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CL-STA-1178 Blinder Tunnel + Agent Tesla Q3 Surge: OTX Detection Pack for ShelbyLoader, GTA VI Lures, Langflow RCE and AWS Bedrock Key Testing

SA
Security Arsenal Team
November 6, 2026
7 min read

Threat Summary

The latest OTX pulses describe a credential-theft-heavy intrusion economy rather than five unrelated events. The most operationally significant pulse is the Iranian state-aligned activity tracked as CL-STA-1178: the adversary impersonated Dubai Airports IT staff, sent trojanized coding challenges to energy and government targets in Iraq and Israel, and staged a DLL-sideloading chain using ShelbyLoader V2, RuntimeBroker.dll, PsProxy.dll, Blackwood.dll and the Chisel tunneling tool. Reporting calls the operation Blinder Tunnel and notes GitHub C2 abuse plus AppDomainManager hijacking. In parallel, Microsoft-linked email telemetry describes a Q3 2026 surge: roughly 7.3 billion phishing threats, September near 3 billion, and Agent Tesla remaining relevant across legal, retail, manufacturing and finance in the United States, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Spain. Consumer-facing crews are exploiting Grand Theft Auto VI release hype with fake downloads, APK lures, false early-access offers and cryptocurrency scams. F5 observed internet-wide exploitation against Langflow and other stacked CVEs, while Datadog documented validation of exposed AWS keys for Amazon Bedrock access using GetCallerIdentity, ListFoundationModels and model invocation checks.

Collectively, the pulses point to one objective: convert identity into durable access. The common chain is lure or exploit, credential/session capture, validation of cloud and SaaS reach, then tunneling or resale. CL-STA-1178 shows the high end of tradecraft; Agent Tesla, GTA VI domains, SVG/CAPTCHA phishing and AWS token-jacking show the commoditized layer feeding the same market.

Threat Actor / Malware Profile

CL-STA-1178 is the named adversary cluster. Distribution is social-engineered and persona-driven: recruiters or fake Dubai Airports IT workflows deliver trojanized coding challenges that feel plausible to developers and technical staff. Payload behavior emphasizes legitimate-process masquerade and signed-binary abuse: AppDomainManager hijacking for .NET execution control, DLL sideloading through RuntimeBroker.dll and PsProxy.dll, and Blackwood.dll as a modular payload stage. Persistence is likely achieved through planted AppDomainManager configuration, side-load paths in user-writable directories, and scheduled re-execution of challenge artifacts. C2 blends GitHub-hosted content with Chisel reverse tunneling to make command traffic resemble normal developer workflow. Anti-analysis includes multi-stage loaders, benign-looking coding tests, renamed system binaries and infrastructure hidden behind collaborative platforms.

Agent Tesla remains a mature .NET credential stealer distributed through phishing attachments, malicious SVG/OneDrive lures, QR-to-CAPTCHA flows and domain spoofing. It harvests browser, mail, FTP and VPN credentials, screenshots and keystrokes, then exfiltrates over SMTP, HTTP or Telegram depending on configuration. The email pulse indicates defenders should treat CAPTCHA gates and SVG attachments as evasion controls, not safety signals. GTA VI domains are opportunistic but useful for credential stuffing, malicious APK delivery and crypto-drain redirects. The Langflow pulse is an exposure-management problem: CVE-2026-0768 and related CVEs are being probed at internet scale for unauthenticated RCE and credential harvesting. The AWS pulse confirms exposed keys are quickly tested against Bedrock by platforms such as KMON_NOC, meaning LLM access has become a monetizable credential capability.

IOC Analysis

The indicator set is weighted toward file hashes for loader and stealer payloads, domains for phishing infrastructure, URLs for OneDrive-themed credential pages and CVEs for externally exploitable services. Operationalize hashes by enforcing block/alert in EDR and email detonation, then pivot to parent process, signer, install path and first-seen telemetry. Domains such as wekash.net, splace.co.za, carloxmextos.org, gta6cyberleek.com, cyberleek.click, mygta6.icu, gta6keycodes.com and contact-rockstargames.com should be treated as newly registered or lure infrastructure even when current resolution is passive. URLs containing long numeric paths under /onedrive/ are strong phishing candidates. CVE indicators are not blocklist items; map them to attack surface inventory and internet-facing Langflow, Exchange, PHP and ThinkPHP-era assets.

Tooling: use OTX Direct Connect or API export into SIEM/TIP, MISP for normalization, VirusTotal and ANY.RUN for hash/context triage, urlscan.io for phishing page capture, and cert transparency monitoring for lookalike domains. For cloud, feed GuardDuty, CloudTrail Lake, Entra ID Protection and Defender for Endpoint into a single identity-risk queue. Treat GitHub C2 and Chisel as behavioral detections first; static IOCs will age quickly.

