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GravityRAT Mobile Espionage & Helix OAuth MFA-Bypass Extortion: OTX Pulse Analysis — APT & Cybercrime Detection Pack

SA
Security Arsenal Team
November 19, 2026
9 min read

Two fresh pulses hit the wire this cycle, and together they sketch the full spectrum of what enterprise defenders are facing right now: a patient, Pakistan-aligned mobile espionage operation against defense-sector humans, and a fast-moving financially motivated crew that has figured out how to walk straight through MFA using Microsoft's own OAuth plumbing. Different motives, different tradecraft — same lesson: identity and the human layer are the perimeter now.

Threat Summary

Pulse 1 — Operation Celestial Force (SpaceCobra / Cosmic Leopard): An active surveillance campaign is deploying GravityRAT (S0237) against defense and aerospace personnel, with a heavy focus on Indian nationals seeking jobs at foreign defense contractors. The lure infrastructure is the tell: fake recruitment portals and trojanized "utility" sites (Android developer libraries, media apps, cloud storage brands — see androiddevpool.com, myvaultz.com, movie-date.net) dressed up with legitimate-looking logos. The operation pairs Android surveillance builds with the HeavyLift loader for Windows-side payload delivery, giving the actor cross-platform collection against individuals who live on both phone and laptop.

Pulse 2 — Helix: A financially motivated extortion group active since July 2026, hitting retail, manufacturing, healthcare, energy, finance, and tech across the US and Canada. Helix's differentiator is identity-first intrusion: voice phishing (vishing) combined with Microsoft OAuth Device Code Flow abuse to defeat MFA, then mass collection from SharePoint in compromised Microsoft 365 tenants, followed by data extortion via a leak site. No classic endpoint dropper required — the cloud is the payload.

Collective read: Both campaigns bypass traditional perimeter defenses by design. One recruits the victim as the delivery mechanism (fake jobs → sideloaded RAT); the other recruits the victim's identity (vishing → OAuth token → cloud data). If your detections are still weighted toward executable-on-disk, you are blind to both.

Threat Actor / Malware Profile

GravityRAT / SpaceCobra (Operation Celestial Force)

  • Distribution: Fake recruitment portals targeting defense job seekers, plus spoofed software-utility and media sites. Sideloaded Android APKs; Windows delivery via the HeavyLift loader.
  • Payload behavior: Full-spectrum mobile surveillance — SMS, call logs, contacts, GPS, microphone/camera, file theft (document-hunting against defense-relevant file types). Windows builds harvest documents, browser data, and system information.
  • C2 communication: HTTP(S) beaconing to actor-controlled domains and API-style endpoints (e.g., api.androiddevpool.com) that masquerade as legitimate developer/analytics traffic.
  • Persistence: Android accessibility-service abuse and device-admin privileges; Windows-side Run keys and scheduled tasks dropped by HeavyLift.
  • Anti-analysis: Sandbox/VM fingerprinting (CPU core count, temperature sensors, uptime checks), delayed execution, and domain rotation across lookalike infrastructure.

Helix (Ransomware / Data Extortion)

  • Distribution: No malware-lure required at initial access — targeted vishing against helpdesk and end users, steering victims into completing an OAuth Device Code Flow authorization on attacker-initiated sessions.
  • Payload behavior: Stolen OAuth tokens grant durable, MFA-satisfied access to M365. Operators enumerate and bulk-download SharePoint document libraries, then extort via leak-site publication. The 54 file-hash IOCs reflect post-compromise tooling and staged exfil/encryption artifacts.
  • C2 communication: Legitimate Microsoft cloud endpoints — the abuse lives inside allowed traffic, making network egress filtering nearly useless without identity-layer analytics.
  • Persistence: Consented OAuth app grants, refresh-token replay, and newly created inbox rules / forwarding to maintain access after password resets.
  • Anti-analysis: Living-off-the-cloud: minimal disk artifacts, use of native Graph/SharePoint APIs, and vishing scripts tuned to defeat helpdesk verification procedures.

IOC Analysis

The GravityRAT pulse is infrastructure-heavy: 28 indicators dominated by domains and hostnames (movie-date.net, myvaultz.com, androidannotations.com, androidasynclib.com, androiddevpool.com, androidstaticserve.com, api.androiddevpool.com). The android* naming convention is deliberate camouflage — these will blend into developer-tool traffic in proxy logs. Domain indicators here are high-fidelity but short-lived: expect rotation within weeks, so hunt historically (30–90 days of DNS/proxy telemetry), not just forward-blocking.

The Helix pulse is hash-heavy (54 indicators, mostly SHA256 with an MD5 straggler). Hashes are point-in-time artifacts — useful for retro-hunts and EDR blocklists, useless against the identity-centric initial access. For Helix, the durable detections are behavioral: device-code-flow authentication events, anomalous consent grants, and SharePoint download bursts.

