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Fake Bank Phishing Kit (29 Domains) + Year-End DocuSign/SharePoint Lures: OTX Pulse Analysis — Credential Harvesting Detection Pack

SA
Security Arsenal Team
November 22, 2026
10 min read

Two concurrent OTX pulses paint a consistent picture: a surge in credential-harvesting phishing infrastructure timed to exploit year-end business processes, with the financial sector squarely in the crosshairs.

The first pulse documents a single phishing kit deployed across 29 unique fake-bank domains active since late September 2026. The operator(s) behind this campaign registered disposable domains impersonating U.S. and Canadian banking brands, each clone sharing identical artifacts — the same tagline, the same bank routing number, and the same support phone number. This artifact reuse is the campaign's critical weakness: it gives defenders a high-fidelity fingerprint for detection and clustering. The kit is built to harvest online banking credentials and personally identifiable information (PII), which typically flows into credential resale markets, account takeover (ATO) operations, and downstream wire/ACH fraud.

The second pulse documents year-end themed phishing lures impersonating SharePoint, DocuSign, compensation adjustments, Q4 invoices, access reviews, and benefits statements. Targeting spans finance, technology, telecommunications, manufacturing, real estate, and aviation. Several indicators are compromised legitimate websites (e.g., a Belgian concrete flooring firm, a Bangladeshi fashion site) being used as phishing hosts — a deliberate technique to inherit domain reputation and bypass age- and category-based URL filters.

Collectively, these pulses reveal the standard phishing-as-a-service (PhaaS) attack chain:

  1. Lure delivery — themed emails (fake raise notifications, invoice follow-ups, bank alerts)
  2. Redirect/landing — disposable domains or compromised legitimate sites hosting cloned portals
  3. Credential capture — form POST exfiltration, often with the victim's email pre-populated via URL parameter (?email=, ?emp=)
  4. Monetization — credential stuffing, ATO, BEC, and PII resale

Threat Actor / Malware Profile

Attribution: Both pulses list the adversary as Unknown. However, the 29-domain bank kit exhibits hallmarks of a phishing kit operator selling or renting a template — identical page artifacts across unrelated domains strongly suggest a single kit in the hands of one operator or a small buyer pool. The year-end lure campaign uses compromised infrastructure, consistent with commodity phishing crews purchasing bulletproof hosting and hacked CMS sites.

Distribution method: Email-borne lures impersonating banks (Pulse 1) and enterprise SaaS/HR workflows — SharePoint file shares, DocuSign signature requests, payroll/compensation notices (Pulse 2). URL parameters like ?email= and ?emp= indicate per-victim personalized links, a common kit feature that pre-fills the victim's email address to increase credibility.

Payload behavior: No executable malware is dropped — this is pure browser-based credential harvesting. Victims enter banking credentials or PII into cloned portals; data is exfiltrated via HTTP POST to the kit's backend, frequently forwarded to Telegram bots or email drop boxes operated by the threat actor.

C2 / exfiltration communication: Standard HTTPS POST to the phishing domain itself or an embedded third-party endpoint. The use of compromised legitimate domains (e.g., bvlbetonvloeren.be, rsfashionsdesignbd.com) provides reputation cover for exfiltration traffic.

Persistence mechanism: None on the endpoint — persistence is achieved at the identity layer. Stolen credentials are replayed against the real banking portal, VPN, or M365 tenant, often within hours of capture.

Anti-analysis techniques: Disposable domain rotation (29 domains and counting), compromised-host staging to defeat domain-age filters, URL-parameter gating (pages may only render the phishing form when the expected ?email= token is present), and likely user-agent/geofencing checks typical of modern kits.

IOC Analysis

The indicator set across both pulses consists of domains, hostnames, and URLs — no file hashes or IPs, which is expected for purely web-based credential phishing.

