Classification: TLP:CLEAR | Publication Date: 2026-11-19 | Source: ransomware.live leak-site monitoring | Nature of data: Unverified threat-actor claims
CURIOUS WORM Ransomware Gang: 6 New Leak-Site Claims in 4 Days — Healthcare & Technology Targeting Analysis
Executive Summary
Between 2026-11-16 and 2026-11-18, the ransomware group tracked as CURIOUS WORM published six new victim listings on its dark web leak site. All six listings were independently observed by two separate leak-site crawlers, confirming the gang posted the claims — but no listing in this dataset constitutes a confirmed breach. Only the named organizations or their regulators can confirm an intrusion.
The claimed victim set shows a clear sector tilt: three of the six listings are tagged Healthcare (examinetics.com, risingpharma.com, interdent.com) and two are tagged Technology (one partially masked as eory.com and one as tlkwp.com). One listing (ex******s.com) has no sector resolution. Geographically, the confirmed-location claims split between the United States (examinetics.com, risingpharma.com) and Germany (interdent.com), with three listings lacking country attribution.
The posting cadence — four listings on a single day (2026-11-16) followed by daily additions — suggests either a batch-detonation cycle or a coordinated leak-site publication wave typical of double-extortion pressure tactics. Security teams in Healthcare and Technology verticals, particularly those with US or German operations, should treat this as a trigger to run the detection content in this briefing.
Sourcing & Verification
- Corroboration status: 6 of 6 listings were independently observed by a second leak-site crawler; 0 appear on a single source only. Multi-source observation confirms the gang made the claim — nothing more.
- Inclusion reflects the threat actor's claim and is NOT confirmation of a breach. A leak-site posting is an accusation by a criminal organization, and criminal organizations lie — for leverage, for reputation, and to inflate their perceived operational tempo.
- A named organization may dispute a listing, and a denial is likewise not proof the claim is false. Disclosure obligations vary by jurisdiction and sector, and not every incident is reportable. Neither silence nor denial settles the question; only the organization or its regulator can confirm.
- Security Arsenal will publish corrections to this briefing as warranted and welcomes contact from any named organization at security@securityarsenal.com.
Threat Actor Profile — CURIOUS WORM
CURIOUS WORM operates as a ransomware threat actor maintaining a dedicated .onion leak site, consistent with the double-extortion model: data theft prior to encryption, with publication threats used as payment leverage. Key characteristics based on leak-site telemetry and sector reporting:
- Operating model: The gang's publication pattern — clustered postings with mixed-sector victims — is consistent with either a closed group or a small RaaS operation with limited affiliates. The relatively low sustained posting volume (6 claims in the last 100 monitored postings for this cycle) suggests a selective, mid-tempo operation rather than a mass-exploitation affiliate program.
- Victimology: The current wave skews toward mid-market organizations in Healthcare and Technology — a profile typical of gangs that balance ransom affordability against regulatory pressure value (healthcare data carries strong extortion leverage due to PHI exposure risk).
- Initial access methods (assessed, not confirmed for any specific listing): Gangs with this profile typically gain entry via exposed remote services (VPN appliances, RDP), spear-phishing with macro- or script-based loaders, and exploitation of internet-facing management planes. See the CVE exposure discussion below — framed strictly as hypothesis.
- Double extortion: Listings on the leak site indicate the gang is in the pressure phase. Publication of a name typically precedes or accompanies threats to release staged data.
- Dwell time: Mid-tempo groups of this type commonly dwell days-to-weeks between access and detonation, using the interval for discovery, credential theft, and data staging. The batch of four same-day listings on 2026-11-16 is consistent with a coordinated detonation/publication cycle after parallel intrusions matured.
Current Campaign Analysis
Claimed Victim Set (2026-11-16 to 2026-11-18)
| Organization (as listed) | Sector | Country | Published |
|---|---|---|---|
| eor***y.com | Technology | ? | 2026-11-18 |
| examinetics.com | Healthcare | US | 2026-11-17 |
| ex********s.com | Not Found | ? | 2026-11-16 |
| risingpharma.com | Healthcare | US | 2026-11-16 |
| tlkw*****p.com | Technology | ? | 2026-11-16 |
| interdent.com | Healthcare | DE | 2026-11-16 |
Sector Targeting
Healthcare dominates this wave (3 of 6 claims). Healthcare remains a high-value extortion target: PHI carries regulatory exposure (HIPAA in the US, GDPR in the EU), patient-safety pressure shortens negotiation timelines, and the sector historically under-invests in segmentation and EDR coverage relative to finance. Technology (2 of 6) follows — technology firms are attractive both for their own data and as potential pivot points into downstream customers (supply-chain leverage).
