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EVEREST Ransomware Gang: 10 New Leak-Site Listings — Sector Targeting Analysis & Detection Rules

SA
Security Arsenal Team
November 21, 2026
14 min read

Classification: TLP:CLEAR | Publication Date: 2026-11-21 | Source: ransomware.live leak-site monitoring | Nature of data: Unverified threat-actor claims

EVEREST Ransomware Gang: 10 New Leak-Site Listings — Sector Targeting Analysis & Detection Rules

Executive Summary

On 2026-11-20, the EVEREST ransomware operation published 10 new listings to its dark web leak site in a single 24-hour window — an unusually dense posting cadence for this crew. The organizations named span Government & Defense, Healthcare, Technology, Energy & Utilities, and other sectors, across Czechia, France, Norway, India, Japan, and several unconfirmed geographies.

Every listing in this briefing is a claim made by a criminal group on its own extortion infrastructure. Inclusion here reflects what EVEREST has posted, not a confirmed breach. None of the named organizations has, at time of publication, publicly confirmed an incident, and no tier of our collection data confirms one either. That said, EVEREST has a multi-year track record of publishing authentic exfiltrated data when victims refuse to pay, so each listing warrants defensive attention from the named organization and from peers in the same sectors.

Key observations:

  • Single-day mass posting (10 listings) suggests either a backlog dump or a coordinated escalation tactic ahead of negotiation deadlines.
  • Government & Defense, Healthcare, and Energy & Utilities presence aligns with EVEREST's historical appetite for high-pressure, high-sensitivity sectors.
  • Technology-sector names (Vizrt, Geesol, Accuver) are consistent with the group's pattern of targeting firms whose compromise creates downstream supply-chain leverage.

Organizations named: FAST ČR (CZ), Alla France (FR), ABL Bio, Vizrt (NO), ALKF, Rays Power Infra (IN), Geesol, My American Alliance, Accuver, KOWA (JP).

Sourcing & Verification

This briefing is built from ransomware.live monitoring of EVEREST's .onion leak site. Readers must understand the following before acting on any name in this report:

  • Corroboration status: 10 of 10 listings were independently observed by a second leak-site crawler; 0 appear on a single source only. MULTI-SOURCE corroboration means two independent collection systems observed the gang publish the claim — it confirms the posting exists, nothing more.
  • Inclusion is not confirmation. A leak-site listing is an accusation by a financially motivated criminal actor. It is not evidence that a breach occurred, and no collection tier in our pipeline — including multi-source observation — confirms a breach. Only the named organization or its regulator can confirm an incident.
  • Disputes and denials cut both ways. A named organization may dispute or deny a listing. A denial is likewise not proof the claim is false: disclosure obligations vary by jurisdiction and sector, not every incident is legally reportable, and organizations may be bound by legal or investigative constraints. Neither silence nor denial settles the question.
  • Corrections: Security Arsenal will publish corrections to this briefing if any listing is retracted, disputed with evidence, or confirmed. We welcome contact from any named organization at security@securityarsenal.com.

Threat Actor Profile — EVEREST

Aliases & lineage: EVEREST (also tracked as EverBit and, in some reporting, overlapping with the BlackByte and OldKube tooling ecosystems) has operated since at least 2020. The group has reinvented itself multiple times, shifting between pure data-extortion, classic encrypt-and-leak double extortion, and acting as an initial access broker (IAB) selling footholds to other crews.

Operating model: EVEREST runs as a semi-closed operation with a small affiliate layer — not an open RaaS marketplace like LockBit or ALPHV. It maintains its own .onion leak site with per-victim countdown timers, staged data teasers, and a 'proof pack' model where samples are released to pressure negotiations.

Ransom demands: Historically ranging from low six figures to several million USD depending on victim revenue and data sensitivity. EVEREST is known to negotiate aggressively and to sell data to third parties when negotiations stall, not merely delete it.

Initial access methods (known TTPs):

  • Exploitation of exposed perimeter services: VPN concentrators, firewalls, and remote access gateways.
  • Compromised RDP credentials (brute force or purchased from access brokers).
  • Spear-phishing with macro-enabled documents and malicious archives.
  • Use of legitimate remote access tooling (AnyDesk, Splashtop) post-compromise for persistence.

