Aliases & Structure: INCRANSOM (formerly associated with Median/MedusaLocker variants) operates as a aggressive Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) entity. They maintain a high-volume leak site strategy, publishing victim data rapidly to force negotiation.
Operational Model: The group utilizes a double-extortion model, encrypting systems while exfiltrating sensitive data for leverage. Typical ransom demands range from $500,000 to $5 million USD, tailored to the victim's revenue.
Initial Access Vectors: INCRANSOM affiliates frequently exploit vulnerabilities in edge networking devices and remote management software. Recent intelligence indicates a shift towards exploiting unpatched VPN appliances (Check Point, Cisco) and remote access tools (ConnectWise ScreenConnect).
Dwell Time: The average dwell time for this group has shortened significantly in the last quarter, averaging 3–5 days between initial access and encryption, reducing the window for detection.
Current Campaign Analysis
Posting Velocity: Between 2026-07-28 and 2026-07-30, INCRANSOM posted 9 new victims, indicating an automated or highly active affiliate campaign.
Sector Targeting:
- Healthcare: High priority targets (PARTNERED HEALTH GROUP, eclmn.com).
- Government:
greenecountyga.govindicates a move into US municipal infrastructure. - Manufacturing: Cross-border hits in Mexico (minigrip.com.mx) and Colombia (DUCON).
- Other/Unknown: Significant volume targeting smaller entities (sslf.local, Della Casa Group AG), suggesting opportunistic scanning.
Geographic Spread: The campaign is globally dispersed, with victims in the US, Australia (AU), United Arab Emirates (AE), Switzerland (CH), Mexico (MX), and Colombia (CO).
Victim Profile: The victims range from small local businesses to regional healthcare providers and government bodies. This suggests a "spray and pray" approach on vulnerable internet-facing assets rather than targeted Big Game Hunting.
CVE Correlation: The diverse geographic spread and the inclusion of government/healthcare victims strongly correlate with the exploitation of:
- CVE-2026-50751 (Check Point Security Gateway): A critical auth bypass allowing network infiltration.
- CVE-2024-1708 (ConnectWise ScreenConnect): A path traversal flaw often used to gain remote code execution (RCE) on managed service provider (MSP) consoles.
- CVE-2026-20131 (Cisco Secure Firewall): Potential entry point for enterprise environments.
Detection Engineering
SIGMA Rules
---
title: Potential ScreenConnect Auth Bypass (CVE-2024-1708)
id: 8c70e6b2-4f50-45a5-bb3c-9b7a2c8d1e9f
status: experimental
description: Detects potential exploitation of ConnectWise ScreenConnect path traversal vulnerability via suspicious URI patterns
references:
- https://cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog
author: Security Arsenal Research
date: 2026/07/31
tags:
- attack.initial_access
- cve.2024.1708
- ransomware.incransom
logsource:
category: webserver
detection:
selection:
cs-uri-query|contains:
- '/Bin/'
- '.aspx'
cs-uri-query|contains|all:
- '..'
- '/'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate administrative access (rare)
level: critical
---
title: Check Point VPN IKEv1 Anomaly Detection (CVE-2026-50751)
id: 9d1f2a3e-5b4c-4d8e-9f0a-1b2c3d4e5f6a
status: experimental
description: Detects mass IKEv1 security association attempts or failures indicative of exploitation attempts against Check Point Gateways
references:
- https://support.checkpoint.com/results/detail/sk/sk180332
author: Security Arsenal Research
date: 2026/07/31
tags:
- attack.initial_access
- cve.2026.50751
- ransomware.incransom
logsource:
product: firewall
detection:
selection:
destination_port: 500
protocol: udp
vpn_feature: 'ikev1'
filter_legit:
src_ip|cidr:
- '10.0.0.0/8'
- '192.168.0.0/16'
- '172.16.0.0/12'
condition: selection and not filter_legit | count(src_ip) > 50
timeframe: 1m
falsepositives:
- VPN storms from trusted office IPs
level: high
---
title: INCRANSOM Pattern - Volume Shadow Copy Deletion
id: a1b2c3d4-5678-90ab-cdef-1234567890ab
status: experimental
description: Detects commands used by INCRANSOM affiliates to delete Volume Shadow Copies via vssadmin or wmic prior to encryption
author: Security Arsenal Research
date: 2026/07/31
tags:
- attack.impact
- attack.t1490
