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Hive0163 InterlockRAT, UAT-8616 SD-WAN, & UNC6240 ShinyHunters: OTX Pulse Analysis — Enterprise Detection Pack

SA
Security Arsenal Team
June 15, 2026
5 min read

This intelligence briefing synthesizes three high-priority OTX pulses indicating a surge in diverse cyber-espionage and extortion campaigns.

  1. Ransomware Ecosystem (Hive0163/Rhysida): A deep analysis of the Interlock and Rhysida ecosystems reveals a sophisticated supply chain using custom malware like NodeSnake (Linux), InterlockRAT, and JunkFiction. The actors leverage trojanized installers and SEO poisoning (SocGholish) to deliver payloads like MintLoader and Vidar across critical sectors in the USA.

  2. Infrastructure Targeting (UAT-8616): Active exploitation of Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN vulnerabilities (CVE-2026-20182, CVE-2026-20133) is underway. Threat actors are deploying webshells (Godzilla, Behinder) and C2 frameworks (Sliver, XenShell) to hijack management infrastructure.

  3. Education Sector Extortion (UNC6240): ShinyHunters is actively exploiting a zero-day (CVE-2026-35273) in Oracle PeopleSoft. The campaign targets higher education, deploying MeshCentral for lateral movement and data exfiltration via azurenetfiles.net.

Collectively, these pulses represent a converged threat where initial access brokers facilitate ransomware and espionage operations simultaneously.

Threat Actor / Malware Profile

Hive0163 (Interlock) & Rhysida

  • Malware Families: NodeSnake, InterlockRAT, JunkFiction, Supper, Rhysida, Broomstick.
  • Distribution: SEO poisoning (SocGholish), trojanized software installers.
  • Behavior: NodeSnake is a Linux/Unix backdoor focusing on persistence; InterlockRAT provides remote command execution on Windows. JunkFiction acts as a downloader.
  • C2: Custom C2 infrastructure often utilizing domain generation algorithms or hardcoded IPs (e.g., 185.196.9.234).

UAT-8616

  • Malware Families: XenShell, Godzilla, Behinder, Sliver.
  • Objective: Persistence in edge network infrastructure (Cisco SD-WAN).
  • Behavior: Exploits authentication bypasses to drop webshells (JSP/Java based) and deploys cryptominers (XMRig) or lateral movement tools (Sliver).

UNC6240 (ShinyHunters)

  • Malware Families: MeshCentral.
  • Target: Education Sector (USA).
  • Behavior: Exploits RCE in Oracle PeopleSoft Environment Management. Deploys MeshCentral agents for full remote control. Uses agent.ashx for callback.

IOC Analysis

  • Domains: leadslaw.com (Interlock C2/SEO), azurenetfiles.net (ShinyHunters C2). SOC teams must block these at the DNS layer and inspect historical HTTP logs for connections.
  • IPs: 185.196.9.234 (Interlock), 176.120.22.24 (ShinyHunters).
  • File Hashes: A significant volume of MD5, SHA1, and SHA256 hashes are provided for loaders (MintLoader) and payloads. Operationalize these by scanning EDR telemetry and quarantine file shares.
  • CVEs:
    • CVE-2026-35273 (Oracle PeopleSoft RCE - Critical)
    • CVE-2026-20182 / CVE-2026-20133 (Cisco SD-WAN Auth Bypass)
    • CVE-2023-36036 (Microsoft Exchange related)
  • Tooling: Use VirusTotal for hash validation, MISP for IOC correlation, and SIEM solutions (Splunk/Sentinel) for network log enrichment.

