INTERPOL 2026 Alert: Defending APAC Against Surge in Social Engineering & AI-Driven Scams

---
title: Suspicious PowerShell Encoding via Social Engineering Lure
id: 9a8b7c6d-5e4f-3a2b-1c0d-9e8f7a6b5c4d
status: experimental
description: Detects PowerShell processes often triggered by phishing documents, specifically looking for encoded commands used to bypass AI/ML filters.
references:
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001/
  - https://www.interpol.int/en/Crimes/Cybercrime
author: Security Arsenal
date: 2026/06/15
tags:
  - attack.execution
  - attack.t1059.001
  - attack.initial_access
  - attack.t1566.001
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection:
    Image|endswith:
      - '\powershell.exe'
      - '\pwsh.exe'
    CommandLine|contains:
      - 'FromBase64String'
      - 'EncodedCommand'
      - 'IEX '
  filter_legit:
    ParentImage|contains:
      - '\Windows\System32\'
      - '\Program Files\'
  condition: selection and not filter_legit
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate system administration scripts
level: high
---
title: Ransomware Precursor - Volume Shadow Copy Deletion
id: b1c2d3e4-5f6a-7b8c-9d0e-1f2a3b4c5d6e
status: experimental
description: Detects attempts to delete Volume Shadow Copies, a common step in encryption-based incidents to prevent recovery.
references:
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490/
author: Security Arsenal
date: 2026/06/15
tags:
  - attack.impact
  - attack.t1490
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection:
    Image|endswith:
      - '\vssadmin.exe'
      - '\wmic.exe'
    CommandLine|contains:
      - 'delete shadows'
      - 'shadowcopy delete'
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - System administrator backup maintenance
level: critical
---
title: AI-Generated Phish - Suspicious Child Process of Browser
id: c3d4e5f6-7a8b-9c0d-1e2f-3a4b5c6d7e8f
status: experimental
description: Detects suspicious processes spawned directly from web browsers, often indicative of a "drive-by" download or malicious link execution from AI-crafted phishing campaigns.
references:
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189/
author: Security Arsenal
date: 2026/06/15
tags:
  - attack.initial_access
  - attack.t1189
  - attack.execution
  - attack.t1204
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_parent:
    ParentImage|contains:
      - '\chrome.exe'
      - '\msedge.exe'
      - '\firefox.exe'
  selection_child:
    Image|endswith:
      - '\cmd.exe'
      - '\powershell.exe'
      - '\wscript.exe'
      - '\mshta.exe'
  condition: selection_parent and selection_child
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate browser-based file downloads initiated by user
level: medium


**KQL (Microsoft Sentinel / Defender)**

// Hunt for AI-driven Phishing precursors: Suspicious Office Macro Activity
// Looks for Office apps spawning PowerShell or cmd, a common vector in targeted APAC campaigns
let OfficeApps = dynamic(["winword.exe", "excel.exe", "powerpnt.exe", "outlook.exe"]);
let SuspiciousChilds = dynamic(["powershell.exe", "cmd.exe", "pwsh.exe", "cscript.exe", "wscript.exe"]);
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ OfficeApps
| where FileName in~ SuspiciousChilds
| where InitiatingProcessSHA256 != ProcessSHA256 // Ensure different process
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc


**Velociraptor VQL**

-- Hunt for Ransomware Indicators: Mass File Renaming or Extension Changes
-- Correlates file system changes with process execution to identify encryption activity
SELECT 
    Process.Name AS ProcessName,
    Process.Pid,
    Process.Cmdline,
    File.Path AS MFilePath,
    File.Size,
    File.Mtime
FROM foreach(
    SELECT Pid FROM pslist() WHERE Name =~ 'rundll32.exe' OR Name =~ 'powershell.exe',
    {
        SELECT * FROM glob(globs="\\C:\\Users\\*\\*.\*") 
        WHERE Mtime > now() - 5m
    }
)
LIMIT 50


**Remediation Script (PowerShell)**

# APAC Threat Hardening Script
# 1. Disable Macros from Internet
# 2. Enable PowerShell Script Block Logging
# 3. Disable WMI over network (Common lateral movement vector)

Write-Host "Applying Security Arsenal Hardening Guidelines..." -ForegroundColor Cyan

# Check/Set Macro Security Settings
$Path = "HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Outlook\Security"
if (-not (Test-Path $Path)) { New-Item -Path $Path -Force | Out-Null }
Set-ItemProperty -Path $Path -Name "EnableUnsafeClientMailRules" -Value 0 -Type DWord -Force
Set-ItemProperty -Path $Path -Name "MarkInternalAsUnsafe" -Value 0 -Type DWord -Force
Write-Host "[+] Hardened Outlook Macro Settings." -ForegroundColor Green

# Enable PowerShell Script Block Logging (Crucial for detecting obfuscated AI scripts)
$registryPath = "HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ScriptBlockLogging"
if (-not (Test-Path $registryPath)) { New-Item -Path $registryPath -Force | Out-Null }
Set-ItemProperty -Path $registryPath -Name "EnableScriptBlockLogging" -Value 1 -Type DWord -Force
Write-Host "[+] Enabled PowerShell ScriptBlock Logging." -ForegroundColor Green

# Disable WMI via Firewall (Block remote execution used in ransomware)
Try {
    Disable-NetFirewallRule -DisplayGroup "Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI)" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
    Write-Host "[+] Disabled WMI Firewall Rules." -ForegroundColor Green
} Catch {
    Write-Host "[-] WMI Firewall rules update skipped or already set." -ForegroundColor Yellow
}

Write-Host "Hardening Complete. Reboot recommended for full effect." -ForegroundColor Cyan