- ransomware.incransom
logsource:
category: process_creation
detection:
selection_vssadmin:
Image|endswith: '\vssadmin.exe'
CommandLine|contains: 'delete shadows'
selection_wmic:
Image|endswith: '\wmic.exe'
CommandLine|contains: 'shadowcopy delete'
condition: 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
- System administration scripts
level: critical
KQL (Microsoft Sentinel)
// Hunt for lateral movement and staging indicators associated with INCRANSOM
// Focuses on PsExec, WMI, and unusual SMB access often seen before encryption
let TimeFrame = ago(7d);
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > TimeFrame
| where (ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName in ('psexec.exe', 'psexec64.exe') or
ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName in ('wmic.exe', 'wbem\wmic.exe') or
ProcessCommandLine has 'reg save' or
ProcessCommandLine has 'shadowcopy')
| extend HostName = DeviceName
| join kind=inner (DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > TimeFrame
| where RemotePort in (445, 135, 139)
| summarize ConnectionCount=count() by DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort
) on DeviceName
| project Timestamp, HostName, ProcessName, ProcessCommandLine, RemoteIP, RemotePort, ConnectionCount, InitiatingProcessAccountName
| order by Timestamp desc
PowerShell - Rapid Response Hardening
<#
.SYNOPSIS
Incident Response Script - Detect Ransomware Precursors
.DESCRIPTION
Checks for recent scheduled tasks (persistence), unusual VSS activity,
and enumerates exposed RDP sessions which INCRANSOM often utilizes.
#>
Write-Host "[+] Starting INCRANSOM Precursor Hunt..." -ForegroundColor Cyan
# 1. Check for Scheduled Tasks created in the last 24 hours (Persistence)
$Date = (Get-Date).AddDays(-1)
Write-Host "[!] Checking for Scheduled Tasks created/modified since: $Date" -ForegroundColor Yellow
Get-ScheduledTask | Where-Object {$_.Date -gt $Date} | Select-Object TaskName, TaskPath, Date, Author
# 2. Check Volume Shadow Copy Service (VSS) Writers for errors (Staging/Destruction)
Write-Host "[!] Checking VSS Writer State..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
vssadmin list writers | Select-String -Pattern "State:.*[5-9]" -Context 2,2
# 3. Enumerate recent RDP logons (Lateral Movement)
Write-Host "[!] Checking for interactive RDP logons in the last 24 hours..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='Security'; ID=4624; LogonType=10; StartTime=$Date} -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
Select-Object TimeCreated, @{N='User';E={$_.Properties[5].Value}}, @{N='IP';E={$_.Properties[19].Value}} | Format-Table -AutoSize
Write-Host "[+] Hunt Complete." -ForegroundColor Green
---
Incident Response Priorities
-
T-minus Detection Checklist:
- Immediately search web proxy logs for ScreenConnect (
.aspxpath traversal) anomalies. - Correlate VPN logs (Check Point/Cisco) for successful auths followed by unusual internal lateral movement (SMB/WMI).
- Look for mass file renames or extension changes in shared drives.
- Immediately search web proxy logs for ScreenConnect (
-
Critical Assets Prioritized:
- Healthcare: Electronic Health Records (EHR) databases and PACS imaging archives.
- Government: Citizen PII databases, tax records, and emergency dispatch systems.
- Manufacturing: CAD designs, intellectual property, and ERP systems (SAP/Oracle).
-
Containment Actions:
- Isolate: Disconnect the VPN appliances identified as vulnerable from the network core.
- Disable: Force-stop all ConnectWise ScreenConnect services immediately.
- Reset: Revoke all VPN and local administrator credentials for exposed segments.
Hardening Recommendations
Immediate (24h):
- Patch: Apply patches for CVE-2024-1708 (ScreenConnect) and CVE-2026-50751 (Check Point) immediately. If patching is impossible, disable Internet-facing access to these services.
- MFA Enforcement: Ensure all VPN and remote access points have phishing-resistant MFA enforced (FIDO2/Certificates).
Short-term (2 weeks):
- Network Segmentation: Move critical backups and domain controllers to an isolated management VLAN inaccessible from the standard VPN DMZ.
- EDR Coverage: Verify full coverage on all internet-facing jump servers and management hosts.
Related Resources
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