Five concurrent OTX pulses paint a single, uncomfortable picture: the infostealer economy has matured into a full supply chain, and the product — your employees' and customers' credentials — is being monetized at every tier.
At the retail tier, the Amazon-themed ClickFix campaign lures users via sponsored Google search results to spoofed login pages, where a fake CAPTCHA coerces victims into executing a malicious command through the legacy Windows finger.exe utility. That living-off-the-land pivot kicks off a chain delivering Lumma Stealer, the Doina loader, and a NetSupport Client payload for persistent remote access.
At the state-aligned tier, UAT-12643 — assessed as North Korea-aligned — deploys the Python-based Good Game infostealer and Overlord RAT against cryptocurrency holders, gaming users, and VoIP operators, with C2 resilience anchored in the Solana blockchain to resist takedown.
At the mobile tier, a malware-as-a-service operation dubbed the 'Party' panel rents SecuriDropper-based Android banking trojans to 50 tenants (34 active paid licenses) targeting six Indian banks via fake Google Play pages, SMS theft, and call forwarding.
And at the monetization tier, the N0N extortion group — active since September 2026 — demonstrates exactly where stolen credentials end up: N0N purchases infostealer-harvested logins, breaches corporate networks across healthcare, retail, finance, technology, education, and telecom sectors in the US, Canada, France, Italy, Netherlands, and Botswana, then exfiltrates Active Directory mappings and legal documents for pure data extortion — no encryption required. Their leak infrastructure includes the Tor site nongzecboljwv3yfndkggsybsglfrkffw7bvk2zemuteoxe6etpusnad.onion.
The fifth pulse, ARMORY CASTLE (UTA0178), a suspected PRC-nexus actor exploiting vCenter zero-day CVE-2026-123890 and BeyondTrust CVE-2026-102764, rounds out the picture with six new malware families (BONESAW, SAWSNAKE, SLIMSAVAGE, CAGEMATCH, BEARBONES, LAZYBONES) — a reminder that credential theft and edge-device exploitation are converging initial-access vectors.
Objective synthesis: harvest credentials at scale (ClickFix/Lumma, Good Game, Android trojans) → sell or broker them → extortion groups like N0N convert them into enterprise intrusions and dark-web leak pressure.
Threat Actor / Malware Profile
N0N Extortion Group
- Distribution/Access: Purchases or reuses credentials harvested by third-party infostealer campaigns; no phishing infrastructure of its own required.
- Payload behavior: Encryption-less extortion. Exfiltrates Active Directory mappings, legal documents, and sensitive data; publishes to a Tor leak site (
nongzecboljwv3yfn...onion). - Infrastructure: Bulletproof-hosted IPs across Sweden (AS42675 Obehosting), Lithuania (AS16125 Cherry Servers), Canada, and India — classic churn-and-burn VPS abuse.
- Targeting: Healthcare, retail, finance, technology, education, telecoms across US, CA, FR, IT, NL, BW.
UAT-12643 (Suspected DPRK-aligned)
- Distribution: Malicious infrastructure impersonating cryptocurrency tools, gaming platforms, and VoIP software.
- Payloads: Good Game (Python-based infostealer harvesting wallets, browser credentials, gaming sessions), Overlord RAT (full remote control), and a multi-cryptocurrency clipboard hijacker that swaps wallet addresses in transit.
- C2: Innovative — leverages the Solana blockchain as a dead-drop/resilience layer, making traditional domain takedowns ineffective. Watch for outbound JSON-RPC patterns to Solana RPC endpoints from non-blockchain processes.
- Anti-analysis: Python packaging (PyInstaller-style SHA256 artifacts observed in IOCs) to obscure the stealer logic.
'Party' Panel — SecuriDropper Android MaaS
- Distribution: Fake Google Play pages branded per-target-bank; multi-tenant panel with 50 accounts / 34 paid licenses.
- Payload behavior: SMS stealer (OTP interception), call forwarding abuse, card data capture; targets six Indian financial institutions plus government and agriculture sectors.
- Infrastructure:
sanaminfotech.online/node3.sanaminfotech.online, IPs 103.129.96.11 and 103.151.199.22.
Amazon ClickFix Chain (Lumma / Doina / NetSupport)
- Distribution: Sponsored Google search result for 'amazon business' → Google Sites-hosted spoofed login → fake CAPTCHA (ClickFix social engineering).
