Classification: TLP:CLEAR | Publication Date: 2026-11-22 | Source: ransomware.live leak-site monitoring (single-source for some listings — see Sourcing & Verification) | Nature of data: Unverified threat-actor claims
INCRANSOM Ransomware Gang: 4 New Leak-Site Claims Spanning Healthcare, Defense & Energy
Executive Summary
Dark web monitoring of the INCRANSOM ransomware group's .onion leak site, conducted via ransomware.live, has identified four new claimed victim postings between 2026-11-19 and 2026-11-21. The organizations named span three high-value sectors — Healthcare, Government & Defense, and Energy & Utilities — across three countries (United States, Italy, France):
- Regions Behavioral Hospital (Healthcare, US) — listed 2026-11-21
- Boeing (Government & Defense, US) — listed 2026-11-20
- eni.it (Energy & Utilities, IT) — listed 2026-11-19
- CHAMBOURCY (Government & Defense, FR) — listed 2026-11-19
Critical caveat: every one of these listings is a claim made by a criminal organization on its own infrastructure. None of the four listings has been independently observed by a second leak-site crawler, and no tier of this data confirms that any breach occurred. Security teams at organizations in the named sectors should treat this briefing as a threat-actor-intent signal — a prompt to hunt and harden — not as confirmation of any specific intrusion.
Sourcing & Verification
Transparency about what this data is — and is not — matters more than speed.
- Corroboration status: 0 of 4 listings were independently observed by a second leak-site crawler. All 4 listings are single-source (observed via ransomware.live only). MULTI-SOURCE status would mean two independent crawlers observed the gang post the claim — it would still not mean a breach was confirmed.
- Inclusion reflects the threat actor's claim, not a confirmed breach. A leak-site posting is an accusation by a criminal. Ransomware groups have documented histories of exaggerating claims, re-listing old incidents, naming organizations that were never compromised, and fabricating data samples to pressure victims or inflate their reputation.
- A named organization may dispute the listing. A denial is likewise not proof the claim is false: disclosure obligations vary by jurisdiction, sector, and data type, and not every incident is legally reportable. Neither silence nor denial settles the question — only the organization or its regulator can confirm an incident.
- Corrections policy: Security Arsenal will publish corrections promptly as new information emerges. We welcome contact from any named organization at security@securityarsenal.com.
Threat Actor Profile — INCRANSOM
INCRANSOM (also tracked in underground forums under the INC RANSOM branding) operates as a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) program, recruiting affiliates who conduct intrusions while the core group maintains the encryptor, negotiation infrastructure, and the leak site. Key characteristics observed across historical campaigns:
- Model: RaaS with a structured affiliate program; leak site and negotiation portals operated centrally.
- Ransom demands: Historically range from the low six figures to multi-million USD equivalents depending on victim revenue, with demands typically denominated in Monero or Bitcoin.
- Initial access methods: Spear-phishing with macro-enabled lures or malicious attachments; exploitation of exposed remote services (VPN concentrators, RDP, firewall management interfaces); purchase of access from initial access brokers (IABs); and exploitation of known-vulnerable perimeter appliances. Opportunistic exploitation of CISA KEV-listed vulnerabilities in edge and virtualization infrastructure is consistent with their observed tradecraft.
- Extortion model: Double extortion — data is staged and exfiltrated before encryption, then used as leverage on the leak site with countdown timers and staged sample releases.
- Dwell time: Historical incidents attributed to the group show dwell times ranging from several days to roughly two weeks between initial access and detonation, giving defenders a meaningful detection window if pre-encryption staging behaviors are monitored.
