Back to Intelligence

GitDoor/GraphDoor APT Backdoors + Multi-Vector Credential Phishing Wave: OTX Pulse Analysis — Enterprise Detection Pack

SA
Security Arsenal Team
November 17, 2026
11 min read

Threat Summary

Four pulses published to AlienVault OTX on 2026-11-17 collectively paint a picture of a threat landscape dominated by two converging trends: industrialized credential harvesting at scale and stealthy cloud-abusing APT intrusion.

The most strategically significant pulse is Operation ShadowCloud, a sophisticated intrusion campaign targeting government entities across Asia and Africa. Operators deploy two novel backdoors — GitDoor and GraphDoor — staged through the legitimate MeshAgent remote management utility. The implants hide command-and-control traffic inside trusted cloud services: Microsoft SharePoint, GitHub, and the Ably messaging platform. Post-exploitation tooling includes Mimikatz and CookieKatz, confirming the endgame is credential theft and session-token harvesting for lateral movement and long-term espionage. This is a classic living-off-trusted-services (LOTS) playbook: by riding legitimate SaaS APIs, the adversary renders domain-reputation blocking largely useless.

In parallel, three mass credential-theft campaigns are running at high volume:

  1. Fake Prime Gaming x FC 27 rewards — phishing pages impersonating EA/Prime Gaming promotions that capture EA account emails, passwords, and 2FA codes in real time (an adversary-in-the-middle style kit), enabling immediate account takeover of gaming accounts that often hold stored payment methods and are frequently reused-password reservoirs.
  2. Microsoft 365 outage-lure phishing (Nov 13, 2026) — a coordinated, multi-sector campaign spoofing M365 service-health notifications ("your held emails will be deleted in 24 hours") to drive urgency clicks through compromised WordPress redirectors to credential-harvesting pages.
  3. Fake crypto-wallet updates — ZIP archives containing malicious BAT scripts impersonating updates for Coldcard, Ledger, Pera Algorand, Revolut, and Xaman, which silently install ConnectWise ScreenConnect — legitimate RMM software abused for persistent remote access and, ultimately, wallet draining.

Collective objective: credential and session theft at every tier — consumer gaming accounts, enterprise M365 identities, crypto private-key holders, and government network credentials. Defenders should treat all four pulses as a single macro-campaign signal: attackers are monetizing identity, and MFA that is not phishing-resistant is being bypassed in real time.

Threat Actor / Malware Profile

Operation ShadowCloud — GitDoor & GraphDoor (APT, Government-Targeted)

  • Distribution: Initial access via spear-phishing and exposed services (per the underlying research); the MeshAgent legitimate remote-management binary is side-loaded or deployed as the persistence/execution vehicle, providing a signed, trusted process under which the implants operate.
  • Payload behavior:
    • GitDoor — backdoor that uses GitHub repositories as its C2 channel, reading commands from and writing results to attacker-controlled repos (issues, commits, or gists). Blends with developer traffic.
    • GraphDoor — leverages Microsoft Graph API / SharePoint for C2, storing tasking and exfil in document libraries. Traffic appears as normal OneDrive/SharePoint sync.
    • Ably messaging is used as a real-time pub/sub C2 fallback — WebSocket-based, TLS-encrypted, and indistinguishable from legitimate app traffic.
  • Credential theft stage: Mimikatz for LSASS credential dumping; CookieKatz for extracting browser session cookies directly from Chrome/Edge memory — enabling MFA bypass via token replay without ever touching a password.
  • Persistence: MeshAgent service installation (runs as SYSTEM), plus likely service creation/registry run keys for the staged payloads.
  • Anti-analysis: C2 over reputable cloud domains defeats egress filtering; implants are fileless-leaning in-memory payloads; hash sets in the pulse indicate frequent recompilation (multiple MD5/SHA256 variants).