Geographic Concentration
Where country attribution exists, claims split between the United States (2) and Germany (1). Germany is a notable inclusion — EU-based victims face GDPR notification obligations that materially raise the cost of a confirmed exfiltration, which gangs exploit as negotiation pressure. The three unattributed listings prevent firm conclusions about geographic strategy.
Victim Profile
The named organizations in the healthcare claims span pharmaceutical distribution and occupational/dental health services — mid-market entities, likely in the tens-to-hundreds-of-millions USD revenue range, large enough to pay meaningful ransoms but frequently below the security-maturity threshold of Fortune-500 peers. This is the classic sweet spot for mid-tempo ransomware operations.
Posting Cadence
Four same-day claims (2026-11-16), then one per day — a pattern consistent with either (a) a batch of intrusions reaching the extortion phase simultaneously, or (b) deliberate staggered publication to maximize pressure and media pickup. Either way, additional listings in the coming days are a reasonable expectation, and organizations in adjacent sectors should not wait for their name to appear before hunting.
CVE Exposure — Hypothesis Only
We have no evidence linking any specific CVE to any specific named listing. However, several vulnerabilities currently on the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog with confirmed ransomware use represent exactly the exposed-surface classes this gang profile typically exploits, and defenders should treat them as priority patch/verify items:
- CVE-2026-59310 (VMware vCenter path traversal, KEV 2026-08-18): vCenter compromise is a force multiplier — it gives attackers hypervisor-level access to encrypt entire ESXi fleets. Verify vCenter is not internet-exposed and is patched.
- CVE-2026-63077 (JetBrains TeamCity deserialization, KEV 2026-08-05): CI/CD servers hold source code, build secrets, and deployment credentials — prime exfiltration and pivot targets for the technology-sector victims this gang is claiming.
- CVE-2026-20316 (Cisco Secure FMC hard-coded password, KEV 2026-07-29): Security-management plane takeover; an attacker controlling FMC can blind network defenses during lateral movement.
- CVE-2026-50751 (Check Point Security Gateway improper authentication in IKEv1, KEV 2026-06-08): VPN/gateway compromise is a top initial-access vector across ransomware operations generally. If IKEv1 aggressive mode is still enabled anywhere, treat it as an emergency.
- CVE-2026-48027 (Nx Console embedded malicious code, KEV 2026-05-27): Developer-tooling supply-chain exposure; relevant to the technology-sector targeting in this wave.
Action: Reconcile your internet-facing asset inventory against these five CVEs today. KEV-listed means exploitation is confirmed in the wild.
Detection Engineering
The following content targets the TTP chain typical of this gang profile: remote-service initial access, hands-on-keyboard lateral movement (PsExec/WMI), credential theft, data staging, and shadow-copy destruction prior to encryption.
---
title: Ransomware Pre-Detonation - Volume Shadow Copy Deletion
description: Detects deletion or resizing of Volume Shadow Copies via vssadmin, wmic, or bcdedit — a near-universal pre-encryption step in CURIOUS WORM-profile ransomware operations
id: 8f2a1c4e-7b3d-4e9a-a1f5-curiousworm001
status: experimental
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intelligence
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
level: high
detection:
selection_img:
Image|endswith:
- '\vssadmin.exe'
- '\wmic.exe'
- '\bcdedit.exe'
- '\diskshadow.exe'
selection_cmd:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'delete shadows'
- 'resize shadowstorage'
- 'shadowcopy delete'
- 'recoveryenabled no'
- 'delete shadows'
condition: selection_img and selection_cmd
falsepositives:
- Legitimate backup administration (rare on servers outside maintenance windows)
fields:
- CommandLine
- ParentCommandLine
- User
tags:
- attack.impact
- attack.t1490
references:
- https://securityarsenal.com/darkside
---
title: Lateral Movement - PsExec or WMI Remote Service Creation
