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ClickFix finger.exe Chain, Lumma/NetSupport, SecuriDropper MaaS and PAN-OS CVE-2026-0257: OTX Enterprise Detection Pack

SA
Security Arsenal Team
November 20, 2026
11 min read

Threat Summary

These five OTX pulses collectively point to a credential-theft-heavy intrusion economy blending browser social engineering, commodity infostealers, rented Android banking malware, edge-device exploitation and reusable phishing infrastructure. The most urgent enterprise-telecom signal is the Amazon-themed ClickFix campaign: a sponsored search result for “amazon business” pushed victims to a spoofed Amazon login on Google Sites, showed a fake CAPTCHA, and convinced the user to paste/run a command that abused Windows finger.exe as a living-off-the-land network/download primitive. Huntress-linked reporting in the pulse ties the chain to Doina, Lumma Stealer and NetSupport Client, a common pattern where an initial LOLBin command stages a credential stealer and then optionally drops a RAT for hands-on access.

In parallel, the “Party Panel” pulse describes a multi-tenant Android banking Trojan MaaS using SecuriDropper, fake Google Play pages, SMS stealing, call forwarding and card-fraud workflows against Indian banks and issuers. The exposed server reportedly held 50 tenant accounts and 34 active paid licenses, which means this is not a single actor but a rented platform: affiliates can brand lures, pick bank targets and operate at low cost. A separate Netskope pulse details one phishing kit generating 29 fake-bank domains against US/Canada users, reusing identical artifacts such as tagline, routing number and support phone number. Finally, Unit42 reports active exploitation of PAN-OS CVE-2026-0257 against GlobalProtect portal/gateway components by ransomware-linked actors tracked as Spikey Scorpius, Tarnished Scorpius and Settra, with Qilin, Brave Prince/S0252 and Inc ecosystem references. The shared objective is access and identity material: browser credentials, cookies/session tokens, banking PII, OTP/SMS interception, VPN access and ransomware-ready footholds.

Threat Actor / Malware Profile

Amazon ClickFix / Doina / Lumma / NetSupport chain. Distribution begins with malvertising and search ads, then a Google Sites-hosted spoofed login and fake CAPTCHA instructs the victim to execute a copied command. The notable behavior is abuse of finger.exe, an obsolete Windows utility repurposed as a LOLBin for outbound network retrieval. Payload behavior likely includes staged download/execution of Doina, Lumma Stealer and NetSupport Client. Lumma typically hunts browser credential stores, cookies, autofill, crypto wallets, FTP/VPN clients and exfiltrates over HTTP/S to panel infrastructure. NetSupport Client provides remote control, command execution and file transfer and is often used as a legitimate-signed RAT. Persistence commonly lands in Run keys, Startup folder, scheduled tasks or service creation depending on privilege. Anti-analysis is usually packed loaders, delayed execution, AMSI/ETW tampering attempts, string obfuscation and domain rotation; the ClickFix layer also evades email controls because execution is user-driven after ad/search redirect.

SecuriDropper “Party Panel” Android banking MaaS. Distribution uses convincing fake Play Store pages and branded Android APK lures targeting customers of Indian banks and card issuers. The pulse tags indicate fake Google Play, call forwarding, SMS stealer, card fraud and malware-as-a-service. Payload behavior on Android should be expected to request Accessibility Services, SMS read/send, notification access, device admin and overlay permission to harvest credentials and OTPs, then forward or suppress bank messages. Infrastructure indicators include 103.129.96.11, 103.151.199.22, sanaminfotech.online and node3.sanaminfotech.online. Persistence is Accessibility abuse plus battery-optimization exclusion; anti-analysis is APK packing, emulator checks and dynamic payload download to avoid static store detection.

PAN-OS CVE-2026-0257 exploitation. Unit42 attributes active exploitation to Spikey Scorpius and Tarnished Scorpius, with Settra ransomware actors also using the flaw. Target components are GlobalProtect portal and gateway. The described impact is authentication bypass enabling unauthorized VPN connection establishment. Ransomware families referenced include Qilin, Brave Prince - S0252 and Settra/Inc ecosystem activity. Expected post-exploitation is credential harvesting from VPN/session contexts, internal discovery, lateral movement, virtualization-layer attack and encryption/extortion. The pulse also references CVE-2023-27532 in tags, which should be treated as contextual historical exposure rather than proof of the same chain unless validated internally.

BUGSTER AI-enabled operations and fake-bank phishing kit. BUGSTER reportedly used jailbroken AI assistants, Hermes Agent framework and DeepSeek V4 to generate scripts and reconnaissance for cybercrime across India, exfiltrating 5,200+ personal records from a university target. This matters for SOC teams because AI lowers the skill floor: expect more polymorphic phishing pages, better lure grammar and faster infrastructure rotation. The 29-domain fake-bank kit uses one reusable template with identical artifacts and disposable domains such as brayfinance.online, bank.firstcp.live, securecapitalcorporationlimited.com, qtbnk.com, norexgo.com, 1stggbinc.cc, oakmontfb.com and allyunitybn.com, targeting Finance users in the US and Canada for credentials and PII.

