Threat Summary
Two concurrent AlienVault OTX pulses reveal a dangerous convergence: adversaries are weaponizing the ConnectWise product stack from both ends — abusing legitimate ConnectWise Cloud Backup (formerly SkyKick) API credentials to silently access hundreds of Microsoft 365 tenants, while simultaneously deploying ConnectWise ScreenConnect remote access software onto endpoints through fake cryptocurrency wallet updates.
Pulse 1 — M365 Vendor Credential Abuse: A Microsoft 365 API credential belonging to ConnectWise Cloud Backup was compromised and used to obtain Microsoft Graph access tokens across hundreds of customer tenants. The actor authenticated from IP 144.172.64.128 on October 15 and traversed tenants in sorted GUID order — a strong indicator of scripted, automated victim enumeration rather than opportunistic access. Targeted sectors include Technology and Government. The pulse references CVE-2025-11371, consistent with known ConnectWise product exploitation patterns.
Pulse 2 — Fake Crypto Wallet Droppers: A social engineering campaign is targeting hardware wallet users (Coldcard, Ledger, Pera Algorand, Revolut, Xaman) with malicious ZIP archives containing BAT scripts masquerading as wallet updates. The payload is not custom malware — it is legitimate ConnectWise ScreenConnect remote support software, giving attackers persistent, signed-binary remote access that blends into normal IT tooling. The campaign has generated 44 indicators including the distribution domain exodus-wallet.pro and numerous file hashes of the BAT droppers.
The collective picture: threat actors are deliberately targeting trusted vendor infrastructure and signed remote-access tooling to bypass EDR controls and identity protections. Objectives include credential harvesting, crypto asset theft, and cloud tenant data access.
Threat Actor / Malware Profile
Attribution: Both pulses are unattributed (TLP:WHITE, actor unknown). TTP overlap — ConnectWise product abuse in both — suggests either shared tooling markets or copycat adoption of a proven technique set.
ScreenConnect-as-RAT Campaign:
- Distribution: Malicious ZIP files delivered via phishing, posing as hardware wallet firmware/software updates for Coldcard, Ledger, Pera Algorand Wallet, Revolut, and Xaman.
- Payload behavior: BAT scripts execute unattended ScreenConnect client installers with pre-configured attacker-controlled relay settings. Because ScreenConnect is digitally signed and widely whitelisted, execution rarely triggers EDR verdicts.
- C2 communication: ScreenConnect clients communicate over outbound HTTPS (443) to attacker-controlled relay servers — often cloud-hosted — making detection dependent on destination reputation and process ancestry rather than payload signatures.
- Persistence: ScreenConnect installs as a Windows service (
ScreenConnect Client (<instanceid>)), ensuring reboot persistence and SYSTEM-level access. - Anti-analysis: Living-off-the-land-by-proxy — no custom malware to reverse; the BAT wrapper is trivial but the payload inherits vendor trust.
M365 Vendor Credential Campaign:
- Distribution/Initial access: Compromised third-party (MSP/backup vendor) API credential — no endpoint intrusion required.
- Behavior: Microsoft Graph access token acquisition across hundreds of tenants; traversal in sorted GUID order indicates automated enumeration, likely for backup data access, mailbox enumeration, or staging follow-on credential theft.
- Persistence: Abuse of pre-authorized service principal consent — persists until the credential is revoked, invisible to endpoint telemetry.
IOC Analysis
The pulses contain four operational indicator classes:
| Type | Examples | Operationalization |
|---|---|---|
| IPv4 | 144.172.64.128 | Block at egress proxy/firewall; hunt Azure AD sign-in logs and VPN logs for historical hits back to Oct 15 |
| Domain | exodus-wallet.pro | Sinkhole/block at DNS; query DNS resolver and proxy logs for resolution events; pivot on registrar and TLS cert |
| FileHash (MD5) | 1829cc10e7795e54b7cb3d551975aea5, 1d49be4bac3afef330dff80515aec590, 30e40c8e80de484130213776f8f0e444, 56930e936a70d3fd25436195945a942a, 73e60d1b2667a37f27ccb22f3e767f4d, 773dbb36091db84e9f0735b98ff7371b, 83929df46fe5ea355dae169e8e765d29 | Load into EDR blocklists and retro-hunt via hash reputation queries; note OTX provides MD5s of SHA1s — pull full hashes from the pulse for accurate matching |
| CVE | CVE-2025-11371 | Inventory ConnectWise product exposure (ScreenConnect servers, Cloud Backup integrations) and patch/audit immediately |
SOC teams should ingest these via OTX DirectConnect API or TAXII into their SIEM. Priority goes to the IP and domain (network-layer control points) and to behavioral detections, since hash lists age quickly while the ScreenConnect-installation behavior is durable.