Mass Credential Phishing Kits (FC 27 / M365 Outage Lures)

  • Distribution: Malvertising, social media, and high-volume email using freshly registered domains (fc27-prime.shop, fc27utprime.com, outagefixed.sbs, moments-notice.com) and compromised legitimate sites (reallifeaccounting.com) as redirectors.
  • Payload behavior: Full credential + real-time 2FA code capture — the phishing proxy relays the victim's OTP to the legitimate service instantly, completing the attacker's own authenticated session. This defeats TOTP and SMS MFA.
  • Anti-analysis: Short domain lifetimes, URL click-tracking wrappers (url.newbooker.com/ls/click), and HTML attachment/redirector chains.

ScreenConnect Crypto-Wallet Campaign

  • Distribution: Deceptive ZIP downloads (malvertising/SEO poisoning) impersonating hardware-wallet software updates.
  • Payload: Malicious BAT scripts that download and silently install ConnectWise ScreenConnect with attacker-controlled instance configuration — no exploit needed, since ScreenConnect is legitimate signed software that most AV/EDR tools whitelist.
  • Objective: Interactive remote hands-on-keyboard access to drain crypto wallets and harvest seed phrases.

IOC Analysis

The indicator set spans four types, each requiring a different operationalization path:

TypeExamplesOperationalization
Domains (phishing/malware distribution)fc27-prime.shop, fc27utprime.online, moments-notice.com, outagefixed.sbs, exodus-wallet.proPush to DNS sinkhole/proxy block lists within 1 hour; add .shop/.sbs newly-registered-domain alerting; retro-search proxy & DNS logs 30 days.
URLs (redirectors/payload paths)reallifeaccounting.com/themelist0.html, outagerestored.sbs/.../themelist0.html, url.newbooker.com/ls/clickURL detonation in sandbox; block full path in secure web gateway; note the shared themelist0.html artifact — a reusable hunt pivot across campaigns.
IPv4 (C2)27.102.66.162 (ShadowCloud)Block at egress firewall; retro-hunt NetFlow/firewall logs; enrich against ASN for adjacent infrastructure.
File hashes (MD5/SHA256)GitDoor/GraphDoor samples, ScreenConnect dropper ZIPsImport to EDR block lists and VirusTotal/OTX watchlists; hashes rot fast — prioritize behavioral detections below over pure hash matching.

Tooling guidance: Use your TIP (ThreatQ, MISP, Anomali, or OpenCTI) to ingest the OTX pulses via the OTX DirectConnect API; normalize indicators into STIX and auto-sync to EDR (CrowdStrike/Defender), proxy (Zscaler/PAN), and SIEM watchlists. For ShadowCloud, IOC matching alone is insufficient — the C2 lives on github.com, sharepoint.com, and ably.io, which you cannot block. Behavioral detection on MeshAgent, LSASS access, and anomalous cloud API usage is mandatory.

