Three pulses published to AlienVault OTX between 19–20 November 2026 collectively map a converging threat landscape: low-friction social engineering at the edge, authentication bypass on perimeter appliances, and AI-lowered attacker skill floors.
Pulse 1 — Amazon-Themed ClickFix Campaign: Operators purchased sponsored Google search placement for the query "amazon business" to redirect victims to a spoofed Amazon login page hosted on Google Sites. The page serves a fake CAPTCHA — the ClickFix technique — that tricks users into pasting and executing a malicious command invoking Windows' obsolete finger.exe utility as a living-off-the-land binary (LOLBins) for payload retrieval. The infection chain ultimately delivers Lumma Stealer (credential/browser/session theft), Doina (loader/dropper stage), and a NetSupport Client RAT for persistent remote access. Hosting and staging infrastructure includes compromised or actor-registered domains such as grillmasterchef.com, ashevilleroofingcontractor.com, and grillrecipespro.com.
Pulse 2 — PAN-OS CVE-2026-0257 Active Exploitation: Unit 42 reports active exploitation of an authentication bypass in Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS GlobalProtect portal and gateway components. Ransomware operators Spikey Scorpius (Qilin), Tarnished Scorpius (Inc), and the Settra group are weaponizing the flaw to establish unauthorized VPN sessions, then pivoting to virtualization-layer attacks (Brave Prince tooling, S0252) and ransomware deployment. Targeting spans ten verticals including education, finance, healthcare, government, energy, and transportation — opportunistic rather than selective.
Pulse 3 — BUGSTER AI-Assisted Intrusion Operations: A financially motivated actor using jailbroken AI assistants (Hermes Agent framework with DeepSeek V4) conducted reconnaissance, exploit script generation, and exfiltration against education and telecommunications targets in India, stealing 5,200+ personal records. Notably, the actor has limited native technical skill — the AI toolchain substitutes for it. This materially lowers the cost of entry-level intrusion and increases expected incident volume.
Collective assessment: The three pulses share a common thread — attack surface erosion via trusted channels (search ads, Google Sites, VPN concentrators) combined with commodity tooling. Defenders should treat perimeter VPN appliances and identity/session theft as the highest-priority exposure this cycle.
Threat Actor / Malware Profile
Lumma Stealer + Doina + NetSupport (ClickFix chain)
- Distribution: Malvertising via sponsored Google search results; spoofed login pages on Google Sites; ClickFix fake-CAPTCHA social engineering delivering clipboard-executed commands.
- Payload behavior:
finger.exeis abused to retrieve second-stage content over the legacy Finger protocol (TCP/79). Doina acts as the staging loader, which decrypts and injects Lumma Stealer. Lumma harvests browser credentials, cookies, session tokens, crypto wallets, and 2FA artifacts. A NetSupport RAT client is deployed for hands-on-keyboard follow-on access. - C2 communication: Lumma uses HTTP/S POST exfiltration to rotating C2 domains, frequently hidden behind Cloudflare. NetSupport RAT communicates over TCP 443/80 with its own protocol, masquerading as legitimate remote-admin traffic.
- Persistence: NetSupport installs as a service or registry Run key entry; Lumma is typically smash-and-grab but the RAT stage provides durable access.
- Anti-analysis: LOLBin abuse (
finger.exe) evades signature and reputation controls; payload staging across benign-seeming recipe/contractor domains defeats domain categorization; in-memory injection avoids disk artifacts.
Spikey Scorpius (Qilin) / Tarnished Scorpius (Inc) / Settra
- Initial access: Authentication bypass on PAN-OS GlobalProtect portal/gateway (CVE-2026-0257), yielding unauthorized VPN sessions.
- Post-exploitation: Brave Prince (S0252) tooling for virtualization-layer attacks — targeting ESXi/vCenter to encrypt entire datastores at scale. Qilin and Inc ransomware payloads deployed after lateral movement and data theft (double extortion).
- Persistence: Creation of rogue local admin accounts on firewall appliances, webshells/droppers on management interfaces, scheduled tasks and service creation on Windows/ESXi hosts.
- Anti-analysis: Log tampering on appliances, use of legitimate admin protocols (SMB, WinRM, SSH) for lateral movement to blend with administrative noise.
BUGSTER (AI-assisted actor)
- Method: Jailbroken LLM assistants (Hermes Agent + DeepSeek V4) generate reconnaissance scripts, exploit code, and exfiltration logic. Despite low actor skill, operational tempo is high. Expect AI-generated tooling to show distinctive tells: verbose comments, generic variable names, inconsistent error handling — useful for code-attribution hunts.