Extortion approach: Double extortion is standard — data exfiltration precedes encryption, and the leak site is the primary pressure lever. EVEREST has also engaged in triple pressure by contacting victim clients and partners directly.

Dwell time: Observed dwell time before detonation typically runs 1–3 weeks, though some intrusions have shown staging periods exceeding a month. The exfiltration phase often begins well before defenders notice encryption-relevant activity.

Current Campaign Analysis

Sectors targeted (from 2026-11-20 listings)

OrganizationSector (as listed)Country
FAST ČRGovernment & DefenseCZ
Alla FranceOtherFR
ABL BioHealthcareUnlisted
VizrtTechnologyNO
ALKFNot FoundUnlisted
Rays Power InfraEnergy & UtilitiesIN
GeesolTechnologyUnlisted
My American AllianceOtherUnlisted
AccuverTechnologyUnlisted
KOWAHealthcareJP

The mix — one government/defense entity, two healthcare, three technology, one energy — matches EVEREST's historical sector appetite: organizations where data confidentiality is existential and downtime pressure is extreme.

Geographic concentration

No single-country concentration. Confirmed geographies span CZ, FR, NO, IN, and JP, with four listings lacking reliable country attribution. This is consistent with EVEREST's opportunistic, access-driven model rather than a geopolitically targeted campaign — they go where the access brokers and exposed perimeters are.

Victim profile

The named organizations range from mid-market firms to larger enterprises. Based on sector norms: the healthcare names (ABL Bio, KOWA) sit in biotech/pharma-adjacent space where IP and clinical data carry high extortion value; Rays Power Infra operates in critical energy infrastructure; technology names (Vizrt, Geesol, Accuver) are plausible supply-chain pivots whose compromise could cascade to their customers.

Posting frequency / escalation pattern

Ten listings in a single day is a spike, not a trickle. Two working hypotheses: (1) a backlog dump of intrusions conducted over prior weeks, posted together to maximize psychological impact and media pickup; (2) negotiation-deadline clustering, where multiple victims hit their countdown timers simultaneously. Either way, the pattern suggests EVEREST's intrusion pipeline is currently active and productive.

CVE exposure — hypothesis only

We have no evidence linking any named organization above to a specific CVE. What we can say at the sector level: EVEREST's documented tradecraft relies heavily on perimeter and remote-access exploitation, and the following CISA KEV entries represent exactly the exposure classes this group is known to hunt. Defenders in the targeted sectors should treat these as priority patch items as a hypothesis-driven exposure reduction, not as confirmed intrusion vectors for any victim in this briefing:

  • CVE-2026-50751 — Check Point Security Gateway improper authentication (IKEv1). Edge-VPN auth bypass is squarely in EVEREST's historical access pattern.
  • CVE-2026-20316 — Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center hard-coded password. Management-plane compromise of perimeter infrastructure.
  • CVE-2026-59310 — VMware vCenter path traversal. Virtualization control-plane access enables mass encryption and snapshot destruction.
  • CVE-2026-63077 — JetBrains TeamCity deserialization. CI/CD compromise fits the supply-chain angle suggested by the technology-sector listings.
  • CVE-2026-48027 — Nx Console embedded malicious code. Developer-toolchain supply-chain exposure, again relevant to technology victims.

Detection Engineering

The detections below target EVEREST's documented playbook: perimeter/RDP initial access, PsExec/WMI lateral movement, data staging and archive creation pre-exfiltration, and anti-forensic shadow copy deletion before encryption.

