Back to Intelligence

Defending Against ClickFix and AI-Driven Threats: ESET 2026 Report Analysis

SA
Security Arsenal Team
July 31, 2026
6 min read

As we progress through 2026, the threat landscape has shifted from simple exploitation to sophisticated, AI-assisted adaptability. According to ESET's latest threat report, adversaries are no longer just writing code; they are leveraging AI platforms to refine malicious software, optimize social engineering, and develop tools specifically designed to neutralize security controls via encryption.

For defenders, this means the traditional "detect and block" mindset is insufficient. We are facing a surge in ClickFix attacks—malvertising campaigns that trick users into executing malware under the guise of fixing a browser error—and a record volume of Quishing (QR code phishing). Perhaps most concerning is the rise of encryption-based tools designed to lock security software out of its own configuration files, effectively blinding the organization before the payload executes.

Technical Analysis

ESET's findings highlight a convergence of three distinct but overlapping vectors:

  1. ClickFix and AI-Assisted Delivery: Attackers use AI-generated templates to create highly convincing fake browser error pages. When users interact with these pages, they inadvertently execute scripts—typically via MShta or PowerShell—that download second-stage payloads. The use of AI allows these lures to be grammatically perfect and visually indistinguishable from legitimate OS dialogs.
  2. Quishing (QR Code Phishing): The shift toward QR codes in physical environments (posters, emails) bypasses traditional email link filters. These codes often lead to credential harvesting sites that use AI to dynamically adapt their appearance based on the user's device and location.
  3. Encryption-Based EDR Evasion: A new class of malware is emerging that targets the configuration files and databases of Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) and Antivirus (AV) solutions. By encrypting these files (often located in C:\ProgramData\ or C:\Program Files\), the malware forces the security service to crash or fail to load signatures, creating a window of opportunity for ransomware or data exfiltration.

Exploitation Status: These are not theoretical proof-of-concepts. ESET confirms active exploitation of ClickFix infrastructure and widespread use of encryption-based wipers in targeted sectors. While no specific CVE is required for these social-engineering and configuration-hijack techniques, the impact is equivalent to a critical vulnerability in the defense stack.

Detection & Response

To counter these adaptable threats, we must focus on behavioral anomalies rather than static signatures. The following detection rules target the execution chains of ClickFix and the file-system manipulation indicative of EDR evasion.

Sigma Rules

YAML
---
title: Potential ClickFix Activity via Browser Spawned Shell
id: 8a2b4c9d-1e3f-4a5b-8c6d-7e8f9a0b1c2d
status: experimental
description: Detects suspicious process execution patterns associated with ClickFix attacks, where a browser process spawns mshta, powershell, or cmd to download payloads.
references:
  - https://www.welivesecurity.com/2026/
author: Security Arsenal
date: 2026/05/15
tags:
  - attack.initial_access
  - attack.t1204
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection:
    ParentImage|endswith:
      - '\chrome.exe'
      - '\firefox.exe'
      - '\msedge.exe'
      - '\opera.exe'
    Image|endswith:
      - '\mshta.exe'
      - '\powershell.exe'
      - '\cmd.exe'
    CommandLine|contains:
      - 'downloadstring'
      - 'iex'
      - 'copyitem'
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate troubleshooting by IT staff (rare)
level: high
---
title: Security Software Directory Modification via Untrusted Process
id: 9b3c5d0e-2f4a-5b6c-9d7e-0f1a2b3c4d5e
status: experimental
description: Detects attempts to encrypt or modify files within known security software directories by processes not signed by the vendor, indicative of defense evasion.
references:
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/
author: Security Arsenal
date: 2026/05/15
tags:
  - attack.defense_evasion
  - attack.t1562.001
logsource:
  category: file_change
  product: windows
detection:
  selection:
    TargetFilename|contains:
      - '\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\'
      - '\ProgramData\CrowdStrike\'
      - '\ProgramData\SentinelOne\'
      - '\Program Files (x86)\Symantec\'
    Image|notcontains:
      - '\Microsoft\'
      - '\CrowdStrike\'
      - '\SentinelOne\'
      - '\Symantec\'
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Security software updating itself (should be excluded via Image signature)
level: critical

KQL (Microsoft Sentinel / Defender)

This query hunts for the ClickFix attack chain, specifically looking for browser processes spawning scripting languages that are commonly used to fetch the initial payload.

