Threat Summary
Recent OTX Pulse data reveals a convergence of state-sponsored cyberespionage and crimeware-as-a-service operations. We are observing three distinct, high-velocity campaigns:
- Gamaredon (FSB): Continuing aggressive operations against Ukrainian entities via a complex infection chain involving HTML smuggling, weaponized RAR archives exploiting CVE-2025-8088, and HTA persistence.
- SideCopy (APT36): Targeting the Afghan Ministry of Finance using spear-phishing with LNK files that leverage compromised
.edu.afinfrastructure to deliver XenoRAT. - BTMOB (SpySolr Evolution): A mobile-focused threat targeting Argentina and Brazil. This Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) platform abuses Android accessibility services to steal data and maintain persistence, distributed via fake streaming and government apps.
Collectively, these threats emphasize the abuse of legitimate protocols (HTML/HTA), supply chain compromises (education domains), and mobile platform weaknesses to achieve espionage and financial theft.
Threat Actor / Malware Profile
Gamaredon Group (Russia/FSB)
- Objective: Long-term cyberespionage against Ukrainian government, defense, and critical infrastructure.
- Malware: GammaPhish, GammaLoad, GammaWorm, GammaSteal, Pteranodon.
- Distribution: Phishing emails containing weaponized xHTML files.
- TTPs:
- Initial Access: HTML smuggling to download RAR archives.
- Exploitation: Exploits CVE-2025-8088 (WinRAR) to extract HTA files recursively.
- Persistence: HTA files are dropped into Windows Startup directories.
- C2: Uses Cloudflare tunnels (
trycloudflare.com) and compromised infrastructure to evade detection.
SideCopy / Transparent Tribe (Pakistan)
- Objective: Espionage against Afghan government financial bodies.
- Malware: XenoRAT (a commercially available but potent RAT).
- Distribution: Spear-phishing with Pashto-language lure documents.
- TTPs:
- Initial Access: Malicious LNK files disguised as staff directories.
- Execution: LNK triggers
mshta.exeto fetch remote HTA payloads. - Infrastructure: Utilizes compromised Afghan educational domains (
abimj.edu.af) for payload hosting.
BTMOB (Unknown / MaaS)
- Objective: Mobile surveillance and credential harvesting in Latin America.
- Malware: BTMOB (evolution of SpySolr).
- Distribution: Fake app stores impersonating streaming services, crypto platforms, and government agencies.
- TTPs:
- Abuse: Heavy reliance on Android Accessibility Services to grant itself permissions silently.
- Capabilities: Keylogging, screen recording, and overlay attacks.
IOC Analysis
The current pulse data provides critical indicators across multiple vectors:
- Exploits: Identification of CVE-2025-8088 is critical. This indicates a high-risk vulnerability in WinRAR that allows arbitrary code execution during archive extraction.
- Network Infrastructure:
- IPs such as
104.194.140.6(Gamaredon) and103.132.98.224(SideCopy) serve as C2 nodes. - The use of
trycloudflare.comsubdomains by Gamaredon suggests an attempt to blend in with legitimate traffic and bypass static IP filtering. - BTMOB utilizes a specific
/24range (191.96.x.x) for C2 operations.
- IPs such as
- Domain Compromise:
abimj.edu.af(SideCopy) indicates a supply chain attack where legitimate educational infrastructure is hijacked for payload delivery. - File Hashes: A mix of MD5, SHA1, and SHA256 hashes are available for the HTA payloads, APK files, and loaders.
Operational Guidance: SOC teams should immediately block the listed IPs and domains at the perimeter. The presence of an HTA file with the associated MD5 hashes in the Startup folder is a definitive sign of compromise.
Detection Engineering
Sigma Rules
---
title: Potential Gamaredon HTML Smuggling and RAR Exploitation
id: 9a3c4d1e-5f6b-4a7c-8e9d-1f2a3b4c5d6e
description: Detects suspicious execution patterns associated with Gamaredon campaigns, specifically RAR extraction leading to HTA execution and use of WinRAR exploits.
status: experimental
date: 2026/06/03
author: Security Arsenal
references:
- https://otx.alienvault.com/pulse/66555a4e1c2e3e4b5c6d7e8f
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
ParentImage|endswith: '\winrar.exe'
Image|endswith: '\cmd.exe'
CommandLine|contains: 'script.hta' # Generic heuristic for HTA execution from archive
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate administrators extracting and running scripts
level: high
tags:
- attack.initial_access
- attack.execution
- gamaredon
- cve-2025-8088
---
title: SideCopy XenoRAT LNK Execution via mshta.exe
id: b4c5d6e7-6g7h-5i8j-9f0a-2b3c4d5e6f7g
description: Detects the execution of mshta.exe initiated by a .lnk file, a common TTP for SideCopy campaigns delivering XenoRAT.