Current Campaign Analysis
Sector Targeting
The four new claimed listings cluster into three sectors:
| Sector | Claimed Listings | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Government & Defense | 2 (Boeing — US; CHAMBOURCY — FR) | Highest-leverage extortion targets; sensitive IP and regulatory pressure |
| Healthcare | 1 (Regions Behavioral Hospital — US) | Behavioral health data carries extreme privacy sensitivity and high payment pressure |
| Energy & Utilities | 1 (eni.it — IT) | Critical infrastructure adjacency amplifies extortion leverage |
The mix is consistent with INCRANSOM's historical preference for organizations with (a) high regulatory exposure, (b) operationally intolerant downtime, and (c) data whose confidentiality alone justifies payment.
Geographic Concentration
Two of four claimed listings are US-based; the remaining two are in Italy and France. This US-plus-Western-Europe distribution matches the gang's established operating geography and avoids CIS-region targets, consistent with most major RaaS programs.
Victim Profile
The claimed set skews toward large enterprises and public-sector-adjacent entities — a major aerospace/defense prime, a multinational energy company, a US healthcare provider, and a French municipality. Estimated revenue/staffing scale ranges from mid-size public administration to tens of billions USD in annual revenue, indicating the gang is not selectively filtering for small, poorly defended targets in this wave.
Posting Frequency & Escalation
Four postings in three days (2026-11-19 through 2026-11-21) represents a compressed burst. Burst posting patterns often indicate either a batch of intrusions reaching the extortion stage simultaneously (suggesting a shared access vector or affiliate), or a deliberate publicity push. All four listings being single-source raises an additional possibility that defenders should weigh: some listings may be inflated or recycled claims. Hunt accordingly — do not assume.
Potential Initial Access Vector Hypotheses (Sector-Level, Not Victim-Specific)
We have no evidence linking any specific CVE to any specific named organization above. However, INCRANSOM's known tradecraft of exploiting perimeter and management-plane vulnerabilities makes the following currently-KEV-listed vulnerabilities relevant hunting surfaces for organizations in the targeted sectors:
- CVE-2026-50751 (Check Point Security Gateway improper authentication, IKEv1) — edge VPN/auth bypass; directly consistent with VPN-centric initial access.
- CVE-2026-20316 (Cisco Secure FMC hard-coded password) — management-plane compromise of security infrastructure.
- CVE-2026-59310 (VMware vCenter path traversal) — hypervisor management compromise; enables mass encryption of virtualized estates, a hallmark of modern big-game ransomware.
- CVE-2026-63077 (JetBrains TeamCity deserialization) — CI/CD compromise enabling supply-chain-style lateral access and credential theft.
- CVE-2026-48027 (Nx Console embedded malicious code) — developer toolchain supply chain exposure.
Treat any unpatched instance of these products in your environment as an active-exposure priority independent of this campaign.
Detection Engineering
The following detections target TTPs consistently observed in INCRANSOM-attributed intrusions: perimeter exploitation followed by tunneling, phishing/macro execution, RDP brute force, PsExec/WMI lateral movement, Cobalt Strike-style beaconing, and pre-encryption data staging and shadow copy deletion.
---
title: INCRANSOM - Suspicious Office Macro Child Process Execution
id: 9f1e2c4a-7b3d-4e5f-9a01-incransom0001
status: experimental
description: Detects Office applications spawning script interpreters or LOLBins consistent with phishing macro initial access used by INCRANSOM affiliates.
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intel
references:
- https://securityarsenal.com/darkside
date: 2026/11/22
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_parent:
ParentImage|endswith:
- '\winword.exe'
- '\excel.exe'
- '\powerpnt.exe'
- '\outlook.exe'
selection_child:
Image|endswith:
- '\powershell.exe'
- '\pwsh.exe'
- '\wscript.exe'
- '\cscript.exe'
- '\mshta.exe'
- '\rundll32.exe'
- '\cmd.exe'
- '\certutil.exe'
filter_known:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'Microsoft Office'
- 'OfficeClickToRun'
condition: selection_parent and selection_child and not filter_known
falsepositives:
- Legitimate Office add-ins invoking scripts (rare in hardened environments)
level: high
tags:
- attack.initial_access
- attack.t1566.001
- attack.t1059
---
title: INCRANSOM - Pre-Encryption Staging - Shadow Copy Deletion and Backup Tampering
id: 9f1e2c4a-7b3d-4e5f-9a02-incransom0002
status: experimental
description: Detects Volume Shadow Copy deletion and backup tampering commands commonly executed immediately before INCRANSOM detonation.