Detection Engineering
---
title: ScreenConnect RMM Execution from Suspicious Parent or User Context
id: 9f2a1c3e-5b7d-4e1a-8c2f-3d6e9a1b4f50
status: experimental
description: Detects ScreenConnect client execution launched by script interpreters or running from non-standard paths, consistent with fake crypto wallet BAT dropper campaigns (OTX 2026-11).
author: Security Arsenal
references:
- https://bartblaze.blogspot.com/2026/11/crypto-hardware-wallet-users-under.html
date: 2026/11/18
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
selection_parent:
ParentImage|endswith:
- '\cmd.exe'
- '\powershell.exe'
- '\wscript.exe'
- '\cscript.exe'
ParentCommandLine|contains:
- '.bat'
selection_sc:
- Image|contains: 'ScreenConnect'
- CommandLine|contains:
- 'ScreenConnect.ClientService.exe'
- '?e=Access&y=Guest'
selection_path:
Image|contains:
- '\AppData\'
- '\Temp\'
- '\Downloads\'
- '\Users\Public\'
condition: selection_sc and (selection_parent or selection_path)
falsepositives:
- Legitimate IT-managed ScreenConnect deployments (baseline service instance IDs and installer paths)
level: high
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1219
---
title: ScreenConnect Service Installation Persistence
id: 2c4d7e91-8a3f-4b6c-9d2e-5f1a7c3b8e44
status: experimental
description: Detects creation of a ScreenConnect Client Windows service, the persistence mechanism used when the RMM is deployed maliciously via phishing droppers.
author: Security Arsenal
date: 2026/11/18
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
selection:
- EventID: 7045
ServiceName|contains: 'ScreenConnect Client'
- Image|endswith: '\sc.exe'
CommandLine|contains:
- 'create'
- 'ScreenConnect'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Authorized RMM rollout by IT (correlate with change tickets)
level: medium
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1543.003
---
title: Suspicious Microsoft Graph Token Acquisition from Known Bad Infrastructure
id: 7b1e4a6d-3f8c-4d2a-9e5b-1c6f8a2d4e70
status: experimental
description: Detects authentication or token request activity sourced from the IP observed abusing ConnectWise/SkyKick M365 API credentials (144.172.64.128), including automated multi-tenant GUID-order enumeration behavior.
author: Security Arsenal
references:
- https://www.huntress.com/blog/vendor-credential-enables-unauthorized-access
date: 2026/11/18
logsource:
category: network_connection
selection_ip:
DestinationIp: '144.172.64.128'
selection_endpoint:
DestinationHostname|contains:
- 'login.microsoftonline.com'
- 'graph.microsoft.com'
condition: selection_ip or selection_endpoint
falsepositives:
- None expected for the dedicated IP; Graph endpoint matches require correlation with source IP and user agent anomalies
level: critical
tags:
- attack.credential_access
- attack.t1552
- attack.t1078.004
// Hunt: ScreenConnect RMM execution, persistence, and C2 + malicious crypto-wallet domain contact
// Microsoft Sentinel — run over last 30 days
let BadIP = "144.172.64.128";
let BadDomains = dynamic(["exodus-wallet.pro"]);
let DropperHashes = dynamic([
"1829cc10e7795e54b7cb3d551975aea5",
"1d49be4bac3afef330dff80515aec590",
"30e40c8e80de484130213776f8f0e444",
"56930e936a70d3fd25436195945a942a",
"73e60d1b2667a37f27ccb22f3e767f4d",
"773dbb36091db84e9f0735b98ff7371b",
"83929df46fe5ea355dae169e8e765d29"]);
union isfuzzy=true
(DeviceProcessEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(30d)
| where FileName has "ScreenConnect"
or InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any (".bat", "ScreenConnect") and InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe")
| extend Detection = "ScreenConnect execution / script-parent"
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, Detection),
(DeviceNetworkEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(30d)
| where RemoteIP == BadIP or RemoteUrl has_any (BadDomains)
or (InitiatingProcessFileName has "ScreenConnect" and RemotePort in (443, 8040, 8041))
| extend Detection = "Network contact with known-bad infra or ScreenConnect relay"
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, RemoteIP, RemoteUrl, RemotePort, Detection),
(DeviceFileEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(30d)
| where MD5 has_any (DropperHashes)
| extend Detection = "Known BAT dropper hash observed on disk"
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, FileName, FolderPath, MD5, Detection),
(SecurityEvent
| where TimeGenerated > ago(30d)
| where EventID == 7045 and ServiceName has "ScreenConnect"
| extend Detection = "ScreenConnect service installed (persistence)"
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, ServiceName, ServiceFileName, Account, Detection)
| sort by TimeGenerated desc
<#
.SYNOPSIS
Security Arsenal — IOC Hunt: ScreenConnect RAT + ConnectWise M365 abuse artifacts
.DESCRIPTION
Checks local host for ScreenConnect services/processes, suspicious service persistence,
connections to known-bad infrastructure, and dropper staging artifacts in user paths.
Run elevated via your RMM/EDR live-response or PS remoting across the fleet.
