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DPRK Hangro State VPN Infrastructure Exposed: Silibank Mail Relays & Rogue Certificate Hierarchy — OTX Detection Pack

SA
Security Arsenal Team
September 23, 2026
8 min read

A new AlienVault OTX pulse — North Korea's Hangro Revisited — documents a significant evolution in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's state-operated VPN and mail relay infrastructure. Security researchers have identified a new certificate hierarchy deployed in July 2026, expanded cross-border network assignments in Chinese address space, and operational servers in Pyongyang and the Russian Far East. This briefing breaks down the pulse data and delivers detection engineering for enterprise SOC teams that may see this infrastructure touch their networks through mail relay abuse, VPN tunneling, or DPRK-linked intrusion activity.


Threat Summary

Hangro is North Korea's state-developed VPN and mail product, used to bridge DPRK internal networks (Kwangmyong) with external infrastructure. The July 2026 update analyzed in this pulse reveals:

  • A new certificate hierarchy replacing the 2024 version — both generations contain cryptographic anomalies where signatures fail verification. This is a fingerprint: legitimate commercial PKI does not produce certificates that fail signature validation, making this a high-fidelity detection signal.
  • Six network assignments in Chinese address space, indicating continued use of cross-border infrastructure to route DPRK state traffic outside the heavily-monitored 175.45.176.0/22 range.
  • Active mail relay and VPN endpoints tied to Silibank (a DPRK financial institution) and Star Joint Venture (star-co.net.kp), a DPRK–foreign joint venture ISP.
  • SoftEther VPN infrastructure — an open-source VPN platform favored by DPRK operators for its SSL-VPN tunneling that blends with legitimate HTTPS traffic.

The collective picture: DPRK state actors continue to invest in resilient, obfuscated communications infrastructure that supports both regime operations and, historically, pre-positioning for financially motivated campaigns (Lazarus Group, APT38, Kimsuky all leverage adjacent infrastructure). Financial sector targeting indicators (Silibank) warrant particular attention from banking and fintech defenders.

Threat Actor / Malware Profile

Infrastructure, not a single malware family — but understanding Hangro's operational profile is critical:

  • Distribution / Access Method: Hangro endpoints operate as mail relays (SMTP) and SoftEther SSL-VPN concentrators. Adversaries and regime operators tunnel C2 and exfiltration through these relays, which appear as legitimate-looking TLS sessions on port 443.
  • C2 Communication: SoftEther wraps VPN traffic in TLS over TCP/443 (also 992, 1194, 5555). The July 2026 certificate chain presents a unique fingerprint: X.509 signatures that fail cryptographic verification — anomalous ASN.1 structures or broken signature algorithms in both the root and intermediate certificates.
  • Persistence / Evasion: Cross-border hosting (Chinese netblocks, Russian Far East) provides jurisdictional resilience. The use of DPRK-registered domains on com/net TLDs (e.g., mail.silibank.com) alongside .kp domains creates dual-homed infrastructure that survives sanctions-driven takedowns.
  • Financial Nexus: Silibank is a sanctioned-adjacent DPRK financial entity. Any connection from your network to Silibank mail or VPN infrastructure is a compliance event (OFAC exposure) in addition to a security event.

IOC Analysis

The pulse contains 47 indicators dominated by two types:

TypeExamplesOperational Use
Hostnamemail.silibank.net.kp, smtp.star-co.net.kp, mail.silibank.comDNS sinkholing, proxy/DNS alerting, TLS SNI inspection
IPv4175.45.176.21, 175.45.178.57, 175.45.178.56, 175.45.177.33, 175.45.176.22Egress firewall blocking, NetFlow retro-hunt, threat intel platform ingestion

Key note on the IP space: 175.45.176.0/22 is the DPRK's primary allocated range (STAR-KP / Ryugyong-dong). Blocking the full /22 is a defensible default for any organization without DPRK business relationships — legitimate traffic from this range to Western enterprise networks is vanishingly rare.

Tooling:

  • Ingest the pulse IOCs into your TIP (MISP, OpenCTI, Anomali) and sync to firewall/proxy block lists.
  • Use JA3/JA3S TLS fingerprinting and certificate inspection (Zeek x509.log, Suricata TLS logging) to detect the anomalous Hangro certificate chain — signature verification failure is detectable in passive TLS logs.
  • SMTP logs should be reviewed for any relay interaction with star-co.net.kp or silibank domains.