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intel
date: 2026/11/22
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_vss:
Image|endswith:
- '\vssadmin.exe'
CommandLine|contains:
- 'delete shadows'
- 'resize shadowstorage'
selection_wmic:
Image|endswith:
- '\wmic.exe'
CommandLine|contains:
- 'shadowcopy delete'
selection_bcd:
Image|endswith:
- '\bcdedit.exe'
CommandLine|contains:
- 'recoveryenabled no'
- 'bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures'
selection_wbadmin:
Image|endswith:
- '\wbadmin.exe'
CommandLine|contains:
- 'delete catalog'
- 'delete backup'
condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Rare; some backup software maintenance tasks
level: critical
tags:
- attack.impact
- attack.t1490
---
title: INCRANSOM - Lateral Movement via PsExec or Remote Service Creation
id: 9f1e2c4a-7b3d-4e5f-9a03-incransom0003
status: experimental
description: Detects remote service installation patterns (PsExec-style) used by INCRANSOM operators for lateral movement and mass ransomware deployment.
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intel
date: 2026/11/22
logsource:
product: windows
service: system
definition: EventID 7045 (Service Installed) or equivalent process_creation telemetry
detection:
selection_service:
EventID: 7045
ServiceFileName|contains:
- 'ADMIN$'
- '\\PSEXESVC'
- '%SystemRoot%\\PSEXESVC'
selection_psexec_proc:
Image|endswith:
- '\psexec.exe'
- '\psexesvc.exe'
- '\paexec.exe'
- '\remcom.exe'
condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate administrative use of PsExec by IT teams (baseline and whitelist known admin hosts)
level: high
tags:
- attack.lateral_movement
- attack.t1569.002
- attack.t1021.002
The following KQL query hunts for pre-ransomware staging behavior in Microsoft Sentinel: mass file access consistent with data collection for exfiltration, followed by compression tool execution and anomalous outbound transfer patterns on the same host within a correlated window.
// INCRANSOM pre-ransomware staging hunt: archive creation + mass file reads + shadow copy tampering
let lookback = 7d;
let suspiciousHosts =
DeviceProcessEvents
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(lookback)
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("delete shadows", "shadowcopy delete", "recoveryenabled no", "delete catalog")
| summarize FirstTamper = min(TimeGenerated) by DeviceName;
let archiveActivity =
DeviceProcessEvents
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(lookback)
| where FileName in~ ("rar.exe", "7z.exe", "7za.exe", "winrar.exe")
or ProcessCommandLine has_any (" a -", " -mx", " -p", ".rar", ".7z")
| summarize ArchiveEvents = count(), FirstArchive = min(TimeGenerated),
SampleCmds = make_set(ProcessCommandLine, 5) by DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName;
let massFileAccess =
DeviceFileEvents
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(lookback)
| where ActionType == "FileCreated" or ActionType == "FileModified"
| where FolderPath has_any ("\\Documents\\", "\\Shares\\", "\\Finance\\", "\\HR\\")
| summarize FileOps = count(), DistinctFolders = dcount(FolderPath) by DeviceName;
let exfilIndicators =
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(lookback)
| where RemoteIPType == "Public"
| summarize OutboundConnections = count(), DistinctRemoteIPs = dcount(RemoteIP),
RemoteHosts = make_set(RemoteUrl, 10) by DeviceName;
suspiciousHosts
| join kind=inner archiveActivity on DeviceName
| join kind=inner massFileAccess on DeviceName
| join kind=inner exfilIndicators on DeviceName
| project DeviceName, FirstTamper, FirstArchive, ArchiveEvents, FileOps,
DistinctRemoteIPs, OutboundConnections, InitiatingProcessAccountName, SampleCmds
| order by FirstTamper asc;
The following PowerShell script performs rapid-response checks aligned to this gang's playbook: exposed RDP listeners, scheduled tasks created in the last 7 days (persistence), shadow copy health, and recently created suspicious services.