IOC Analysis
The indicator set across these pulses is weighted toward domains and file hashes, with CVEs serving as the pivot for exposure management rather than direct detection.
| Indicator | Type | Pulse | Operationalization |
|---|---|---|---|
grillmasterchef.com | Domain | ClickFix | Block at DNS/proxy; hunt proxy logs for connections |
ashevilleroofingcontractor.com | Domain | ClickFix | Block; note pattern — legitimate small-business sites used as staging |
grillrecipespro.com | Domain | ClickFix | Block; retro-hunt last 90 days of DNS resolution |
035d396b...17e8b7 (SHA-256) | FileHash | ClickFix | Block in EDR; hunt for process creation by hash |
2bb937c7...768e25 (MD5) / 923db163...2477 (SHA-1) | FileHash | ClickFix | Supplement SHA-256 blocking for legacy tooling |
| CVE-2026-0257 | CVE | PAN-OS | Patch immediately; audit GlobalProtect logs for pre-patch compromise |
| CVE-2026-109618 / CVE-2026-109619 | CVE | ClickFix / BUGSTER | Cross-reference vulnerability scanners; shared CVEs across pulses suggest common exploit tooling |
| CVE-2023-27532 | CVE | PAN-OS pulse | Veeam Backup flaw referenced in operator playbook — verify Veeam patch state as ransomware actors target backups |
Operational guidance: Ingest domains and hashes into your threat intel platform (MISP, OpenCTI) with TLP:WHITE handling; push domains to DNS sinkhole/proxy blocklists; push hashes to EDR block policies. Note the CVE overlap (CVE-2026-109618/619 appearing in both the ClickFix and BUGSTER pulses) — this indicates shared exploit kits or AI-generated tooling converging on the same vulnerabilities, and should drive those CVEs to the top of patch prioritization.
Detection Engineering
---
title: ClickFix Finger Utility LOLBin Execution
id: 7a1c4e52-9f3d-4b1e-8c2a-1d5e6f7a8b9c
status: experimental
description: Detects execution of Windows finger.exe with suspicious arguments consistent with ClickFix social-engineering chains that abuse the Finger protocol to retrieve payloads (Lumma Stealer / Doina staging).
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intelligence
date: 2026/11/20
references:
- https://www.huntress.com/blog/amazon-clickfix-finger
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
Image|endswith: '\finger.exe'
selection_args:
CommandLine|contains:
- '@'
- 'http'
- 'cmd'
- 'powershell'
- 'mshta'
- '|'
condition: selection_img and selection_args
falsepositives:
- Virtually none; finger.exe is obsolete and has no legitimate enterprise use case in modern environments
level: high
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059
- attack.t1105
- attack.t1659
---
title: NetSupport RAT or Lumma Stealer Staging Infrastructure Communication
id: 2b8d5f63-0a4e-5c2f-9d3b-2e6f708b9c0d
status: experimental
description: Detects network connections to domains identified in the Amazon-themed ClickFix campaign delivering Lumma Stealer, Doina, and NetSupport RAT.
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intelligence
date: 2026/11/20
references:
- https://www.huntress.com/blog/amazon-clickfix-finger
logsource:
category: dns
product: windows
detection:
selection:
query|contains:
- 'grillmasterchef.com'
- 'ashevilleroofingcontractor.com'
- 'grillrecipespro.com'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unlikely; these domains have no legitimate business purpose in this context
level: critical
tags:
- attack.command_and_control
- attack.t1071
- attack.t1105
---
title: Rogue VPN Session or GlobalProtect Auth Bypass Artifacts (CVE-2026-0257)
id: 3c9e6074-1b5f-6d30-0e4c-3f7081c0d1e2
status: experimental
description: Detects suspicious process execution on Windows hosts immediately following GlobalProtect VPN session establishment, consistent with ransomware operator post-exploitation behavior (Qilin/Inc/Settra) after PAN-OS CVE-2026-0257 authentication bypass.