Detection Engineering

YAML
---
title: CL-STA-1178 ShelbyLoader AppDomainManager and DLL Sideload Chain
id: 9b2d7b6f-5c41-4dd9-a1c7-clsta1178apdm
status: experimental
description: Detects .NET AppDomainManager hijack and suspicious DLL sideload artifacts associated with ShelbyLoader V2, RuntimeBroker.dll, PsProxy.dll and Blackwood.dll.
author: Security Arsenal
date: 2026/11/06
references:
  - https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/blinder-tunnel-targets-critical-infrastructure/
logsource:
  product: windows
  category: process_creation
level: high
logsource:
  product: windows
  category: process_creation
detection:
  sel_img:
    Image|endswith:
      - '\RuntimeBroker.exe'
      - '\powershell.exe'
      - '\msbuild.exe'
      - '\dotnet.exe'
  sel_cli:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - 'AppDomainManager'
      - 'ShelbyLoader'
      - 'PsProxy.dll'
      - 'Blackwood.dll'
      - 'coding challenge'
      - 'Dubai Airports'
  condition: sel_img and sel_cli
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate .NET development with explicit AppDomainManager configuration
fields:
  - CommandLine
  - ParentCommandLine
  - Image
  - User
---
title: Chisel Reverse Tunnel or GitHub C2 Egress from Developer Workstations
id: 4a83d7b1-22c8-4f93-b4e5-blinderchisel
status: experimental
description: Identifies Chisel-like reverse tunnel arguments or rare egress to raw GitHub content from office/developer endpoints consistent with Blinder Tunnel C2.
author: Security Arsenal
date: 2026/11/06
references:
  - https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/blinder-tunnel-targets-critical-infrastructure/
logsource:
  product: windows
  category: process_creation
detection:
  sel_args:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - 'chisel client'
      - 'chisel server'
      - 'R:0.0.0.0'
      - '--reverse'
      - 'raw.githubusercontent.com'
      - 'githubusercontent'
  sel_rare_parent:
    ParentImage|endswith:
      - '\devenv.exe'
      - '\code.exe'
      - '\RuntimeBroker.exe'
      - '\powershell.exe'
  condition: sel_args and sel_rare_parent
level: medium
falsepositives:
  - Developer tunneling and package retrieval
fields:
  - CommandLine
  - ParentImage
  - DestinationHostname
---
title: AWS Credential Validation for Amazon Bedrock Access
id: c76a0fd8-9d10-4ce1-aac4-bedrockvalidate
status: experimental
description: Detects rapid sequence of GetCallerIdentity followed by Bedrock ListFoundationModels or InvokeModel checks from interactive or newly exposed keys.
author: Security Arsenal
date: 2026/11/06
references:
  - https://securitylabs.datadoghq.com/articles/beyond-valid-credentials-how-exposed-aws-keys-are-tested-for-amazon-bedrock-access
logsource:
  product: aws
  service: cloudtrail
detection:
  sel_identity:
    eventName: 'GetCallerIdentity'
  sel_bedrock:
    eventName:
      - 'ListFoundationModels'
      - 'InvokeModel'
      - 'Converse'
      - 'ListModelCustomizationJobs'
  timeframe: 15m
  condition: sel_identity and sel_bedrock
level: high
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate AI enablement testing by cloud platform teams
fields:
  - userIdentity.accessKeyId
  - sourceIPAddress
  - userAgent
  - eventName
KQL — Microsoft Sentinel / Defender
let lookback = 7d;
let bad_domains = dynamic(["wekash.net","splace.co.za","carloxmextos.org","gta6cyberleek.com","cyberleek.click","mygta6.icu","gta6keycodes.com","cyberleek.my","contact-rockstargames.com","cyberleek.cfd","cyberleek.world"]);
let bad_hashes = dynamic(["6e7d9b33f1e72ea1ede71373a604ecdb060dab7d42055179c1eede9ecd1fd239","f5b12772db6817f7a765a6fe7565fd3d4f87edc28e42fe3ec0244a372a410fc9","53f35e49eb9b271fd8cbcd3daacb525328dbf159a03dbd1c7adebe0363daa402","bedd2297739632da8ee470367295fe976e55be74d628dcaee7fa98121ee530f1","923641364ef0ce3a6f1d944890244082b8c7f29c9600c0433b2a0ca9822c0608"]);
union isfuzzy=true
(DeviceNetworkEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(lookback)
| where RemoteUrl has_any (bad_domains) or RemoteIP in ())
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, RemoteUrl, RemoteIP, ActionType),
(DeviceProcessEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(lookback)
| where SHA256 in (bad_hashes) or ProcessCommandLine has_any ("AppDomainManager","ShelbyLoader","PsProxy.dll","Blackwood.dll","chisel client","raw.githubusercontent.com")
