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CastleRAT, NightshadeC2 & PyPI Supply-Chain Stealer: OTX Pulse Analysis — Logistics Phishing, .pth Startup Hooks, and UPS Tool Abuse

SA
Security Arsenal Team
November 19, 2026
11 min read

Five OTX pulses published 2026-11-18 through 2026-11-19 paint a coherent picture of a credential-theft-heavy threat landscape in which attackers are deliberately targeting trust infrastructure — the business portals, package registries, and infrastructure management tools that enterprises rely on by default. Three distinct clusters of activity emerge:

Cluster 1 — US Logistics Sector Campaigns. Two overlapping pulses document three parallel campaigns against American trucking and logistics companies. The HelloFriends campaign operates fraudulent carrier-verification portals impersonating FMCSA/SAFER, Motus, DAT, and TIMOCOM to harvest credentials, SSNs, EINs, and fuel card data. NodeRemote distributes backdoors disguised as broker onboarding documents, delivering commercial and custom remote access tooling including NetSupport Manager, MeshCentral, CastleRAT, and NightshadeC2, with delivery observed over WebDAV. The objective is dual: direct financial theft (fuel cards, broker payment diversion) and persistent access for follow-on freight-fraud and resale of harvested corporate identities on criminal marketplaces — the raw material that feeds dark web credential ecosystems.

Cluster 2 — PyPI Supply-Chain Compromise. Two corroborating pulses (JFrog and Socket research) confirm that Microsoft's agent-framework package on PyPI was hijacked on 2026-11-17. Versions 1.26.1 and 1.26.2 were repacked locally with a malicious .pth startup hook that executes a credential stealer on every Python interpreter launch — no import required. The payload sweeps environment variables and config files for Azure tokens, GitHub Actions secrets, and CI/CD credentials, then exfiltrates them. This is a developer-workstation and build-pipeline compromise: any engineer or runner that pip-installed the poisoned versions should be presumed to have leaked cloud identities.

Cluster 3 — Infrastructure Tool Abuse. A threat actor abused CyberPower PowerPanel Business (PPB) — legitimate UPS management software — as an execution channel on a Windows domain controller. Malicious .cmd files were uploaded through the PPB web console (TCP 3052) and executed by the service binary ppbed.exe with SYSTEM privileges. The intrusion included DLL side-loading, Active Directory database extraction (credential theft at domain scale), and deployment of MSIL.Killav!gen1 to blind endpoint defenses.

The common thread: every cluster converts legitimate trust into credential theft. Stolen carrier identities, cloud tokens, and AD hashes are precisely the commodities traded in initial-access broker channels — defenders should treat all three clusters as pre-positioning for downstream intrusions.

Threat Actor / Malware Profile

FamilyRoleKey Behaviors
HelloFriends (phishing kit)Credential/PII harvestingFake SAFER/Motus/DAT portals (dot.fmcsa.saferprofilereview.info, motus.relayconsolidation.online, update-dat.com); captures logins, SSN/EIN, fuel card data
NodeRemoteLoader/backdoorMalicious broker-onboarding documents; WebDAV staging; C2 at 87.120.104.213; drops secondary RATs
CastleRAT / NightshadeC2Custom RAT + C2 frameworkPersistent remote access, command execution, data staging for exfiltration
NetSupport Manager / MeshCentralLegitimate RMM abused as RATInstalled silently as persistence; blends with admin tooling; often whitelisted by default
PyPI credential stealerSupply-chain infostealer.pth file in site-packages executes at interpreter startup; harvests env vars, Azure/GitHub/CI-CD tokens; exfiltrates over HTTPS
MSIL.Killav!gen1Defense evasionTerminates AV/EDR processes ahead of AD extraction on domain controllers

Attack chains observed:

  • Logistics: phishing email → fake verification portal (credential harvest) OR onboarding document → NodeRemote → RAT install (NetSupport/MeshCentral/CastleRAT) → persistence → fuel card theft / broker fraud.
  • Supply chain: pip install agent-framework==1.26.1/1.26.2 → .pth hook written to site-packages → every python invocation triggers stealer → env vars, ~/.azure, ~/.git-credentials, CI tokens collected → HTTPS exfil.
  • Infrastructure: access to PPB web console (TCP 3052) → upload .cmd as power-event script → ppbed.exe executes as SYSTEM → DLL side-loading → ntds.dit extraction → Killav deployed to suppress EDR.