IOC Analysis

The indicator set is domain-heavy and behavior-heavy. Domains/hostnames are highest value for immediate DNS, proxy, email and TLS SNI controls: grillmasterchef.com, ashevilleroofingcontractor.com, grillrecipespro.com, sanaminfotech.online, node3.sanaminfotech.online and the fake-bank list. IPv4 indicators 103.129.96.11 and 103.151.199.22 should be blocked at egress and retro-hunted in firewall, VPN, DNS and EDR network telemetry. File hashes are useful for confirmation and retro triage but should not be the primary control because ClickFix/Lumma loaders rotate quickly; prioritize hash pivots into parent process, signer, command line and first-contact URL. CVE indicators CVE-2026-0257, CVE-2023-27532, CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619 should be reconciled with asset inventory; verify vendor guidance before treating the 2026-numbered CVEs as externally confirmed beyond the pulse.

SOC operationalization should follow indicator type. For domains, add to DNS sinkhole/proxy block and query historical passive DNS for sibling subdomains and registrar reuse. For IPs, block inbound/outbound and search NetFlow/Zeek for rare JA3/JA4, long-lived TLS sessions and periodic beacon intervals. For hashes, submit to sandbox and EDR reputation, then hunt by hash plus imphash/signer and child-process trees. For Android, push package hashes and domains to MTD/EMM, review Accessibility grants and block sideloading. For PAN-OS, do not wait for endpoint IOCs: inventory GlobalProtect version, review authentication logs for impossible portal/gateway sequences, unexpected successful logins, new local accounts, config changes and session establishment outside normal geography.