# INCRANSOM Rapid Triage & Hardening Check - run as Administrator on servers/jump hosts
# Output: console report + CSV artifacts to C:\IR-Triage
$outDir = "C:\IR-Triage"
New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path $outDir -Force | Out-Null
$now = Get-Date
$cutoff = $now.AddDays(-7)
Write-Host "=== [1] RDP Exposure Check ===" -ForegroundColor Cyan
$rdpEnabled = (Get-ItemProperty 'HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server' -Name fDenyTSConnections).fDenyTSConnections
if ($rdpEnabled -eq 0) {
Write-Warning "RDP is ENABLED. Verify it is not internet-exposed (check perimeter ACLs/NAT)."
Get-NetTCPConnection -LocalPort 3389 -State Listen -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
Select-Object LocalAddress, LocalPort, OwningProcess | Format-Table
} else { Write-Host "RDP disabled. OK." }
Write-Host "=== [2] Scheduled Tasks Created in Last 7 Days ===" -ForegroundColor Cyan
Get-ScheduledTask | ForEach-Object {
$info = $_ | Get-ScheduledTaskInfo -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[PSCustomObject]@{ TaskName=$_.TaskName; TaskPath=$_.TaskPath; Author=$_.Author; State=$_.State }
} | Where-Object { $_.TaskPath -notlike '\Microsoft*' } |
Export-Csv "$outDir\ScheduledTasks.csv" -NoTypeInformation
Get-ChildItem "$outDir\ScheduledTasks.csv"
Write-Host "=== [3] Volume Shadow Copy Health ===" -ForegroundColor Cyan
$shadows = Get-CimInstance Win32_ShadowCopy -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
if (-not $shadows) {
Write-Warning "NO Volume Shadow Copies present. If this is unexpected, investigate possible anti-recovery tampering (T1490)."
} else {
$shadows | Select-Object DeviceObject, InstallDate, VolumeName | Format-Table
}
Write-Host "=== [4] Services Installed in Last 7 Days (PsExec-style check) ===" -ForegroundColor Cyan
Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='System'; Id=7045; StartTime=$cutoff} -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
Select-Object TimeCreated, @{n='Service';e={$_.Properties[0].Value}}, @{n='Binary';e={$_.Properties[1].Value}} |
Export-Csv "$outDir\NewServices.csv" -NoTypeInformation
if (Test-Path "$outDir\NewServices.csv") { Get-Content "$outDir\NewServices.csv" }
Write-Host "=== [5] Recent Failed Logon Bursts (RDP brute force indicator) ===" -ForegroundColor Cyan
Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='Security'; Id=4625; StartTime=$cutoff} -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
Group-Object @{e={$_.Properties[5].Value}} | Where-Object Count -gt 50 |
Sort-Object Count -Descending | Select-Object Count, Name | Format-Table
Write-Host "Triage complete. Artifacts in $outDir" -ForegroundColor Green
Incident Response Priorities
T-Minus Detection Checklist (Before Encryption Fires)
INCRANSOM's observed dwell time gives defenders a window. Prioritize hunting for, in order:
- Edge device anomalies — new admin sessions on VPN/firewall management planes (Check Point, Cisco FMC), especially from unusual source geographies or outside change windows.
- Credential access — LSASS memory access by non-system processes; DCSync-style replication requests (Event 4662 with replication GUIDs); unexpected NTDS.dit access or Volume Shadow Copy abuse on domain controllers.
- Persistence — new scheduled tasks, services (7045 events), run keys, or local admin accounts created in the last 14 days.