Detection Engineering

YAML
---
title: MeshAgent or ScreenConnect RMM Execution Outside Approved Baseline
id: 7d3a1c2e-9f44-4c2a-a1b1-shadowcloud01
status: experimental
description: Detects execution or installation of MeshAgent (Operation ShadowCloud staging tool) or ConnectWise ScreenConnect (crypto-wallet campaign payload) by non-standard paths or unsigned/unapproved instances. Legitimate RMM abused for persistence and C2.
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intelligence
date: 2026/11/17
references:
    - https://securelist.com/operation-shadowcloud-gitdoor/122004/
    - https://bartblaze.blogspot.com/2026/11/crypto-hardware-wallet-users-under.html
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_binary:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\MeshAgent.exe'
            - '\ScreenConnect.ClientService.exe'
            - '\ScreenConnect.WindowsClient.exe'
    selection_bat_dropper:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'screenconnect'
            - '.bat'
    filter_approved_paths:
        Image|startswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files\ScreenConnect'
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\ScreenConnect'
    condition: (selection_binary and not filter_approved_paths) or selection_bat_dropper
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate IT use of MeshAgent/ScreenConnect - maintain an approved-instance allowlist
level: high
tags:
    - attack.command_and_control
    - attack.t1219
    - attack.persistence
---
title: Credential Access via LSASS or Browser Cookie Theft (Mimikatz / CookieKatz)
id: 8e4b2d3f-1a55-4d3b-b2c2-shadowcloud02
status: experimental
description: Detects suspicious access to LSASS memory (Mimikatz-style credential dumping) and browser credential/cookie store access (CookieKatz), both observed in Operation ShadowCloud post-exploitation.
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intelligence
date: 2026/11/17
references:
    - https://securelist.com/operation-shadowcloud-gitdoor/122004/
logsource:
    category: process_access
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_lsass:
        TargetImage|endswith: '\lsass.exe'
        GrantedAccess|contains:
            - '0x1010'
            - '0x1410'
            - '0x1FFFFF'
    filter_known:
        SourceImage|startswith:
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\'
            - 'C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\'
    selection_cookies:
        TargetImage|endswith:
            - '\User Data\Default\Network\Cookies'
            - '\User Data\Default\Login Data'
    condition: (selection_lsass and not filter_known) or selection_cookies
falsepositives:
    - EDR/AV products legitimately accessing LSASS - tune filter_known per environment
level: critical
tags:
    - attack.credential_access
    - attack.t1003.001
    - attack.t1539
---
title: Phishing Kit Domain Patterns - Gaming and M365 Outage Lures
id: 9f5c3e4a-2b66-4e4c-c3d3-phishwave03
status: experimental
description: Detects DNS/network access to known credential-phishing infrastructure from the FC 27 Prime Gaming and Microsoft 365 outage-lure campaigns, plus heuristic matching on lookalike naming patterns.
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intelligence
date: 2026/11/17
logsource:
    category: dns
detection:
    selection_ioc:
        query:
            - 'fc27-prime.shop'
            - 'fc27prime.shop'
            - 'fc27utprime.com'
            - 'fc27utprime.online'
            - 'fcutprime.online'
            - 'moments-notice.com'
            - 'newbooker.com'
            - 'outagefixed.sbs'
            - 'outagerestored.sbs'
            - 'exodus-wallet.pro'
            - 'reallifeaccounting.com'
    selection_pattern:
        query|contains:
            - 'fc27'
            - 'utprime'
            - 'outagefixed'
            - 'outagerestored'
            - '-wallet.pro'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - None expected for exact IOC matches; pattern matches may hit legitimate gaming sites
level: high
tags:
    - attack.initial_access
    - attack.t1566
    - attack.t1071.001
KQL — Microsoft Sentinel / Defender
// Sentinel Hunt: ShadowCloud C2, RMM abuse, and phishing infrastructure
// Covers: MeshAgent/ScreenConnect execution, cloud C2 (GitHub/SharePoint/Ably),
// credential phishing domains, and LSASS access — hunt window 30 days.
let PhishDomains = dynamic([
    "fc27-prime.shop","fc27prime.shop","fc27utprime.com","fc27utprime.online",
    "fcutprime.online","moments-notice.com","planetmaison.com","newbooker.com",
    "reallifeaccounting.com","outagerestored.sbs","outagefixed.sbs","exodus-wallet.pro"
]);
let ShadowC2 = dynamic(["27.102.66.162"]);
let SuspiciousRMM = dynamic(["meshagent.exe","screenconnect.clientservice.exe",
    "screenconnect.windowsclient.exe"]);
let AblyC2 = DeviceNetworkEvents
    | where TimeGenerated > ago(30d)
    | where RemoteUrl has_any ("ably.io","ably-realtime.com")
    | where not(InitiatingProcessFolderPath has_any ("Program Files"))
    | project AblyHit=TimeGenerated, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName,
              InitiatingProcessCommandLine, RemoteUrl, RemoteIP;
let RMMAbuse = DeviceProcessEvents
    | where TimeGenerated > ago(30d)
    | where FileName in~ (SuspiciousRMM)
    | where not(FolderPath has_any ("Program Files\\ScreenConnect","Program Files (x86)\\ScreenConnect"))
    | project RMMHit=TimeGenerated, DeviceName, FileName, FolderPath, ProcessCommandLine, AccountName;
let PhishNet = DeviceNetworkEvents
    | where TimeGenerated > ago(30d)
    | where RemoteUrl in~ (PhishDomains) or RemoteIP in~ (ShadowC2)
    | project PhishHit=TimeGenerated, DeviceName, RemoteUrl, RemoteIP,
              InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine;
let BATDropper = DeviceProcessEvents
    | where TimeGenerated > ago(30d)
    | where FileName =~ "cmd.exe"
    | where ProcessCommandLine has_all (".bat","screenconnect")
    | project Bathit=TimeGenerated, DeviceName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName;
union AblyC2, RMMAbuse, PhishNet, BATDropper
| sort by TimeGenerated desc
PowerShell
# Security Arsenal - OTX Pulse IOC Hunt (2026-11-17)
# Hunts: ShadowCloud artifacts, ScreenConnect/MeshAgent abuse, phishing hits
# Run elevated on endpoints or via your EDR/Intune remote script capability.