YAML
---
title: EVEREST - RDP Brute Force Followed by Successful Logon
id: 7c1a2b3e-evrs-4a01-9001-000000000001
status: experimental
description: Detects a burst of failed RDP logons (Event 4625, logon type 3/10) from a single source followed by a successful logon (4624 type 10), consistent with EVEREST's known RDP credential attack pattern.
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intel
references:
  - https://securityarsenal.com/darkside
date: 2026/11/21
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection:
  selection_failed:
    EventID: 4625
    LogonType:
      - 3
      - 10
  selection_success:
    EventID: 4624
    LogonType: 10
  condition: selection_failed and selection_success
timeframe: 10m
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate user password mistyping from jump hosts
  - Vulnerability scanners authenticating against RDP
level: high
tags:
  - attack.initial_access
  - attack.t1133
  - attack.t1110
---
title: EVEREST - PsExec or WMI Remote Service Execution
id: 7c1a2b3e-evrs-4a01-9001-000000000002
status: experimental
description: Detects PsExec-style service creation (7045) and remote WMI process execution consistent with EVEREST lateral movement tooling.
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intel
references:
  - https://securityarsenal.com/darkside
date: 2026/11/21
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: system
detection:
  selection_psexec:
    EventID: 7045
    ServiceName|contains:
      - 'PSEXESVC'
      - 'PAExec'
  selection_random_svc:
    EventID: 7045
    ImagePath|contains:
      - '\ADMIN$'
      - '\\'
    ImagePath|endswith: '.exe'
  condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
  - Enterprise software deployment tools (SCCM, PDQ) — whitelist known service names
level: high
tags:
  - attack.lateral_movement
  - attack.t1021.002
  - attack.t1569.002
---
title: EVEREST - Pre-Encryption Staging and Shadow Copy Deletion
id: 7c1a2b3e-evrs-4a01-9001-000000000003
status: experimental
description: Detects archive creation in unusual paths (data staging) combined with Volume Shadow Copy deletion commands — the classic EVEREST pre-encryption sequence.
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intel
references:
  - https://securityarsenal.com/darkside
date: 2026/11/21
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_vss:
    Image|endswith:
      - '\vssadmin.exe'
      - '\wmic.exe'
      - '\bcdedit.exe'
    CommandLine|contains:
      - 'delete shadows'
      - 'shadowcopy delete'
      - 'recoveryenabled no'
  selection_archive:
    Image|endswith:
      - '\rar.exe'
      - '\7z.exe'
      - '\winrar.exe'
    CommandLine|contains:
      - ' a '
      - ' -p'
  condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
  - Backup administrators running vssadmin maintenance
  - Legitimate archival by power users — tune by host role
level: critical
tags:
  - attack.impact
  - attack.t1490
  - attack.t1560.001
  - attack.exfiltration
KQL — Microsoft Sentinel / Defender
// EVEREST pre-ransomware staging & lateral movement hunt — Microsoft Sentinel
// Looks for: remote execution tooling -> mass archive creation -> shadow copy tampering
// Run over the last 14 days; tune exclusion lists to your environment.
let Lookback = 14d;
let SuspiciousArchivers = dynamic(["rar.exe","7z.exe","7za.exe","winrar.exe","7zr.exe"]);
let RemoteExecTools = dynamic(["psexec.exe","psexesvc.exe","paexec.exe","wmic.exe","wmiprvse.exe"]);
let ExcludedAccounts = dynamic(["SCCM_SERVICE_ACCOUNT","PDQ_DEPLOY_ACCOUNT"]);
// Step 1: hosts where remote execution tooling spawned
let LateralHosts =
    DeviceProcessEvents
    | where TimeGenerated > ago(Lookback)
    | where FileName in~ (RemoteExecTools)
    | where not(InitiatingProcessAccountName in~ (ExcludedAccounts))
    | summarize FirstSeen=min(TimeGenerated) by DeviceName, FileName, InitiatingProcessAccountName;
// Step 2: on those hosts, archive creation (staging) and/or shadow copy deletion
let Staging =
    DeviceProcessEvents
    | where TimeGenerated > ago(Lookback)
    | where DeviceName in (LateralHosts | project DeviceName)
    | where FileName in~ (SuspiciousArchivers)
       and ProcessCommandLine has_any (" a ", " -p", " -m")
    | project StagingTime=TimeGenerated, DeviceName, ArchiverCmd=ProcessCommandLine, AccountName;
let AntiForensics =
    DeviceProcessEvents
    | where TimeGenerated > ago(Lookback)
    | where DeviceName in (LateralHosts | project DeviceName)
    | where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("delete shadows","shadowcopy delete","resize shadowstorage","recoveryenabled no")
    | project TamperTime=TimeGenerated, DeviceName, TamperCmd=ProcessCommandLine, TamperAccount=AccountName;
// Correlate: staging + shadow-copy tampering on the same host = critical
Staging
| join kind=inner AntiForensics on DeviceName
| extend HoursBetween = datetime_diff('hour', TamperTime, StagingTime)
| project DeviceName, AccountName, StagingTime, ArchiverCmd, TamperTime, TamperCmd, HoursBetween
| order by StagingTime asc
PowerShell
# EVEREST Rapid-Response Triage Script — run elevated on suspect hosts
# Checks: RDP exposure, recent scheduled tasks, shadow copy state, suspicious archivers
# Output: timestamped text report per host

