GENESIS Ransomware: US Sector Blitz — Technical Analysis & Defense

---
title: Potential ConnectWise ScreenConnect Path Traversal (CVE-2024-1708)
id: 9b1f3c8d-7e4a-4f9b-9e5c-1d2a3b4c5d6e
status: experimental
description: Detects potential exploitation of CVE-2024-1708 in ConnectWise ScreenConnect via suspicious URI patterns.
references:
    - https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog
author: Security Arsenal
date: 2026/06/04
tags:
    - attack.initial_access
    - cve.2024.1708
    - detection.emerging_threats
logsource:
    category: webserver
    product: null
detection:
    selection:
        cs-uri-query|contains:
            - '/Bin/../'
            - '/App/../'
            - 'WebService.asmx'
            - 'Login.ashx'
        cs-method: POST
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administrative misconfigurations (rare)
level: critical
---
title: Microsoft Exchange Deserialization Exploit (CVE-2023-21529)
id: a1b2c3d4-5e6f-7a8b-9c0d-1e2f3a4b5c6d
status: experimental
description: Detects suspicious deserialization activity on Microsoft Exchange servers indicative of CVE-2023-21529 exploitation.
references:
    - https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog
author: Security Arsenal
date: 2026/06/04
tags:
    - attack.initial_access
    - cve.2023.21529
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 5140 or 5145
        ShareName|contains: 'Exchange'
    filter:
        SubjectUserName|contains: 
            - 'MSExchange'
            - 'HealthMailbox'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Valid administrative access
level: high
---
title: GENESIS Ransomware Pre-Encryption Shadow Copy Deletion
id: 1a2b3c4d-5e6f-7a8b-9c0d-1e2f3a4b5c6e
status: experimental
description: Detects commands used by GENESIS affiliates to delete Volume Shadow Copies prior to encryption.
author: Security Arsenal
date: 2026/06/04
tags:
    - attack.impact
    - attack.t1490
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: 
            - '\vssadmin.exe'
            - '\wbadmin.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'delete shadows'
            - 'delete catalog'
            - 'Remove-WmiObject -Class Win32_ShadowCopy'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - System administration tasks
level: critical


**KQL (Microsoft Sentinel)**
kql
// Hunt for lateral movement and data staging associated with GENESIS
let SuspiciousProcs = dynamic(["powershell.exe", "cmd.exe", "wmic.exe", "psexec.exe", "psexec64.exe", "rclone.exe"]);
DeviceProcessEvents  
| where Timestamp >= ago(7d)  
| where FileName in~ (SuspiciousProcs)  
| where ProcessCommandLine has any("Invoke-Expression", "FromBase64String", "EncryptedData", "vssadmin", "shadowcopy", "/delete", "net share")  
| summarize count(), arg_max(Timestamp, *) by DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine  
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, FolderPath


**PowerShell Response Script**
powershell
<#
.SYNOPSIS
    GENESIS Ransomware Incident Response Check
.DESCRIPTION
    Checks for signs of GENESIS activity: RDP anomolies, recent scheduled tasks (persistence),
    and abnormal Shadow Copy deletion attempts.
#>

Write-Host "[!] GENESIS THREAT HUNT - STARTING" -ForegroundColor Cyan

# 1. Check for Scheduled Tasks created in the last 7 days (Persistence)
Write-Host "\n[*] Checking for scheduled tasks created/modified in last 7 days..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
Get-ScheduledTask | Where-Object {$_.Date -gt (Get-Date).AddDays(-7)} | Select-Object TaskName, Date, Author, Actions

# 2. Check Event Logs for VSS Shadow Copy Deletion
Write-Host "\n[*] Checking for VSSAdmin deletion events..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
$VSSEvents = Get-WinEvent -LogName Application -FilterXPath "*[System[(EventID=7036 or EventID=1)]] and *[Data[.='vssadmin'] or [Data[.'wbadmin']]]" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
if ($VSSEvents) { $VSSEvents | Select-Object TimeCreated, Message }
else { Write-Host "No critical VSS events found." }

# 3. Network Connections for non-standard ports (C2 Beacons)
Write-Host "\n[*] Checking for established connections on high ports..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
Get-NetTCPConnection -State Established | Where-Object {$_.RemotePort -gt 1024 -and $_.LocalPort -ne 443 -and $_.LocalPort -ne 80} | Select-Object LocalAddress, LocalPort, RemoteAddress, RemotePort, OwningProcess

Write-Host "\n[!] HUNT COMPLETE." -ForegroundColor Cyan