  • Domains/hostnames (e.g., brayfinance.online, qtbnk.com, oakmontfb.com, englaus.sbs, login.yhoodgc.top): Push these to DNS sinkholes, secure web gateways, and email security block lists. Low false-positive risk — these are either newly registered disposable domains or clearly malicious subdomains.
  • Full URLs with parameters (e.g., https://englaus.sbs/fnzbmledrak/fnzbmledrak?email=, http://comet.kickcharge.com/assets/images/in/?emp=): The base domains here may be compromised legitimate sites — block the full URL path rather than the apex domain to avoid breaking legitimate business traffic, and alert the compromised site's operators where possible.
  • Pattern-based detection: The query parameters ?email= and ?emp= appended to outbound web requests are strong hunt pivots. Proxy logs filtered for these parameters against low-reputation domains will surface both known and unknown kit infrastructure.

Operationalization: Ingest the full OTX indicator sets (29 + 14 IOCs) into your TI platform, enforce at DNS/proxy/email layers, and run retroactive hunts over the past 60 days of proxy, DNS, and email gateway logs — the bank kit has been active since late September.

Detection Engineering

YAML
---
title: Outbound Connection to Fake Banking Phishing Kit Domains
id: 9f3a1c2e-7b4d-4e8f-a1c5-20261122bank
status: experimental
description: Detects DNS queries or web connections to the 29 fake-bank phishing kit domains identified in OTX pulse 'One Phishing Kit, 29 Fake Banks'. Identical tagline/routing-number artifacts confirm a single kit operator.
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intelligence
logsource:
    category: dns
product: windows
odetection:
    selection:
        query|contains:
            - 'brayfinance.online'
            - 'firstcp.live'
            - 'securecapitalcorporationlimited.com'
            - 'qtbnk.com'
            - 'norexgo.com'
            - '1stggbinc.cc'
            - 'oakmontfb.com'
            - 'allyunitybn.com'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - None expected; domains are confirmed phishing infrastructure
level: high
tags:
    - attack.initial_access
    - attack.t1566.002
    - attack.collection
---
title: Phishing URL with Email Pre-Population Parameter Accessed
id: 4c7d2e1a-3f5b-4a9c-b2d6-20261122lure
status: experimental
description: Detects outbound web requests to URLs containing ?email= or ?emp= parameters on suspicious infrastructure, matching the per-victim link pattern used by the 2026 year-end phishing lure campaign (SharePoint/DocuSign impersonation).
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intelligence
logsource:
    category: proxy
odetection:
    selection_uri:
        cs-uri-query|contains:
            - '?email='
            - '?emp='
    selection_host:
        cs-host|contains:
            - 'englaus.sbs'
            - 'yhoodgc.top'
            - 'kickcharge.com'
            - 'bvlbetonvloeren.be'
            - 'rsfashionsdesignbd.com'
            - 'tropical100.com.do'
    condition: selection_uri and selection_host
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate marketing platforms use email parameters; tune against known-good ESP domains
level: medium
tags:
    - attack.initial_access
    - attack.t1566.002
---
title: Credential Entry Followed by New M365 Sign-In From Unfamiliar ASN
id: 8e1b5f3d-2c6a-4d7e-c3a8-20261122ato
status: experimental
description: Correlation hunting logic — after a user visits known phishing infrastructure, detect anomalous sign-ins to detect account takeover. Stolen banking/SSO credentials are typically replayed within hours of harvest.
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intelligence
logsource:
    category: authentication
odetection:
    selection:
        TargetUserName|contains: '%'
        EventID: 'LoginSuccess'
    filter_known_asns:
        SourceASN|in:
            - 'KNOWN_CORPORATE_ASN_1'
            - 'KNOWN_VPN_ASN_2'
    condition: selection and not filter_known_asns
falsepositives:
    - Employees traveling or using new ISPs; correlate with preceding phishing URL visit
level: high
tags:
    - attack.initial_access
    - attack.t1078
    - attack.credential_access
KQL — Microsoft Sentinel / Defender
// Hunt: Phishing kit infrastructure access + credential replay risk
// OTX Pulses: Fake Bank Kit (29 domains) + 2026 Year-End Phishing Lures
let phishingDomains = dynamic([
    "brayfinance.online", "firstcp.live", "securecapitalcorporationlimited.com",
    "qtbnk.com", "norexgo.com", "1stggbinc.cc", "oakmontfb.com",
    "allyunitybn.com", "rsfashionsdesignbd.com", "bvlbetonvloeren.be",
    "englaus.sbs", "tropical100.com.do", "kickcharge.com", "yhoodgc.top"
]);
let Lookback = 60d;
let PhishingHits = DeviceNetworkEvents
    | where TimeGenerated > ago(Lookback)
    | where RemoteUrl has_any (phishingDomains)
    | project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName,
              RemoteUrl, RemoteIP, InitiatingProcessFileName;
PhishingHits
| join kind=leftouter (
    SigninLogs
    | where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
    | where ResultType == 0
    | summarize SignIns = count(), Locations = make_set(Location),
                IPs = make_set(IPAddress) by UserPrincipalName
    ) on $left.InitiatingProcessAccountName == $right.UserPrincipalName
| summarize FirstSeen = min(TimeGenerated), LastSeen = max(TimeGenerated),
            URLsHit = make_set(RemoteUrl), SignInIPs = make_set(IPs)
  by DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName
| sort by FirstSeen asc;
PowerShell
# Security Arsenal - Phishing Kit IOC Hunt Script
# Pulses: 'One Phishing Kit, 29 Fake Banks' + '2026 Year End Phishing Lures'
# Checks browser history caches and DNS resolver cache for phishing infrastructure access.
# Run elevated on endpoints or deploy via your RMM/EDR live response console.