Detection Engineering

YAML
---
title: Windows ClickFix finger.exe Abuse to Stage Malware
id: 5f0d0a41-9c96-4c7c-8f5b-0txclickfix001
status: experimental
description: Detects user-driven ClickFix-style execution abusing Windows finger.exe for network retrieval, commonly associated with fake CAPTCHA lures, Lumma Stealer, Doina and NetSupport staging.
author: Security Arsenal
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_img:
    Image|endswith: '\finger.exe'
  selection_cmd:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - 'http://'
      - 'https://'
      - '@'
      - 'curl'
      - 'powershell'
      - 'mshta'
      - 'rundll32'
  selection_parent:
    ParentImage|endswith:
      - '\explorer.exe'
      - '\chrome.exe'
      - '\msedge.exe'
      - '\firefox.exe'
      - '\brave.exe'
      - '\winword.exe'
      - '\excel.exe'
  condition: selection_img and selection_cmd and selection_parent
falsepositives:
  - Legacy administration of UNIX finger services, extremely rare on enterprise Windows endpoints.
level: high
tags:
  - attack.execution
  - attack.t1059
  - attack.t1105
  - attack.t1204
references:
  - https://www.huntress.com/blog/amazon-clickfix-finger
date: 2026/11/20
modified: 2026/11/20
---
title: Browser or Explorer Spawning Scripting and LOLBin Chain After ClickFix
id: 7b0b0af0-2c67-49db-a5f1-0txclickfix002
status: experimental
description: Detects browser/explorer-spawned cmd, PowerShell, mshta, rundll32 or curl chains consistent with fake CAPTCHA paste-and-run instructions leading to infostealer or RAT execution.
author: Security Arsenal
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_parent:
    ParentImage|endswith:
      - '\explorer.exe'
      - '\chrome.exe'
      - '\msedge.exe'
      - '\firefox.exe'
      - '\brave.exe'
  selection_child:
    Image|endswith:
      - '\cmd.exe'
      - '\powershell.exe'
      - '\pwsh.exe'
      - '\mshta.exe'
      - '\rundll32.exe'
      - '\curl.exe'
      - '\bitsadmin.exe'
      - '\certutil.exe'
  selection_susp:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - 'iex'
      - 'Invoke-Expression'
      - 'DownloadString'
      - 'Start-BitsTransfer'
      - 'hidden'
      - '-w hidden'
      - 'nop'
      - '-enc'
      - 'FromBase64String'
      - 'amsi'
      - 'http'
  condition: selection_parent and selection_child and selection_susp
falsepositives:
  - Admin scripts launched from shell, software deployment, browser extensions. Tune by parent process and command line.
level: high
tags:
  - attack.execution
  - attack.t1059
  - attack.t1204
  - attack.t1027
references:
  - https://www.huntress.com/blog/amazon-clickfix-finger
date: 2026/11/20
modified: 2026/11/20
---
title: PAN-OS GlobalProtect Authentication Bypass and Post-Exploit VPN Session Anomaly
id: 9d4ac2f3-3c6e-4c3f-9a5e-0txpanos001
status: experimental
description: Correlates authentication anomalies against Palo Alto GlobalProtect portal/gateway with new sessions, config changes or privileged account creation consistent with CVE-2026-0257 exploitation and ransomware operator access.
author: Security Arsenal
logsource:
  product: paloalto
  service: globalprotect
detection:
  selection_keywords:
    - 'auth'
    - 'login'
    - 'portal'
    - 'gateway'
    - 'globalprotect'
  selection_success:
    - 'success'
    - 'authenticated'
    - 'session established'
  selection_suspicious:
    - 'config commit'
    - 'admin created'
    - 'local user added'
    - 'new device'
    - 'unusual country'
    - 'multiple failed followed by success'
    - 'non-browser user-agent'
  condition: selection_keywords and selection_success and selection_suspicious
falsepositives:
  - Normal travel VPN, maintenance windows, managed service provider changes. Enrich with change tickets and source ASN.
level: critical
tags:
  - attack.initial-access
  - attack.t1190
  - attack.t1078
  - attack.t1133
references:
  - https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/active-exploitation-of-pan-os-cve-2026-0257/
date: 2026/11/20
modified: 2026/11/20
KQL — Microsoft Sentinel / Defender
let lookback = 14d;
let domains = dynamic(["grillmasterchef.com","ashevilleroofingcontractor.com","grillrecipespro.com","sanaminfotech.online","node3.sanaminfotech.online","brayfinance.online","bank.firstcp.live","securecapitalcorporationlimited.com","qtbnk.com","norexgo.com","1stggbinc.cc","oakmontfb.com","allyunitybn.com"]);
let ips = dynamic(["103.129.96.11","103.151.199.22"]);
let hashes = dynamic(["2bb937c7eac0843313ee402735768e25","923db163b89884e3f371cf322ee1a071515e2477","035d396b3a329f59d680dc36a0a639eb7fb306bea97e42f5f53293dce817e8b7","927ca44949d7788aa86f9d7f04d7fdacecd1dfb9","5fcd3ff3c0a07651041eb79bd8b04aee37d6848f6b77bbad567b6fa9852215ff","66b51246f648a25aca8150d82900e37568dc67712ea4341afb7929638368acd7"]);
let net =
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(lookback)
| where RemoteUrl has_any (domains) or RemoteIP in (ips)
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, DeviceId, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, RemoteIP, RemoteUrl, RemotePort, Protocol, ActionType;
let proc =
DeviceProcessEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(lookback)
| where (FileName =~ "finger.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has_any ("http","https","@","powershell","mshta","rundll32"))
   or (InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe","brave.exe","explorer.exe") and FileName in~ ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","mshta.exe","rundll32.exe","curl.exe","bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe") and ProcessCommandLine has_any ("iex","DownloadString","-enc","FromBase64String","Start-BitsTransfer","amsi","http"))
   or SHA256 in (hashes) or SHA1 in (hashes) or MD5 in (hashes)
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, DeviceId, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA256, SHA1, MD5, FolderPath;
union net, proc
| sort by TimeGenerated desc
PowerShell
$ErrorActionPreference = 'SilentlyContinue'
$lookback = (Get-Date).AddDays(-14)
$domains = @('grillmasterchef.com','ashevilleroofingcontractor.com','grillrecipespro.com','sanaminfotech.online','node3.sanaminfotech.online','brayfinance.online','bank.firstcp.live','securecapitalcorporationlimited.com','qtbnk.com','norexgo.com','1stggbinc.cc','oakmontfb.com','allyunitybn.com')
$ips = @('103.129.96.11','103.151.199.22')
$hashes = @('2bb937c7eac0843313ee402735768e25','923db163b89884e3f371cf322ee1a071515e2477','035d396b3a329f59d680dc36a0a639eb7fb306bea97e42f5f53293dce817e8b7','927ca44949d7788aa86f9d7f04d7fdacecd1dfb9','5fcd3ff3c0a07651041eb79bd8b04aee37d6848f6b77bbad567b6fa9852215ff','66b51246f648a25aca8150d82900e37568dc67712ea4341afb7929638368acd7')
Write-Host '[+] Active network IOC matches'
Get-NetTCPConnection | Where-Object { $ips -contains $_.RemoteAddress } | Select-Object LocalAddress,LocalPort,RemoteAddress,RemotePort,State,OwningProcess,@{n='Process';e={(Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess).Path}},@{n='CmdLine';e={(Get-CimInstance Win32_Process -Filter "ProcessId=$($_.OwningProcess)").CommandLine}}
Write-Host '[+] DNS cache IOC hits'
Get-DnsClientCache | Where-Object { $name = $_.Name; $domains | Where-Object { $name -like "*$_*" } } | Select-Object Name,Type,TimeToLive,Data
Write-Host '[+] Suspicious persistence entries'
$runPaths = @('HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run','HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce','HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run','HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce')
foreach ($p in $runPaths) { Get-ItemProperty $p | ForEach-Object { $_.PSObject.Properties | Where-Object { $_.Value -match 'powershell|mshta|rundll32|curl|finger|AppData|Temp|http' } | Select-Object @{n='Key';e={$p}},Name,Value } }
Get-ScheduledTask | Where-Object { $_.Actions.Execute -match 'powershell|mshta|rundll32|curl|finger' -or ($_.Actions.Arguments -match 'http|enc|DownloadString|AppData|Temp') } | Select-Object TaskName,TaskPath,State,@{n='Action';e={($_.Actions | ForEach-Object { "$($_.Execute) $($_.Arguments)" }) -join ' | '}}
Write-Host '[+] Recent suspicious files by hash in common user-writable paths'
$paths = @($env:TEMP,$env:APPDATA,$env:LOCALAPPDATA,"$env:USERPROFILE\Downloads","C:\ProgramData")
foreach ($path in $paths) { Get-ChildItem $path -Recurse -File -Force | Where-Object { $_.LastWriteTime -gt $lookback } | ForEach-Object { $sha256=(Get-FileHash $_.FullName -Algorithm SHA256).Hash; $sha1=(Get-FileHash $_.FullName -Algorithm SHA1).Hash; $md5=(Get-FileHash $_.FullName -Algorithm MD5).Hash; if ($hashes -contains $sha256 -or $hashes -contains $sha1 -or $hashes -contains $md5) { [pscustomobject]@{Path=$_.FullName;SHA256=$sha256;SHA1=$sha1;MD5=$md5;LastWriteTime=$_.LastWriteTime} } } }
Write-Host '[+] finger.exe and LOLBin process evidence from event logs if present'
Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='Security';Id=4688;StartTime=$lookback} | Where-Object { $_.Message -match 'finger.exe|mshta.exe|rundll32.exe|certutil.exe|bitsadmin.exe' -and $_.Message -match 'http|DownloadString|-enc|AppData|Temp' } | Select-Object TimeCreated,Id,Message -First 200