$ErrorActionPreference = 'SilentlyContinue'
$Findings = @()

# --- 1. MeshAgent / ScreenConnect services and binaries (ShadowCloud + crypto campaign) ---
$RMMNames = 'MeshAgent','ScreenConnect'
Get-Service | Where-Object { $n=$_.Name; $RMMNames | ForEach-Object { $n -match $_ } } | ForEach-Object {
    $Findings += [pscustomobject]@{Type='SuspiciousService'; Name=$_.Name; Status=$_.Status; Detail=$_.DisplayName}
}
$RMMPaths = @("$env:ProgramData\MeshAgent","$env:TEMP\meshagent.exe",
              "$env:ProgramFiles\ScreenConnect*","$env:LOCALAPPDATA\ScreenConnect*")
foreach ($p in $RMMPaths) {
    if (Test-Path $p) { $Findings += [pscustomobject]@{Type='RMMPath'; Name=$p; Status='Exists'; Detail=(Get-Item $p).LastWriteTime} }
}

# --- 2. Persistence: Run keys / scheduled tasks referencing MeshAgent, ScreenConnect, or BAT droppers ---
$RunKeys = 'HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run',
           'HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run'
foreach ($k in $RunKeys) {
    Get-ItemProperty $k | ForEach-Object { $_.PSObject.Properties } |
        Where-Object { $_.Value -match 'meshagent|screenconnect|\.bat' } | ForEach-Object {
            $Findings += [pscustomobject]@{Type='Persistence-RunKey'; Name=$_.Name; Status='Found'; Detail=$_.Value}
        }
}
Get-ScheduledTask | Where-Object { ($_.Actions.Execute + $_.Actions.Arguments) -match 'meshagent|screenconnect' } | ForEach-Object {
    $Findings += [pscustomobject]@{Type='Persistence-Task'; Name=$_.TaskName; Status=$_.State; Detail=$_.Actions.Execute}
}

# --- 3. Network: active connections to ShadowCloud C2 + cloud C2 beacons ---
$BadIP = '27.102.66.162'
Get-NetTCPConnection -State Established | Where-Object { $_.RemoteAddress -eq $BadIP } | ForEach-Object {
    $proc = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess
    $Findings += [pscustomobject]@{Type='C2-Connection'; Name=$proc.ProcessName; Status='ACTIVE'; Detail="$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"}
}
# Non-browser processes talking to GitHub raw / Ably (GitDoor C2 heuristic)
Get-NetTCPConnection -State Established | ForEach-Object {
    $proc = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess
    if ($proc.ProcessName -notmatch 'chrome|msedge|firefox|Teams|Code' -and
        $proc.ProcessName -match 'mesh|gitdoor|powershell|cmd') {
        $Findings += [pscustomobject]@{Type='C2-Heuristic'; Name=$proc.ProcessName; Status='Review'; Detail=$_.RemoteAddress}
    }
}

