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INC Ransomware: Defending Against the 2026 Prolific RaaS Surge

SA
Security Arsenal Team
June 19, 2026
6 min read

As we navigate the threat landscape of 2026, the disruption of major cartels like LockBit and BlackCat has left a vacuum that is being aggressively filled by new, agile players. Leading the charge is INC, a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) operation that has matured from a nascent project into one of the most prolific cybercrime groups active today. With 830+ claimed victims since August 2023, INC represents a clear and present danger to organizations of all sizes.

Unlike generic malware campaigns, INC operates on a mature affiliate model. This means the initial access vectors may vary—ranging from exploited vulnerabilities to valid credential usage—but the core payload remains consistent: aggressive encryption and double-extortion tactics. Defenders cannot rely on signature-based detection alone; we must pivot to behavioral analysis and robust credential hygiene to stem the tide of this encryption-based menace.

Technical Analysis

Threat Overview: INC is a RaaS platform providing encryption tools to a network of affiliates. The group has exploited the fragmentation of the ransomware ecosystem following law enforcement actions against competitors, absorbing affiliates seeking new revenue streams.

Affected Products & Platforms: While the specific source intelligence does not cite a singular software vulnerability (CVE), INC affiliates are known to target heterogeneous environments. The payload is capable of encrypting Windows and Linux systems, including virtualized infrastructure and NAS devices.

Attack Chain & Exploitation Status:

  • Initial Access: Affiliates typically gain access through unpatched external services, compromised credentials (phishing or info-stealers), or purchased initial access brokers.
  • Execution: Upon gaining a foothold, operators move laterally, often using remote management tools (e.g., RDP, Splashtop) to deploy the INC payload.
  • Impact: The payload employs strong encryption algorithms to lock files. Critically, it attempts to delete Volume Shadow Copies to prevent native system recovery, a hallmark of modern ransomware.
  • CVE Status: This specific advisory focuses on the activity and success of the INC operation rather than a specific zero-day. Defenders should assume that any unpatched 2025/2026 vulnerability (e.g., in VPN appliances or edge devices) serves as a potential doorway for INC affiliates.

Detection & Response

Given the lack of a specific CVE in this report, detection relies heavily on identifying the behavioral precursors to encryption—the "hands-on-keyboard" activities and the payload's attempts to cripple system recovery.

Sigma Rules

YAML
---
title: INC Ransomware Prep - Shadow Copy Deletion
id: 92a3f1c8-1b4d-4d67-bc12-3e5a8f901234
status: experimental
description: Detects attempts to delete Volume Shadow Copies, a common step taken by INC ransomware to prevent recovery.
references:
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490/
author: Security Arsenal
date: 2026/06/18
tags:
  - attack.impact
  - attack.t1490
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection:
    Image|endswith:
      - '\vssadmin.exe'
      - '\wmic.exe'
    CommandLine|contains:
      - 'delete shadows'
      - 'shadowcopy delete'
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate system administration tasks
level: high
---
title: INC Ransomware Prep - System Log Clearing
id: 82b4e1c9-2c5d-4e12-ac34-4f6b9g012345
status: experimental
description: Detects the use of wevtutil to clear system logs, often performed by ransomware operators to hide tracks.
references:
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/
author: Security Arsenal
date: 2026/06/18
tags:
  - attack.defense_evasion
  - attack.t1070.001
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection:
    Image|endswith: '\wevtutil.exe'
    CommandLine|contains: 'cl'
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Admin scripts clearing logs for space
level: medium
---
title: INC Ransomware - BCD Recovery Modification
id: 73c5d2a0-3d6e-5f23-bd45-5g7c0h123456
status: experimental
description: Detects modification of boot configuration to disable recovery, a tactic observed in INC encryptors.
references:
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490/
author: Security Arsenal
date: 2026/06/18
tags:
  - attack.impact
  - attack.t1490
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection:
    Image|endswith: '\bcdedit.exe'
    CommandLine|contains:
      - 'recoveryenabled no'
      - 'ignoreallfailures'
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Rare administrative boot configuration changes
level: high

KQL (Microsoft Sentinel)

KQL — Microsoft Sentinel / Defender
// Hunt for ransomware precursor activities: Shadow Copy Deletion
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where (ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName in ("vssadmin.exe", "wmic.exe") or FileName in ("vssadmin.exe", "wmic.exe"))
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("delete shadows", "shadowcopy delete")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName
| extend TS = 1

Velociraptor VQL

VQL — Velociraptor
-- Hunt for suspicious ransomware precursor processes
SELECT Pid, Name, CommandLine, Exe, Username, CreateTime
FROM pslist()
WHERE Name =~ "vssadmin" 
   AND CommandLine =~ "delete"
   OR Name =~ "wevtutil" 
   AND CommandLine =~ "cl"

Remediation Script (PowerShell)

PowerShell
# INC Ransomware Hardening Script
# Run this on critical endpoints to verify recovery mechanisms are active

Write-Host "Checking System Recovery Configuration..." -ForegroundColor Cyan

# 1. Check if VSS Service is Running
$vssService = Get-Service -Name VSS -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
if ($vssService.Status -ne 'Running') {
    Write-Host "[WARNING] Volume Shadow Copy Service is not Running. Start it manually." -ForegroundColor Red
} else {
    Write-Host "[OK] Volume Shadow Copy Service is Running." -ForegroundColor Green
}

# 2. Check recent Shadow Copies (Ensure they exist)
try {
    $shadows = vssadmin list shadows
    if ($shadows -match "No shadow copies") {
        Write-Host "[WARNING] No Shadow Copies found. System is vulnerable to data loss." -ForegroundColor Red
    } else {
        Write-Host "[OK] Shadow Copies exist." -ForegroundColor Green
    }
} catch {
    Write-Host "[ERROR] Could not query VSS." -ForegroundColor Red
}

# 3. Check for 'recoveryenabled' status (simple check)
$bcdStatus = bcdedit /enum | Select-String "recoveryenabled"
if ($bcdStatus -like "*no*") {
    Write-Host "[CRITICAL] Boot Recovery is DISABLED. Re-enable immediately using: bcdedit /set {default} recoveryenabled yes" -ForegroundColor Red
} else {
    Write-Host "[OK] Boot Recovery appears enabled." -ForegroundColor Green
}

Write-Host "Remediation check complete."

Remediation

  1. Isolate and Contain: If INC activity is suspected, immediately isolate affected hosts from the network to prevent lateral movement. INC affiliates aggressively move to domain controllers.
  2. Credential Reset: Assume the attacker has valid credentials. Force a password reset for all privileged accounts and service accounts used on affected segments, specifically enforcing MFA re-enrollment.
  3. Verify Backups: This threat specializes in encryption. Verify that offline backups are immutable and have not been touched. Test a restore procedure immediately.
  4. Patch Edge Infrastructure: While no specific CVE is cited in this report, INC affiliates exploit unpatched internet-facing appliances. Ensure all VPNs, firewalls, and remote access tools are patched to the latest 2026 firmware.
  5. Disable RDP (if unused): As a primary lateral movement vector for RaaS groups, restrict RDP access strictly via VPN or Gateway, and disable it directly from the internet.

Related Resources

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