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, ParentFileName, SHA256, AccountName),
(SecurityEvent
| where TimeGenerated > ago(lookback)
| where EventID in (4688, 4624, 4625)
| where CommandLine has_any ("chisel","AppDomainManager","aws sts get-caller-identity","bedrock list-foundation-models")
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, Account, CommandLine, ProcessName, IpAddress)
PowerShell
$ErrorActionPreference = 'SilentlyContinue'
$Hashes = @('6e7d9b33f1e72ea1ede71373a604ecdb060dab7d42055179c1eede9ecd1fd239','f5b12772db6817f7a765a6fe7565fd3d4f87edc28e42fe3ec0244a372a410fc9','53f35e49eb9b271fd8cbcd3daacb525328dbf159a03dbd1c7adebe0363daa402','bedd2297739632da8ee470367295fe976e55be74d628dcaee7fa98121ee530f1','923641364ef0ce3a6f1d944890244082b8c7f29c9600c0433b2a0ca9822c0608')
$Names = @('ShelbyLoader','RuntimeBroker.dll','PsProxy.dll','Blackwood.dll','chisel')
$Domains = @('wekash.net','splace.co.za','carloxmextos.org','gta6cyberleek.com','cyberleek.click','mygta6.icu','gta6keycodes.com','contact-rockstargames.com')
Write-Output '[*] Recent prefetch, amcache and shimcache process names'
Get-ChildItem $env:SystemRoot\Prefetch -Filter *.pf | Where-Object {$_.Name -match 'RUNTIMEBROKER|CHISEL|MSBUILD|DOTNET|POWERSHELL'} | Select-Object Name,LastWriteTime
Write-Output '[*] User-writable AppDomainManager and DLL staging paths'
$paths = @($env:APPDATA,$env:LOCALAPPDATA,$env:TEMP,'C:\ProgramData')
foreach ($p in $paths) { Get-ChildItem $p -Recurse -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Where-Object {$Names -contains $_.Name -or ($Hashes -contains ((Get-FileHash $_.FullName -Algorithm SHA256).Hash))} | Select-Object FullName,Length,LastWriteTime }
Write-Output '[*] Persistence locations with challenge, airport or loader names'
Get-CimInstance Win32_StartupCommand | Where-Object {$_.Command -match 'AppDomainManager|Shelby|RuntimeBroker|Blackwood|Dubai|coding'} | Select-Object Name,Command,Location,User
Get-ScheduledTask | Where-Object {$_.TaskName -match 'Dubai|Challenge|Shelby|RuntimeBroker|Blackwood' -or $_.Actions.Execute -match 'powershell|msbuild|dotnet|chisel'} | Select-Object TaskName,TaskPath,State
Write-Output '[*] DNS cache and active TCP endpoints for lure domains'
Get-DnsClientCache | Where-Object {$_.Entry -match ($Domains -join '|')} | Select-Object Entry,Name,Data
Get-NetTCPConnection -State Established | Where-Object {$_.OwningProcess -in (Get-Process | Where-Object {$_.ProcessName -match 'powershell|dotnet|RuntimeBroker|chisel'}).Id} | Select-Object LocalAddress,LocalPort,RemoteAddress,RemotePort,OwningProcess
Write-Output '[*] AWS CLI/Bedrock validation traces in shell history'
Get-Content "$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\PSReadLine\ConsoleHost_history.txt" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Where-Object {$_ -match 'get-caller-identity|bedrock|list-foundation-models|invoke-model|chisel|githubusercontent'}

Response Priorities

Immediate: block and alert on listed hashes, domains and URLs at proxy, DNS, email gateway and EDR; isolate endpoints with AppDomainManager, RuntimeBroker sideload or Chisel artifacts; revoke sessions and rotate credentials where Agent Tesla or phishing-page interaction is confirmed; emergency-disable exposed AWS access keys and deny Bedrock until reviewed.

24h: reset passwords and revoke refresh tokens for users in the credential path; enforce phishing-resistant MFA re-registration; search CloudTrail, Entra and Google Workspace logs for impossible travel, token-jacking and GetCallerIdentity to Bedrock sequences; check developer endpoints for fake coding challenge archives and GitHub raw content retrieval; validate Langflow exposure and patch CVE-2026-0768 plus adjacent listed CVEs.

1 week: harden architecture by removing .NET AppDomainManager writable paths from standard users, applying WDAC/AppLocker DLL rules, restricting outbound tunneling tools, segmenting OT/energy/government assets, disabling legacy email protocols, constraining AWS keys with least privilege and SCPs, adding canary Bedrock entitlements, and creating detections for newly registered lookalike domains tied to release events and recruiter-themed lures.

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