Persistence mechanisms: .pth interpreter hooks (T1546), RMM service installation (T1543), power-event script registration in PPB. Anti-analysis: abuse of signed/legitimate binaries (NetSupport, MeshCentral, ppbed.exe), DLL side-loading (T1574.002), and AV termination tooling (T1562.001).

IOC Analysis

The pulses contain four indicator classes, each requiring a different operationalization path:

  • IPv4 (87.120.104.213): shared NodeRemote/CastleRAT C2 infrastructure appearing across both logistics pulses — high-confidence block at egress firewall, proxy, and DNS sinkhole. Because the same IP backs multiple campaigns, any internal host observed communicating with it should be triaged as a confirmed compromise, not a false positive.
  • Domains/hostnames (dotcompanyinfo.com, highwayonboarding.net, update-dat.com, termsconditionsrelease.pro, dot.fmcsa.saferprofilereview.info, motus.relayconsolidation.online, motus.iconnectdataconsolidation.online): phishing and impersonation infrastructure. Push to DNS protective-resolver blocklists and email gateway URL rewriting. Note the pattern — subdomains of legitimate-sounding brands hung off attacker-controlled apex domains; hunt retrospectively in DNS and proxy logs for 30 days.
  • File hashes (SHA256/SHA1/MD5): the PyPI pulse hashes identify the trojanized wheels — scan artifact repositories, developer machines, CI caches, and container base images for the seven SHA256s. The PPB-pulse hashes cover the Killav payload and side-loaded DLLs — sweep domain controllers and servers running UPS software.
  • Behavioral indicators (no IOC value): .pth files in site-packages, ppbed.exe spawning cmd.exe, unexpected TCP 3052 exposure. These are the most durable detections because they survive infrastructure rotation.

SOC teams should ingest the pulse exports into their TIP (MISP/OpenCTI), expire IPs/domains at 90 days, and prioritize hash-based retro-hunts via EDR telemetry. ANY.RUN sandbox detonation of the NodeRemote documents and Socket/JFrog package diffing provide the decoded payload details behind the truncated pulse descriptions.

