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Koktevrat Android RAT, Eclipse & Brain Cipher Ransomware: OTX Pulse Analysis — Enterprise Detection Pack

SA
Security Arsenal Team
November 19, 2026
9 min read

Threat Summary

Three concurrent pulses tracked in AlienVault OTX paint a picture of a threat landscape dominated by two operational modes: mobile-focused social engineering against consumer loyalty ecosystems, and mature ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) style operations conducting double extortion against enterprise networks.

Koktevrat is an Android RAT distributed through a fraudulent loyalty campaign impersonating Conad, a major Italian retail chain. Victims are lured to conad-plus[.]shop with promises of 10× miPREMIO loyalty points and induced to sideload a two-stage APK chain whose assets are RC4-encrypted. Once installed, the malware abuses Android Accessibility Services to deploy overlay attacks against banking and payment apps, exfiltrating credentials over a WebSocket-based C2 channel.

Eclipse (tracked as Nightmare Eclipse / Chaotic Eclipse / Dead Eclipse) is a rogue actor operating from Russian-geolocated infrastructure since April 2026. Unlike financially motivated ransomware crews, Eclipse conducts zero-day disclosure campaigns against Microsoft products — including exploitation of CVE-2026-50656 targeting Windows security subsystems — apparently driven by personal vendetta. Observed intrusion vectors include VPN gateway compromise and privilege escalation against enterprise networks spanning retail, healthcare, government, finance, and eight other verticals across eleven countries.

Brain Cipher is a financially motivated ransomware group active since the early 2020s that deploys a modified LockBit 3.0 builder. The group practices classic double extortion — data theft followed by encryption — with Monero ransom demands ranging from $150,000 to $8 million. Initial access relies on social engineering, zero-day exploitation, and network infiltration, with victims concentrated in healthcare, finance, manufacturing, and technology across North America and Europe.

Collectively, these pulses show adversaries converging on credential theft and data extortion as primary objectives, using both mobile and traditional enterprise attack surfaces.

Threat Actor / Malware Profile

Koktevrat (Android RAT)

  • Distribution: Phishing/smishing lures directing Italian users to a spoofed Conad loyalty site (conad-plus[.]shop) serving a fake "Conad Plus" app.
  • Payload behavior: Two-APK installation chain; second-stage operational code is RC4-encrypted inside app assets and decrypted at runtime. Performs overlay attacks against legitimate banking apps to harvest credentials and intercept session data.
  • C2 communication: Persistent WebSocket channel for real-time command execution, enabling live operator interaction (screen streaming, gesture injection, SMS interception).
  • Persistence mechanism: Android Accessibility Service abuse grants the malware the ability to self-grant permissions, survive uninstall attempts, and auto-relaunch.
  • Anti-analysis: RC4-encrypted assets defeat static APK analysis; dynamic code loading obscures the true payload until runtime.

Eclipse (Nightmare/Chaotic/Dead Eclipse)

  • Distribution: VPN gateway compromise and zero-day exploitation of Microsoft products (CVE-2026-50656).
  • Payload behavior: Targeting of Windows security subsystems for privilege escalation; destructive/disclosure-oriented operations rather than pure monetization.
  • C2 communication: Infrastructure observed on Tencent Cloud-hosted IP 1.116.130.98 over non-standard port 91 (https://1.116.130.98:91), consistent with adversary use of bulletproof or rented cloud VPS for staging.
  • Persistence mechanism: Privilege escalation within Windows environments enables service creation, scheduled tasks, and credential dumping for lateral movement.
  • Anti-analysis: Zero-day usage minimizes signature exposure; operations routed through Russian-geolocated and cloud-hosted infrastructure to complicate attribution.

Brain Cipher (LockBit 3.0 variant)

  • Distribution: Social engineering, zero-day exploitation, and direct network infiltration.
  • Payload behavior: Modified LockBit 3.0 ransomware binary performing rapid file encryption; paired with large-scale data exfiltration for double extortion via a dedicated leak site.
  • C2 communication: Exfiltration staging prior to encryption; ransom negotiation conducted in Monero to resist tracing.
  • Persistence mechanism: LockBit 3.0 lineage typically disables recovery (VSS deletion), terminates security services, and propagates via Group Policy and PsExec-style lateral movement.
  • Anti-analysis: LockBit 3.0 derivatives employ encrypted payloads, anti-debugging checks, and require command-line passcodes to execute the decryptor stage.

