BridgePay Ransomware Incident: Defense and Detection for Payment Processors

---
title: Potential Ransomware Activity - Volume Shadow Copy Deletion
id: 8a2f1c82-9e4b-4d67-bc12-3e5a8f901234
status: experimental
description: Detects attempts to delete Volume Shadow Copies, often used by ransomware to prevent recovery of payment databases and logs.
references:
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490/
author: Security Arsenal
date: 2025/04/10
tags:
  - attack.impact
  - attack.t1490
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection:
    Image|endswith:
      - '\vssadmin.exe'
      - '\wmic.exe'
    CommandLine|contains:
      - 'delete shadows'
      - 'shadowstorage delete'
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate system administration (rare)
level: critical
---
title: Suspicious Mass File Encryption or Extension Changes
id: 9b3f2d93-0f5c-5e78-cd23-4f6b9g012345
status: experimental
description: Detects patterns indicative of file encryption activity, such as bulk renaming or creation of files with known ransom extensions in application directories.
references:
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486/
author: Security Arsenal
date: 2025/04/10
tags:
  - attack.impact
  - attack.t1486
logsource:
  category: file_change
  product: windows
detection:
  selection:
    TargetFilename|contains:
      - '\PaymentData\'
      - '\BridgePay\'
      - '\Transactions\'
    TargetFilename|endswith:
      - '.locked'
      - '.encrypted'
      - '.crypt'
      - '.key'
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Unknown - High confidence alert for payment processing dirs
level: high

// Hunt for potential ransomware precursors targeting payment infrastructure
// Looks for deletion of backups, mass encryption, or suspicious process execution
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName in~ ("vssadmin.exe", "wbadmin.exe", "wmic.exe", "powershell.exe", "cmd.exe")
| where CommandLine has_any ("delete", "shadow", "backup", "encryption", "Invoke-AESEncryption")
| extend ProcessName = tostring(split(FileName, '\')[-1])
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessName, CommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName
| order by Timestamp desc

-- Hunt for suspicious processes associated with ransomware deployment
-- Focuses on VSS deletion tools and encryption scripts
SELECT Pid, Name, CommandLine, Exe, Username
FROM pslist()
WHERE Name =~ 'vssadmin.exe'
   OR Name =~ 'wbadmin.exe'
   OR (Name =~ 'powershell.exe' AND CommandLine =~ '.*Add-Type.*Assembly.*System.Security.Cryptography.*')
   OR (Name =~ 'cmd.exe' AND CommandLine =~ '.*cipher.* /w.*')

# BridgePay Incident Response Hardening Script
# Run this on critical payment servers to verify integrity and halt potential spread

Write-Host "[+] Initiating Security Check for Payment Gateway Server..." -ForegroundColor Cyan

# 1. Check for unusual scheduled tasks (common persistence mechanism)
Write-Host "[*] Checking for suspicious scheduled tasks..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
$suspiciousTasks = Get-ScheduledTask | Where-Object { $_.Actions.Execute -like "*powershell*" -or $_.Actions.Execute -like "*cmd*" }
if ($suspiciousTasks) {
    Write-Warning "Suspicious Scheduled Tasks Found:"
    $suspiciousTasks | Select-Object TaskName, TaskPath, State | Format-Table
} else {
    Write-Host "No obviously suspicious scheduled tasks found." -ForegroundColor Green
}

# 2. Verify VSS Service Status (Critical for recovery)
Write-Host "[*] Verifying Volume Shadow Copy Service Status..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
$vssService = Get-Service -Name VSS -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
if ($vssService.Status -ne 'Running') {
    Write-Warning "VSS Service is not running. Backups may fail. Attempting to start..."
    Start-Service -Name VSS -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
} else {
    Write-Host "VSS Service is Running." -ForegroundColor Green
}

# 3. Audit Remote Desktop Connections (Potential vector)
Write-Host "[*] Auditing recent RDP connections..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
$rdpEvents = Get-WinEvent -LogName Security -FilterXPath "*[System[(EventID=4624)]] and *[EventData[Data[@Name='LogonType']='10']]]" -MaxEvents 10 -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
if ($rdpEvents) {
    Write-Host "Recent RDP Logons found. Verify these users are authorized."
    $rdpEvents | Select-Object TimeCreated, @{n='User';e={$_.Properties[5].Value}}, @{n='IP';e={$_.Properties[18].Value}} | Format-Table
}

Write-Host "[+] Hardening check complete." -ForegroundColor Cyan