Operationalization guidance:

  • Push domains/hostnames into DNS sinkholes, proxy blocklists, and EDR network IOC feeds; alert on any historical resolution.
  • Load SHA256 values into your EDR blocklist and run retro-hunts across endpoint and mail-gateway telemetry.
  • Treat CVE-2026-125350 as a priority exposure-check item for mobile/edge assets pending vendor detail.
  • Normalize everything through STIX/TAXII ingestion (OTX integrates natively with MISP, ThreatConnect, OpenCTI, and Sentinel's TI feed) so enrichment and aging are automatic.

Detection Engineering

YAML
---
title: Suspicious OAuth Device Code Flow Authentication (Helix TTP)
id: 9f2c1a7e-6b3d-4e5a-9c1f-2a8b7d4e6f01
status: experimental
description: Detects Azure AD sign-ins using the OAuth Device Code flow, abused by Helix via vishing to bypass MFA and obtain durable tokens for M365/SharePoint access.
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intel
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: signinlogs
detection:
    selection:
        authentication_protocol: 'deviceCodeFlow'
    filter_known:
        - device_detail.displayname|contains: 'Corporate'
        - user_type: 'Managed'
    condition: selection and not filter_known
fields:
    - user_principal_name
    - ip_address
    - location_details
    - app_display_name
    - device_detail
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate device-code sign-ins from CLI tooling (Azure CLI, VS Code) on unmanaged devices
level: high
tags:
    - attack.initial_access
    - attack.t1078
    - attack.t1550
date: 2026/11/20
---
title: HeavyLift / GravityRAT Persistence via Scheduled Task or Run Key
id: 7d4e2b1c-8a5f-4c6d-b2e9-1f3a5c7d9e11
status: experimental
description: Detects creation of scheduled tasks or Run-key persistence by non-standard binaries in user-writable paths, consistent with GravityRAT HeavyLift loader persistence on Windows endpoints.
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intel
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_schtasks:
        Image|endswith: '\schtasks.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '/create'
            - '/sc'
    selection_runkey:
        Image|endswith: '\reg.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'CurrentVersion\Run'
    selection_paths:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
            - '\AppData\Roaming\'
            - '\Users\Public\'
    condition: 1 of selection_schtasks, 1 of selection_runkey | selection_paths is not None
    condition: (selection_schtasks or selection_runkey) and selection_paths
fields:
    - CommandLine
    - ParentImage
    - User
falsepositives:
    - Software installers registering update tasks
level: medium
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1053.005
    - attack.t1547.001
date: 2026/11/20
---
title: Mass SharePoint File Download Burst (Helix Exfiltration Pattern)
id: 3b8d5f2a-4c7e-4a1d-8e6f-5b2c9d1e3f17
status: experimental
description: Detects abnormal volume of SharePoint/OneDrive file download operations by a single user within a short window, consistent with Helix post-compromise bulk data theft from M365 tenants.
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intel
logsource:
    product: m365
    service: sharepoint
detection:
    selection:
        operation: 'FileDownloaded'
    condition: selection
timeframe: 15m
correlation:
    type: event_count
    group-by:
        - user_id
    threshold: 100
fields:
    - user_id
    - client_ip
    - site_url
    - source_file_name
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate OneDrive sync client initial sync
    - Backup/migration tooling service accounts
level: high
tags:
    - attack.exfiltration
    - attack.collection
    - attack.t1567.002
    - attack.t1530
date: 2026/11/20
KQL — Microsoft Sentinel / Defender
// GravityRAT infrastructure + Helix device-code-flow abuse — Sentinel hunt
let gravityrat_iocs = dynamic(["movie-date.net","myvaultz.com","androidannotations.com","androidasynclib.com","androiddevpool.com","androidstaticserve.com","api.androiddevpool.com"]);
let NetHits = DeviceNetworkEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(90d)
| where RemoteUrl has_any (gravityrat_iocs)
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, RemoteUrl, RemoteIP, ActionType
| extend Hunt = "GravityRAT_C2_Domain";
let DnsHits = DeviceEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(90d)
| where ActionType == "DnsQueryResponse"
| where AdditionalFields has_any (gravityrat_iocs)
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, ActionType, AdditionalFields
| extend Hunt = "GravityRAT_DNS_Resolution";
let HelixDeviceCode = SigninLogs
| where TimeGenerated > ago(30d)
| where AuthenticationProtocol == "deviceCodeFlow"
| summarize SignInCount = count(), IPs = make_set(IPAddress), Apps = make_set(AppDisplayName) by UserPrincipalName, bin(TimeGenerated, 1d)
| extend Hunt = "Helix_OAuth_DeviceCodeFlow";
union NetHits, DnsHits, HelixDeviceCode
| sort by TimeGenerated desc
PowerShell
# Security Arsenal - GravityRAT/HeavyLift + Helix host hunt
# Run elevated on suspect Windows endpoints