description: Detects remote execution tooling (PsExec service install, WmiPrvSE-spawned processes) consistent with hands-on-keyboard lateral movement observed in double-extortion ransomware intrusions
id: 9b3d2e5f-6c4a-5f8b-b2e6-curiousworm002
status: experimental
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intelligence
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
level: high
detection:
selection_psexec:
Image|endswith:
- '\PSEXESVC.exe'
- '\psexec.exe'
ServiceName|contains:
- 'PSEXESVC'
selection_wmi_child:
ParentImage|endswith: '\WmiPrvSE.exe'
Image|endswith:
- '\cmd.exe'
- '\powershell.exe'
- '\pwsh.exe'
- '\rundll32.exe'
- '\cscript.exe'
- '\wscript.exe'
condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate administrative tooling — baseline admin workstation usage and alert on deviations
fields:
- Image
- ParentImage
- CommandLine
- User
- Computer
tags:
- attack.lateral_movement
- attack.t1569.002
- attack.t1047
- attack.t1021.002
references:
- https://securityarsenal.com/darkside
---
title: Data Staging - Archival Utility Spawned by Script or Office Process
description: Detects compression utilities (rar, 7z) executed from suspicious parent processes — consistent with pre-exfiltration data staging in double-extortion campaigns
id: 7c4f3a6d-8d5b-6a9c-c3f7-curiousworm003
status: experimental
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intelligence
date: 2026/11/19
modified: 2026/11/19
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
level: medium
detection:
selection_archive:
Image|endswith:
- '\rar.exe'
- '\7z.exe'
- '\7za.exe'
- '\winrar.exe'
selection_parent:
ParentImage|endswith:
- '\powershell.exe'
- '\pwsh.exe'
- '\cmd.exe'
- '\wscript.exe'
- '\cscript.exe'
- '\winword.exe'
- '\excel.exe'
- '\mshta.exe'
condition: selection_archive and selection_parent
falsepositives:
- Software packaging and IT automation — filter known admin accounts and build servers
fields:
- Image
- ParentImage
- CommandLine
- User
tags:
- attack.collection
- attack.t1560.001
references:
- https://securityarsenal.com/darkside
Hunt query for Microsoft Sentinel covering lateral movement and pre-ransomware staging over a 7-day window:
// CURIOUS WORM-profile hunt: lateral movement + staging chain
// Looks for PsExec/service-based remote execution, WMI-spawned shells,
// shadow copy tampering, and archive staging within the same host in 7 days
let Lookback = 7d;
let SuspiciousProc =
DeviceProcessEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(Lookback)
| where FileName in~ ("vssadmin.exe","wmic.exe","bcdedit.exe","psexesvc.exe","psexec.exe","rar.exe","7z.exe","7za.exe")
or (InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "WmiPrvSE.exe" and FileName in~ ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","rundll32.exe"))
| summarize
ProcCount = count(),
DistinctProcs = dcount(FileName),
Processes = make_set(FileName),
FirstSeen = min(TimeGenerated),
LastSeen = max(TimeGenerated),
Accounts = make_set(AccountName)
by DeviceName, bin(TimeGenerated, 1h);
SuspiciousProc
| where DistinctProcs >= 2 // multiple stages of the chain on one host = escalate
| join kind=leftouter (
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(Lookback)
| where RemotePort in (445, 3389, 5985, 5986)
| summarize SMB_RDP_Hits = count(), RemoteIPs = make_set(RemoteIP, 10) by DeviceName, bin(TimeGenerated, 1h)
) on DeviceName, TimeGenerated
| project DeviceName, TimeGenerated, Processes, DistinctProcs, Accounts, SMB_RDP_Hits, RemoteIPs, FirstSeen, LastSeen
| order by DistinctProcs desc, SMB_RDP_Hits desc;
Rapid-response PowerShell script — checks for exposed RDP, scheduled tasks created in the last 7 days, and shadow copy status:
# CURIOUS WORM Rapid Triage — run elevated on suspect hosts
# Checks: RDP exposure, recent scheduled tasks, shadow copy health, suspicious services
Write-Host "=== [1] RDP Exposure Check ===" -ForegroundColor Cyan
$rdp = Get-ItemProperty 'HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server' -Name fDenyTSConnections -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
if ($rdp.fDenyTSConnections -eq 0) {
Write-Warning "RDP is ENABLED. Verify it is not internet-reachable (check perimeter NAT/firewall)."
