHER Hardening & Detection Script
.DESCRIPTION
    Checks for indicators of compromise related to BRAINCIPHER TTPs (VSS deletion, recent scheduled tasks) 
    and validates patch status for CVE-2026-50751 (Check Point) & CVE-2024-1708 (ScreenConnect).
#>

Write-Host "[+] Checking for VSS Shadow Copy Deletion Attempts..." -ForegroundColor Cyan
$VSSLogs = Get-WinEvent -LogName 'Microsoft-Windows-VSSAdmin/Operational' -MaxEvents 50 -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Where-Object { $_.Message -match 'delete' -and $_.TimeCreated -gt (Get-Date).AddHours(-24) }
if ($VSSLogs) { Write-Host "[!] ALERT: VSS Deletion detected in last 24 hours!" -ForegroundColor Red } else { Write-Host "[-] No recent VSS deletion logs found." -ForegroundColor Green }

Write-Host "[+] Enumerating Scheduled Tasks created in last 7 days (Persistence Check)..." -ForegroundColor Cyan
$DateCutoff = (Get-Date).AddDays(-7)
$SuspiciousTasks = Get-ScheduledTask | Where-Object { $_.Date -gt $DateCutoff }
if ($SuspiciousTasks) { 
    Write-Host "[!] ALERT: Recent Scheduled Tasks Found:" -ForegroundColor Yellow
    $SuspiciousTasks | Select-Object TaskName, Date, Author | Format-Table
}

Write-Host "[+] Checking for ScreenConnect (ConnectWise) Services..." -ForegroundColor Cyan
$ScreenConnectService = Get-Service -Name "ScreenConnect*" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
if ($ScreenConnectService) {
    Write-Host "[!] WARNING: ConnectWise ScreenConnect service detected. Verify patch for CVE-2024-1708 immediately." -ForegroundColor Red
    $ScreenConnectService | Select-Object Name, Status, StartType
}