Defending Against the Surge: Encryption-Based Attacks and Supply Chain Risks in Europe

---
title: Potential Ransomware Activity - Volume Shadow Copy Deletion
id: 3a1b2c3d-4e5f-6a7b-8c9d-0e1f2a3b4c5d
status: experimental
description: Detects attempts to delete Volume Shadow Copies, a common precursor to ransomware encryption to prevent recovery.
references:
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490/
author: Security Arsenal
date: 2026/04/06
tags:
  - attack.impact
  - attack.t1490
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection:
    Image|endswith:
      - '\vssadmin.exe'
      - '\wmic.exe'
    CommandLine|contains:
      - 'delete shadows'
      - 'shadowstorage delete'
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - System administrators manually managing disk space (rare)
level: high
---
title: Suspicious Use of Native Encryption Tools
id: 4b2c3d4e-5f6a-7b8c-9d0e-1f2a3b4c5d6e
status: experimental
description: Detects the use of cipher.exe or manage-bde in a manner consistent with data wiping or encryption attacks.
references:
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486/
author: Security Arsenal
date: 2026/04/06
tags:
  - attack.impact
  - attack.t1486
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_cipher:
    Image|endswith: '\cipher.exe'
    CommandLine|contains: '/w'
  selection_bitlocker:
    Image|endswith: '\manage-bde.exe'
    CommandLine|contains: '-lock'
  condition: 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate drive maintenance or encryption setups
level: medium
---
title: Suspicious Child Process of Supply Chain Updater
id: 5c3d4e5f-6a7b-8c9d-0e1f-2a3b4c5d6e7f
status: experimental
description: Detects common updater spawning a shell, often indicative of supply chain compromise where the update mechanism is weaponized.
references:
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195/
author: Security Arsenal
date: 2026/04/06
tags:
  - attack.initial_access
  - attack.t1195
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection:
    ParentImage|contains:
      - '\update.exe'
      - '\updater.exe'
      - '\agent.exe'
    Image|endswith:
      - '\powershell.exe'
      - '\cmd.exe'
      - '\wscript.exe'
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate software updates utilizing scripts
level: medium

// Hunt for mass encryption events or file modifications correlated with suspicious processes
let FileEncryptionThreshold = 1000; // Threshold for file modifications in 1 minute
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where ProcessName in~ ('cipher.exe', 'manage-bde.exe', 'vssadmin.exe') 
   or CommandLine has_any ('delete shadows', '/w', '-lock', '-encrypt')
| join kind=inner (
    DeviceFileEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(24h)
    | summarize Count = count() by DeviceId, bin(Timestamp, 1m)
    | where Count > FileEncryptionThreshold
) on DeviceId
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessAccountName, ActionType
| extend AlertDetails = "High volume of file modifications detected coinciding with encryption utility execution."

-- Hunt for processes accessing user directories rapidly (Encryption behavior)
SELECT 
    Pid, 
    Name, 
    CommandLine, 
    Username, 
    StartTime
FROM pslist()
WHERE Name =~ 'cipher.exe' 
   OR Name =~ 'manage-bde.exe'
   OR Name =~ 'vssadmin.exe'

-- Complementary check: Look for handles open to many files in user profiles (potential bulk encryption)
-- Note: This requires the handles() artifact which can be noisy, use selectively.
-- SELECT Pid, Name, count(Handle) as HandleCount FROM handles() WHERE Name =~ '*.doc*' OR Name =~ '*.pdf*' GROUP BY Pid, Name HAVING HandleCount > 50

# Security Arsenal - Ransomware Readiness Check
# Checks for VSS Status and Suspicious Processes

Write-Host "[+] Starting Ransomware Environment Check..." -ForegroundColor Cyan

# 1. Check Volume Shadow Copy Storage Status
Write-Host "\n[+] Checking Volume Shadow Copy (VSS) Status..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
try {
    $vss = vssadmin list shadows
    if ($vss -match "No shadow copies found") {
        Write-Host "[!] WARNING: No Shadow Copies found. Recovery may be impossible if encryption occurs." -ForegroundColor Red
    } else {
        Write-Host "[+] Shadow Copies exist." -ForegroundColor Green
        Write-Host $vss
    }
} catch {
    Write-Host "[!] Error checking VSS: $_" -ForegroundColor Red
}

# 2. Check for Suspicious Active Processes
Write-Host "\n[+] Scanning for high-risk processes..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
$riskProcesses = @("cipher.exe", "vssadmin.exe", "manage-bde.exe", "wbadmin.exe")
$found = $false

foreach ($proc in Get-Process | Where-Object { $riskProcesses -contains $_.ProcessName }) {
    Write-Host "[!] ALERT: Suspicious process found - PID: $($proc.Id), Name: $($proc.ProcessName), Path: $($proc.Path)" -ForegroundColor Red
    $found = $true
}

if (-not $found) {
    Write-Host "[+] No high-risk processes currently active." -ForegroundColor Green
}

Write-Host "\n[+] Check Complete. If alerts were triggered, initiate Incident Response protocols immediately." -ForegroundColor Cyan