Detection Engineering

YAML
title: Potential ShinyHunters MeshCentral C2 Activity
id: d8f8e9a0-6b1a-4a9c-9f5e-1a2b3c4d5e6f
status: experimental
description: Detects network connections to known ShinyHunters C2 infrastructure associated with Oracle PeopleSoft exploitation.
references:
    - https://otx.alienvault.com/pulse/660000000000
author: Security Arsenal Research
date: 2026/06/16
tags:
    - attack.command_and_control
    - attack.t1071.001
logsource:
    category: network_connection
product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        DestinationHostname|contains:
            - 'azurenetfiles.net'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: critical
---
title: Suspicious Cisco SD-WAN Webshell Process Creation
date: 2026/06/16
author: Security Arsenal Research
status: experimental
description: Detects potential webshell activity on Cisco SD-WAN devices via suspicious Java process arguments or file creation.
references:
    - https://otx.alienvault.com/pulse/660000000001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
product: linux
detection:
    selection_java:
        Image|endswith: '/java'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'godzilla'
            - 'behinder'
            - 'memshell'
    selection_webshell:
        TargetFilename|contains:
            - '.jsp'
            - '.jspx'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'curl'
            - 'wget'
    condition: 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administrative scripts
level: high
---
title: InterlockRAT NodeSnake Linux Persistence
id: a1b2c3d4-e5f6-4a7b-8c9d-0e1f2a3b4c5d
status: experimental
description: Detects persistence mechanisms used by NodeSnake or InterlockRAT on Linux endpoints.
references:
    - https://otx.alienvault.com/pulse/660000000002
author: Security Arsenal Research
date: 2026/06/16
logsource:
    product: linux
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_cron:
        Image|endswith: '/crontab'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '/tmp/'
            - '/var/tmp/'
    selection_node:
        Image|endswith: '/node'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'base64'
            - 'eval'
    condition: 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Developer activity
level: medium


kql
// Hunt for ShinyHunters and Interlock Network IOCs
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where RemoteUrl has "azurenetfiles.net" 
   or RemoteUrl has "leadslaw.com"
   or RemoteIP in ("185.196.9.234", "176.120.22.24")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, RemoteUrl, RemoteIP, RemotePort
| extend IOCPulse = iif(RemoteUrl has "azurenetfiles", "UNC6240_ShinyHunters", "Hive0163_Interlock")


powershell
# IOC Hunter for Interlock and ShinyHunters File Hashes
$TargetHashes = @(
    "333903c7d22a27098e45fc64b77a264aa220605cfbd3e329c200d7e4b42c881c",
    "d94f75a70b5cabaf786ac57177ed841732e62bdcc9a29e06e5b41d9be567bcfa",
    "c7e9332731b06644fc73e0046a2a89eaa59b09f54250e9bd622467187351711f",
    "2ab684d93c1553fad87041b4dea97188a97e78589deee2a7bacff905564f3a35"
)

Write-Host "Scanning for OTX Pulse IOCs (Interlock/Rhysida/ShinyHunters)..." -ForegroundColor Cyan

# Check common download directories
$PathsToScan = @("C:\Users\*\Downloads\", "C:\Windows\Temp\", "C:\ProgramData\")

foreach ($path in $PathsToScan) {
    if (Test-Path $path) {
        Get-ChildItem -Path $path -Recurse -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | ForEach-Object {
            $file = $_
            if ($file.Length -gt 0) {
                try {
                    $hash = (Get-FileHash -Path $file.FullName -Algorithm SHA256 -ErrorAction Stop).Hash.ToLower()
                    if ($TargetHashes -contains $hash) {
                        Write-Host "[ALERT] Malicious file found: $($file.FullName) | Hash: $hash" -ForegroundColor Red
                    }
                } catch {
                    # Ignore access errors
                }
            }
        }
    }
}

# Check for MeshCentral Agent Artifacts
$MeshPath = "C:\Windows\MeshAgent"
if (Test-Path $MeshPath) {
    Write-Host "[WARNING] MeshCentral Agent directory detected: $MeshPath. Verify legitimate usage (UNC6240 activity)." -ForegroundColor Yellow
}


# Response Priorities

*   **Immediate:** 
    *   Block all listed domains (`azurenetfiles.net`, `leadslaw.com`) and IPs at the firewall/proxy.
    *   Patch **CVE-2026-35273** (Oracle PeopleSoft) and **CVE-2026-20182** (Cisco SD-WAN) immediately.
    *   Isolate devices matching the file hash IOCs.
*   **24 Hours:**
    *   Initiate credential reset for accounts active on endpoints where `MintLoader` or `Vidar` (information stealers) may have executed (Pulse 1).
    *   Audit Oracle PeopleSoft servers for unauthorized `MeshCentral` installations or `agent.ashx` files.
*   **1 Week:**
    *   Review external attack surface for exposed SD-WAN management interfaces.
    *   Implement application control to block execution of unsigned installers and LOLBins (Living Off The Land) abused by `JunkFiction`.

Related Resources

Security Arsenal Incident Response Managed SOC & MDR Services AlertMonitor Threat Detection From The Dark Side Intel Hub

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