$iocDomains = @("movie-date.net","myvaultz.com","androidannotations.com","androidasynclib.com","androiddevpool.com","androidstaticserve.com","api.androiddevpool.com")
$iocHashes = @("255a65d30841ab4082bd9d0eea79d49c5ee88f56136157d8d6156aef11c12309","da738753c27f2708bd2257f8cac3385a4ccb0df1341b76acfda07fa980cfb4bd","4daf48805aeee6726cbf9fb4077799b473c907f07e8c5082a0f26d10f5fff1e0","ab20150025af33813865b6388ce12704a18e434be0624ebf84477bbdc6fb2f00","04461a6b8ac0fea7f089d739aee9ed081d9a1fa30c837214ef3cd50e60be0804","2f38120d7880a35c94d837dd60fdf24f4e48f58bd18ec33aa20c4061a61afab2","3be4a707c52526a2b49b7f7bf7e5d6b05ca9bbcc14df8f84269ccfde526f6365")

Write-Host "`n=== [1] Run-Key Persistence Check ===" -ForegroundColor Cyan
Get-ItemProperty "HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run","HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
  Out-String | Write-Host

Write-Host "=== [2] Suspicious Scheduled Tasks (user paths) ===" -ForegroundColor Cyan
Get-ScheduledTask | ForEach-Object {
  $actions = $_.Actions | Out-String
  if ($actions -match "AppData|Users\\Public|Temp") {
    [PSCustomObject]@{ TaskName=$_.TaskName; Path=$_.TaskPath; Action=$actions.Trim() }
  }
} | Format-List

Write-Host "=== [3] Active Connections to IOC Domains ===" -ForegroundColor Cyan
foreach ($d in $iocDomains) {
  try {
    $ips = (Resolve-DnsName $d -ErrorAction Stop).IPAddress
    foreach ($ip in $ips) {
      $conn = Get-NetTCPConnection -RemoteAddress $ip -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
      if ($conn) { Write-Host "HIT: $d ($ip) active connection" -ForegroundColor Red; $conn | Format-List OwningProcess,State,RemotePort }
    }
  } catch {}
}

Write-Host "=== [4] DNS Cache Residue ===" -ForegroundColor Cyan
$cache = Get-DnsClientCache -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
foreach ($d in $iocDomains) {
  $hit = $cache | Where-Object { $_.Entry -like "*$d*" }
  if ($hit) { Write-Host "DNS CACHE HIT: $d" -ForegroundColor Red; $hit | Format-List }
}

Write-Host "=== [5] Helix Tooling Hash Sweep (common staging dirs) ===" -ForegroundColor Cyan
$dirs = @("$env:TEMP","$env:PUBLIC","$env:APPDATA","$env:LOCALAPPDATA")
foreach ($dir in $dirs) {
  Get-ChildItem $dir -Recurse -File -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | ForEach-Object {
    $h = (Get-FileHash $_.FullName -Algorithm SHA256 -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue).Hash
    if ($iocHashes -contains $h.ToLower()) {
      Write-Host "MALICIOUS HASH: $($_.FullName) [$h]" -ForegroundColor Red
    }
  }
}
Write-Host "`nHunt complete. Review any HIT output above and isolate the host before remediation." -ForegroundColor Yellow

Response Priorities

Immediate (0–4h):

  • Block all GravityRAT domains/hostnames at DNS, proxy, and EDR network layers; enable retro-alerting on 90 days of DNS telemetry.
  • Push the 8 SHA256 IOCs (full 54-hash list from the OTX pulse) into EDR blocklists and retro-hunt.
  • Query M365 sign-in logs for any deviceCodeFlow authentications in the last 30 days; treat unexpected hits as compromised until proven otherwise.
  • Alert HR/recruiting teams at defense-adjacent orgs: brief staff on fake recruitment-portal lures targeting defense job seekers.

24 hours:

  • For any device-code-flow hit: revoke all refresh tokens and sessions (Revoke-AzureADUserAllRefreshToken), force password reset, re-register MFA, and audit consent grants and inbox rules for persistence left behind.
  • Audit SharePoint/OneDrive download volumes per user for the affected window; identify what data was staged for extortion and activate your legal/comms playbook early — Helix's model is leak-site pressure, not just encryption.
  • Mobile device audit for personnel in the targeted demographic: look for sideloaded APKs, unknown device-admin apps, and accessibility-service abuse.

1 week (architecture hardening):

  • Disable or tightly restrict OAuth Device Code Flow tenant-wide (Conditional Access authentication-flows policy) — it is rarely business-critical and is Helix's entire initial-access strategy.
  • Deploy Conditional Access token-protection / device-compliance requirements so stolen refresh tokens can't replay from unmanaged devices.
  • Implement an enterprise mobile threat defense (MTD) agent with sideloaded-app detection, and establish a managed app-store-only policy for corporate-adjacent devices.
  • Harden helpdesk vishing defenses: out-of-band identity verification (manager callback or hardware-token challenge) before any MFA reset or device registration.
  • Add rate-based SharePoint download alerting as a standing analytic, not a one-time hunt.

The through-line this week: both actors win by convincing a human to do the dangerous thing — install the app, approve the code. Your telemetry strategy has to assume the human said yes.

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