Detection Engineering

YAML
---
title: Malicious .pth Startup Hook Written to Python site-packages
id: 7f3a1c2e-9b4d-4e1a-a6c5-20261119pth1
status: experimental
description: Detects creation or modification of .pth files in Python site-packages/dist-packages, the persistence and execution mechanism used in the agent-framework PyPI supply-chain compromise (versions 1.26.1/1.26.2). .pth files execute embedded code on every interpreter startup.
references:
  - https://research.jfrog.com/post/agent-framework-hijack/
  - https://socket.dev/blog/agent-framework-pypi-package-compromised-with-credential-stealer
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intelligence
date: 2026/11/19
logsource:
  category: file_event
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_path:
    TargetFilename|contains:
      - '\Lib\site-packages\'
      - '\site-packages\'
      - '\dist-packages\'
  selection_ext:
    TargetFilename|endswith: '.pth'
  filter_legit_installers:
    Image|endswith:
      - '\pip.exe'
      - '\python.exe'
      - '\setup.exe'
  condition: selection_path and selection_ext and not filter_legit_installers
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate package installation or upgrades outside pip (conda, poetry)
  - Developer virtual-environment tooling
level: high
tags:
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.t1546
  - attack.t1195.002
---
title: CyberPower PowerPanel Service Spawning Command Shell
id: 8a4b2d3f-1c5e-4f2b-b7d6-20261119ppb2
status: experimental
description: Detects ppbed.exe (CyberPower PowerPanel Business service) spawning cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or script interpreters. Threat actors abused PPB power-event script execution to run malicious .cmd files with SYSTEM privileges on a domain controller, followed by AD extraction and MSIL.Killav!gen1 deployment.
references:
  - https://www.security.com/blog-post/power-management-software-attack-vector
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intelligence
date: 2026/11/19
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_parent:
    ParentImage|endswith: '\ppbed.exe'
  selection_child:
    Image|endswith:
      - '\cmd.exe'
      - '\powershell.exe'
      - '\pwsh.exe'
      - '\wscript.exe'
      - '\cscript.exe'
      - '\mshta.exe'
      - '\rundll32.exe'
  condition: selection_parent and selection_child
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate administrator-configured power-event scripts (rare; baseline and allowlist by hash)
level: critical
tags:
  - attack.execution
  - attack.t1059
  - attack.privilege_escalation
  - attack.t1574.002
---
title: Fake Logistics Carrier Portal DNS Resolution or NodeRemote C2
id: 9c5e3f4a-2d6f-4a3c-c8e7-20261119log3
status: experimental
description: Detects DNS queries or network connections to fraudulent FMCSA/DAT/Motus carrier-verification portals and NodeRemote/CastleRAT C2 infrastructure (87.120.104.213) used in the HelloFriends and NodeRemote campaigns targeting US trucking and logistics firms.
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intelligence
date: 2026/11/19
logsource:
  category: dns
detection:
  selection_domain:
    query|contains:
      - 'dotcompanyinfo.com'
      - 'highwayonboarding.net'
      - 'update-dat.com'
      - 'termsconditionsrelease.pro'
      - 'saferprofilereview.info'
      - 'relayconsolidation.online'
      - 'iconnectdataconsolidation.online'
  condition: selection_domain
falsepositives:
  - Threat intelligence or sandbox lookups by security staff
level: high
tags:
  - attack.command_and_control
  - attack.t1071
  - attack.collection
  - attack.t1566
KQL — Microsoft Sentinel / Defender
// Security Arsenal — Combined hunt: logistics C2, PyPI stealer artifacts, PowerPanel abuse
// Run across DeviceNetworkEvents + DeviceProcessEvents (30-day lookback)
let Lookback = 30d;
let BadDomains = dynamic(["dotcompanyinfo.com","highwayonboarding.net","update-dat.com","termsconditionsrelease.pro","saferprofilereview.info","relayconsolidation.online","iconnectdataconsolidation.online"]);
let NetworkHits =
    DeviceNetworkEvents
    | where TimeGenerated > ago(Lookback)
    | where RemoteIP == "87.120.104.213"
       or RemoteUrl has_any (BadDomains)
       or RemotePort == 3052
    | project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, RemoteIP, RemoteUrl, RemotePort, ActionType
    | extend HuntSource = "NetworkIOC";
let ProcessHits =
    DeviceProcessEvents
    | where TimeGenerated > ago(Lookback)
    | where
        // PowerPanel service spawning shells (SYSTEM execution on DC)
        (InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "ppbed.exe" and FileName in~ ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","mshta.exe","rundll32.exe"))
        // RMM abuse from NodeRemote campaign
        or (FileName has_any ("MeshAgent","nmsrvc","client32") and InitiatingProcessFileName !in~ ("msiexec.exe","svchost.exe"))
        // Python interpreter launched where stealer .pth hooks would fire, outside dev tools
        or (FileName =~ "python.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has_any ("-c","http"))
    | project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA256
    | extend HuntSource = "ProcessBehavior";
let PthArtifacts =
    DeviceFileEvents
    | where TimeGenerated > ago(Lookback)
    | where FolderPath endswith ".pth" and (FolderPath has "site-packages" or FolderPath has "dist-packages")
    | where SHA256 in ("d27fa34414e6201d5e03e559ef634f020057554d7b3f4898dd5d7cd3e989e110","3d20a8bc91351a9a16b6db243b848ceca0206b7a8623b02d2af553a9c9f7e0a9","54d885b7d7161c9ed96489c66364c4bfbf635929166843bba10d97d46b5a2e1f","325e7e9f0ec94e41ad1a1b7a3f18a6b8b5bffece2e2b97b8d3369eb967452f93","39fa329f2a93f734b0bb8f5adb203ea3331d1ae479832a5015a54cb17aabd663","21f28e8517a10ffe431f8d68f5875c85eca4001ae6d118322b0a41873998eb5e","c275ccbe520ef3c0f02dc6a35389e427f9f1b4e0b12e140cd7bf7179ce143f02")
       or ActionType == "FileCreated"
    | project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, FolderPath, FileName, SHA256, InitiatingProcessFileName
    | extend HuntSource = "PthHookArtifact";
union NetworkHits, ProcessHits, PthArtifacts
| sort by TimeGenerated desc
PowerShell
# Security Arsenal — IOC & Artifact Hunt: CastleRAT/NightshadeC2, PyPI .pth stealer, PowerPanel abuse
# Run elevated on endpoints, dev workstations, CI runners, and domain controllers
$ErrorActionPreference = 'SilentlyContinue'
$Report = @()