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intelligence
date: 2026/11/20
references:
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/active-exploitation-of-pan-os-cve-2026-0257/
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_parent:
ParentImage|endswith:
- '\PanGPA.exe'
- '\PanGPS.exe'
selection_suspicious_child:
Image|endswith:
- '\cmd.exe'
- '\powershell.exe'
- '\wmic.exe'
- '\psexec.exe'
- '\nltest.exe'
- '\whoami.exe'
condition: selection_parent and selection_suspicious_child
falsepositives:
- Rare; GlobalProtect processes do not normally spawn administrative shells
level: high
tags:
- attack.initial_access
- attack.t1190
- attack.t1133
// Hunt: ClickFix / Lumma Stealer finger.exe LOLBin + staging domains + post-VPN recon (CVE-2026-0257)
// Lookback: 14 days | Microsoft Sentinel / Defender XDR
let ClickFixDomains = dynamic(["grillmasterchef.com", "ashevilleroofingcontractor.com", "grillrecipespro.com"]);
let StagingHashes = dynamic(["035d396b3a329f59d680dc36a0a639eb7fb306bea97e42f5f53293dce817e8b7",
"2bb937c7eac0843313ee402735768e25",
"923db163b89884e3f371cf322ee1a071515e2477"]);
let FingerExec =
DeviceProcessEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(14d)
| where FileName =~ "finger.exe"
| extend SuspiciousArgs = ProcessCommandLine has_any ("@", "http", "cmd", "powershell", "mshta", "|")
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, FingerExec=1;
let DomainHits =
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(14d)
| where RemoteUrl in~ (ClickFixDomains)
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, RemoteUrl, RemoteIP, RemotePort, DomainHit=1;
let HashHits =
DeviceProcessEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(14d)
| where SHA256 in~ (StagingHashes) or SHA1 in~ (StagingHashes) or MD5 in~ (StagingHashes)
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, FileName, SHA256, ProcessCommandLine, HashHit=1;
let PostVpnRecon =
DeviceProcessEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(14d)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("PanGPA.exe", "PanGPS.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("cmd.exe", "powershell.exe", "wmic.exe", "whoami.exe", "nltest.exe", "net.exe")
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, PostVpnRecon=1;
union isfuzzy=true FingerExec, DomainHits, HashHits, PostVpnRecon
| sort by TimeGenerated asc
<#
.SYNOPSIS
Security Arsenal IOC Hunt — ClickFix/Lumma + PAN-OS CVE-2026-0257 artifacts
.DESCRIPTION
Checks hosts for: finger.exe execution remnants, NetSupport RAT persistence
(services/run keys), ClickFix staging domain connections in DNS cache,
staging payload hashes, and rogue VPN-era local admin accounts.
Run via your RMM/EDR or PS remoting across the fleet. Outputs JSON per host.
#>
$Report = [ordered]@{
Hostname = $env:COMPUTERNAME
ScanTime = (Get-Date).ToUniversalTime().ToString("o")
Findings = @()
}
# --- 1. DNS cache hits for ClickFix staging domains ---
$BadDomains = @("grillmasterchef.com","ashevilleroofingcontractor.com","grillrecipespro.com")
$DnsHits = Get-DnsClientCache -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Where-Object {
$n = $_.Entry; $BadDomains | Where-Object { $n -like "*$_*" }
}
if ($DnsHits) {
$Report.Findings += @{ Check = "ClickFixStagingDomain-DNSCache"; Severity = "CRITICAL"
Detail = ($DnsHits | Select-Object Entry, Data | ConvertTo-Json -Compress) }
}
# --- 2. Staging payload file hashes anywhere on common drop paths ---
$BadHashes = @("035d396b3a329f59d680dc36a0a639eb7fb306bea97e42f5f53293dce817e8b7")
$DropPaths = @("$env:TEMP","$env:LOCALAPPDATA\Temp","$env:APPDATA","C:\Users\Public")
foreach ($p in $DropPaths) {
Get-ChildItem -Path $p -Recurse -File -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | ForEach-Object {
$h = (Get-FileHash $_.FullName -Algorithm SHA256 -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue).Hash
if ($h -and ($BadHashes -contains $h.ToLower())) {
$Report.Findings += @{ Check = "LummaStagingHash"; Severity = "CRITICAL"; Detail = $_.FullName }
}
}
}
# --- 3. NetSupport RAT persistence: services, run keys, install dirs ---
$SvcHits = Get-CimInstance Win32_Service -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
Where-Object { $_.Name -match "client32|netsupport|PCICTL" -or $_.PathName -match "client32\.exe|NSM" }
if ($SvcHits) {
$Report.Findings += @{ Check = "NetSupportService"; Severity = "HIGH"
Detail = ($SvcHits | Select-Object Name, PathName, State | ConvertTo-Json -Compress) }
}
$RunKeys = @("HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run",
"HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run")
foreach ($rk in $RunKeys) {
