INTERLOCK Ransomware Gang: Critical Infrastructure Surge — CVE-2026-50751 Analysis & Detection

---
title: Potential Check Point VPN IKEv1 Exploitation (CVE-2026-50751)
id: 9a8b7c6d-5e4f-3a2b-1c0d-9e8f7a6b5c4d
description: Detects potential exploitation attempts of CVE-2026-50751 involving improper authentication in IKEv1 key exchange on Check Point Gateways.
status: experimental
author: Security Arsenal
references:
    - https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog
date: 2026/07/17
tags:
    - attack.initial_access
    - cve.2026.50751
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: firewall
product: checkpoint
detection:
    selection:
        product|contains: 'VPN'
        action: 'decrypt' or 'key_install'
        ike_version: '1'
        src_ip|startswith:
            - '10.' # Placeholder for internal monitoring, adjust for external hunting
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate IKEv1 VPN connections from known legacy partners
level: high
---
title: ScreenConnect Path Traversal Authentication Bypass (CVE-2024-1708)
id: 1a2b3c4d-5e6f-7a8b-9c0d-1e2f3a4b5c6d
description: Detects suspicious path traversal patterns in ScreenConnect web logs indicative of authentication bypass.
status: experimental
author: Security Arsenal
references:
    - https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog
date: 2026/07/17
tags:
    - attack.initial_access
    - cve.2024.1708
    - ransomware.interlock
logsource:
    category: webserver
product: connectwise_screenconnect
detection:
    selection_uri:
        cs-uri-query|contains:
            - '../'
            - '%2e%2e'
            - 'AuthenticationService.aspx'
    selection_status:
        sc-status: 200
    condition: all of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Misconfigured proxies
level: critical
---
title: Interlock Ransomware Preparation - Volume Shadow Copy Deletion
id: 2b3c4d5e-6f7a-8b9c-0d1e-2f3a4b5c6d7e
description: Detects commands used to delete Volume Shadow Copies, a common precursor to Interlock encryption.
status: experimental
author: Security Arsenal
date: 2026/07/17
tags:
    - attack.impact
    - attack.t1485
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\vssadmin.exe'
        - Image|endswith: '\wmic.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'delete shadows'
            - 'shadowcopy delete'
    condition: all of selection*
falsepositives:
    - System administration scripts
level: high

// Hunt for Interlock lateral movement and staging indicators
// Looks for PsExec/WMI usage followed by archiving activity
let ProcessEvents = DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d);
let LateralMovement = ProcessEvents
| where FileName in~ ('psexec.exe', 'psexec64.exe', 'wmic.exe')
   or ProcessCommandLine has_any ('process call create', 'create remote');
let DataStaging = ProcessEvents
| where FileName in~ ('winrar.exe', '7z.exe', 'winzip.exe', 'tar.exe')
   or ProcessCommandLine has_any ('-a', '-m0', 'compress');
LateralMovement
| join kind=inner (DataStaging) on DeviceId, InitiatingProcessAccountName
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessAccountName, FolderPath
| order by Timestamp desc

<#
.SYNOPSIS
    Interlock Ransomware Triage Script
.DESCRIPTION
    Checks for signs of INTERLOCK activity: Scheduled tasks, VSS anomalies, and recent process execution.
#>

Write-Host "[*] Starting INTERLOCK Ransomware Triage..." -ForegroundColor Cyan

# 1. Check for recently created Scheduled Tasks (Common Persistence)
Write-Host "[+] Checking for Scheduled Tasks created in last 7 days..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
Get-ScheduledTask | Where-Object {
    $_.Date -gt (Get-Date).AddDays(-7)
} | Select-Object TaskName, Date, Author, Actions | Format-Table -AutoSize

# 2. Check for Volume Shadow Copy Manipulation
Write-Host "[+] Checking System Event Log for VSS Deletion events..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='System'; ProviderName='VSS'; StartTime=(Get-Date).AddHours(-24); Id=12345} -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | 
Select-Object TimeCreated, Message | Format-List

# 3. Check for Rclone/WinRAR in AppData (Common Staging)
Write-Host "[+] Scanning User AppData for archiving tools..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
Get-ChildItem -Path "C:\Users\*\AppData\Local" -Filter "rclone.exe" -Recurse -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
Get-ChildItem -Path "C:\Users\*\AppData\Local" -Filter "winrar.exe" -Recurse -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue

Write-Host "[*] Triage Complete. Review findings immediately." -ForegroundColor Cyan


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