Write-Host "[*] 1. Checking for malicious .pth startup hooks in Python site-packages..." -ForegroundColor Cyan
$pythonPaths = @("$env:LOCALAPPDATA\Programs\Python", "C:\Python*", "C:\Program Files\Python*", "$env:USERPROFILE\AppData\Roaming\Python")
foreach ($base in $pythonPaths) {
    Get-ChildItem -Path $base -Recurse -Filter "*.pth" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | ForEach-Object {
        $content = Get-Content $_.FullName -Raw
        # Legit .pth files contain paths; weaponized ones contain 'import' + exec logic
        if ($content -match 'import (os|subprocess|urllib|requests|base64)' -or $content -match 'exec\(|eval\(|fromhex|b64decode') {
            $Report += [PSCustomObject]@{Check='PTH_Hook'; Path=$_.FullName; Detail='Suspicious executable .pth content'; Severity='CRITICAL'}
        }
    }
}

Write-Host "[*] 2. Checking installed agent-framework version (1.26.1 / 1.26.2 = compromised)..." -ForegroundColor Cyan
$pipList = pip list 2>$null | Select-String 'agent-framework'
if ($pipList -match '1\.26\.[12]') {
    $Report += [PSCustomObject]@{Check='PyPI_Compromise'; Path=$pipList.Line; Detail='Compromised agent-framework version installed'; Severity='CRITICAL'}
}

Write-Host "[*] 3. Checking network connections to NodeRemote/CastleRAT C2 (87.120.104.213) and PPB port 3052..." -ForegroundColor Cyan
Get-NetTCPConnection | Where-Object { $_.RemoteAddress -eq '87.120.104.213' -or $_.RemotePort -eq 3052 -or $_.LocalPort -eq 3052 } | ForEach-Object {
    $proc = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess
    $Report += [PSCustomObject]@{Check='Network_IOC'; Path=$proc.Path; Detail="Conn to $($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort) state $($_.State)"; Severity='HIGH'}
}

Write-Host "[*] 4. Checking DNS cache for fake logistics portal domains..." -ForegroundColor Cyan
$badDomains = @('dotcompanyinfo','highwayonboarding','update-dat','termsconditionsrelease','saferprofilereview','relayconsolidation','iconnectdataconsolidation')
Get-DnsClientCache | Where-Object { $e=$_.Entry; $badDomains | Where-Object { $e -match $_ } } | ForEach-Object {
    $Report += [PSCustomObject]@{Check='DNS_Cache'; Path=$_.Entry; Detail='Resolved fake logistics portal domain'; Severity='HIGH'}
}

Write-Host "[*] 5. Checking for abused RMM tooling (MeshAgent / NetSupport) services and processes..." -ForegroundColor Cyan
Get-Service | Where-Object { $_.Name -match 'MeshAgent|NetSupport|nmsrvc' -or $_.DisplayName -match 'MeshCentral|NetSupport' } | ForEach-Object {
    $Report += [PSCustomObject]@{Check='RMM_Service'; Path=$_.Name; Detail="Status: $($_.Status) — verify this RMM is sanctioned"; Severity='MEDIUM'}
}