- Execution: Tricks the user into pasting a command invoking
finger.exe— a deprecated Windows LOLBin repurposed to fetch the payload. - Payloads: Lumma Stealer (browser credentials, cookies, crypto wallets, 2FA tokens), Doina loader, NetSupport Client for persistent RAT access.
- Infrastructure: Compromised legitimate sites as staging:
grillmasterchef.com,ashevilleroofingcontractor.com,grillrecipespro.com. - Persistence: NetSupport client installation provides durable remote access independent of the stealer lifecycle.
ARMORY CASTLE / UTA0178
- Vector: Chained zero-days — BeyondTrust Remote Support CVE-2026-102764 → vCenter Server CVE-2026-123890.
- Toolset: BONESAW (Golang exploitation utility), SAWSNAKE, SLIMSAVAGE, CAGEMATCH, BEARBONES, LAZYBONES — webshells and Golden SAML capability indicating identity-plane persistence on ESXi/vCenter, where EDR coverage is typically absent.
IOC Analysis
The pulse set contains four operational indicator classes:
| Type | Count (approx.) | Primary Use |
|---|---|---|
| IPv4 | ~15 | C2 / bulletproof hosting / panel infrastructure |
| Domains & hostnames | ~6 | ClickFix staging, MaaS panel, Tor leak site |
| File hashes (MD5/SHA1/SHA256) | ~15 | Lumma/Good Game/Overlord/Android payload identification |
| CVEs | ~6 | vCenter, BeyondTrust, and related exploited flaws |
Operationalization guidance for SOC teams:
- IPs — Push to perimeter blocklists (firewall, proxy, DNS sinkhole). Prioritize the Obehosting (185.157.161.0/24 range) and Cherry Servers indicators tied to N0N, and 103.129.96.11 / 103.151.199.22 for the Android panel. Note the Tor onion address cannot be blocked at the perimeter but is a strong DLP/detection string in proxy and endpoint telemetry.
- Domains — Sinkhole
sanaminfotech.online,node3.sanaminfotech.online,uberip.com, and the ClickFix staging domains. Because ClickFix abuses compromised legitimate sites, pair domain blocks with process-level detection (finger.exe,mshta,powershellspawning from browser copy-paste). - Hashes — Import into EDR block lists (Defender, CrowdStrike, SentinelOne custom indicators). SHA256 values for Good Game/Overlord and the Android APKs should also be submitted to your sandbox for retrospective detonation.
- CVEs — CVE-2026-123890 and CVE-2026-102764 go straight to the vulnerability management queue with emergency-change priority. Any internet-facing vCenter or BeyondTrust instance is a drop-everything patch item.
Tooling: OTX pulses can be ingested directly via the OTX DirectConnect API into Splunk, Sentinel (via the OTX TAXII connector), or MISP. YARA rules from the referenced Cisco Talos and Huntress reports decode the Good Game and Lumma artifacts; oletools and pyinstxtractor are effective against the Python-packaged stealer samples.
Detection Engineering
The following detections target the specific behaviors in these pulses: finger.exe ClickFix execution, infostealer credential-store access, clipboard hijacking, and suspicious outbound patterns consistent with blockchain-based C2.
---
title: ClickFix Fake CAPTCHA - Finger.exe LOLBin Execution
id: 9f3a2c11-7b44-4e2a-9d51-clickfix0001
status: experimental
description: Detects execution of the legacy Windows finger.exe utility, abused in Amazon-themed ClickFix campaigns to fetch Lumma Stealer payloads via user-pasted commands.
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intel
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
- Image|endswith: '\finger.exe'
selection_parent:
ParentImage|endswith:
- '\powershell.exe'
- '\cmd.exe'
- '\explorer.exe'
- '\msedge.exe'
- '\chrome.exe'
condition: selection_img and selection_parent
falsepositives:
- Legacy administrative use of finger (extremely rare on modern systems)
level: high
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1204
- attack.t1218
date: 2026/11/20
---
title: Infostealer Credential Store Access - Lumma / Good Game Pattern
id: 9f3a2c11-7b44-4e2a-9d51-stealer0002
status: experimental
description: Detects suspicious access to browser credential stores, crypto wallet files, and session data consistent with Lumma Stealer and Good Game infostealer behavior.