$props = Get-ItemProperty -Path $rk -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
if ($props) {
$props.PSObject.Properties | Where-Object { $_.Value -match "client32|netsupport|NSM|finger" } | ForEach-Object {
$Report.Findings += @{ Check = "PersistenceRunKey"; Severity = "HIGH"; Detail = "$($_.Name) = $($_.Value)" }
}
}
}
# --- 4. Scheduled tasks invoking LOLBins or suspicious payloads ---
Get-ScheduledTask -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | ForEach-Object {
$actions = ($_.Actions | ForEach-Object { "$($_.Execute) $($_.Arguments)" }) -join "; "
if ($actions -match "finger\.exe|mshta|powershell.*-enc|client32") {
$Report.Findings += @{ Check = "SuspiciousScheduledTask"; Severity = "HIGH"; Detail = "$($_.TaskName): $actions" }
}
}
# --- 5. Live/established connections on Finger (79) or NetSupport default ports ---
$Conns = Get-NetTCPConnection -State Established -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
Where-Object { $_.RemotePort -in @(79, 5405, 4421) -and $_.RemoteAddress -notmatch "^(10\.|172\.(1[6-9]|2[0-9]|3[0-1])\.|192\.168\.|127\.)" }
if ($Conns) {
$Report.Findings += @{ Check = "SuspiciousOutboundPort"; Severity = "HIGH"
Detail = ($Conns | Select-Object LocalPort, RemoteAddress, RemotePort, OwningProcess | ConvertTo-Json -Compress) }
}
# --- 6. Recently created local admin accounts (post-VPN-bypass rogue accounts) ---
$Cutoff = (Get-Date).AddDays(-14)
Get-LocalUser -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Where-Object { $_.Enabled -and $_.LastLogon -gt $Cutoff } | ForEach-Object {
$isAdmin = (Get-LocalGroupMember -Group "Administrators" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue).Name -contains "$env:COMPUTERNAME\$($_.Name)"
if ($isAdmin -and $_.Name -notin @("Administrator","DefaultAccount","WDAGUtilityAccount")) {
$Report.Findings += @{ Check = "RecentLocalAdminLogon"; Severity = "MEDIUM"; Detail = "$($_.Name) last logon $($_.LastLogon)" }
}
}
$Report | ConvertTo-Json -Depth 5
Response Priorities
Immediate (0–4 hours)
- Block
grillmasterchef.com,ashevilleroofingcontractor.com,grillrecipespro.comat DNS resolver, secure web gateway, and EDR network protection layers. Retro-hunt 90 days of DNS/proxy logs. - Block the Lumma staging hashes (MD5/SHA-1/SHA-256) in EDR block policies.
- Alert on any
finger.exeexecution — there is no legitimate use case in modern enterprise environments; treat any hit as a confirmed incident. - Patch PAN-OS to the fixed release addressing CVE-2026-0257 on all GlobalProtect portals/gateways. If patching is delayed, restrict portal access by source IP and enable enhanced logging.
- Audit GlobalProtect auth logs for sessions from anomalous geographies/ASNs predating the patch; assume compromise where anomalies exist.
24 hours
- Identity verification is mandatory. Lumma Stealer harvests browser session tokens and cookies — assume all sessions on affected endpoints are compromised. Force password resets and revoke active sessions (Entra ID / Okta) for any user on an endpoint with finger.exe execution or staging-domain hits.
- Invalidate refresh tokens and revoke OAuth grants for impacted users; session-token theft bypasses MFA.
- Hunt for NetSupport RAT persistence (services, run keys) per the PowerShell script above; any hit triggers full host isolation and forensic imaging.
- Review VPN-connected hosts for post-authentication recon (whoami, nltest, net group) within 15 minutes of session establishment — a hallmark of the Scorpius operator playbooks.
- Verify Veeam Backup patch state (CVE-2023-27532 referenced in the operator playbook) — ransomware crews target backups before detonation.
1 week
- Attack-surface hardening: If GlobalProtect is internet-exposed, migrate to a ZTNA posture or place the portal behind an IP allowlist/geofence. Subscribe to PAN-OS emergency-release advisories.
- LOLBins policy: Deploy WDAC/AppLocker rules blocking
finger.exe, and audit other retro-utilities (finger,tftp,rexec) that adversaries repurpose for payload retrieval. - ClickFix user awareness: Distribute guidance on fake-CAPTCHA paste-and-run lures. No legitimate site will ever ask a user to open Run/Terminal and paste a command. Consider browser policies that disable clipboard-write prompts from untrusted origins.
- Virtualization layer: Audit ESXi/vCenter for unauthorized accounts and SSH enablement; enforce lockdown mode and MFA on vCenter — this is the Qilin/Inc endgame target.
- AI-assisted threat planning: Update threat models to assume higher intrusion volume from low-skill actors; prioritize automated containment over manual triage for commodity incidents.
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