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China-Nexus Spray-and-Check Campaign: GOCS, SNOWLIGHT, Neo-reGeorg Infrastructure — OTX Pulse Analysis

SA
Security Arsenal Team
August 4, 2026
6 min read

A China-nexus threat actor is conducting a highly opportunistic, automated "spray-and-check" campaign targeting government and commercial infrastructure globally. The campaign leverages a centralized attack infrastructure utilizing cracked Cobalt Strike derivatives and a sophisticated malware ecosystem.

The attack chain begins with the exploitation of CVE-2025-24813, allowing attackers to gain initial access. Upon successful exploitation, the payload delivers a multi-platform loader ecosystem involving GOCS, Meterpreter, and SNOWLIGHT. The actors utilize Neo-reGeorg (MITRE ATT&CK S1189) for C2 tunneling to obfuscate traffic. The primary infrastructure is hosted on segments within 130.94.17.0/24 and 130.94.30.0/24. This campaign is characterized by its breadth, affecting over 100 countries, rather than specific, targeted espionage, suggesting an attempt to establish a vast foothold network for future operations.

Threat Actor / Malware Profile

Malware Families

  • GOCS: A loader component used within this campaign to stage subsequent payloads. It is designed to be multi-platform, indicating a capability to infect both Windows and Linux servers within the targeted infrastructure.
  • SNOWLIGHT: A sophisticated malware family used for post-exploitation, likely providing data exfiltration or lateral movement capabilities. Its integration here suggests a high level of operational maturity.
  • Neo-reGeorg: A webshell tunneling tool (S1189) used to establish a covert communication channel (C2) over HTTP/HTTPS, blending traffic with legitimate web traffic to evade detection.
  • Meterpreter: A standard post-exploitation tool, often deployed via Metasploit or modified frameworks, used for command execution and system manipulation.

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs)

  • Initial Access: Exploitation of CVE-2025-24813.
  • Execution: Use of cracked Cobalt Strike derivatives and custom loaders (GOCS).
  • Command & Control (C2): Abuse of webshells (Neo-reGeorg) and direct connections to IP infrastructure.
  • Infrastructure: The actors rely on a centralized set of IPs, specifically 130.94.17.180 and 130.94.30.168, alongside nodes hosted on various cloud providers (e.g., 149.129.37.105).

IOC Analysis

The provided IOCs include 37 indicators, primarily IPv4 addresses and one CVE. There are no domain names listed, suggesting a reliance on direct IP-to-IP communication to avoid DNS-based detection and sinkholing.

  • IPv4 Addresses: The list ranges from 130.94.17.180 (likely primary C2) to 221.198.83.248 (potential scanning/probing origin). SOC teams should immediately block these IPs at the perimeter and firewalls.
  • CVE-2025-24813: This is the root vulnerability. Operations teams must prioritize patching affected assets.
  • FileHash-SHA256 (d7ed70cdd88f6cccbdc0ad6851d7a61b7fce79fdf9c4cd9f9bb375233a96b2dd): This is a malicious payload, likely the GOCS loader or a component of the SNOWLIGHT malware. EDR solutions should be configured to quarantine files matching this hash.

Detection Engineering

Sigma Rules

YAML
title: Potential C2 Connection to China-Nexus Infrastructure
id: 8a4b2c1d-5e6f-4a3b-8c9d-1e2f3a4b5c6d
description: Detects network connections to known IP infrastructure associated with the China-nexus spray-and-check campaign (CVE-2025-24813).
status: experimental
date: 2026/08/05
author: Security Arsenal
references:
    - https://otx.alienvault.com/pulse/62000000
tags:
    - c2.traffic
    - attack.command_and_control
    - apt
logsource:
    category: network_connection
product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        DestinationIp|startswith:
            - '130.94.17.'
            - '130.94.30.'
            - '221.198.83.'
            - '149.129.37.'
            - '92.38.135.'
        DestinationPort|between: 1-65535
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate traffic to compromised hosts
level: critical
---
title: Malicious Payload Execution - GOCS/SNOWLIGHT Loader
description: Detects the execution of a file with the specific SHA256 hash associated with the GOCS/SNOWLIGHT loader.
id: 1d2e3f4a-5b6c-7d8e-9f0a-1b2c3d4e5f6a
status: experimental
date: 2026/08/05
author: Security Arsenal
references:
    - https://otx.alienvault.com/pulse/62000000
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.initial_access
    - malware.gocs
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Hashes|contains: 'd7ed70cdd88f6cccbdc0ad6851d7a61b7fce79fdf9c4cd9f9bb375233a96b2dd'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - None
level: critical
---
title: Potential Neo-reGeorg Webshell Activity
description: Detects potential Neo-reGeorg webshell usage based on common URI patterns and specific C2 IPs.
id: 2a3b4c5d-6e7f-8a9b-0c1d-2e3f4a5b6c7d
status: experimental
date: 2026/08/05
author: Security Arsenal
references:
    - https://otx.alienvault.com/pulse/62000000
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.webshell
    - attack.t1505.003
logsource:
    category: web_access
    product: apache
    service: httpd
detection:
    selection_ip:
        cIP|startswith:
            - '130.94.17.'
            - '130.94.30.'
    selection_uri:
        csUriQuery|contains:
            - 'cmd='
            - 'tunnel'
    condition: 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administrative access
level: high