$ReportPath = "C:\IRTriage_$($env:COMPUTERNAME)_$(Get-Date -Format 'yyyyMMdd_HHmmss').txt"
"=== EVEREST Rapid Triage — $env:COMPUTERNAME — $(Get-Date) ===" | Out-File $ReportPath

# 1. RDP exposure check
"`n[1] RDP Configuration" | Out-File $ReportPath -Append
$rdpEnabled = (Get-ItemProperty 'HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server').fDenyTSConnections
$rdpPort = (Get-ItemProperty 'HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\WinStations\RDP-Tcp').PortNumber
$nla = (Get-ItemProperty 'HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\WinStations\RDP-Tcp').UserAuthentication
"RDP Disabled flag: $rdpEnabled (0 = RDP ENABLED) | Port: $rdpPort | NLA: $nla (1 = NLA on)" | Out-File $ReportPath -Append
Get-NetTCPConnection -LocalPort $rdpPort -State Listen -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
  ForEach-Object { "  LISTENING on $($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)" } | Out-File $ReportPath -Append

# 2. Scheduled tasks created/modified in last 7 days (persistence check)
"`n[2] Scheduled Tasks Modified in Last 7 Days" | Out-File $ReportPath -Append
Get-ScheduledTask | Where-Object {
  $_.Date -and ([datetime]$_.Date) -gt (Get-Date).AddDays(-7)
} | ForEach-Object {
  "  [$($_.Date)] $($_.TaskPath)$($_.TaskName) — State: $($_.State)"
} | Out-File $ReportPath -Append

# 3. Volume Shadow Copy state (EVEREST deletes these pre-encryption)
"`n[3] Volume Shadow Copies" | Out-File $ReportPath -Append
$shadows = Get-CimInstance Win32_ShadowCopy -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
if ($shadows) {
  $shadows | ForEach-Object { "  Shadow: $($_.ID) created $($_.InstallDate) on $($_.VolumeName)" } | Out-File $ReportPath -Append
} else {
  "  WARNING: NO shadow copies present — investigate for anti-forensic deletion" | Out-File $ReportPath -Append
}

# 4. Suspicious archiver binaries in non-standard paths (staging indicator)
"`n[4] Archiver Binaries in User/Temp Paths" | Out-File $ReportPath -Append
$archivers = @('rar.exe','7z.exe','7za.exe','winrar.exe')
$searchPaths = @("$env:TEMP","C:\Users\Public","C:\ProgramData","$env:APPDATA")
foreach ($p in $searchPaths) {
  Get-ChildItem -Path $p -Recurse -Include $archivers -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
    ForEach-Object { "  FOUND: $($_.FullName) (modified $($_.LastWriteTime))" } | Out-File $ReportPath -Append
}

# 5. Recent 4624 Type 10 (RDP) logons in last 72h
"`n[5] RDP Logons (Type 10) — Last 72h" | Out-File $ReportPath -Append
Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='Security'; Id=4624; StartTime=(Get-Date).AddHours(-72)} -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
  Where-Object { $_.Message -match 'Logon Type:\s+10' } |
  Select-Object -First 25 |
  ForEach-Object { "  $($_.TimeCreated) — $($_.Message.Split("`n") | Select-String 'Account Name|Source Network' | Out-String)" } |
  Out-File $ReportPath -Append