Response Priorities

Immediate: Block listed domains, hostnames and IPs at DNS, proxy, SWG, email and firewall; add file hashes to EDR block/quarantine after validation. Search endpoint telemetry for finger.exe launched from browsers/explorer and for browser-spawned powershell.exe, cmd.exe, mshta.exe, rundll32.exe, curl.exe, bitsadmin.exe or certutil.exe. Disable or constrain legacy finger.exe via WDAC/AppLocker where business impact allows. For PAN-OS, verify GlobalProtect exposure, apply vendor mitigation/patch guidance, restrict portal access by source geography/ASN where feasible, force re-authentication for suspicious sessions and rotate admin/VPN credentials if anomaly is found. For mobile fleets, alert on sideloaded APKs, unknown Accessibility grants and SMS/notification access outside approved apps.

24h: Treat Lumma/NetSupport and fake-bank phishing as credential compromise until disproven. Invalidate sessions and reset passwords for users with matching network, process or phishing-page contact; prioritize cookies/session-token theft by revoking OAuth grants and refreshing IdP tokens rather than password-only resets. Check MFA fatigue prompts, impossible travel, new inbox rules, added authenticators and abnormal mailbox export. Review VPN logs for new device certs, unusual source IPs, logins outside working hours and admin/config events. Capture volatile evidence before rebuild: process tree, command lines, prefetch, Run keys, scheduled tasks, browser history and DNS cache. If NetSupport is confirmed, hunt for remote file transfer, interactive command shells and follow-on credential dumping.

1 week: Harden architecture around the observed vectors. Reduce search-ad risk with browser isolation for high-risk categories, controlled copy/paste warnings, and user coaching specific to fake CAPTCHA paste-and-run lures. Enforce smart screen/reputation, block child processes from browsers, constrain LOLBins and deploy script controls for unsigned PowerShell. For identity, move high-risk users to phishing-resistant MFA, shorten session lifetimes after sensitive events and alert on token replay. For edge, remove GlobalProtect from broad internet exposure where possible, add WAF/IPS signatures, centralize PAN-OS auth/config logs and test emergency patch workflow. For mobile banking risk, require Play Protect/EMM compliance, block sideloading on managed devices, monitor Accessibility service grants and coordinate with fraud teams on OTP rerouting and call-forwarding anomalies. Finally, track reusable phishing-kit artifacts such as identical tagline, routing number and support phone number to cluster new disposable domains before credential loss.

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