---
title: Potential Exploitation of Cisco FMC Deserialization (CVE-2026-20131)
id: 1d0f8a12-5b6c-4a9e-8f1c-2a3b4c5d6e7f
description: Detects potential exploitation attempts against Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center (FMC) via deserialization anomalies or suspicious process spawns on the management appliance.
status: experimental
date: 2026/04/17
author: Security Arsenal Research
references:
    - https://cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog
logsource:
    product: cisco
    service: fmc
detection:
    selection:
        cef.message|contains: 'Authorization'
        cef.request|contains: '/api/fmc_config/v1/domain/'
    filter_legit:
        src_ip|cidr:
            - '10.0.0.0/8'
            - '192.168.0.0/16'
            - '172.16.0.0/12'
    condition: selection and not filter_legit
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administrative access from unknown IPs
level: high
---
title: SmarterMail Authentication Bypass Anomaly (CVE-2026-23760)
id: 2e1g9b23-6c7d-5b0f-9g2d-3b4c5d6e7f8g
description: Identifies suspicious authentication patterns or path traversal attempts indicative of SmarterMail exploits.
status: experimental
date: 2026/04/17
author: Security Arsenal Research
logsource:
    category: web
detection:
    selection_uri:
        cs-uri-query|contains:
            - '/Services/MailView.ashx'
            - '/Services/Calendar.ashx'
    selection_method:
        cs-method: 'POST'
    selection_status:
        sc-status:
            - 200
            - 500
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate mail client access
level: high
---
title: DragonForce Lateral Movement via WMI
id: 3f2h0c34-7d8e-6c1g-0h3e-4c5d6e7f8g9h
description: Detects lateral movement activity often used by ransomware operators utilizing WMI for remote code execution.
status: experimental
date: 2026/04/17
author: Security Arsenal Research
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\wmiprvse.exe'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\rundll32.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate system administration
level: high

// Hunt for potential DragonForce staging and lateral movement
// Looks for large file copy operations and WMI spawns within a short timeframe
let TimeFrame = 1h;
Process
| where Timestamp > ago(TimeFrame)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in ('wmiprvse.exe', 'svchost.exe')
| where FileName in ('powershell.exe', 'cmd.exe', 'robocopy.exe', 'rclone.exe')
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName, CommandLine
| extend AnomalyDetails = "Potential Ransomware Lateral Movement"
union (
    DeviceFileEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(TimeFrame)
    | where InitiatingProcessSHA256 !in ("KnownLegitHashes") // Filter known good if possible
    | where FileSize > 10000000 // > 10MB potential staging
    | project Timestamp, DeviceName, FileName, ActionType, FolderPath
    | extend AnomalyDetails = "Potential Large Scale Data Staging"
)
| order by Timestamp desc

<#
.SYNOPSIS
    DragonForce Response Hardening Script
.DESCRIPTION
    Checks for signs of compromise (Shadow Copy manipulation, Scheduled Tasks) and hardens RDP access.
#>

Write-Host "[+] Starting DragonForce Emergency Hardening Check..." -ForegroundColor Cyan

# 1. Check for recent Volume Shadow Copy Deletion attempts (Common Ransomware TTP)
Write-Host "[*] Checking Event Logs for VSS Deletion..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
$vssEvents = Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='Application'; ProviderName='VSS'; ID=12343} -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | 
              Where-Object { $_.TimeCreated -gt (Get-Date).AddHours(-24) }

if ($vssEvents) {
    Write-Host "[!] ALERT: Recent VSS Deletion events found!" -ForegroundColor Red
    $vssEvents | Select-Object TimeCreated, Message | Format-List
} else {
    Write-Host "[-] No recent VSS deletion events detected." -ForegroundColor Green
}

# 2. Enumerate Scheduled Tasks created in last 7 days (Persistence mechanism)
Write-Host "[*] Checking for Scheduled Tasks created in last 7 days..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
$tasks = Get-ScheduledTask | Where-Object { $_.Date -gt (Get-Date).AddDays(-7) }

if ($tasks) {
    Write-Host "[!] ALERT: Recent Scheduled Tasks found (Review required):" -ForegroundColor Red
    $tasks | Select-Object TaskName, Date, Author, Action
} else {
    Write-Host "[-] No suspicious recent scheduled tasks found." -ForegroundColor Green
}

# 3. Harden RDP (Disable if not strictly required)
Write-Host "[*] Checking NLA status for RDP..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
$nla = (Get-WmiObject -class "Win32_TSGeneralSetting" -Namespace root\cimv2\terminalservices -Filter "TerminalName='RDP-tcp'").UserAuthenticationRequired
if (-not $nla) {
    Write-Host "[!] WARNING: Network Level Authentication (NLA) is DISABLED on RDP." -ForegroundColor Red
    Write-Host "[*] Enabling NLA..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
    (Get-WmiObject -class "Win32_TSGeneralSetting" -Namespace root\cimv2\terminalservices -Filter "TerminalName='RDP-tcp'").SetUserAuthenticationRequired(1)
} else {
    Write-Host "[-] NLA is Enabled." -ForegroundColor Green
}

Write-Host "[+] Script Complete." -ForegroundColor Cyan


---

# Incident Response Priorities

If DragonForce activity is suspected or confirmed:

1.  **T-Minus Detection Checklist:**
    *   **Immediate:** Inspect logs for **Cisco FMC** and **Citrix ADC** anomalies (CVE-2026-20131, CVE-2025-5777). Look for "failed login" spikes followed by successful admin logins from unusual Geo-locations.
    *   **Internal:** Hunt for `wmiprvse.exe` spawning PowerShell. This is their primary lateral movement vector.
    *   **Data:** Search for massive volume file transfers (>10GB) to cloud storage or unknown IPs in the last 48 hours.

2.  **Critical Assets at Risk:**
    *   **Email Servers:** SmarterMail exploits suggest a specific interest in harvesting PII and communications.
    *   **Backup Repositories:** DragonForce actors typically delete shadow copies (`vssadmin delete shadows`) immediately upon gaining Domain Admin privileges.

3.  **Containment Actions (Order of Urgency):

---

# Hardening Recommendations

**Immediate (Within 24 Hours):**
*   **Patch Edge:** Immediately apply patches for **CVE-2026-20131 (Cisco FMC)** and **CVE-2026-23760 (SmarterMail)**. These are active keys to the kingdom.
*   **Disable Internet-Facing RDP:** If RDP is required, enforce MFA and place behind a VPN. Do not expose port 3389 directly.
*   **Password Rotation:** Force reset of all local and domain administrator credentials, especially for service accounts used on mail and firewall appliances.

**Short-Term (2 Weeks):**
*   **Network Segmentation:** isolate critical backup servers from the general network. Ensure backups are immutable or offline.
*   **Implement Geo-Blocking:** Restrict access to management interfaces (Cisco FMC, Citrix) to known corporate IP ranges only.
*   **EDR Coverage:** Ensure full EDR coverage is active on all edge management servers (often overlooked).

---