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intel
logsource:
category: file_event
product: windows
detection:
selection_paths:
TargetFilename|contains:
- '\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Login Data'
- '\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Local State'
- '\AppData\Roaming\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\'
- '\AppData\Roaming\Exodus\'
- '\AppData\Roaming\Electrum\wallets\'
- '\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\Default\Login Data'
filter_browsers:
Image|endswith:
- '\chrome.exe'
- '\firefox.exe'
- '\msedge.exe'
condition: selection_paths and not filter_browsers
falsepositives:
- Backup software, legitimate password managers accessing vaults
level: high
tags:
- attack.credential_access
- attack.t1555
- attack.t1555.003
date: 2026/11/20
---
title: Suspicious Outbound to Blockchain RPC Endpoint from Non-Wallet Process
id: 9f3a2c11-7b44-4e2a-9d51-chainc20003
status: experimental
description: Detects processes not associated with legitimate wallet software initiating connections to Solana RPC endpoints, consistent with Overlord RAT blockchain-resilient C2 used by UAT-12643.
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intel
logsource:
category: network_connection
product: windows
detection:
selection_dest:
DestinationHostname|contains:
- 'api.mainnet-beta.solana.com'
- 'solana-mainnet'
- 'rpc.ankr.com'
filter_wallets:
Image|contains:
- '\phantom'
- '\solflare'
- '\exodus'
condition: selection_dest and not filter_wallets
falsepositives:
- Blockchain development environments, trading tools
level: medium
tags:
- attack.command_and_control
- attack.t1071
- attack.t1102
date: 2026/11/20
// Security Arsenal — OTX Pulse Hunt: Infostealer & Extortion Infrastructure
// Hunts network IOCs from N0N, UAT-12643, Party Panel, and ClickFix pulses
// plus behavioral fingerprint of finger.exe ClickFix execution
let ioc_ips = dynamic(["198.13.158.143","81.161.239.10","185.157.161.148","185.157.161.93","188.214.135.130","217.18.55.185","41.216.188.11","103.129.96.11","103.151.199.22","103.147.251.5","103.190.38.3","118.174.128.34","118.174.128.36"]);
let ioc_domains = dynamic(["nongzecboljwv3yfndkggsybsglfrkffw7bvk2zemuteoxe6etpusnad.onion","uberip.com","sanaminfotech.online","node3.sanaminfotech.online","grillmasterchef.com","ashevilleroofingcontractor.com","grillrecipespro.com"]);
let NetworkHits =
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(14d)
| where RemoteIP in (ioc_ips) or RemoteUrl in (ioc_domains)
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemoteUrl, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, ActionType;
let ClickFixBehavior =
DeviceProcessEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(14d)
| where FileName =~ "finger.exe"
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine;
union NetworkHits, ClickFixBehavior
| sort by TimeGenerated desc
# Security Arsenal — OTX IOC Hunt Script (Infostealer & Extortion Pack)
# Run elevated on endpoints or via your RMM/EDR remote shell
$ErrorActionPreference = 'SilentlyContinue'
$report = @()
Write-Host "[+] Security Arsenal OTX Hunt — $(Get-Date -Format 'yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm')" -ForegroundColor Cyan
# 1. Network connections to known pulse IOCs
$iocIPs = @('198.13.158.143','81.161.239.10','185.157.161.148','185.157.161.93',
'188.214.135.130','217.18.55.185','41.216.188.11','103.129.96.11',
'103.151.199.22','103.147.251.5','103.190.38.3','118.174.128.34','118.174.128.36')
$conns = Get-NetTCPConnection | Where-Object { $iocIPs -contains $_.RemoteAddress }
foreach ($c in $conns) {
$proc = Get-Process -Id $c.OwningProcess
$report += [PSCustomObject]@{
Type='NetworkIOC'; Detail="$($proc.ProcessName) -> $($c.RemoteAddress):$($c.RemotePort) [$($c.State)]"
}
}
# 2. DNS cache check for pulse domains
$iocDomains = @('sanaminfotech.online','uberip.com','grillmasterchef.com',
'ashevilleroofingcontractor.com','grillrecipespro.com')
$dns = Get-DnsClientCache | Where-Object { $d = $_.Entry; $iocDomains | Where-Object { $d -like "*$_*" } }
foreach ($d in $dns) { $report += [PSCustomObject]@{Type='DNSCacheIOC'; Detail="$($d.Entry) -> $($d.Data)"} }
# 3. ClickFix artifact: finger.exe execution evidence in prefetch
$prefetch = Get-ChildItem 'C:\Windows\Prefetch\FINGER.EXE-*.pf'