#>
$badIP = '144.172.64.128'
$badDomain = 'exodus-wallet.pro'
$dropperMD5s = @(
'1829cc10e7795e54b7cb3d551975aea5',
'1d49be4bac3afef330dff80515aec590',
'30e40c8e80de484130213776f8f0e444',
'56930e936a70d3fd25436195945a942a',
'73e60d1b2667a37f27ccb22f3e767f4d',
'773dbb36091db84e9f0735b98ff7371b',
'83929df46fe5ea355dae169e8e765d29'
)
Write-Host "=== [1] ScreenConnect services (persistence check) ===" -ForegroundColor Cyan
Get-CimInstance Win32_Service | Where-Object { $_.Name -like '*ScreenConnect*' -or $_.DisplayName -like '*ScreenConnect*' } |
Select-Object Name, DisplayName, State, StartMode, PathName | Format-List
Write-Host "=== [2] ScreenConnect running processes ===" -ForegroundColor Cyan
Get-Process | Where-Object { $_.ProcessName -like '*ScreenConnect*' -or $_.Path -like '*ScreenConnect*' } |
Select-Object ProcessName, Id, Path, StartTime | Format-Table -AutoSize
Write-Host "=== [3] Active connections to known-bad IP ===" -ForegroundColor Cyan
Get-NetTCPConnection -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Where-Object { $_.RemoteAddress -eq $badIP } |
Select-Object LocalAddress, LocalPort, RemoteAddress, RemotePort, State, OwningProcess | Format-Table -AutoSize
Write-Host "=== [4] Registry run-key persistence referencing ScreenConnect/scripts ===" -ForegroundColor Cyan
$runKeys = @('HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run',
'HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce',
'HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run',
'HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce')
foreach ($k in $runKeys) {
if (Test-Path $k) {
Get-ItemProperty $k | Get-Member -MemberType NoteProperty | ForEach-Object {
$val = (Get-ItemProperty $k).($_.Name)
if ($val -match 'ScreenConnect|\.bat|wallet|ledger|coldcard') {
Write-Host "[!] $($k) :: $($_.Name) = $val" -ForegroundColor Red
}
}
}
}
Write-Host "=== [5] Scheduled tasks referencing ScreenConnect or BAT droppers ===" -ForegroundColor Cyan
Get-ScheduledTask | ForEach-Object {
$t = $_
$t.Actions | Where-Object { $_.Execute -match 'ScreenConnect|cmd\.exe|powershell' -and $_.Arguments -match '\.bat|wallet' } |
ForEach-Object { Write-Host "[!] Task: $($t.TaskName) -> $($_.Execute) $($_.Arguments)" -ForegroundColor Red }
}
Write-Host "=== [6] Dropper hash sweep in user-writable paths ===" -ForegroundColor Cyan
$searchPaths = @("$env:USERPROFILE\Downloads", "$env:TEMP", "C:\Users\Public", "$env:ProgramData")
foreach ($p in $searchPaths) {
if (Test-Path $p) {
Get-ChildItem $p -Recurse -File -Include *.bat,*.zip,*.exe -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | ForEach-Object {
$h = (Get-FileHash $_.FullName -Algorithm MD5).Hash.ToLower()
if ($dropperMD5s -contains $h) {
Write-Host "[CRITICAL] Dropper match: $($_.FullName) (MD5: $h)" -ForegroundColor Red
}
}
}
}
Write-Host "=== [7] DNS cache check for malicious domain ===" -ForegroundColor Cyan
Get-DnsClientCache | Where-Object { $_.Entry -like "*$badDomain*" } |
Select-Object Entry, Data, TimeToLive | Format-Table -AutoSize
Write-Host "Hunt complete. Escalate any [CRITICAL]/[!] findings to the IR bridge." -ForegroundColor Green
Response Priorities
Immediate (0–4 hours):
- Block
144.172.64.128at all egress points andexodus-wallet.proat DNS/proxy layers. - Load the seven MD5 indicators into EDR blocklists and trigger retro-hunts across the full retention window.
- Run the KQL query and PowerShell sweep fleet-wide; any unauthorized ScreenConnect service = isolation and IR engagement.
- If you use ConnectWise Cloud Backup/SkyKick: revoke and rotate the vendor's M365 API credentials now, then audit Graph token issuance since October 15.
24 Hours:
- Audit Azure AD/Entra sign-in and audit logs for service principal token activity from the attacker IP and for anomalous cross-tenant GUID enumeration patterns.
- Force credential resets for any user whose mailbox, wallet, or backup data was accessed; this campaign explicitly targets credentials and crypto assets.
- Verify MFA enforcement on all admin and service principal accounts; review third-party app consent grants for over-privileged Graph scopes.
- Confirm whether any employee downloaded "wallet update" ZIPs — treat affected users' seed phrases as compromised.
1 Week:
- Implement an RMM allowlist: block execution of ScreenConnect and other remote-access tools not explicitly approved for your environment (AppLocker/WDAC policies).
- Patch and audit all ConnectWise product exposure per CVE-2025-11371 guidance.
- Harden third-party vendor access: enforce conditional access on MSP/vendor service principals, short-lived credentials, and alerting on bulk tenant enumeration.
- Add crypto-wallet-themed phishing lures to security awareness and email gateway detonation rulesets.
Related Resources
Security Arsenal Incident Response Managed SOC & MDR Services AlertMonitor Threat Detection From The Dark Side Intel Hub
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