KQL — Microsoft Sentinel / Defender
// Hunt for ClickFix Attack Chains
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ('chrome.exe', 'msedge.exe', 'firefox.exe')
| where FileName in~ ('mshta.exe', 'powershell.exe', 'cmd.exe', 'wscript.exe', 'cscript.exe')
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ('download', 'iex', 'copy', 'invoke-expression', 'FromBase64String')
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, AccountName
| order by Timestamp desc

Velociraptor VQL

This artifact hunts for file modifications within security vendor directories. This is crucial for detecting the "encryption-based" disabling of security tools mentioned in the ESET report.

VQL — Velociraptor
-- Hunt for suspicious modifications in Security Software directories
SELECT FullPath, Size, Modetime, Mode.String
FROM glob(globs='/*ProgramData/*/Platform/**', accessor='file')
WHERE Modetime > now() - 24h
   AND NOT Mode.String =~ '^d'
   AND FullPath =~ '(Microsoft|CrowdStrike|SentinelOne|Symantec)'

-- Supplement with process creation for browser spawned shells
SELECT Pid, Name, CommandLine, Exe, Parent.Pid, Parent.Name
FROM pslist()
WHERE Parent.Name =~ 'chrome.exe'
   OR Parent.Name =~ 'msedge.exe'
   OR Parent.Name =~ 'firefox.exe'
WHERE Name =~ 'powershell.exe'
   OR Name =~ 'mshta.exe'
   OR Name =~ 'cmd.exe'

Remediation Script (PowerShell)

Use this script to audit the integrity of Windows Defender services and check for recent modifications to security directories that may indicate an encryption-based attack.

PowerShell
# Check Windows Defender Status and Integrity
Function Check-DefenderIntegrity {
    Write-Host "[+] Checking Windows Defender Service Status..." -ForegroundColor Cyan
    
    $defenderService = Get-Service -Name WinDefend -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
    if ($defenderService.Status -ne 'Running') {
        Write-Host "[!] ALERT: Windows Defender Service is not running. Status: $($defenderService.Status)" -ForegroundColor Red
        Start-Service WinDefend -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
    } else {
        Write-Host "[+] Windows Defender Service is Running." -ForegroundColor Green
    }

    # Check Tamper Protection Status (Registry)
    $tamperPath = "HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Features"
    $tamperStatus = (Get-ItemProperty -Path $tamperPath -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue).TamperProtection
    
    if ($tamperStatus -ne 5) { # 5 usually means ON, 0 OFF, 1 Limited
        Write-Host "[!] WARNING: Tamper Protection may be disabled or limited. Value: $tamperStatus" -ForegroundColor Yellow
    } else {
        Write-Host "[+] Tamper Protection is Enabled." -ForegroundColor Green
    }
}

# Scan for recent file modifications in security directories (Encryption-based attack indicators)
Function Find-SuspiciousSecurityModifications {
    Write-Host "[+] Scanning for recent modifications in Security Directories (Last 24h)..." -ForegroundColor Cyan
    
    $paths = @("$env:ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender", "$env:ProgramData\CrowdStrike", "$env:ProgramData\SentinelOne")
    $cutoffTime = (Get-Date).AddHours(-24)

    foreach ($path in $paths) {
        if (Test-Path $path) {
            Get-ChildItem -Path $path -Recurse -File -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | 
            Where-Object { $_.LastWriteTime -gt $cutoffTime } | 
            Select-Object FullName, LastWriteTime, Length | 
            Format-Table -AutoSize
        }
    }
}

Check-DefenderIntegrity
Find-SuspiciousSecurityModifications
Write-Host "[+] Audit Complete." -ForegroundColor Cyan

Remediation

  1. Containment: If a ClickFix infection is detected, isolate the affected endpoint immediately. These scripts often act as downloaders for infostealers or ransomware.
  2. Restore Security Configurations:
    • For Windows Defender, run "C:\Program Files\Windows Defender\MpCmdRun.exe" -RestoreDefaults if tampering is detected.
    • Re-deploy EDR agents using a push mechanism (e.g., SCCM, Intune) if the local agent is non-responsive due to file encryption.
  3. User Awareness (Quishing/ClickFix):
    • Update security awareness training to explicitly cover "ClickFix"—the technique where users are told to run code to "fix" a browser video issue.
    • Advise users to never scan QR codes from unknown sources, especially those received via unexpected emails.
  4. Policy Hardening:
    • Restrict the use of mshta.exe and PowerShell for standard users via AppLocker or Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC).
    • Implement Microsoft Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) rules, specifically "Block abuse of exploited vulnerable signed drivers" and "Block Office applications from creating child processes."

Related Resources

Security Arsenal Incident Response Services AlertMonitor Platform Book a SOC Assessment incident-response Intel Hub

Is your security operations ready?

Get a free SOC assessment or see how AlertMonitor cuts through alert noise with automated triage.