Write-Host "[*] 6. Checking for PowerPanel Business and anomalous ppbed.exe child artifacts..." -ForegroundColor Cyan
Get-ChildItem 'C:\Program Files*\CyberPower*' -Recurse -Filter '*.cmd' -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | ForEach-Object {
    $Report += [PSCustomObject]@{Check='PPB_Script'; Path=$_.FullName; Detail="Power-event script present (LastWrite: $($_.LastWriteTime)) — validate legitimacy"; Severity='HIGH'}
}
Get-ChildItem 'C:\ProgramData','C:\Windows\Temp' -Recurse -Include '*.cmd','*.bat' -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Where-Object { $_.LastWriteTime -gt (Get-Date).AddDays(-14) } | ForEach-Object {
    $Report += [PSCustomObject]@{Check='Recent_Script'; Path=$_.FullName; Detail='Recently dropped script in staging location'; Severity='MEDIUM'}
}

Write-Host "[*] 7. Checking for Killav payload hashes on disk (hash sweep of common staging dirs)..." -ForegroundColor Cyan
$killavHashes = @('04206431c83d1d81726e56fffb5166c0a7f138eb366e5aa918dee54af1ef22b5','12e716f48875befa978ff4a78a0b99a18b1809fc5bcc34c761158875da611aa8','1949894c26e03d6f15ed7f4393a89dbd52f8acc62959d3d5e4f695d6a19c6d9c','925a9d35a32e1a6a1ce1ae4b9ff09e289184d4d925d700752c99f15ab04296dd','56970620ba88b24aa993099cebbe7d5e118447b52450e886f9f896abc88ceab0')
Get-ChildItem 'C:\Users','C:\ProgramData','C:\Windows\Temp' -Recurse -Include '*.exe','*.dll' -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | ForEach-Object {
    $h = (Get-FileHash $_.FullName -Algorithm SHA256).Hash.ToLower()
    if ($killavHashes -contains $h) {
        $Report += [PSCustomObject]@{Check='Hash_Match'; Path=$_.FullName; Detail="SHA256 match: $h"; Severity='CRITICAL'}
    }
}

Write-Host "`n===== HUNT RESULTS =====" -ForegroundColor Yellow
if ($Report.Count -eq 0) { Write-Host '[+] No indicators found on this host.' -ForegroundColor Green }
else { $Report | Sort-Object Severity | Format-Table -AutoSize; $Report | Export-Csv ".\OTX_Hunt_$(hostname)_$(Get-Date -Format yyyyMMdd).csv" -NoTypeInformation }

Response Priorities

Immediate (0–4 hours):

  • Block 87.120.104.213 and all seven phishing/impersonation domains at the egress firewall, proxy, and protective DNS; push IOCs to email gateways for URL rewriting.
  • Quarantine the trojanized PyPI wheels: pin or remove agent-framework 1.26.1/1.26.2, purge CI caches and artifact repositories, and scan developer endpoints for the seven published SHA256s.
  • Retro-hunt 30 days of DNS/proxy/EDR telemetry using the KQL above; isolate any host with C2 connections or RMM process hits.
  • Audit all systems running CyberPower PowerPanel Business; confirm TCP 3052 is not network-reachable beyond dedicated management VLANs.

24 hours (identity & credential containment):

  • Force rotation of every credential that could have touched a poisoned Python environment: Azure service principals, GitHub Actions secrets, PATs, CI/CD pipeline variables, and any keys present in environment variables on affected runners. Review Azure AD sign-in and GitHub audit logs for anomalous token use since 2026-11-17.
  • For logistics-targeted staff: reset carrier portal credentials, notify fuel card providers to freeze/reissue cards, and flag any recently changed broker payment or banking details in TMS/accounting systems for callback verification.
  • If PPB artifacts are found on a domain controller: assume full AD compromise — initiate enterprise-wide krbtgt double-reset and tier-0 credential rotation, and review ntds.dit access and DCSync-style replication events.

1 week (architecture hardening):

  • Enforce package-manager hygiene: internal PyPI proxy with hash pinning and allowlisted versions, block direct pip access to public registries from build agents, and alert on any .pth write outside known installer processes.
  • Segment infrastructure management tools: UPS/power-management consoles on isolated management networks with MFA, no internet exposure, and application control preventing service binaries from spawning shells.
  • Deploy RMM allowlisting (block unauthorized remote-access tools via WDAC/AppLocker) and add detection content for WebDAV-based payload staging.
  • Stand up targeted phishing awareness for logistics/brokerage staff covering FMCSA/DAT/TIMOCOM impersonation lures, and require out-of-band verification for any payment-detail change.

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