- Lateral movement — PsExec/WMI remote execution, RDP logons between workstations (not just from jump hosts), SMB admin-share writes of executables.
- Staging & exfiltration — archive tool execution (rar/7z) on file servers, mass file read bursts, large outbound transfers to cloud storage or unknown IPs, installation of tools like Rclone/FileZilla/MEGAsync.
- Pre-detonation sabotage — vssadmin delete shadows, bcdedit recovery disabling, backup catalog deletion, security tool uninstall attempts, mass event log clearing.
Critical Assets Historically Prioritized for Exfiltration
Based on the group's sector targeting and double-extortion model:
- Healthcare: EHR databases, patient records (behavioral health records are especially high-leverage), insurance/billing data, HR files.
- Government & Defense: contract documentation, engineering/CAD data, export-controlled technical data, internal communications with government counterparts.
- Energy & Utilities: OT-adjacent network diagrams, SCADA documentation, vendor contracts, employee PII.
- All sectors: executive mailboxes, legal files, financial statements, and anything demonstrating regulatory non-compliance (used as extra extortion pressure).
Containment Actions Ordered by Urgency
- Isolate suspected staging hosts from the network (EDR isolation, not power-off — preserve memory).
- Disable compromised accounts and force enterprise-wide credential resets, starting with privileged/service accounts; revoke active sessions and tokens.
- Block identified C2 and exfil destinations at the egress proxy/firewall; alert on existing connections.
- Segment backup infrastructure immediately — verify offline/immutable copies are intact and unreachable from production credentials.
- Snapshot/forensically image domain controllers, file servers, and the hypervisor management plane before remediation.
- Disable suspect persistence (tasks, services, accounts) only after collection; document everything.
- Engage legal/comms early — if your organization is named on a leak site, coordinate external statements with counsel; do not validate or deny the criminal's claims publicly without verified internal findings.
Hardening Recommendations
Immediate (24 Hours)
- Patch or mitigate the KEV-listed exposures relevant to your estate: CVE-2026-50751 (Check Point IKEv1), CVE-2026-20316 (Cisco FMC), CVE-2026-59310 (vCenter), CVE-2026-63077 (TeamCity), CVE-2026-48027 (Nx Console). These are confirmed exploited; treat as emergency change.
- Verify no management interface (vCenter, FMC, firewall portals, RDP) is reachable from the internet; place behind VPN + MFA or remove exposure entirely.
- Enforce phishing-resistant MFA (FIDO2/passkeys) on all remote access and privileged accounts.
- Deploy the Sigma and KQL detections above and alert immediately on shadow copy deletion or 7045 service installs matching PsExec patterns.
- Audit scheduled tasks and local admins created in the last 14 days across servers and workstations.
- Confirm backup immutability and test one restore path today — assume attackers will target backups first.
Short-Term (2 Weeks)
- Implement tiered administration with dedicated Privileged Access Workstations; eliminate workstation-to-workstation RDP and SMB between user subnets.
- Segment the virtualization and backup planes onto isolated networks with separate credential domains; a compromised domain admin must not equal a compromised hypervisor.
- Deploy egress filtering and DLP tuned to detect archive creation tools and anomalous outbound volume to unsanctioned cloud storage.
- Restrict macro execution via Attack Surface Reduction rules; block Office child processes per the Sigma rule above.
- Stand up canary credentials and decoy file shares to catch enumeration and staging early in the dwell window.
- Establish a leak-site monitoring workflow (internal or via a provider) so that if your organization is ever named by a gang, you learn it from your own telemetry pipeline — not from the news — and can respond to the claim with verified facts.
This briefing reflects unverified threat-actor claims observed on criminal infrastructure. It is provided for defensive purposes. Security Arsenal does not interact with, pay, or facilitate threat actors. Named organizations may contact security@securityarsenal.com regarding any listing referenced here.
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