IOC Analysis

The indicator set across these pulses spans four operationally distinct types:

  • File hashes (SHA256/MD5): The bulk of indicators — Koktevrat APK hashes and Eclipse/Brain Cipher binary hashes. These are point-in-time artifacts; ransomware and APK samples are frequently repacked, so hashes should be treated as retrospective hunt material rather than forward-looking blocks. Feed them into your EDR's blocklist and run retro-hunts across 30–90 days of telemetry.
  • Hostnames/Domains: www.conad-plus[.]shop (Koktevrat distribution) and Brain Cipher victim/exfil-related domains (prosomnus.com, clinicaromero.com, cadorath.com). Block the Koktevrat domain at DNS and web proxy layers immediately; victim domains associated with ransomware pulses may indicate exfiltration staging or leak-site entries and warrant threat-hunt pivots rather than blanket blocking.
  • IPv4 + URL: 1.116.130.98 and https://1.116.130.98:91 — Eclipse C2/staging on Tencent Cloud. Non-standard port 91 with direct-IP TLS is a high-fidelity network detection: hunt proxy, firewall, and NetFlow logs for any egress to this IP regardless of port.
  • Mobile indicators: Koktevrat SHA256 hashes should be submitted to mobile threat defense (MTD) platforms and checked against VirusTotal/OTX for sample pivots.

Tooling for operationalization: OTX DirectConnect API or the OTXv2 Python SDK for automated IOC ingestion; MISP or OpenCTI for indicator management; Sigma rules converted via sigmac/pySigma to your SIEM dialect; MTD integration (Lookout, Zimperium, Microsoft Defender for Endpoint on Android) for mobile hash coverage.

Detection Engineering

YAML
---
title: Koktevrat Android RAT - Fake Conad Plus APK Installation and Distribution Domain
description: Detects network access to the Koktevrat distribution domain serving the fake Conad Plus Android loyalty app targeting Italian users.
status: experimental
logsource:
  category: proxy
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intel
date: 2026/11/19
tags:
  - attack.initial-access
  - attack.t1189
  - attack.command-and-control
  - attack.t1071.001
detection:
  selection_domain:
    c-uri|contains:
      - 'conad-plus.shop'
      - 'www.conad-plus.shop'
  condition: selection_domain
falsepositives:
  - Unlikely; domain is a known malicious impersonation of Conad retail brand
level: high
---
title: Eclipse Ransomware - C2 Communication to Tencent Cloud Staging Infrastructure
description: Detects network connections to Eclipse (Nightmare/Chaotic Eclipse) C2 and staging infrastructure, including direct-IP TLS on non-standard port 91.
status: experimental
logsource:
  category: network_connection
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intel
date: 2026/11/19
tags:
  - attack.command-and-control
  - attack.t1071
  - attack.t1571
detection:
  selection_ip:
    DestinationIp:
      - '1.116.130.98'
  selection_port:
    DestinationPort: 91
  condition: selection_ip or selection_port
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate Tencent Cloud customer traffic; investigate any hit in enterprise context
level: critical
---
title: Brain Cipher / LockBit 3.0 - Ransomware Execution and Recovery Destruction
description: Detects LockBit 3.0-derived ransomware behavior associated with Brain Cipher including shadow copy deletion, backup catalog removal, and boot status modification prior to encryption.
status: experimental
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intel
date: 2026/11/19
tags:
  - attack.impact
  - attack.t1490
  - attack.t1486
detection:
  selection_vssadmin:
    Image|endswith: '\vssadmin.exe'
    CommandLine|contains:
      - 'delete shadows'
      - 'resize shadowstorage'
  selection_wbadmin:
    Image|endswith: '\wbadmin.exe'
    CommandLine|contains:
      - 'delete catalog'
      - 'delete systemstatebackup'
  selection_bcdedit:
    Image|endswith: '\bcdedit.exe'
    CommandLine|contains:
      - 'recoveryenabled no'
      - 'ignoreallfailures'
  condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
  - Rare legitimate backup administration; correlate with encryption activity and unusual parent processes
level: critical
KQL — Microsoft Sentinel / Defender
// Hunt for Eclipse C2 traffic, Brain Cipher exfil staging, and Koktevrat domain resolution
let EclipseC2 = dynamic(["1.116.130.98"]);
let KoktevratDomains = dynamic(["conad-plus.shop", "www.conad-plus.shop"]);
let BrainCipherHashes = dynamic([
  "9c5698924d4d1881efaf88651a304cb3",
  "714b31629c37dee57038ca4e52ef65ac",
  "f94d17b5f232e9cfd2255ca9823cb18a",
  "8dbd57b042bc63b9ecdc9e3e5506ce85",
  "a0efa7fb6dff1e035510ec1f42e083e4"]);
union isfuzzy=true
  (DeviceNetworkEvents
  | where RemoteIP in (EclipseC2) or RemoteUrl has_any (KoktevratDomains)
  | project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, RemoteIP, RemotePort, RemoteUrl, ActionType),
  (DeviceFileEvents
  | where MD5 in (BrainCipherHashes) or SHA256 in~ (
      "670ff0f67f140db35e65b5a61ac504fa8975df6048cf15795a6a7dbe580636bb",
      "7f85522cb5f554c82df4a37937f2362c3e28af554ab8bfda7436ac968b1b806b",
      "21669e7c60f78a90c10c37b8c741e14efc0820c5e51725094dcb8b86767c6dca",
      "6ac3cc61aefeb0c6a4600e03c35f72ca702b3b297ec72d1d844f19db76b7db9a")
  | project Timestamp, DeviceName, FileName, FolderPath, MD5, SHA256, InitiatingProcessFileName),
  (DeviceProcessEvents
  | where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("delete shadows", "delete catalog", "recoveryenabled no", "ignoreallfailures")
  | project Timestamp, DeviceName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessAccountName)
| sort by Timestamp desc
PowerShell
# Security Arsenal IOC Hunt — Koktevrat / Eclipse / Brain Cipher
# Run elevated on Windows endpoints; reviews network, persistence, and recovery artifacts