$phishingIOCs = @(
    'brayfinance.online','firstcp.live','securecapitalcorporationlimited.com',
    'qtbnk.com','norexgo.com','1stggbinc.cc','oakmontfb.com','allyunitybn.com',
    'rsfashionsdesignbd.com','bvlbetonvloeren.be','englaus.sbs',
    'tropical100.com.do','kickcharge.com','yhoodgc.top'
)

Write-Host "[*] Security Arsenal Phishing Kit IOC Hunt - $(Get-Date -Format 'yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm')" -ForegroundColor Cyan
$findings = @()

# --- Check 1: DNS resolver cache for phishing domain resolutions ---
Write-Host "[*] Checking DNS resolver cache..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
try {
    $dnsCache = Get-DnsClientCache -ErrorAction Stop
    foreach ($ioc in $phishingIOCs) {
        $match = $dnsCache | Where-Object { $_.Entry -like "*$ioc*" }
        if ($match) {
            $findings += [PSCustomObject]@{
                Source   = 'DNS Cache'
                IOC      = $ioc
                Detail   = ($match | Select-Object -First 1).Entry
                Severity = 'HIGH - Host resolved known phishing domain'
            }
        }
    }
} catch { Write-Host "[!] DNS cache check failed: $_" -ForegroundColor Red }

# --- Check 2: Chrome/Edge browser history for phishing URLs ---
Write-Host "[*] Checking browser history databases..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
$historyPaths = @(
    "$env:LOCALAPPDATA\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\History",
    "$env:LOCALAPPDATA\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\Default\History"
)
foreach ($histPath in $historyPaths) {
    if (Test-Path $histPath) {
        $tmpCopy = Join-Path $env:TEMP ("hist_" + [guid]::NewGuid().ToString('N'))
        try {
            Copy-Item $histPath $tmpCopy -Force -ErrorAction Stop
            $raw = [System.IO.File]::ReadAllBytes($tmpCopy)
            $text = [System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString($raw)
            foreach ($ioc in $phishingIOCs) {
                if ($text -match [regex]::Escape($ioc)) {
                    $findings += [PSCustomObject]@{
                        Source   = (Split-Path (Split-Path $histPath -Parent) -Leaf) + ' History'
                        IOC      = $ioc
                        Detail   = "Phishing URL string found in browser history: $histPath"
                        Severity = 'CRITICAL - User visited phishing site; force credential reset'
                    }
                }
            }
            Remove-Item $tmpCopy -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
        } catch { Write-Host "[!] Could not read $histPath (may be locked): $_" -ForegroundColor DarkYellow }
    }
}