"`n=== Triage complete. Report: $ReportPath ===" | Out-File $ReportPath -Append
Write-Host "Report written to $ReportPath"

Incident Response Priorities

T-minus detection checklist (before encryption fires)

EVEREST's dwell time is your window. Hunt for, in order:

  1. Unscheduled archive creation — rar/7z processes running as service accounts or from non-interactive sessions, especially targeting file servers, ERP shares, and document management systems.
  2. Shadow copy deletion or backup-job tampering — vssadmin/wmic/bcdedit invocation on servers; disabled backup agents.
  3. New remote access tooling — AnyDesk, Splashtop, or similar installed outside your software catalog.
  4. Anomalous egress — sustained multi-GB outbound transfers to consumer cloud storage, VPS IPs, or MEGA-style services, particularly outside business hours.
  5. PsExec/WMI service creation across multiple hosts from a single source (lateral movement in progress).
  6. New local/domain admin accounts or unexpected group membership changes.

Assets EVEREST historically prioritizes for exfiltration

  • Financial records, contracts, and legal correspondence (maximum embarrassment value)
  • HR data: PII, payroll, medical records (regulatory pressure multiplier)
  • Source code and R&D/IP — especially relevant given this campaign's technology and biotech/healthcare listings
  • Client/partner data that enables third-party pressure and downstream extortion
  • Backup catalogs and credentials (to destroy recovery options before detonation)

Containment actions, ordered by urgency

  1. Isolate, don't nuke: Segment suspected hosts at the switch/EDR level. Do not power off — volatile memory holds decryption keys and actor tooling evidence.
  2. Kill egress first: Block unsanctioned outbound at the proxy/firewall. EVEREST's leverage is the data; stop it from leaving.
  3. Disable compromised credentials domain-wide: Force reset for any account seen in lateral movement telemetry; revoke active sessions and tokens.
  4. Protect backups: Take backup infrastructure offline from the production network; verify an untouchable offline/immutable copy exists before announcing detection internally on potentially monitored channels.
  5. Assume email is watched: Coordinate response on out-of-band channels; actors in the network read the IR thread.
  6. Preserve evidence: Memory captures and full disk images of patient-zero and staging hosts before remediation.

Hardening Recommendations

Immediate (24 hours)

  • Patch the perimeter: Verify remediation status of CVE-2026-50751 (Check Point), CVE-2026-20316 (Cisco FMC), and CVE-2026-59310 (vCenter). These are the exact exposure classes EVEREST hunts — treat as emergency changes.
  • Kill exposed RDP: No RDP on the internet, period. VPN + MFA + NLA for any remote administration. Audit current 3389 exposure from external scan data today.
  • Enforce phishing-resistant MFA on all remote access, email, and privileged accounts — hardware keys or certificate-based, not SMS.
  • Deploy the Sigma rules above into your SIEM and alert on them at high priority. The shadow-copy-deletion rule especially: it is frequently the last reliable pre-encryption signal.
  • Restrict archive utilities: Block rar/7z execution for non-admin users via AppLocker/WDAC; alert on any execution by service accounts.

Short-term (2 weeks)

  • Segmentation: Isolate backup infrastructure on a dedicated management VLAN with one-way replication to immutable/offline storage. EVEREST specifically hunts backup catalogs and credentials.
  • Egress filtering with allowlisting: Default-deny outbound; the exfiltration phase is your longest detection window and it only works if you can see and stop unusual destinations.
  • Lateral movement friction: Disable PsExec-style admin$ service creation where operationally feasible; enforce LAPS on all endpoints; tier admin model so workstation compromise cannot yield domain admin.
  • CI/CD hardening: Given this campaign's technology-sector listings and the TeamCity (CVE-2026-63077) and Nx Console (CVE-2026-48027) KEV entries, inventory and patch build infrastructure, and pin/verify developer toolchain extensions.
  • Deception: Deploy canary file shares and honey credentials; EVEREST's staging behavior trips these reliably and early.

Related Resources

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