# --- 4. DNS cache: phishing domain hits ---
$Phish = 'fc27-prime','fc27prime','fc27utprime','fcutprime','moments-notice',
         'outagefixed','outagerestored','exodus-wallet.pro','reallifeaccounting'
Get-DnsClientCache | Where-Object { $e=$_.Entry; $Phish | ForEach-Object { $e -match $_ } } | ForEach-Object {
    $Findings += [pscustomobject]@{Type='DNS-PhishHit'; Name=$_.Entry; Status='Resolved'; Detail=$_.Data}
}

# --- 5. ShadowCloud file-hash artifacts (MD5 set from pulse) ---
$BadMD5 = '32151547d912488ac5242731057170a3','e63ec733393e4e7e3424cbff918003a3',
          '14ec33ea808e697870d00c5e434c2952','e9d4081fac4a5111e6856f333d490439',
          '1829cc10e7795e54b7cb3d551975aea5'
Get-ChildItem "$env:TEMP","$env:ProgramData","$env:USERPROFILE\Downloads" -Recurse -File -Depth 2 | ForEach-Object {
    if ((Get-FileHash $_.FullName -Algorithm MD5).Hash.ToLower() -in $BadMD5) {
        $Findings += [pscustomobject]@{Type='MaliciousFile'; Name=$_.FullName; Status='HASH MATCH'; Detail='Quarantine immediately'}
    }
}

if ($Findings) { $Findings | Format-Table -AutoSize; $Findings | Export-Csv ".\OTX_Hunt_$(Get-Date -f yyyyMMdd_HHmm).csv" -NoTypeInformation }
else { Write-Output "[+] No OTX 2026-11-17 indicators found on $env:COMPUTERNAME" }

Response Priorities

Immediate (0-4 hours):

  • Block all pulse domains, URLs, and 27.102.66.162 at DNS, proxy, and egress firewall; import file hashes to EDR prevention (not just detection).
  • Audit for unauthorized MeshAgent and ScreenConnect installations — any instance not deployed by your IT team is malicious until proven otherwise. Uninstall, capture memory first.
  • Deploy the Sigma rules and run the KQL hunt across the last 30 days; prioritize the themelist0.html URL pivot in web logs.
  • Alert helpdesk to the M365 outage lure — users who clicked the "emails will be deleted" notification need immediate password resets.

Within 24 hours (identity-first response):

  • Treat every interaction with the phishing domains as a confirmed credential compromise: force password resets AND revoke all active sessions/refresh tokens (M365: Revoke-AzureADUserAllRefreshToken) — CookieKatz-style token theft means a password change alone does not evict the attacker.
  • Audit EA/gaming SSO and crypto-wallet-adjacent corporate accounts where users reuse credentials; check Okta/Entra sign-in logs for anomalous OTP submissions in the phishing window.
  • For any endpoint with LSASS access detections, assume domain credential exposure and escalate to tiered credential-reset (krbtgt twice if domain controllers are implicated).

Within 1 week (architecture hardening):

  • Migrate high-value users to phishing-resistant MFA (FIDO2/passkeys) — all four pulses exploit TOTP/SMS OTP relay or session-token theft; FIDO2 binds the credential to the origin and kills this attack class.
  • Implement an RMM allowlist policy: block execution of all remote-access tools except an approved, code-signed list (AppLocker/WDAC). This single control neuters both MeshAgent staging and ScreenConnect abuse.
  • Restrict and monitor egress to consumer cloud APIs used for C2: alert on non-browser processes communicating with github.com raw content, SharePoint Graph API, and ably.io; enforce Conditional Access/token-binding for M365.
  • Add browser cookie-store protection (EDR tamper rules on Cookies/Login Data files) and enable Chrome App-Bound Encryption where fleet-wide.
  • Conduct targeted user awareness on the three active lures: gaming reward scams, fake outage notifications, and wallet "update" downloads.

Related Resources

Security Arsenal Incident Response Managed SOC & MDR Services AlertMonitor Threat Detection From The Dark Side Intel Hub

Is your security operations ready?

Get a free SOC assessment or see how AlertMonitor cuts through alert noise with automated triage.