Detection Engineering

YAML
---
title: Network Connection to DPRK Hangro / Silibank Infrastructure
description: Detects DNS resolution or network connection to known North Korean Hangro VPN and mail relay infrastructure identified in OTX pulse 'North Korea's Hangro Revisited'
status: experimental
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intel
logsource:
  category: dns
detection:
  selection:
    query|contains:
      - 'silibank.net.kp'
      - 'silibank.com'
      - 'star-co.net.kp'
      - 'hangro'
  condition: selection
fields:
  - query
  - answer
  - Image
falsepositives:
  - Academic DPRK research networks
level: high
tags:
  - attack.command_and_control
  - attack.t1071
  - attack.t1090
---
title: Outbound Connection to DPRK 175.45.176.0/22 Address Space
description: Detects outbound network connections to North Korea's primary allocated IPv4 range used by Hangro VPN and state mail relays
status: experimental
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intel
logsource:
  category: network_connection
detection:
  selection_ip:
    DestinationIp|cidr:
      - '175.45.176.0/22'
  filter_initiated:
    Initiated: 'true'
  condition: selection_ip and filter_initiated
fields:
  - DestinationIp
  - DestinationPort
  - Image
  - User
falsepositives:
  - Threat intelligence research activity
level: critical
tags:
  - attack.command_and_control
  - attack.exfiltration
  - attack.t1090.003
---
title: TLS Certificate With Failed Signature Verification - Hangro Certificate Anomaly
description: Detects TLS sessions presenting X.509 certificates with signatures that fail verification, a fingerprint of the Hangro July 2026 and 2024 certificate hierarchies
status: experimental
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intel
logsource:
  product: zeek
  service: x509
detection:
  selection:
    validation_status|contains:
      - 'self signed'
      - 'invalid'
      - 'signature failure'
  filter_issuer:
    certificate.issuer|contains:
      - 'KP'
      - 'Pyongyang'
      - 'silibank'
      - 'star-co'
  condition: selection and filter_issuer
fields:
  - certificate.subject
  - certificate.issuer
  - id.orig_h
  - id.resp_h
falsepositives:
  - Misconfigured internal PKI
level: high
tags:
  - attack.command_and_control
  - attack.t1573
  - attack.t1557
KQL — Microsoft Sentinel / Defender
// Hunt: DPRK Hangro infrastructure contact + SoftEther-style TLS VPN behavior
let DprkIPs = dynamic(["175.45.176.21","175.45.176.22","175.45.178.56","175.45.178.57","175.45.177.33"]);
let DprkDomains = dynamic(["mail.silibank.net.kp","mail.silibank.com","smtp.star-co.net.kp"]);
let DprkRange = "175.45.176.0/22";
let NetworkHits = DeviceNetworkEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(30d)
| where RemoteIP in (DprkIPs) or ipv4_is_in_range(RemoteIP, DprkRange)
   or RemoteUrl has_any (DprkDomains)
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine,
          RemoteIP, RemoteUrl, RemotePort;
let DnsHits = DeviceNetworkEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(30d)
| where RemoteUrl endswith ".kp" or RemoteUrl has_any ("silibank","star-co","hangro")
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, RemoteUrl, RemoteIP;
// SoftEther default ports used by Hangro VPN concentrators
let SoftEtherVpn = DeviceNetworkEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(30d)
| where RemotePort in (443, 992, 1194, 5555)
| where ipv4_is_in_range(RemoteIP, DprkRange)
| summarize Connections=count(), FirstSeen=min(TimeGenerated), LastSeen=max(TimeGenerated)
  by DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, RemoteIP, RemotePort;
union NetworkHits, DnsHits
| sort by TimeGenerated desc;
// Run SoftEtherVpn separately for VPN-tunnel-specific hunting
PowerShell
# Hangro / DPRK Infrastructure IOC Hunt - Security Arsenal
# Checks active connections, DNS cache, and certificate store for DPRK indicators

$DprkCidr = "175.45.176.0/22"
$DprkIPs  = @("175.45.176.21","175.45.176.22","175.45.178.56","175.45.178.57","175.45.177.33")
$DprkDomains = @("silibank","star-co.net.kp","hangro",".net.kp")