foreach ($p in $prefetch) { $report += [PSCustomObject]@{Type='ClickFixArtifact'; Detail="finger.exe prefetch: $($p.Name) ($($p.LastWriteTime))"} }
# 4. NetSupport RAT persistence artifacts (post-Lumma payload)
$nsPaths = @("$env:ProgramFiles\NetSupport","${env:ProgramFiles(x86)}\NetSupport","$env:AppData\NetSupport")
foreach ($p in $nsPaths) { if (Test-Path $p) { $report += [PSCustomObject]@{Type='NetSupportArtifact'; Detail=$p} } }
$runKeys = 'HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run',
'HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run'
foreach ($k in $runKeys) {
$vals = Get-ItemProperty $k
if ($vals -match 'netsupport|client32') { $report += [PSCustomObject]@{Type='PersistenceIOC'; Detail="$k contains NetSupport reference"} }
}
# 5. Scheduled tasks with suspicious LOLBin chains
$tasks = Get-ScheduledTask | Where-Object { $_.Actions.Execute -match 'finger|mshta|rundll32' -and $_.TaskPath -notlike '\Microsoft*' }
foreach ($t in $tasks) { $report += [PSCustomObject]@{Type='SuspiciousTask'; Detail="$($t.TaskName): $($t.Actions.Execute) $($t.Actions.Arguments)"} }
# 6. File hash sweep on common staging locations (Lumma / Good Game samples)
$iocHashes = @('b7dfd524b305f476eebf5fc05c4689ed105df44e66353b0d21212a2192c9c26c',
'16622bb8df60403217ccf8e326e2e9e718e01c85d7b52fe5c5e1cf44d62d25c8',
'5fcd3ff3c0a07651041eb79bd8b04aee37d6848f6b77bbad567b6fa9852215ff',
'035d396b3a329f59d680dc36a0a639eb7fb306bea97e42f5f53293dce817e8b7')
$scanDirs = @("$env:TEMP","$env:AppData","$env:LocalAppData\Temp","C:\Users\Public\Downloads")
foreach ($dir in $scanDirs) {
Get-ChildItem $dir -Recurse -File -Depth 2 | ForEach-Object {
$h = (Get-FileHash $_.FullName -Algorithm SHA256).Hash.ToLower()
if ($iocHashes -contains $h) { $report += [PSCustomObject]@{Type='HashMatch'; Detail="$($_.FullName) [$h]"} }
}
}
if ($report.Count -eq 0) { Write-Host "[-] No IOC matches found." -ForegroundColor Green }
else { $report | Format-Table -AutoSize; $report | Export-Csv ".\otx_hunt_$(Get-Date -Format 'yyyyMMdd_HHmm').csv" -NoTypeInformation }
Response Priorities
Immediate (0–4 hours):
- Block all IPv4 and domain IOCs at firewall, proxy, and DNS layers; sinkhole
sanaminfotech.onlineand the ClickFix staging domains. - Deploy the Sigma rules above to your SIEM and enable the
finger.exedetection — any hit is near-certain malicious. - Sweep endpoints for the provided SHA256 hashes via EDR; quarantine matches.
- Confirm no outbound connections to N0N infrastructure (185.157.161.148/93, 188.214.135.130) in the last 30 days of netflow.
Within 24 hours:
- Because every pulse in this set touches credential theft, initiate an identity verification cycle: force password resets for any user whose endpoint shows stealer indicators, revoke active sessions and refresh tokens, and audit for MFA fatigue anomalies.
- Check your organization against infostealer log marketplaces and the N0N leak site for exposed corporate credentials — N0N's entire model converts stolen creds into intrusions, typically within days of harvest.
- Review VPN, SSO, and SaaS login telemetry for impossible-travel and credential-stuffing patterns sourced from stealer logs.
- Alert help desk to social-engineering risk — N0N-style actors pair stolen AD mappings with targeted vishing.
Within 1 week:
- Harden the ClickFix vector: disable or restrict
finger.exe(AppLocker/WDAC), and deploy browser protections against copy-paste-to-terminal social engineering; brief staff that no legitimate CAPTCHA ever asks you to run a command. - Patch the edge: emergency-change CVE-2026-123890 (vCenter) and CVE-2026-102764 (BeyondTrust); ARMORY CASTLE is actively chaining them. Virtualization management planes must be isolated from general network access.
- Mobile estate: for any staff in India-adjacent operations, enforce Play-Protect-only app installs and MDM blocking of sideloaded APKs; audit for the Party panel APK hashes.
- Anti-extortion posture: verify DLP coverage on AD enumeration tools and bulk file staging, since N0N exfiltrates without encrypting — your only warning is the data leaving.
- Subscribe to the referenced OTX pulses for automated IOC refresh via TAXII into your detection stack.
Related Resources
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