Write-Host "[+] Checking for Eclipse C2 connections (1.116.130.98:91)..."
Get-NetTCPConnection | Where-Object { $_.RemoteAddress -eq "1.116.130.98" } |
    Select-Object LocalAddress, LocalPort, RemoteAddress, RemotePort, State, OwningProcess

Write-Host "[+] Reviewing DNS cache for Koktevrat distribution domain..."
Get-DnsClientCache | Where-Object { $_.Entry -match "conad-plus" } |
    Select-Object Entry, RecordType, Data

Write-Host "[+] Scanning running processes against Brain Cipher MD5 indicators..."
$BrainCipherMd5 = @(
    "9c5698924d4d1881efaf88651a304cb3",
    "714b31629c37dee57038ca4e52ef65ac",
    "f94d17b5f232e9cfd2255ca9823cb18a",
    "8dbd57b042bc63b9ecdc9e3e5506ce85",
    "a0efa7fb6dff1e035510ec1f42e083e4"
)
Get-Process | Where-Object { $_.Path } | ForEach-Object {
    try {
        $h = (Get-FileHash -Path $_.Path -Algorithm MD5 -ErrorAction Stop).Hash.ToLower()
        if ($BrainCipherMd5 -contains $h) {
            Write-Warning "MATCH: $($_.ProcessName) - $($_.Path) - $h"
        }
    } catch {}
}

Write-Host "[+] Checking shadow copy status (LockBit 3.0 lineage deletes VSS pre-encryption)..."
vssadmin list shadows 2>$null
Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='System'; Id=524} -MaxEvents 20 -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
    Select-Object TimeCreated, Message

Write-Host "[+] Auditing suspicious scheduled tasks and services (Eclipse persistence)..."
Get-ScheduledTask | Where-Object {
    $_.TaskPath -notlike "\Microsoft*" -and $_.State -eq "Ready"
} | Select-Object TaskName, TaskPath, @{N='Action';E={($_.Actions | ForEach-Object { $_.Execute }) -join '; '}}

Write-Host "[+] Checking firewall/proxy logs location reminder: hunt egress to port 91 and conad-plus[.]shop in perimeter telemetry."
Write-Host "[+] Hunt complete. Escalate any matches to IR immediately."

Response Priorities

Immediate (0–4 hours)

  • Block conad-plus[.]shop and www.conad-plus[.]shop at DNS resolver, secure web gateway, and email gateway layers; alert on any historical resolution.
  • Block all egress to 1.116.130.98 at the firewall and hunt NetFlow/proxy logs for past connections, especially on port 91.
  • Push all Koktevrat, Eclipse, and Brain Cipher file hashes into EDR blocklists and run retro-hunts across 30–90 days.
  • Inventory managed Android devices for sideloaded APKs; enforce MDM policies blocking installation from unknown sources.

24 Hours

  • If any Koktevrat hash or domain hit is confirmed: treat as credential compromise. Force password resets for affected users, revoke active sessions and tokens (especially banking/loyalty app sessions), and review for fraudulent loyalty point or payment activity.
  • For suspected Eclipse or Brain Cipher presence: verify VPN gateway patch levels, audit privileged account logons for anomalies, validate MFA enforcement on all remote access, and check for signs of data staging (large outbound transfers, compressed archives in temp directories).
  • Confirm CVE-2026-50656 patch status across the Windows fleet; prioritize internet-facing systems.

1 Week

  • Harden the attack vectors: deploy MTD on corporate Android fleets, restrict Accessibility Service grants to allowlisted apps, and disable sideloading enterprise-wide.
  • Implement application control (WDAC/AppLocker) to block unauthorized executables; enable tamper protection and cloud-delivered protection in EDR.
  • Segment networks to limit ransomware lateral movement; enforce least privilege and tiered admin models; test immutable/offline backups against a LockBit 3.0-style scenario.
  • Subscribe to OTX pulse feeds via DirectConnect for automated IOC ingestion into your SIEM/SOAR pipeline.

Related Resources

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