KQL (Microsoft Sentinel)

KQL — Microsoft Sentinel / Defender
// Hunt for network connections to known C2 infrastructure
let IOC_IPs = dynamic(['130.94.17.180', '130.94.30.168', '221.198.83.248', '149.129.37.105', '92.38.135.196']);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where RemoteIP in (IOC_IPs) or RemoteIP has_any_prefix ('130.94.17.', '130.94.30.')
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, RemoteUrl
| summarize count() by DeviceName, RemoteIP
| extend AlertMessage = "Potential C2 connection to China-nexus infrastructure"
;

// Hunt for specific file hash on endpoints
let MaliciousHash = 'd7ed70cdd88f6cccbdc0ad6851d7a61b7fce79fdf9c4cd9f9bb375233a96b2dd';
DeviceFileEvents
| where SHA256 == MaliciousHash
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FileName, FolderPath, InitiatingProcessAccountName, SHA256
| extend AlertMessage = "Detection of GOCS/SNOWLIGHT payload"

PowerShell Hunt Script

PowerShell
# IOC Hunt Script: China-Nexus Spray-and-Check Campaign
# Checks for active network connections to malicious IPs and file system presence of known payload hashes

$MaliciousIPs = @( 
    '130.94.17.180', '130.94.30.168', 
    '221.198.83.248', '149.129.37.105', '92.38.135.196' 
)

$MaliciousHash = 'd7ed70cdd88f6cccbdc0ad6851d7a61b7fce79fdf9c4cd9f9bb375233a96b2dd'

Write-Host "[+] Checking active network connections for known C2 IPs..." -ForegroundColor Cyan

$activeConnections = Get-NetTCPConnection -State Established -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue

foreach ($ip in $MaliciousIPs) {
    $matches = $activeConnections | Where-Object { $_.RemoteAddress -eq $ip }
    if ($matches) {
        Write-Host "[!] ALERT: Connection detected to $ip" -ForegroundColor Red
        $matches | Format-Table LocalAddress, LocalPort, RemoteAddress, RemotePort, OwningProcess -AutoSize
        $matches | ForEach-Object { Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Select-Object ProcessName, Id, Path }
    }
}

Write-Host "[+] Scanning file system for known payload hash ($MaliciousHash)..." -ForegroundColor Cyan

# Searching common drive roots, adjust as necessary for your environment
$drives = Get-PSDrive -PSProvider FileSystem | Select-Object -ExpandProperty Root

foreach ($drive in $drives) {
    Write-Host "Scanning $drive..."
    try {
        Get-ChildItem -Path $drive -Recurse -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | 
        ForEach-Object {
            $hash = (Get-FileHash -Path $_.FullName -Algorithm SHA256 -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue).Hash
            if ($hash -eq $MaliciousHash) {
                Write-Host "[!] ALERT: Malicious file found at $($_.FullName)" -ForegroundColor Red
            }
        }
    }
    catch {
        # Ignore access errors
    }
}

Write-Host "[+] Hunt complete."

Response Priorities

  • Immediate: Block all listed IPv4 addresses at network perimeter (Firewall, Proxy) and endpoint (EDR) levels. Initiate a hunt for the SHA256 hash d7ed70cdd88f6cccbdc0ad6851d7a61b7fce79fdf9c4cd9f9bb375233a96b2dd across all endpoints.
  • 24h: Identify and patch systems vulnerable to CVE-2025-24813. Review web server logs for indicators of Neo-reGeorg webshell activity (unusual URI patterns, high volume of POST requests to specific endpoints) originating from the IP ranges 130.94.17.0/24 and 130.94.30.0/24.
  • 1 week: Conduct a thorough architecture review. Restrict outbound internet access for critical servers to prevent C2 beaconing if the initial foothold was established. Implement signatures for Neo-reGeorg and Cobalt Strike derivatives in NIDS/HIDS.

Related Resources

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