status: experimental
date: 2026/06/03
author: Security Arsenal
references:
- https://otx.alienvault.com/pulse/66555a4e1c2e3e4b5c6d7e90
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith: '\mshta.exe'
ParentImage|endswith: '\explorer.exe'
CommandLine|contains: '.hta'
filter_legit:
CommandLine|contains: 'C:\Windows\System32'
condition: selection and not filter_legit
falsepositives:
- Administrative troubleshooting
level: high
tags:
- attack.initial_access
- attack.execution
- apt36
- sidecopy
- xenorat
---
title: Cloudflare Tunnel C2 Activity (Gamaredon)
id: c5d6e7f8-7h8i-6j9k-0a1b-3c4d5e6f7g8h
description: Detects processes establishing connections to suspicious Cloudflare tunnel domains often used by Gamaredon for C2.
status: experimental
date: 2026/06/03
author: Security Arsenal
references:
- https://otx.alienvault.com/pulse/66555a4e1c2e3e4b5c6d7e8f
logsource:
category: network_connection
product: windows
detection:
selection:
DestinationHostname|contains: '.trycloudflare.com'
Initiated: 'true'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate developer use of Cloudflare tunnels
level: medium
tags:
- attack.command_and_control
- gamaredon
- defense_evasion
KQL (Microsoft Sentinel)
// Hunt for SideCopy and Gamaredon Network IOCs
let IOCs = dynamic([
"104.194.140.6", "103.132.98.224", "191.96.225.241", "191.96.79.41",
"200.9.155.153", "195.160.221.203", "iiwdsxwamylbwwsoyrmj.supabase.co",
"quitethepastry.ru", "abimj.edu.af", "trycloudflare.com"
]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where RemoteIP in (IOCs) or RemoteUrl has_any (IOCs)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, RemoteIP, RemoteUrl, RemotePort
| summarize count() by DeviceName, RemoteUrl
| order by count_ desc
kql
// Hunt for HTA persistence in Startup folders (Gamaredon)
DeviceFileEvents
| whereFolderPath contains "Start Menu\\Programs\\Startup"
| where FileName endswith ".hta"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FileName,FolderPath, SHA256, InitiatingProcessAccountName
| order by Timestamp desc
PowerShell Hunt Script
# Security Arsenal Threat Hunt: Gamaredon & SideCopy Persistence Check
# Checks for HTA files in Startup and Suspicious Scheduled Tasks
Write-Host "[+] Checking for suspicious HTA files in Startup directories..." -ForegroundColor Cyan
$StartUpPaths = @(
"$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup",
"$env:ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup"
)
foreach ($Path in $StartUpPaths) {
if (Test-Path $Path) {
Get-ChildItem -Path $Path -Filter "*.hta" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | ForEach-Object {
Write-Host "[!] Suspicious HTA found: $($_.FullName)" -ForegroundColor Red
$Hash = Get-FileHash -Path $_.FullName -Algorithm MD5 -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
Write-Host " MD5: $($Hash.Hash)"
}
}
}
Write-Host "[+] Checking for recent modifications to Run registry keys..." -ForegroundColor Cyan
$RunKeys = @(
"HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run",
"HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run"
)
foreach ($Key in $RunKeys) {
if (Test-Path $Key) {
Get-Item -Path $Key | ForEach-Object {
$_.GetValueNames() | ForEach-Object {
$Value = $_.GetValue($_)
if ($Value -match "mshta" -or $Value -match ".hta" -or $Value -match "trycloudflare") {
Write-Host "[!] Suspicious persistence in $Key" -ForegroundColor Yellow
Write-Host " Name: $_ | Value: $Value"
}
}
}
}
}
Write-Host "[+] Hunt complete." -ForegroundColor Green
Response Priorities
Immediate (0-4 hours)
- Block IOCs: Immediately block all listed IPs (
191.96.x.x,104.194.140.6, etc.) and domains (abimj.edu.af,trycloudflare.comsubdomains) on perimeter firewalls and proxies. - Endpoint Isolation: Isolate any endpoints with alerts related to
mshta.exespawned by LNK files orwinrar.exedropping files to Startup.
24 Hours
- Vulnerability Scan: Identify systems running unpatched versions of WinRAR vulnerable to CVE-2025-8088.
- Mobile Audit: If MDM is in place, query for the installation of apps matching the BTMOB hashes or requesting excessive Accessibility Services.
- Supply Chain Check: Investigate logs for any interactions with
abimj.edu.afor other unexpected educational domains.
1 Week
- Architecture Hardening: Implement application control (AppLocker) to block
mshta.exeexecution from Office documents and LNK files for general user populations. - User Awareness: Distribute specific briefings regarding the spear-phishing lures used by SideCopy (Pashto language) and Gamaredon (archival exploits).
Related Resources
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