Get-NetTCPConnection -LocalPort 3389 -State Listen -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
Select-Object LocalAddress, LocalPort, OwningProcess | Format-Table -AutoSize
} else { Write-Host "RDP disabled. OK." }
Write-Host "=== [2] Scheduled Tasks Created in Last 7 Days ===" -ForegroundColor Cyan
Get-ScheduledTask | Where-Object { $_.Date -and ([datetime]$_.Date) -gt (Get-Date).AddDays(-7) } |
Select-Object TaskName, TaskPath, Date, @{n='Author';e={$_.Author}} |
Format-Table -AutoSize
Write-Host "=== [3] Volume Shadow Copy Status ===" -ForegroundColor Cyan
$shadows = Get-WmiObject Win32_ShadowCopy -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
if (-not $shadows) { Write-Warning "NO shadow copies present — verify whether VSS was tampered with (T1490)." }
else { $shadows | Select-Object DeviceObject, InstallDate, VolumeName | Format-Table -AutoSize }
Write-Host "=== [4] Suspicious Recently-Created Services ===" -ForegroundColor Cyan
Get-CimInstance Win32_Service | Where-Object {
$_.PathName -match 'PSEXESVC|\\Temp\\|\\AppData\\|\\Users\\Public\\' -and $_.State -eq 'Running'
} | Select-Object Name, DisplayName, PathName, StartName | Format-Table -AutoSize
Write-Host "=== [5] New Local Accounts (Last 7 Days) ===" -ForegroundColor Cyan
Get-LocalUser | Where-Object { $_.PasswordLastSet -gt (Get-Date).AddDays(-7) -or $_.LastLogon -gt (Get-Date).AddDays(-7) } |
Select-Object Name, Enabled, LastLogon, PasswordLastSet | Format-Table -AutoSize
Write-Host "=== Triage complete. Escalate any WARNING output to IR. ===" -ForegroundColor Green
Incident Response Priorities
T-Minus Detection Checklist (before encryption fires)
- Shadow copy tampering —
vssadmin delete shadows,bcdedit ... recoveryenabled no(Sigma rule 1). This is the highest-fidelity pre-detonation signal; treat any hit outside a change window as an active incident. - PsExec/WMI service creation on multiple hosts from one source — indicates hands-on lateral movement (Sigma rule 2, KQL query).
- Mass archive creation — rar/7z processes touching file shares, especially spawned by scripts (Sigma rule 3).
- Anomalous outbound volume — sustained multi-GB transfers to unfamiliar IPs/cloud storage from servers (not just endpoints).
- New local admin accounts or unexpected Group Policy changes — groups of this profile push ransomware via GPO/scheduled tasks at detonation time.
- EDR/AV tampering — service stops, exclusions added, or agent uninstall attempts.
Critical Assets Historically Prioritized for Exfiltration
- Healthcare claims: PHI databases, patient scheduling/billing exports, HR records, and insurance documentation — all carry maximum regulatory and litigation leverage.
- Technology claims: Source code repositories, CI/CD secrets and signing keys (see CVE-2026-63077 exposure), customer lists, and support-ticket archives containing client credentials.
- Cross-sector: Finance/payroll data, executive mailboxes, legal contracts, and backup catalogs (to destroy recovery options).
Containment Actions Ordered by Urgency
- Isolate, don't power off — network-quarantine affected hosts to preserve volatile evidence.
- Disable compromised identities — force-reset any account observed in lateral movement telemetry; revoke active sessions and tokens (including service accounts).
- Block outbound at the perimeter — deny egress to unknown destinations; exfiltration often continues during negotiation.
- Verify backup integrity and isolation — confirm offline/immutable copies exist before the detonation window; check backup admin credentials for misuse.
- Snapshot forensic state — capture memory and key logs from affected hosts before remediation wipes evidence.
- Engage IR retainer and counsel early — named-on-leak-site status triggers legal, regulatory, and communications timelines even while technical facts are being established.
Hardening Recommendations
Immediate (24 hours)
- Patch or mitigate all five KEV CVEs listed above on any exposed asset: CVE-2026-59310 (vCenter), CVE-2026-63077 (TeamCity), CVE-2026-20316 (Cisco FMC), CVE-2026-50751 (Check Point IKEv1), CVE-2026-48027 (Nx Console). KEV listing = confirmed active exploitation.
- Disable IKEv1 aggressive mode on Check Point gateways and any other VPN concentrators; audit VPN auth logs for anomalous logins.
- Verify RDP is not internet-exposed on any host (run the triage script; check perimeter NAT). Enforce VPN + MFA for all remote administration.
- Deploy the three Sigma rules and the Sentinel KQL query above; route shadow-copy-deletion alerts as P1.
- Confirm backup immutability and test one restore from offline copy today.
- Block macro execution from internet-sourced Office documents (Mark-of-the-Web policy) if not already enforced.
Short-Term (2 Weeks)
- Segment critical infrastructure: isolate vCenter/ESXi management interfaces, backup infrastructure, and CI/CD servers onto dedicated VLANs with host-based firewalling; deny workstation-to-server SMB except from designated admin hosts.
- Enforce phishing-resistant MFA (FIDO2) on VPN, email, and all remote access; eliminate legacy auth protocols.
- Deploy tiered administration — no Domain Admin logon outside PAWs; LAPS on all endpoints; disable cached credentials where feasible.
- Egress filtering and TLS inspection on server VLANs — double-extortion depends on bulk exfiltration; make it loud.
- Attack surface management: continuous external scanning for exposed RDP/VPN/management planes, reconciled against the KEV catalog weekly.
- Tabletop the leak-site scenario: ensure legal, comms, and executives have a pre-agreed playbook for the day your organization's name appears on a .onion site — because by then, response speed is the only variable you control.
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