# --- Check 3: Outlook OST indicator - check for suspicious cached URLs in IE/Edge WebCache ---
Write-Host "[*] Checking for credential-replay artifacts (recent unusual logon events)..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
$logonEvents = Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='Security'; Id=4624; LogonType=10} -MaxEvents 50 -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
if ($logonEvents) {
    foreach ($evt in $logonEvents | Select-Object -First 10) {
        $msg = $evt.Message
        if ($msg -match 'Source Network Address:\s+([\d\.]+)') {
            $srcIP = $Matches[1]
            if ($srcIP -notmatch '^(10\.|172\.(1[6-9]|2\d|3[01])\.|192\.168\.|127\.)') {
                $findings += [PSCustomObject]@{
                    Source   = 'Security Event Log'
                    IOC      = $srcIP
                    Detail   = "External RDP/network logon at $($evt.TimeCreated)"
                    Severity = 'MEDIUM - Verify legitimacy of external logon source'
                }
            }
        }
    }
}

# --- Results ---
if ($findings.Count -gt 0) {
    Write-Host "`n[!!!] $($findings.Count) FINDING(S) DETECTED:" -ForegroundColor Red
    $findings | Format-Table -AutoSize | Out-String | Write-Host
    $findings | Export-Csv "PhishingKit_Hunt_$(hostname)_$(Get-Date -Format 'yyyyMMdd_HHmm').csv" -NoTypeInformation
    Write-Host "[*] Results exported to CSV in current directory." -ForegroundColor Cyan
    Write-Host "[*] ACTION: Reset credentials for any user whose browser history shows a phishing domain visit." -ForegroundColor Red
} else {
    Write-Host "`n[+] No phishing kit IOCs found on this host." -ForegroundColor Green
}

Response Priorities

Immediate (0-4 hours):

  • Push all 43 indicators to DNS sinkhole, secure web gateway, and email security gateway block lists; block full URL paths for compromised legitimate domains to avoid collateral disruption
  • Execute the KQL hunt across the last 60 days of network telemetry to identify any user who visited the fake-bank or lure infrastructure
  • Run the PowerShell hunt script on endpoints belonging to finance, payroll, and executive staff — the highest-value targets for these lures
  • Flag any inbound mail containing ?email= / ?emp= parameterized links for enhanced inspection

24 hours:

  • For every confirmed phishing-site visit, perform immediate credential reset for the affected user — both the impersonated service (banking/SSO) and any account where password reuse is plausible
  • Review M365/Entra sign-in logs for anomalous ASN, impossible travel, or MFA fatigue patterns for exposed users; revoke active sessions and refresh tokens
  • Notify your banking partners' fraud teams if corporate banking credentials may have been entered on fake portals; monitor for unauthorized ACH/wire initiation
  • Check for OAuth consent grants issued in the exposure window — phishing crews frequently pivot from password theft to persistent app consent

1 week:

  • Deploy the Sigma correlation rule linking phishing-site visits to subsequent anomalous sign-ins as a standing analytic
  • Implement or tighten DMARC/DKIM/SPF enforcement and add lookalike-domain monitoring for your own brand — if 29 fake banks exist, fake versions of your login portal are cheap to produce
  • Roll out year-end-specific phishing awareness content covering the exact lures in these pulses: compensation changes, Q4 invoices, DocuSign requests, and access reviews
  • Evaluate FIDO2/passkey enforcement for finance and privileged users — phishing-resistant MFA neutralizes credential replay even when the harvest succeeds
  • Subscribe to the OTX pulse feeds referenced here for automated indicator ingestion into your TI pipeline

Related Resources

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Fake Bank Phishing Kit (29 Domains) + Year-End DocuSign/SharePoint Lures: OTX Pulse Analysis — Credential Harvesting Detection Pack | Security Arsenal | Security Arsenal