Write-Host "`n[1] Active TCP connections to DPRK address space..." -ForegroundColor Cyan
Get-NetTCPConnection -State Established -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
  Where-Object { $DprkIPs -contains $_.RemoteAddress } |
  Select-Object LocalAddress,LocalPort,RemoteAddress,RemotePort,OwningProcess,
    @{N='Process';E={(Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue).ProcessName}} |
  Format-Table -AutoSize

Write-Host "`n[2] DNS client cache for .kp / Silibank / Star-co entries..." -ForegroundColor Cyan
Get-DnsClientCache -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
  Where-Object { $d = $_.Entry; ($DprkDomains | Where-Object { $d -like "*$_*" }) } |
  Select-Object Entry, Data, Type | Format-Table -AutoSize

Write-Host "`n[3] Persistent routes or VPN adapters toward DPRK range..." -ForegroundColor Cyan
Get-NetRoute -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
  Where-Object { $_.DestinationPrefix -like "175.45.176*" } |
  Format-Table -AutoSize
Get-VpnConnection -AllUserConnection -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
  Where-Object { $_.ServerAddress -match "175\.45\.17[6-9]" -or $_.ServerAddress -match "silibank|star-co|hangro" } |
  Format-Table Name, ServerAddress, TunnelType -AutoSize

Write-Host "`n[4] Certificate store check for Hangro-style KP issuers..." -ForegroundColor Cyan
Get-ChildItem -Recurse Cert:\LocalMachine\Root, Cert:\LocalMachine\CA, Cert:\CurrentUser\Root -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
  Where-Object { $_.Issuer -match "KP|Pyongyang|silibank|star-co" -or $_.Subject -match "KP|Pyongyang|silibank|star-co" } |
  Select-Object Subject, Issuer, Thumbprint, NotBefore, NotAfter | Format-List

Write-Host "`n[5] SoftEther client artifacts..." -ForegroundColor Cyan
$SoftEtherPaths = @("$env:ProgramFiles\SoftEther VPN Client","${env:ProgramFiles(x86)}\SoftEther VPN Client","$env:LOCALAPPDATA\SoftEther")
foreach ($p in $SoftEtherPaths) { if (Test-Path $p) { Write-Host "FOUND: $p" -ForegroundColor Red; Get-ChildItem $p -Recurse -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Select-Object FullName, LastWriteTime } }
Get-Service -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Where-Object { $_.Name -match "sevpn|softether" -or $_.DisplayName -match "SoftEther" } | Format-Table Name, DisplayName, Status

Write-Host "`nHunt complete. Any hit above = escalate to IR immediately (OFAC compliance + intrusion risk)." -ForegroundColor Yellow

Response Priorities

Immediate (0-4 hours):

  • Block the full 175.45.176.0/22 range at egress firewalls and proxy; sinkhole silibank / star-co / *.kp DNS at the resolver.
  • Deploy the Sigma DNS and network rules; retro-hunt 90 days of NetFlow/proxy/Zeek logs for the listed IPs and hostnames.
  • Run the PowerShell hunt script on any endpoint flagged by retro-hunts; check for SoftEther client installations (unauthorized VPN clients are both an intrusion indicator and a policy violation).

24 Hours:

  • Review SMTP gateway logs for any relay interaction with .kp domains or the Silibank mail hosts — financial-sector mail relay abuse could indicate phishing pre-staging or BEC reconnaissance.
  • If any endpoint shows Hangro infrastructure contact: initiate credential reset and session revocation for the associated user, and check for concurrent Lazarus/APT38 tradecraft (custom loaders, RATs) — DPRK operators commonly pivot from infrastructure access to payload delivery.
  • Engage legal/compliance: confirmed DPRK infrastructure communication may trigger OFAC reporting obligations.

1 Week:

  • Implement TLS certificate validation alerting (Zeek x509 anomalies, Suricata tls-sni rules) to catch the failed-signature Hangro certificate fingerprint network-wide.
  • Enforce egress policy blocking unauthorized VPN protocols and ports 992/1194/5555 outbound.
  • Add DPRK-adjacent ASN monitoring (STAR-KP AS131279, plus Chinese and Russian Far East transit ASNs hosting DPRK assignments) to your threat intelligence watchlist.
  • Brief financial fraud teams on DPRK financial-institution infrastructure overlap if you operate in banking or fintech.

Related Resources

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