---
title: Potential Check Point IKEv1 Improper Authentication Exploit
id: 44fdd3d3-7c2b-4c3d-9a1e-5f4e6a7b8c9d
description: Detects potential exploitation of CVE-2026-50751 involving IKEv1 key exchange anomalies or unexpected authentication bypass attempts on Check Point Security Gateways.
status: experimental
date: 2026/07/14
author: Security Arsenal Research
logsource:
  product: checkpoint
  service: vpn
detection:
  selection:
    product: 'VPN'
    proto: 'IKE'
    ike_version: '1'
    action: 'accept' # Unexpected accept or key exchange success without valid auth sequence
  filter:
    src_ip:
      - '127.0.0.1'
      - '::1'
  condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate IKEv1 misconfiguration
level: critical
---
title: Cisco FMC Deserialization Remote Code Execution
id: 88a4b2c1-d4f5-4a6e-9b8c-1d2e3f4a5b6c
description: Detects suspicious process spawns from the Cisco FMC Tomcat/Java service context, indicative of CVE-2026-20131 exploitation leading to remote code execution.
status: experimental
date: 2026/07/14
author: Security Arsenal Research
references:
  - https://cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog
logsource:
  product: linux
  service: process
detection:
  selection:
    ParentImage|endswith: '/java'
    Image|endswith:
      - '/sh'
      - '/bash'
      - '/nc'
      - '/python'
    ParentCommandLine|contains: 'Cisco'
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Administrative troubleshooting via FMC CLI
level: high
---
title: ConnectWise ScreenConnect Path Traversal Exploitation
id: 99c5d3e2-e5g6-7h8i-9j0k-1l2m3n4o5p6q
description: Detects exploitation attempts of CVE-2024-1708 in ConnectWise ScreenConnect via suspicious URI patterns or process execution from the web directory.
status: experimental
date: 2026/07/14
author: Security Arsenal Research
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection:
  selection:
    EventID: 4688
    NewProcessName|contains: 'ScreenConnect'
    CommandLine|contains:
      - '..\\..\'
      - '%windir%\\system32\\cmd.exe'
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Rare administrative debugging
level: critical

// Hunt for lateral movement and staging associated with D1R
// Looks for suspicious administrative tool usage and mass file copying
let TimeFrame = 1d;
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(TimeFrame)
// Targeting tools associated with the CVEs and common ransomware TTPs
| where ProcessName in~ (\"psexec.exe\", \"psexec64.exe\", \"wmic.exe\", \"powershell.exe\", \"cmd.exe\") 
 or FolderPath has @\"ScreenConnect\" 
 or ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName =~ \"java.exe\" // FMC exploitation context
// Detecting staging logic\| where ProcessCommandLine has @\"robocopy\" 
 or ProcessCommandLine has @\"copy\" 
 or ProcessCommandLine has @\"7z\" 
 or ProcessCommandLine has @\"rar\"
// Filter for potential C2 or Exfil destinations
| where ProcessCommandLine matches regex @\"[0-9]{1,3}\\.[0-9]{1,3}\\.[0-9]{1,3}\\.[0-9]{1,3}\"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName
| order by Timestamp desc

<#
.SYNOPSIS
    D1R Ransomware Emergency Hardening and Detection Script
.DESCRIPTION
    Checks for signs of D1R activity (VSS manipulation, scheduled tasks)
    and applies immediate hardening for CVE-2026-50751 & CVE-2026-20131.
#>

Write-Host \"[+] Starting D1R Emergency Hardening Check...\" -ForegroundColor Cyan

# 1. Check for recent Scheduled Tasks (Persistence)
Write-Host \"[1] Checking for Scheduled Tasks created in the last 7 days...\" -ForegroundColor Yellow
$dateCutoff = (Get-Date).AddDays(-7)
Get-ScheduledTask | Where-Object {$_.Date -gt $dateCutoff} | Select-Object TaskName, TaskPath, Date, Author

# 2. Check VSS Shadow Copy Status (Pre-Encryption)
Write-Host \"[2] Checking Volume Shadow Copy Storage...\" -ForegroundColor Yellow
$vss = vssadmin list shadows
if ($vss -match \"No shadow copies found\") {
    Write-Host \"[!] WARNING: No shadow copies found. Possible deletion by threat actor.\" -ForegroundColor Red
} else {
    Write-Host \"[+] Shadow copies present.\" -ForegroundColor Green
}

# 3. Audit Check Point & Cisco Services (Hardening for CVEs)
Write-Host \"[3] Auditing Check Point VPN Service Status...\" -ForegroundColor Yellow
$cpService = Get-Service -Name \"VPN-1\" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
if ($cpService) {
    Write-Host \"[+] Check Point Service Status: $($cpService.Status)\"
    # Recommendation: Ensure IKEv1 is disabled in policy if not required
    Write-Host \"[!] ACTION ITEM: Verify IKEv1 is disabled in Check Point Policy to mitigate CVE-2026-50751.\" -ForegroundColor Red
}

Write-Host \"[4] Auditing Cisco FMC/Tomcat Services...\" -ForegroundColor Yellow
$ciscoProcesses = Get-Process -Name \"java\" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Where-Object {$_.Path -like \"*Cisco*\"}
if ($ciscoProcesses) {
    Write-Host \"[!] ACTION ITEM: Isolate Cisco FMC Management Interface immediately. Patch CVE-2026-20131.\" -ForegroundColor Red
}

Write-Host \"[+] Scan Complete.\" -ForegroundColor Green


# Incident Response Priorities

**T-Minus Detection Checklist:**
1.  **VPN & Firewall Logs:** immediately review Check Point (SmartView Tracker) and Cisco FMC logs for successful IKEv1 connections or anomalous web management logins on non-standard ports.
2.  **RMM Sessions:** Audit ConnectWise ScreenConnect logs for path traversal errors or `\\..\\` patterns in the URI.
3.  **Identity:** Check for anomalous Service Account usage, specifically on Microsoft Exchange (CVE-2023-21529) and Firewall Management consoles.

**Critical Assets at Risk:**
*   **Source Code Repositories:** (Git, Perforce) — D1R specifically targets Tech firms.
*   **CAD/PLM Databases:** Siemens Teamcenter, Autodesk Vault — Targeted in Manufacturing sectors (Bosch).
*   **Email Archives:** PST/OST files for executive communications.

**Containment Actions:**
1.  **Isolate Management Planes:** Disconnect VPN concentrators and Firewall Management Centers (FMC/SmartCenter) from the network if patching cannot be verified immediately.
2.  **Disable ScreenConnect:** Halt the ConnectWise ScreenConnect service globally until patched.
3.  **Reset Creds:** Force reset of credentials for all local admin accounts on Exchange and FMC servers.

# Hardening Recommendations

**Immediate (24 Hours):**
*   **Patch CISA KEVs:** Apply patches for **CVE-2026-50751** (Check Point) and **CVE-2026-20131** (Cisco FMC) immediately.
*   **Disable IKEv1:** Configure Check Point Security Gateways to require IKEv2 only.
*   **Block Internet Access to Management:** Enforce network segmentation to block inbound Internet access to Firewall Management interfaces and RMM tools.

**Short-term (2 Weeks):**
*   **Zero Trust Architecture:** Implement granular access controls for administrative jump-boxes. Assume the perimeter is breached.
*   **Phishing Resiliency:** Deploy MFA for all VPN and RMM access, ensuring FIDO2 hardware keys are prioritized over push notifications.